



**ABHIDHAMMA DEBATE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE
SELECTED POINTS OF CONTROVERSY BETWEEN THE
ABHIDHAMMATTHAVIBHĀVINĪṬĪKĀ AND THE
PARAMATTHADĪPANĪṬĪKĀ**

Ven. Visuddha

A Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of
the Requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
(Buddhist Studies)

Graduate School
Mahachulalongkornrajavidyalaya University
B.E. 2561/2018



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
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The Graduate School of Mahachulalongkornrajavidyalaya University has approved this dissertation entitled “Abhidhamma debate: A comparative study of the selected points of controversy between the “Abhidhammatthavibhāvinīṭikā and the Paramatthadīpanīṭikā” as a part of Education according to its curriculum of Doctor of Philosophy in Buddhist Studies

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Abstract

This dissertation entitled “*Abhidhamma* debate: A comparative study of selected points of controversy between the *Abhidhammatthavibhāvinīṭikā* and the *Paramatthadīpanīṭikā*” has four objectives: 1) to introduce *Abhidhamma* debate and related texts that contribute to the debate in Myanmar, 2) to comparatively study the different ways of explaining two dissenting *Abhidhamma* sub-commentaries, 3) to comprehend the nature of controversial points that had scarcely been touched in the field of Buddhist studies, and 4) to study scholars’ different opinions on the selected controversy points. Regardless of the well-known debate about the origin of *Abhidhamma*, here, the *Abhidhamma* debate refers to arguments between two *Abhidhamma* sub-commentaries, *Abhidhammatthavibhāvinīṭikā* and *Paramatthadīpanīṭikā*. Both *ṭikās* are commenting on the same root text, the *Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha*; all are henceforth referred to as *Vibhāvinī*, *Dīpanī* and *Saṅgaha* respectively. The *Saṅgaha* was written approximately in the eleventh century, the *Vibhāvinī* in the twelfth and the *Dīpanī* in the late nineteenth. Both *ṭikās* make an exposition on all nine chapters of the *Saṅgaha*. The *Dīpanī* criticizes the *Vibhāvinī* on 245 points in all nine chapters: (70) points in the compendium of consciousness (*cittasaṅgaha*), (12) points in the compendium of mental factors (*cetasikasaṅgaha*), (32) points in the compendium of miscellaneous (*pakiṇṇakasaṅgaha*), (26) points in the compendium of cognitive process

(*vīthisaṅgaha*), (34) points in the compendium of the process-freed (*vīthimuttasaṅgaha*), (29) points in the compendium of matter (*rūpasaṅgaha*), (20) points in the compendium of categories (*samuccayasaṅgaha*), (19) in the compendium of conditionality (*paccayasaṅgaha*) and (3) points in the compendium of meditation subjects (*kammaṭṭhānasaṅgaha*). These points are called here controversy points.

As for the first objective, it introduces the background and history of *Abhidhamma* debate, the cause of the debate and the contributing texts etc. As for the second objective, it studies the explanations (*saṃvaṇṇanā*) of two *Abhidhamma* sub-commentaries on the same root passage (*saṃvaṇṇetabba*) of *Saṅgaha*, with the help of their key texts, *Maṅḍisāramañjūsāṭīkā* for *Vinīṭīkā* and *Anudīpanīṭīkā* for *Dīpanī*. The second verse of *Saṅgaha* is chosen as root passage which mentions the four ultimate truths (*paramatthadhamma*) and contains (8) controversial points. As for the third objective, it explains the meaning of a statement of *Saṅgaha*, an exposition on the statement by the *Vibhāvinī* and the *Dīpanī* respectively and highlights the points on which the *Dīpanī* criticizes. Then, chapter four selects two controversial points and studies them comparatively, consulting with scholarly works which have contributed to the *Abhidhamma* debate. This is qualitative research entirely based on *Pāḷi* literature, such *Pāḷi* Cannon, the Commentaries, the Sub-commentaries, the *Pāḷi* key-texts, Myanmar *Nissayas* and so on.

The results of this research will benefit those who are interested in *Pāḷi* literature and *Abhidhamma* subjects because this research explores the clear picture of *Abhidhamma* debate, the controversy points, different opinions of scholars and the Roman transliteration and English translations of some selected passages from the texts which contributed to the debate. The suggestion made from this research shows that there are many problematic issues and many aspects of *Pāḷi* literature that are waiting for further research which is vitally important to preserve the *Theravāda* tradition.

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Ven. Visuddha

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List of Abbreviation

Abhidh-s	:	Abhidhammatthavibhāvinīṭikā
Abhidh-sṬ.	:	Abhidhammatthavibhāvinīṭikā
AnDP.	:	Anudīpanī
DA	:	Dīghanikāya Aṭṭhakathā
Dh	:	Dhammapada
Dhms.	:	Dhammasaṅgaṇī
DhsA.	:	Dhammasaṅgaṇī Aṭṭhakahtā
ItA	:	Itivutta Aṭṭhakathā
KvuA	:	Kathāvatthu Aṭṭhakathā
MAṬ	:	Majjhimanikāya Aṭṭhakathā Ṭikā
Maṇis.	:	Maṇisāramaṅjūsāṭikā
Nd ¹ .	:	Mahāniddeśa
Nett	:	Nettipakaraṇa
NettA	:	Nettipakaraṇa Aṭṭhakathā
PD.	:	Paramatthadīpanīṭikā
Patis.	:	Paṭisambhidāmaggaṇī
PpkMṬ.	:	Pañcapakaraṇa Mūlaṭikā.
PpkAnṬ	:	Pañcapakaraṇa Anuṭikā
S.	:	Samṃyuttanikāya
Vin	:	Vinayaṇī

Vism : Visuddhimagga

For example;

1) ItA II 41

ItA = Itivuttaka Aṭṭhakathā

II = Volum II

41 = Page number

2) PD. 20

PD = Paramatthadīpanīṭīkā

20 = Page number

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Chapter I

Introduction

1.1 Background and significant of the issue

The teaching of the Buddha is known as *Tipiṭaka* and preserved in high esteem in the *Theravāda* Buddhism. *Tipiṭaka* refers to three principal divisions, *Vinaya-Piṭaka*: disciplinary rules, *Suttapiṭaka*: discourses, and *Abhidhammapiṭaka*: higher teachings. The *Abhidhammapiṭaka* forms the third section of the *Tipiṭaka*. It has seven canonical texts. Each text has own exegetical text called *Aṭṭhakathā* (commentary). And in turn, each commentary has its own exegetical text called *Ṭīkā* (sub-commentary). There are two kinds of *Ṭīkā*: *Mūlaṭīkā* and *Anuṭīkā*. While the *Mūlaṭīkā* center upon *Abhidhamma* canonical texts, the *Anuṭīkā* gives definition on *Mūlaṭīkā*. The collection of works on the *Abhidhamma Piṭaka* is therefore extensive. With the purpose of contributing to *Abhidhamma* study, many scholars have composed numerous manuals of *Abhidhamma* since fifth century CE. There are ten short manuals of *Abhidhamma* recorded in *History of Piṭaka Literature*.¹ Among these, the *Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha* (referred to henceforth as the *Saṅgaha*), composed in approximately the twelfth century, is a popular text which is the most popular and dominates *Abhidhamma* studies as it enables students to grasp the essence of *Theravāda Abhidhamma*. In the form of the *Saṅgaha*, Ācariya Anuruddha, the text's author, attempted to extract the essence of the *Abhidhamma* and the commentarial works on it. He achieved this by condensing the canon of *Abhidhamma* texts into adequate summary hand book.

¹ U Yam, *History of Piṭaka Literature*, (Myanmar: Yangon, Hamsathavathi Publication, 1957), p. 121.

The *Saṅgaha* consists of nine chapters. It first lays down the four foundations of ultimate realities which permeate the entire *Abhidhamma* canonical texts except the fourth text, “*Puggalapaññatti*”. They are consciousness (*citta*), mental factors (*cetasika*), matter (*rūpa*) and *nibbāna*, which are covered in the first six chapters of the *Saṅgaha*. The last three chapters deal with salient points of the Buddha’s teachings such as the ‘Enlightenment factors (*bodhipakkhiyadhamma*), dependent origination (*paṭiccasamuppāda*), causal relationship (*paṭṭhāna*), and mental development (*kammaṭṭhāna*).

The Compendium of Consciousness (*cittasaṅgaha*), the first chapter, gives a detailed account of consciousness. First, consciousness is basically classified under four categories of consciousness in the sense-sphere (*kāmāvacaracitta*), the fine-material-sphere (*rūpāvacaracitta*), the immaterial-sphere (*arūpāvacaracitta*), and the category of Supramundane consciousness (*lokuttaracitta*). And then these are sub-divided into three ethical qualities of wholesome (*kusalacitta*), unwholesome (*akusalacitta*), and undetermined (*abyākatacitta*). And again, it enumerates certain types of consciousness belonging to each specific category in order. In this way, the *cittasaṅgaha* draws the conclusion that the maximum number of consciousness upon which the entire *Abhidhamma* canonical texts expatiate, are 89 or 121 only.

In the same way, Ācariya Anuruddha handles relevant topics of *Abhidhamma* in the rest eight chapters. Due to the purpose of summarizing enormous doctrines in a short and succinct manner, the *Saṅgaha* is extremely terse and incomprehensible to most students unless they are guided by competent teacher or they have ancillary commentary on it. The text is thus described figuratively as a little boat to cross the ocean of *Abhidhamma* literature. In consequence of its popularity in the Theravāda tradition, there is a large collection of ancillary *Ṭīkā* literature on the *Saṅgaha* both in Pāli and vernacular languages. There are nineteen Pāli

sub-commentaries on the *Saṅgha* recorded in *History of Piṭaka Literature*.² This project will focus on two of these.

The first is the “*Abhidhammatthavibhāvinīṭikā*” by Ācariya Sumaṅgalasāmi (referred to hereafter as the *Vibhāvinī*), written in the twelfth century in Sri Lanka. The author mentions the reason and the aids of composing the *Vibhāvinī* that although many old commentaries on the *Saṅgha* are available, none of them reveals the hidden meanings of every point in it. He therefore wrote the *Vibhāvinī* in order to explain this hidden meaning, and did so concisely, apparently finishing the work within in the space of twenty-four days.³ The *Vibhāvinī* is well known in Burma, under the names “*Ṭikāhla* (beautiful *ṭikā*) and *Ṭikākyaw* (famous *ṭikā*)”. The former was so named because its way of definition, of presentation, of constructing Pāli sentence etc., are beautiful. The later definition was changed allegedly due to exclamation that “the *ṭikā* makes me famous” by Ācariya Ariyavaṃsa who wrote a key text to the *Vibhāvinī* “*Maṇīsāramaṅjūsāṭikā*” after being been enlightened by the *Vibhāvinī*.⁴

Contradictory to Ācariya Ariyavaṃsa, Ledī Saydaw, a Burmese scholar-monk-(1846-1923), was not satisfied with some points of definition on the *Saṅgha* by the former sub-commentaries, especially the *Vibhāvinī*. He wrote a new Pāli sub-commentary on the *Saṅgha*, *Paramatthadīpanīṭikā* (referred to hereafter as the *Dīpanī*). He mentions that he was requested to write a sub-commentary on the *Saṅgha* by those who felt that the former sub-commentaries were not able to satisfy them. Taking what he regarded as essential from previous commentaries, he wrote a new sub-commentary on the *Saṅgha*. It seems to imply that while he takes essential interpretation, he will overtly turn down any interpretation if it is, to him, unnecessary or erroneous.

In the *Dīpanī*, Ledī Saydaw, although dealing with other commentarial texts, mentions three sub-commentaries by name: the

² U Yam, **History of Piṭaka Literature**, (Myanmar: Yangon, Hamsathavathi Publication, 1957), p. 125.

³ *Abhidh-sṬ*, 223

⁴ Yazathinkyam, **History of Buddhist lineage**, (Myanmar: Yangon, The Religious Affairs Dept, 2008), p.138

Abhidhammattha-saṅgahaporāṇaṭīkā (Porāṇaṭīkā), a sub-commentary on the *Saṅgaha* by Ācariya Navavimalabuddhi; the *Abhidhammattha-vibhāvinīṭīkā*, a sub-commentary on the *Saṅgaha* by Ācariya Sumaṅgalasāmi; and the *Paramatthamañjūsā* or *Visuddhimaggamahāṭīkā (mahāṭīkā)*, a sub-commentary on the *Visuddhimagga* by Ācariya Dhammapāla. Ledī Sayadaw analyzes and criticizes 245 points contained in those sub-commentaries, especially in the *Vibhāvinī*. He makes comprehensive exposition and he used to express the symbol phrases such as "*vibhāvanīyaṃ pana* (in the *Vibhāvanī*, however)" or "*ṭīkāsu pana* (in the sub-commentaries however) etc., when a notion in the *Vibhāvanī* and other is to be either rejected or supported. Most of the points are rejected and very few points are supported. The following sample sentences are used when a notion is to be rejected:

"*vibhāvaniyaṃ pana*: in the *Vibhāvinī* however."

"*taṃ na yujjati*: that is not proper."

"*taṃ sabbaṃ na paccetabbaṃ*: all of that should not be believed."

"*taṃ sabbaṃ na yuttaṃ*: all of that is not proper."

"*taṃ pi na sundaraṃ*: that is also not good."

"*taṃ paṭikkhittaṃ*: that is rejected."

"*sabbaṃ taṃ niratthakameva*: all of that is only vain."

"*taṃ akāraṇaṃ*: that is not a cause."

"*so duppāṭho*: that is bad word"

"*taṃ tathā na daṭṭhbaṃ*: that is accepted like that."

"*so idha nādhippeto*: that is here not desired."

"*taṃ aṭṭhakathāya na sameti*: that is not fit with commentary."

The following sentences are used when the notions are to be supported.

"*taṃ pāliyaṃ anāgatāpi yujjatiyeva*: even though not coming to the Pāli canon, that is indeed reasonable."

"*taṃ pi tena pariyāyena yujjatiyeva*: that is too reasonable in meaning of that formula."

"*taṃ pi yuttaṃ viya dissati*: that is also seem to proper."⁵

Because of such strong objectionable remark, the *Dīpanī* has become a popular text among scholars and those who fond of the *Vibhāvinī* have been frustrated by it. As a result, there was a great debate about these two *Abhidhamma* sub-commentaries. Some scholars wrote a book, an article, sub-commentary and other related documents. Within 35 years after printing the *Dīpanī* (1900-1935), over forty books, explanation, interpretation and sub-commentaries on the *Saṅgaha*, both in *Pāli* and Myanmar, had been written by the scholars, monks and laymen taking a firm stand on the side that they prefer. It is known as the great debate on the *Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha* in Myanmar. The debate is well-known as controversy between *Vibhāvinī* and *Dīpanī*.

In general observation on these two, the *Vibhāvinī* has its key commentary the *Maṇisāramañjūsāṭīkā* by Ariyavaṃsa, while the *Dīpanī* has its key commentary the *Paramatthaanudīpanī* by Ledī Sayadaw himself. In some sensitive case, the author of the *Vibhāvinī* mostly focuses on the *Abhidhamma-Anuṭīkā* by Ācariya *Dhammapāla*,⁶ whereas the author of the *Dīpanī* the *Abhidhamma-Mūlaṭīkā* by Ācariya *Ānandathera*.⁷ As the *Dīpanī* obviously states its disagreements, the *Vibhāvinī* also mentions its disagreements with prior commentaries in certain case such as "*keci pana imam atthaṃ asallakkhetvā va*:"⁸ some teachers, not having observed this particular meaning" "*keci pana cittassa thitikkhaṇaṃ paṭisedhenti*:"⁹ some teachers refuses a moment of the existence of consciousness". Based on these sub-commentaries, this dissertation will

⁵ PD: 1- 600

⁶ Abhidh-avṬ. II. 125: *Evañca katvā vuttaṃ ācariyadhammapāla-therena*.

⁷ PD. 190: *Ayaṃ ācariyānandattherassa adhippāyo*.

⁸ Abhid-sṬ. 115.

⁹ Abhid-sṬ. 138.

study the controversy points and related texts comparatively in five chapters.

Chapter one introduces the background history of *Abhidhamma* debate, *Abhidhamma* texts that were contributing to the debate, the objective of the research, the statement of the problems desired to know, literature reviews, definition of the term used in the research, research methodology, the advantage expected to obtain from this research etc.

Chapter two is to study different exposition by dissent two sub-commentaries on the same root passage. As for root passage, the second verse of *Saṅgaha* is chosen as it mentions the four ultimate truths (*paramatthadhamma*), consciousness (*citta*) mental factors (*cetasika*) matter (*rūpa*) and *nibbana*, that are fundamental factors of *Abhidhamma* doctrines. To understand the exposition of *Vibhāvinī* thoroughly, it is necessary to consult with *Maṇisāramañjūsātīkā*, the key text of *Vibhāvinī* and to understand the exposition of *Dīpanī* thoroughly, it is necessary to consult with *Anudīpanīṭīkā*, a key text of *Dīpanī*. Therefore, chapter two provides original *Pāli* texts and their respective translation of two sub-commentaries. It explains the expositions of two *ṭīkā*s in simple way with the help of their key texts, giving respective *Pāli* passage as footnotes.

Chapter three is to study the perspective of controversy points. The controversy points are 245, all in all, in nine chapters: (70) points in compendium of consciousness (*cittasaṅgaha*), (12) points in compendium of mental factors (*cetasikaṅgaha*), (32) points in compendium of miscellaneous (*pakiṇṇakasaṅgaha*), (26) points in cognitive process (*vīthisaṅgaha*), (34) points in compendium of the process-freed (*vīthimuttasaṅgaha*), (29) points in compendium of matter (*rūpasaṅgaha*), (20) points in compendium of categories (*samuccayasāṅgaha*), (19) in compendium of conditionality (*paccayasāṅgaha*) and (3) points in compendium of meditation subjects (*kammaṭṭhānasaṅgaha*). It is huge task to explain the meaning of all the points. Therefore, (70) controversy points in compendium of consciousness (*cittasaṅgaha*) are chosen as being first chapter and two *ṭīkā*s would show off their masterpiece at the beginning. The chapter explains the meaning of controversy points in simple way and provides original *Pāli* texts that are corresponding to the controversy points

as footnote because it is hard to find the corresponding *Pāli* passages out of vast passages of sub-commentaries.

Chapter four is to study comparatively the selected points of controversy consulting with the texts that were contributing to the Debate and other *Pāli* literatures such as *Pāli* Cannon, commentaries and sub-commentaries, *Gaṇṭhi*, *Nissaya* and so on. For the purpose, two controversy points are chosen: (1) demonstrative meaning of the word “*tattha*” and (2) formal definition (*viggaha*) of the word “*nibbana*” because these points include in second verse that is explained in detail in chapter two. So, the readers can access the original meaning of two commentaries and the explanation of their key texts. Furthermore, the researcher tries to choose two points, one point he supports to *Vibhāvinī* and another to *Dīpanī*.

Chapter five is conclusion with suggestion for further research regarding this subject. There are two appendixes. Appendix I provides the table of (70) controversy points that are explained in chapter three side by side so that the reader easily understands the theme of controversy points. Appendix II provides Roman scripts transliteration and English translation of selected passages of the *Abhidhamma* texts which contribute to the debate and are used as reference in chapter four. The researcher of this dissertation hopes for that this dissertation will contribute to the field of Buddhist studies, especially to the studies of *Pāli* literature in some way.

1.2 Objective of the Research

1.2.1 To introduce the development of *Abhidhamma* literature and *Abhidhamma* debate in Myanmar.

1.2.2 To study comparatively the exposition of two dissents *Abhidhamma* sub-commentaries.

1.2.3 To study the perspective of controversy points between two *Abhidhamma* sub-commentaries, *Vibhāvinī* and *Dīpanī*.

1.2.4 To study comparatively selected points of controversy and different view of different scholars on the points.

1.3 Statement of problems desired to know

1.3.1 What has been the impact of Ledī Sayadaw’s critique of the former commentaries and sub-commentaries in Myanmar?

1.3.2 What is the nature of commentarial literature and how do they common on certain words or phrases or sentences in their own way?

1.3.3 What is the perspective of controversy points: grammatical, doctrinal, logical or philosophical and so on?

1.4 Scope of the research

This research intends to explore the commentarial traditions and concepts that have been carried by Theravāda Pāḷi scholars from generation to generation. The Commentarial traditions and concepts are complex and profound. Without guidance by competent teachers, it is hard to understand the way of approach traditionally to Pāḷi literature. With purpose of the preservation of commentarial traditions and concepts, this dissertation studies controversy points between two Abhidhamma sub-commentaries. It is certainly Pāḷi textual studies. Therefore, this research entirely bases on the *Pāḷi* literature: *Pāḷi* Canon, Early Post-Canonical texts, Later Post-Canonical texts, Commentaries, Sub-commentaries, later *Abhidhamma* texts and Myanmar *Nissaya*, Translation and other scholarly works that are related to this subject.

1.5 Definitions of the terms used in the Research

Pāḷi : It is a literary language of the Prakrit language family. It is regarded as Sacred language of *Theravāda* Buddhism and was first written down in Sri Lanka in the first century BCE.

Tipiṭaka (Pāli Canon): (ti- three + piṭka - baskets): It is the collection of primary Pāli language texts which form the doctrinal foundation of Theravāda Buddhism, in reference to the three principal divisions of the Teachings by the Buddha and his disciples.

Aṭṭhakathā (commentary): It is exegetical text to the Pāli canons. These commentaries give the traditional interpretations of the scriptures. The major commentaries were based on earlier ones, now lost, in Pakrit, which were written down at the same time as the Canon, in the last century BCE.

Ṭīkā (Sub-commentary): It is primarily sub-commentary on the commentary. This literature continues the commentaries' developments of the traditional interpretation of the scriptures.

Viggaha (Vigyo): It is way of resolution or definition or interpretation of words according to their elements.

Samvaṇṇetabba (Lemma): A word or phrase defined in a commentary or sub-commentary.

Samvaṇṇanā: A definition or explanation to Lemma.

Nissaya: Myanmar word-by-word translation with annotation.

Upacārattha: A metaphor or a meaning that is explained figuratively. It is opposite to *mukkyattha*.

Mukkyattha: definitive meaning. It is opposite to *upacārattha*.

Pariyāya: alternative way of definition. It is opposite to *nipariyāya*.

Nipariyāya: definitive way of definition. It is opposite to *pariyāya*.

Padhānattha: major meaning of a word. For example, rañño putto rājaputto: a son of a king, in this word, the king is minor meaning, *apadhānattha*. The son is major meaning, *padhānattha*.

Appadhānattha: minor meaning of a word.

1.6 Review of the literature and Research works concerned

Ledi Sayadaw's critiques generated intensive controversy and resulted in numerous scholarly works, articles, books, sub-commentaries, arguing with each other in Myanmar. Within 35 years after printing the *Dipani* (1900-1935), over forty books, explanation, interpretation and sub-commentaries on the *Saṅgaha*, both in *Pāli* and Myanmar, had been written by the scholars, monks and laymen taking a firm stand on the side that they prefer. It is known as the great debate on the *Abhidhamma* in Myanmar. Among these works some books, articles and papers etc., which took part of either side, were forever lost as poor maintenance and political circumstance in Myanmar. Some books which are still available to the date will be briefly introduced.

1.6.1 *Aṅkuraṭṭikā*

Aṅkuraṭṭikā is a *Pāli* text written by *Sayadaw Vimalābhivamsālankāra*, living in Nay Ying village, Pakhangyi township, at Saka era 1271 (1909 AD), printed at Pyigyimandain press house, Yangon, revised by *Pāli* teacher Saya Pyay. Its full name is “*Aṅkuraṭṭikā or Thingyo Mahāṭṭikāthitpat*”. It contains 442 pages. It is regarded as fifth Sub-commentary on the *Saṅgaha* in other texts such as the Decree-*ṭṭikā*. The *Aṅkuraṭṭikā* is a text which defending for *Vibhāvinī*. The author was famous and well-known as *Talinegone Sayaday* and he wrote many books in both languages, *Pāli* and Myanmar. He mentioned his scholarly works in the conclusion of *Aṅkuraṭṭikā*. The scholarly works are as follow;

1. *Atulaṭṭikāpāli*: Sub-commentary on *Aṭṭhasālinī-aṭṭhakathā*
2. *Vinayabuddhiṭṭikāpāli*: Sub-commentary on *Kaṅkhā-vitaraṇāṭṭhakathā*
3. *Saddatthabhedacintāmahāṭṭikāpāli*: Commentary on *Saddattha-bhedacintā*
4. *Atthanīṭṭipāli*: grammatical work,
5. *Kaviviyapāli*: grammatical work and
6. *Saddabherīpāli*: grammatical work.

7. *Kavicandra*:
8. *Candālaṅkāra*:
9. *Maṅgalākyawkhaung* poem and
10. Its answer (*Maṅgalākyawkhang* poem's answer)

1.6.2 *Paramatthavisodhanīṭkā Thit Pāḷi*

The *Paramatthavisodhanīṭkā Thit Pāḷi* is a new *Pāḷi* text, written by *Dhammāruṃ Sayadaw U Dīpamālā*, living in Chaung Oo Township, Sagain, at Saka era 1271 (1909 AD), printed at *Sāsanālaṅkāra Pitakat* press house, Yangon, revised by Pāḷi Scholar Saya Tin. It contains 146 pages. Though the name of the author is shown as “*U Dīpamālā*” on the book cover, it is shown the author's name as “*Dīpālāṅkārathera*” in concluded verse. This text focused on the points criticized by the *Dīpanī* and defends and supports the notions of *Vibhāvinī*. The author mentioned the text's position thus:

Idaṅcame paramatthavisodhanippakaraṇaṃ paramattha-dīpaniyaṃ āgataviruddhavādaṃ visodhessati. Imasmiṃ pana pakaraṇe maṅṣāramaṅjūsā sukhuccāraṇatthaṃ vitthāraṭṭikāti daṭṭhabbāti.

This *Paramatthavisodhani* text will defend the points criticized (by *Ledi Sayadaw*) in the *Paramatthadīpanī*. In this text, *Maṅṣāramaṅjūsāṭṭikā* should be known as “*Vitthāraṭṭikā*” for the sake of easy-saying.

*Dīpālāṅkāratherena gaṇavācakahūtena
Disāsu āgatānampi sissānaṃ pariyattiṅca.
Divasaṃ vācakaṃ kātvā antarantarakālaṃva
Vihitā vaṇṇanāsāyaṃ paramatthavisodadhanī.
Anāyāsena niṭṭhāva sattānampi tathevete
Susaṅkappā nisesena niṭṭhāpentu sadākālaṃ.*

As the *Paramatthavisodhanī*, by *Dīpaṅkarathera*, teacher who teaches pupils coming from different direction, having taught daytime, compiling on the time between, completed without

dangerous, likewise good thoughts of beings may come to complete forever without lacking anything.

1.6.3 *Abhidhammattha-Anuvibhāvinī*

Abhidhammattha-anuvibhāvinī is a *Pāli* text, written by Sayadaw Sāgarābhidhaja, living in Pubbārāma monastery, Bagu village, Khayan township, at Saka Era 1272, 1910 AD. Though complete text was written, first two chapters became printed book at *Sāsanālaṅkāra Pitakat* press house, Yangon and the rests still remain as unprinted book. The text is exegesis of *Vibhāvinī* and obviously stands against with *Dīpanī* and supports the notion *Vibhāvinī*.

*Vibhāvanissa bhūtatthaṃ racitā nadīpanī
Pahāya yātigambhīraṃ micchāñāṇena ācitā*

Appassute hyanekehi avassantehi thomitā

Taṃ taṃ gantvāna viññūnaṃ dassanathāya sādhukaṃ

*Uddharitvāna tassatthaṃ micchāsallaṃ mahāmuhaṃ
Samāsato pavakkhāmi bhāvanīyassa vaṇṇanaṃ. (Nidāna)*

Rejecting profound and accurate meaning of *Vibhāvinī*, new *Dīpanī* is written with the knowledge that is wrongly accumulated, and it is praised by many with little and impractical knowledge.

Having removed its meaning which is spike of untruth and huge delusion, I will write a commentary on *Vibhāvinī* in brief righteously taking citation of the related texts so that the wise men could read.

1.6.4 *Atisundaraṃkyam*

Atisundaraṃkyam is Myanmar text, written by U Nat Thar, living in Yangon, printed at *Sāsanālaṅkāra Pīṭakā* press house, 1910 AD. It contains 403 pages but not includes the last chapter,

Kammaṭṭhānapariccheda. The text was written with the purpose of standing against with *Paramatthadīpanī* and supports the notion of *Abhidhammatthavibhāvinī-ṭīkā*. U Nat Thar is pen name and he is ex-monk, the name of Monkhood is *U Nāginda*, and given name is U Tun Aye. The author apparently attacks the *Dīpani*. The name of the text “Atisundara” is given as opposite usage of what the *Dīpanī* frequently use in the text “*taṃ na sundaraṃ*”. It means that whatever the *Dīpani* said not good, is very good. The author wrote another book “*Ukkaṃvaṃsa Jāgariya Kyam*” which is abusing Ledī Sayadaw without connecting any point in the *Dīpanī*.

1.6.5 *Abhidhammatthavibhāvinīyojanā*

This *Abhidhammatthavibhāvinīyojanā* is a *Pāli* text, written by *Sayadaw Ashin Nānindāsabha*, living in *Hmankyawng, Shwekyin* temple, Bahan township, Yangon, at Saka era 1281 (1919 AD), printed at Pyigyimandain press house, Yangon, revised by *Ashin Ādiccavaṃsa*, Senior disciple of the author. It contains 774 pages. The word “*yojanā*” means “paraphrases”. Therefore, this text is the paraphrases of *Vibhāvinī*. The printed book is well arranged by his disciple. There are two parts on every page of the texts, the above is the text of *Vibhāvinī* and the beneath is the text of *Yojanā* which is the definition of above texts thereof.

Ashin Setṭhila, another senior disciple of author wrote introduction of the *Yojanā* in *Pāli* which take space of seven pages. He mentioned “*pakaraṇanidāna*” the cause of the text that the author was requested not only by many disciples but also by respected monk, the abbot of *Mahādhammadīpikārāma* monastery in Yangon, to write new sub-commentary on *Vibhāvinī* because the *Vibhāvinī* is very useful and its key text, the *Maṇisāramañjūsā* is extensive. The abbot advised the author to write *Yojanā* with two purposes, to explain the nature of *Abhidhamma* and to show the nature of *Pāli* composition. Then the time was that when there is extensive controversy about *Vibhāvinī* in Myanmar.

Ajjhiṭṭhaṃ sissa saṅghassa. Mahā therassa patthitaṃ.

Sāsanamhi vivādañca. Paccesā vaṇṇanā kata.

This explanation text was done due to the desirous of disciple monks, inspiration of senior monk and controversy in *Sāsana*.

1.6.6 *Anudīpanī*

The *Anudīpanī* was written by *Ledī Sayadaw*, Moneywar, 1920 AD, printed at *Haṃsāvati* press house, Mandalay, contains 324 pages. *Pathamakyaw U Ṇāṇa*, the author's senior disciple wrote introduction in *Pāli*, saying the cause of appearance of the *Anudīpanī* that: The *Anudīpanī* came to appear as a key text of the *Dīpanī* because of that after the *Dīpanī* had been printed, it was getting famous quickly and wildly spread to four directions, not only local but also overseas such as Sri Lanka, Landon etc. *Ledī Sayadaw* thought that the *Dīpanī* will not be difficult for Myanmar students as there is *Nissaya* by his senior disciple, but for foreigners the *Nissaya* could not help them. Therefore, *Ledī Sayadaw* wrote a key text of the *Dīpanī*.

Paramatthadīpanīnāma yena therena sā katā
Teneve sā kata hoti ayam tassānudīpanī.
Aṭṭhasattadvayekamhi sake sā jetṭhamāsake
Kāḷe navamiyam diva majjhanhike niṭṭham gatā. (nigamana)

The *Thera* himself, by whom the *Dīpanī* was created, had created it's a key text, this *Anudīpanī*. It came to complete at afternoon on 9th over full moon day of month "Nayun", (approximately June-July), Saka Era 1278. (1916, AD).

1.6.7 Ming Khing Ṭikākyaw-Gaṇṭhi-Thit

Ming Khing Ṭikākyaw-Gaṇṭhi-Thit is a Myanmar commentary text, written by Second *Ming Khing Sayadaw Bhaddanta Vicārinda*, living in Mong Ywa town, but while compiling this text, he was in Sagain for pursuing seclusion, printed at Saka Era 1282 (1920AD) at *Paññāsippam Pitakat* press house, revised by Pāli Scholar Sayar U Boe Thwe. The author explains detail meaning of the *Vibhāvinī* in Myanmar language, obviously

stands against with the *Dīpanī* and supports the notion of the *Vibhāvinī*. He analyzes all the points from both *ṭikās*, numbering on each point exactly.

The author said that there are wrong points in both *ṭikās*, but very few in the *Vibhāvinī* and more in the *Dīpanī*. The eighteen points are wrong in the *Vibhāvinī*. Among that, nine points are caused by careless-writing and nine points are cause by wrong-notion as the *Dīpanī* accused. The three hundred and twenty-five points are wrong in the *Dīpanī*. Among those, ninety-seven points are cause by careless-writing and two hundred and twenty-eight points are cause by wrong-notion.

According to the author's conclusion, the *Dīpanī*'s accusation points are two hundred and forty-six. Out of them, only eighteen points are wrong as its accusation and the rest two hundred and twenty-eight points are not wrong but wrong-accusation and the *Dīpanī* itself has ninety-seven careless-writing points. Therefore, three hundred and twenty-five points are in the *Dīpanī* which has been badly done by the Ledīsayādaw. The author wrote these points sentence by sentence in Myanmar as follow:

In the *Vibhāvinī*, nine careless-writing points are found.

In the *Dīpanī*, however, ninety-seven careless-writing points are found.

In that *Dīpanī*, among accusation points to the *Vibhāvinī*, 46th, 47th, 58th, 59th, 73th, 145th, 146th, 147th, these nine points seem to be right-accusation.

The rest 228 points in the *Dīpanī*, which are marked with number, two hundred twenty-eight points are merely badly wrong-accusations.

Therefore, ninety-seven careless-writing points and two hundred and twenty-eight wrong-accusation points are in the *Dīpanī*.

1.6.8 *Mahāatulaṭṭikā*

The *Mahāatulaṭṭikā* is a Pāli text, written by Sayadaw Nāgindasāmithera, living in *Moenyo* township, *Sāyāvati* district, at Saka Era 1286 (1924 AD) printed at Sāsanālaṅkāra Pitakat press house, Yangon, revised by Pāḷi Scholar Saya Phayay and contains 598 pages. The text obviously stands against with the *Dīpanī* and supports the notion of the *Vibhāvinī*. It mentioned the nature of the text and affiliated text in the conclusion thus:

*Yathā lokamhi jotenti ubho candimasūriyā
Tatheva paramatthesu mahāatulaṭṭikāca.*

*Gambhīsāratthasampunṇaṃ paramatthavisodhanī
Ubho lokamhi jotentu saddhammo yāva tiṭṭhati.¹⁰*

As both, the moon and the Sun, shine in the world, so too, the field of *Paramattha*, both, *Mahāatulaṭṭikā* and *Paramatthavisodhanī* which is full of profound meaning, may shine in the world as long as the noble doctrines exit.

*Mahāatulaṭṭikācāti paramatthadīpaniyaṃ āgataviruddavādaṃ
tatha tatha samabhāvaṃ dissanato sāravinicchayehi visodhitaṃ
katvā racitā nāgindasāmi mahātherena racitā mahāatulaṭṭikāca.
Paramatthavisodhanīti tathā sabbākārena visodhitaṃ katvā vihitā
dīpamālā mahātherena racitā paramatthavisodhanīṭṭikā ca daṭṭhabbā.
(nigamana)*

The *Mahāatulaṭṭikā* is that which is created by Nāgindamahāthera having removed the false notion of *Dīpanī* by the essential judgment due to seeing fitness with specific texts. The *Paramatthavisodhanī* is known as that which is created by Dīpamālāthera, having removed by all means like the previous text.

¹⁰ Bhaddanta Nāgindasāmithera, **Mahāatula-ṭṭikā**, (Yangon: Sāsanālaṅkāra Pitakat press house, 1924), p. 595.

1.6.9 Degree-*ṭīkā*

The Decree-*ṭīkā* is a *Pāli* commentary, written by *Sayadaw U Sāsana*, living in Sainkhaung monastery, Pinn Township, printed at Yatanasiddhi Piṭaka press house 1934 AD, 500 copies, compiled by *U Ghosita*. It contains 149 pages and word correction as appendix. The author was a learned monk and had many followers in his time. At the present, the Pinn Township is a remote village and the monastery is also quite and unknown. The author's profile is rather low and no other scholarly works of his remain. Only the Decree *ṭīkā* might be considered as the masterpiece of this author. The Decree-*ṭīkā* is a *Pāli* text, however an introduction is written in two languages, Myanmar and Pāli. In the introduction, the author uses similes to display his view regarding the controversy on the *Saṅgaha*. He states that the seven treaties of *Abhidhamma* are similar to seven big woodlands created by the *Buddha*. The *Saṅgaha* is similar to Small Park which looks like a guide to or a model for the seven big woodlands, and this was created by *Ācariya Anuruddha*. The five commentators are similar to five gardeners who intend to take hold of taxes of honoring, appreciation etc., by the students who study *Saṅgaha*. The five commentators wrote five sub-commentaries on the *Saṅgaha*. The Decree-*ṭīkā* analyses those five commentaries as follow:

The first commentator wrote a sub-commentary on the *Saṅgaha* giving traditional concepts and definition of *Abhidhamma*, a corpus that is preserved and hand down from generation to generation. It refers to the *Abhidhammatthaporāṇaṭīkā*. The second was not satisfied with it and wrote a sub-commentary on the *Saṅgaha* adding various ways of definitions such as grammatical explanation, catechetical explanation, and citation of several references. It refers to the *Vibhāvinī*. Again, a third master wrote another sub-commentary on the *Saṅgaha* with some more explanation which is excluded in first two texts. It refers to *Visuddhimaggamahā-ṭīkā*. Again, the forth said that the various ways of definition by the former three sub-commentaries did not meet the perception of *Abhidhamma* traditionally accepted by elder monks and there was much deviation from the concepts of *Pāli* cannon and commentaries.

He therefore wrote a new sub-commentary on the *Saṅgaha*, which has the title *Paramatthadīpanī*. It is written with his own style, using much materials i.e. example, reasoning, illustration, concrete reference and so on. Again, the fifth was indignant at aggressive remark upon the second made by the forth. He wrote a new sub-commentary on the *Saṅgaha* defending the second and repudiating the forth. Meanwhile he also took hold of taxes of appreciation, honoring etc., by the consumers of students. There was a big disagreement among these five sub-commentators. The first and the third ignored these arguments. The second and the forth, the fourth and the fifth were getting into direct arguments, quoting explicitly from the predecessors they intended to refute.

Ordinary students could not assume whose description was to be counted as legitimate and authoritative. The author of the Decree-*ṭīkā* was requested by his disciple to make judgment in the contention. Therefore, the author wrote this text by the name of *Vivādādhikaraṇavinicchayatīkā* or the Decree-*ṭīkā*. He mentioned his purpose of writing the text in *Pāli* verse thus;

Tesaṃ taṃ vivadantānaṃ samathāyādhikaraṇaṃ

Navassānāgatatthañ ca karissāmi vinicchayaṃ

I am going write a judgment in order to settle the dispute of those who are quarreling and in order to prevent the appearance of a new argumentative person in the future.

In the texts, the author indicates controversy points by number. There are 263¹¹ points out of 270 in the Decree *ṭīkā* on which he made a decision. The author used to say decree in each of conclusion such as *Tasmā catuttho va jeyatu tass' eva santakaṃ hotu. Dutiya pañcamā parājentu ti*, therefore let the forth conquer, the fact belongs to the forth. Let the second and the fifth be defeated. *Tasmā sabbesam pi jayyaparājayo n' atthi. Sabbe samasamā hontū ti*: therefore, there is neither conqueror nor loser. They are equal.

¹¹ U Sāsana, **Decree ṭīkā**, (Yangon: Yatanasiddhi Piṭaka press house, 1934), p. 149.

1.6.10 The *Pāli* literature of Burma:

This book is written by Mabel Haynes Bode. Printed and published by the Royal Asiatic Society, London, 1909. In this book, Mrs. Bode wrote general observation of the *Pāli* literature of Burma. She begins with the arrival of the *Pāli* Tipitaka to Burma and concludes with a glance at the literature of the era of the printing-press. Her work is helpful to the scholars in the field of Buddhist literature in some way. Mr Shwe Zan Aung gave a review on her book that "At first sight it would appear that the learned authoress gave greater prominence to grammarians than to our philosophers; but after a careful reading, I came to the conclusion that she left very little to be desired".¹² In the regard to subject-matter of this dissertation, she gives little information about the *Vibhāvinī* and related story of Ariyavaṃsa but scarcely mentions about *Dīpanī* when she lists Ledī Sayadaw's works.

1.6.11 *Abhidhamma* Literature in Burma:

This book is written by Shwe Zan Aung. Printed and published by *Pāli* Text Society, 1910-1912. Mr. Shwe Zan Aung wrote this paper to offer more detail account of *Abhidhamma* literature than Mrs. Bode did as she leaved Burmese works. In this paper, he introduced the *Abhidhamma* books studied by eminent Thera of Burma and written by Burmese scholars in *Pāli* and Burmese language. His work is helpful to scholars in field of *Abhidhamma* studies. But as he admitted, hurried survey of the *Abhidhamma* literature could not draw whole picture of Burma's *Abhidhamma* studies. In the regard to the subject-matter of this dissertation, he gave, as a tiny part of long series of *Abhidhamma*, an intimation of the debate. He remarked that the *Dīpanī* has not yet gained the popularity it deserves.

¹² Shwe Zan Aung, *Abhidhamma literature in Burma*, (JPTS, 1910-1912), p. 112.

1.6.12 Ledi Sayadaw, *Abhidhamma*, and the Development of the Modern Insight Meditation Movement in Burma

This book is written by Erik Christopher Braun, A Doctoral Thesis Submitted to Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2008. It is an intellectual biography of Ledī Sayadaw. Its argument is that the strong tradition of *Abhidhamma* study in Burma determined Ledi's understanding of meditation. According to his title and argument, the author tries to reveal full account of Ledī Sayadaw's life, events, activities, experiences, contributions etc., He emphasize on Ledi Sayadaw's contribution to *Abhidhamma* literature and meditation technique. In the regard to the subject-matter of this dissertation, he describes broad range of the *Abhidhamma* debate and put much effort to numerous controversial points giving explanation of both sides. This dissertation will surely consult with this thesis. The point is that this thesis gives two explanations of both sides but doesn't study comparatively.

1.6.13 *Paramatthadīpanī* (An Exposition of the True Meaning)

It is an English translation of *Dīpanī* By Ashin Nandamālābhivaṃsa. It is master's degree thesis submitted to Postgraduate Institute of *Pāli* and Buddhist Studies, University of Kelaniya, Sri Lank. It has translated four chapters out of nine, up to *Vīthipariccheda* and not yet published.

1.6.14 *Paramatthadīpanī*-Manmarpyan:

It is a Myanmar translation of *Dīpanī* by Ledī Ashin Kelāsa, one of distinguished pupil of Ledī Sayadaw, Published by Burma Publisher, Yangon, Myanmar, 1992. It has translated seven chapters out of nine, up to *Rūpapariccheda*.

1.7 Method of Research

1.7.1 Collecting the data and related texts about the development of *Abhidhamma* literature and *Abhidhamma* debate.

1.7.2 Selecting specific portion of expositions of two *Abhidhamma* sub-commentaries.

1.7.3 Simplifying and paraphrasing the meaning of expositions of two *Abhidhamma* sub-commentaries with the help of two key sub-commentarial texts.

1.7.4 Comparing different expositions of two *Abhidhamma* sub-commentaries

1.7.5 Analyzing and explaining the controversy points that contained in selected portions.

1.7.6 Studying comparatively the selected points and Consulting with related texts that are contributing to *Abhidhamma* debate

1.7.7 Making conclusion for selected controversy points from the point of view of this dissertation.

1.7.8 providing necessary material as Appendix that support to respective chapters.

1.8 Advantages of Research Expected to Obtain

1.8.1 To be able to understand clearly the development of *Abhidhamma* literature in Myanmar.

1.8.2 To be able to see the clear picture of *Abhidhamma* debate in Myanmar.

1.8.3 To be able to understand the nature of *Pāli* commentarial literature.

1.8.4 To be able to understand the aspects of controversy points between two *Abhidhamma* sub-commentaries.

1.8.5 To be able to understand the attitudes of *Abhidhadhamma* scholars who were contributing to the *Abhidhamma* debate.

Chapter II

A Comparative Study of the exposition of the *Abhidhammatthavibhāvinītikā* and the *Paramatthadīpanītikā*

2. 1 Introduction

Anuruddha Mahāthera composes *Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha* systematically. At the beginning of the texts, he composes two verses. In first verse, he pays respect to the Triple Gem and makes an acknowledgement to compose *Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha*. In second verse, he shows content categories. Then, in next passages, he explains those categories one by one in brief. Sumaṅgala Mahāthera writes *Abhidhammatthavibhāvanītikā* to explain a glossary of each term, indicated meaning of each word, contextual meaning of sentences, related and hidden meaning of Saṅgaha. In turn, Ariyavaṃsa Sayadaw writes *Maṇisāramañjūsātikā* to explains *Abhidhammatthavibhāvanītikā*. Ledī Sayadaw also writes *Paramatthadīpanī* to explain *Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha* and *Anudīpanī* to explains some points of *Paramatthadīpanī*.

To do comparative study of these five texts, I select second verse of *Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha* and its definition from two texts. I provide original Pāli passages of *Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha*, *Abhidhammatthavibhāvanītikā* and *Paramatthadīpanī* and their translations. (referred to them henceforth as *Saṅgaha*, *Vibhāvinī* and *Dīpanī* respectively). There are several English translations of *Saṅgaha* such as Manual of Abhidhamma By Naradah Mahathera, Compendium of Buddhis Philosophy by Swe Zan Aung, and A Comprehensive Manual of *Abhidhammadhamma* by Bhikkhu Bodhi. Among these, I used Manual of *Abhidhamma* by Narada Mahathera. For *Vibhāvanī*, I use Rupert Gethen's translation "the summary of topic of *Abhidhamma* and for *Dīpanī*, I use

An Exposition of the true meaning” by Ashin Nadamālābhivaṃsa. I provide original *Pāli* and its translation first, then I try to simplify and paraphrase these passages with the help of their key commentaries, *Maṇisāramañjūsā* and *Paramatthānudīpanī*. There is no English translation of *Maṇisāramañjūsātikāna* and *Anudīpanītikā*. I explain some necessary points of these two texts in the contexts and provide original *Pāli* in footnote. In this chapter, I mainly focus on these five texts so that controversy points of two sub-commentaries becomes clear for next chapter.

2.2 Introductory verse and subject matter

Sammāsambuddha matulaṃ sasaddhammagāṇuttamaṃ

Abhivādiya bhāsissaṃ abhidhammatthasaṅgahaṃ.

Tattha vutt' ābhidhammatthā catudhā paramatthato

Cittaṃ cetasikaṃ rūpaṃ Nibbāna' iti sabbathā.

The fully Enlightened Peerless One, with the Sublime Doctrine and the Noble Order, do I respectfully salute, and shall speak concisely of things contained in the Abhidhamma.

In an ultimate sense the categories of *Abhidhamma*, mentioned therein, are fourfold in all: i. Consciousness, ii. Mental states, iii. Matter, and iv. *Nibbāna*.¹

These verses are first and second verse in the *Saṅgaha*. First expresses the honouring Triple Gem and the acknowledgement to compose a text, named as *Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha*. The second express the subject matters about which the text is going to explore. The objective of this chapter is to study comparatively the expositions on *Saṅgaha* by *Vibhāvinī*

¹ Bhikkhu Bodhi, **A Comprehensive Manual of Abhidhamma**, (Kandy: Sri Lanka, the Buddhist Publication Society, 1993), p. 23.

and *Dīpanīṭṭkā*. I provide original *Pāli* passage from both *ṭīkā*s and their translations. I take translation of *Vibhāvinī* from a book “the Summary of the topics of *Abhidhamma* and Exposition of the Topics of *Abhidhamma*” by R. P. Wijeratne and Rupert Gettin, and the translation of *Dīpanī* from a book “the exposition of true meaning” by Ashin Nandamālaābhivaṃsa. I try to understand the expositions of both *ṭīkā*s and simplify and paraphrase the meaning with the help of their respective key commentaries, *Maṇisāramaṅjūsāṭṭīkā* for *Vibhāvinī* and *Anūdīpanī* for *Dīpanī*.

The expositions on the second verse are to be observed in brief. The exposition on this verse by *Vibhāvinī* consists of two pages² and on the other hand, it consists of eleven pages by *Dīpanī*³. In making the exposition on this verse, *Vibhāvinī* just gives meaning of the word "*paramattha*" in two ways by a sentence but *Dīpanī* makes detail definition and related explanation of the word by three pages. *Vibhāvinī* makes definition of the word *citta*, *cetasika* and *rūpa* by a paragraph on each but *Dīpanī* does on *citta* by two and half pages, *cetasika* by one page and *rūpa* by two and half pages. *Vibhāvanī* makes a definition of *Nibbāna* in two ways by a sentence but *Dīpanī* does it in two ways by one page. While making exposition on this verse by eleven pages, *Dīpanī* criticizes eight points that has been done by *Vibhāvinī* and old *Abhidhamma* sub-commentary. One concerns with indicated meaning of *tattha*: therein, one with *sabbattha*: in all, one with the meaning of *paramattha*: ultimate sense, one with the definition of *citta*: consciousness, one with the meaning of *cetasika*: mental state, two with *rūpa*: matter and one with the definition of *Nibbāna*. Before analyzing these controversial points, it is necessary to study the intended meanings of the expositions of two Sub-commentaries. This chapter will present the expositions comparatively vice versa.

2.3 The exposition on the connection between two verses

It is *Pāli* commentarial practice which is to explain a connection between two sentences or two verses and a reason of attempting next

² Abhidh-sṬ. 73.

³ PD. 21.

sentence or verse. It is called “*anusandhi*: the connection” in *Pāli*. It clarifies the essence meaning of previous sentences and gives a hint of what next sentence is going to say. Sometime, such practice fills the hiatus meaning of two, previous and subsequent. According to the practice, both *ṭīkā*s explain the connection between two verses. Both *ṭīkā*s have explained that the first verse express honouring triple Gem and an acknowledgement to compose *Abhidhammasaṅgaha* texts. Having done the two points in first verse, Anuruddha Thera compose second verse to show the topic of *Abhidhamma* in the texts, they are four in all, *citta*, *cetasika*, *rūpa* and *Nibbāna*. This is the connection between two verses. This is a connection between two verses. Detail explanation of two sub-commentaries will be studied side by side in the following.

2.3.1 *Vibhāvinī*'s exposition on the connection

Vibhāvinī explains the connection thus:

*Evaṃ tāva yathādhippetappayojananimittam ratanattayapaṇāṃ-ādikaṃ vidhāya idāni yesaṃ abhidhammatthānaṃ saṅgahaṇavasena idaṃ pakaraṇaṃ paṭṭhapīyati. Te tāva saṅkhepato uddisanto āha “tattha vutt’ ātyādi. Tattha tasmīṃ abhidhamme sabbathā kusalādivasena, khandhādivasena ca vuttā abhidhammatthā paramatthato sammuti ṭhapetvā nibbattitaparamatthavasena cittaṃ viññānakkhandho cetasikaṃ vedanādikkhandhattayaṃ rūpaṃ bhūtopādāyabhedabhinno rūpakkhandho, Nibbānaṃ maggaphalāna mārammaṇabhūto asaṅkhatadhammoti evaṃ catudhā catūhākārehi ṭhitāti yojanā.”*⁴

Thus, having first finished honouring the Triple Gem and so on for the reason referred to, now, in order to indicate in brief, the topics of *Abhidhamma* which the work sets out to summarize, he utters the words beginning [the topics...] spoken of therein (*tattha vuttā*)

⁴ Abhidh-sṬ. 73.

Therein – in the Abhidhamma --- the topics of Abhidhamma spoken of in full, as wholesome and so on, and as aggregates and so on, from the ultimate standpoint --- by way of ultimate exposition, setting aside conventional talk - -- are four --- are classified in four ways, namely: consciousness (citta), the aggregates of consciousness (viññāṇa); mentalities, the three aggregates beginning with feeling; materiality, the aggregate of materiality differentiated as the elements and dependent [materialities]; nmibbāna, the unconditioned dhamma which becomes the object of the paths and fruits. This is the grammatical construction⁵.

Vibhāvinī explains the meaning of the verse that the things contained in *Abhidhamma* are concisely four. It is in ultimate standpoint, not in conventional standpoint. The Buddha preaches wholesome phenomena etc., in *Dhammasaṅgaṇi* and five aggregates etc., in *Vibhaṅga* in various numbers. These dhammas are concisely or briefly four in ultimate truths. These four are *citta*, *cetasika*, *rūpa* and *Nibbāna*. Here, *citta* refers to the aggregate of consciousness because the word “*citta*” bears another meaning such as *vicitta*: decorated, *cittakamma*: the art of painting, *paññatti*: designation and so on.⁶ *Cetasika* refers to the three aggregates beginning with feeling because the word “*cetasika*” may confute with *cittasamuṭṭhānarūpa*: mind-born matter for those who are thinking that *setasā kataṃ setasikaṃ*: *setasika* is that which is by mind and *setasā samuṭṭhitaṃ setasikaṃ*: *setasika* is that which is born by mind etc.⁷ *Rūpa* refers to the aggregate of materiality because the word “*rūpa*” bears other meaning such as *piyarūpa*: an enticing object of sight, *sātarūpa*: pleasant

⁵ R. P. Wijeratne and Rupert Gethin, **Summary of the topics of Abhidhamma and Exposition of the Topics of Abhidhamma**, (London: PTS, 2007), P. 7.

⁶ Manis. 121: *Cittasaddo vicittakammapaññattiādīsu pavattati. Idha pana tassa viññāṇatthe pavattiṃ dassento “cittaṃ viññāṇakkho” ti āha.*

⁷ Manis. 122: *Cetasā kataṃ cetasikanti vā cetasā samuṭṭhitaṃ cetasikanti vā atthaṃ parikappentassa cittasamuṭṭhānarūpassapi cetasikabhāvappasaṅgo siyā taṃ nivattanaatthamāha “cetasikaṃ venādikkhandhattayan”ti.*

object of sight and so on.⁸ *Nibbāna* refers to the unconditioned *dhamma* because the word “*Nibbāna*” bears the meaning of *Arahatta* path and fruits etc.⁹

2.3.2 *Dīpanī*'s exposition on the connection

Dīpanī also explains the indicated and related meaning of the verse, slightly different from the mode of *Vibhāvinī* thus:

*Evam ādigāthāya taṃ taṃ payojanasahite pañca at
the dassetvā idāni te abhidhammatthe uddesato dassento
dutīyagātha māha. Tattha tatthāti bhāsisṣaṃ
abhidhammatthasaṅgahanti vutte tasmim
abhidhammatthasaṅgahapade mayā vuttā abhidhammatthā
sabbathā paramatthato catudhā hontīti yojanā.*¹⁰

Thus, having explained the five points each with their advantages in the opening verse, now Thera spoke the second verse to expound the outline of the topics in *Abhidhamma*. Herein, *tattha* means “in that word, *abhidhammattha saṅgaha*” which is used in this phrase, *bhāsisṣaṃ abhidhammattha-saṅgahaṃ*; the topics in *Abhidhamma* (*abhidhammattha*) pointed out by me are four-fold in all aspects under the name of *paramattha* (ultimate reality). This is interpretation.¹¹

⁸ Mañis. 122: *Rūpasaddassa piyarūpa satarūpādīsū pavattanato idha rūpakkhandhappavattiṃ dassento āha “rūpaṃ bhūtupādāyabhdabhinno rūpakkhandho.*

⁹ Mañis. 123: *Nibbāna saddassa arahattapalādīsū pavattanato idha asaṅkhatadhammappavattiṃ dassetu māha “nibbānaṃ maggaphalāna mārammanabhūto asaṅkhatadhammoti.*

¹⁰ PD. 20.

¹¹ Ashin Nandamālābhivamsa, *Paramatthadīpanī (the exposition of true meaning)*, Master's Degree Thesis, (Sri Lanka: Peradeniya University, 1996), p. 23.

In this regard, the dissent definition on the word “*tattha*” can be seen. *Vibhāvinī* says that *tattha* – means in the *Abhidhamma* while *Dīpanī* say *tattha* – means in the word *Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha*.

By the exposition “*tatthāti tasmim̐ abhidhamme*: therein – in the *Abhidhamma*” *Vibhāvinī* intends to prevent the assumption that the word “*ta*” would indicate the word “*Abhidhammasaṅgaha*” or the text [*Abhidhammasaṅgaha* text].¹² If the word “*ta*” indicates the word or the text, the meaning would be that I had said in the *Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha* text. It is not preferable because Ācariya Anuruddha had not been said things contained in *Abhidhamma* and the text. If the word “*ta*” indicates the *Abhidhamma pitaka*, the meaning would be that “*tattha bhagavatā vuttā*: the Buddha had said in that *Abhidhamma pitaka*.”¹³ It is preferable because these things had been said in *Abhidhamma pitaka*. Therefore, in order to show that the word “*ta*” indicates *Abhidhamma pitaka*, *Vibhāvinī* says “*tatthāti tasmim̐ abhidhamme*: therein – in the *Abhidhamma*”.

Dīpanī does not accept the exposition and criticizes old *ṭīkā*s and *Vibhāvinī* thus:

ṭīkāyaṃ tāva tattha tasmim̐ abhidhammatthasaṅgahapakaraṇeti vā abhidhammatthapade ti vā abhidhamme ti vā tasaddattho niddiṭṭho. Vibhāvinīyaṃ pana tasmim̐ abhidhamme ti. Sabbamaṃ na sunndaraṃ. Na hi abhidhammatthasaṅgahapakaraṇe mayā vuttā abhidhammatthāti yujjati. Pakaraṇaṃ hi upari vuccamānameva hoti. Na tu vuttaṃ kuto abhidhammatthāti. Na ca saṃvaṇṇanāpakaraṇesu ādimhiyeva tāva tasaddo appadhāpadāni paccāmasatīti atthi. Tasmā aṭṭhasāliniyaṃ

¹² Maṇis. 120: *Tatthāti taṃsaddassa pakkantavisayattā tena “abhidhammatthasaṅgaha”nti padaṃ vā paccāmasēyya pakaraṇaṃ vā ti tannivattanatthamāha “tattha tasmim̐ abhidhamme”ti.*

¹³ Maṇis. 120: *Abhidhammapīṭakassa pana taṃ saddena paccāmasane “tattha bhagavatā vuttā” ti attho bhavēyya. So ca iṭṭhoyeva. Tena tattha tesam̐ vuttatthā.*

*ādimhi “tattha kenat̐thena abhidhammo”¹⁴ ti vākye viya idha tasaddatho veditabbo.*¹⁵

Firstly, in *Ṭīkā* the meaning of “*ta*” is given “*Tattha* means in that text, “*Abhidhammattha-saṅgaha*,” or in that word, “*Abhidhammattha*”, or in that *Abhidhamma* (.287). Then *Vibhāvinī* says “in that *Abhidhamma*”. All are not correct. Because the meaning – the topics in *Abhidhamma* which I have already mentioned in this book, *Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha* – is not reasonable; even the book indeed will be compiled later on, not yet compiled; where are the topics in *Abhidhamma*? Furthermore, there is not such a word, “*ta*”, that refers minor words at the very beginning in Commentaries; so the meaning of the word, “*ta*”, here must be understood as if the word, “*ta*” in the first sentence, “*thattha kenat̐thena abhidhammo?*” in *Aṭṭhasālinī*.¹⁶

In this regard, *Dīpanī* intend to say that old *ṭīkā* explains the indicated meaning of “*ta*” in the word “*tattha*” in three ways. Among them, the first way is that *tattha* – means in that text, “*Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha*”. It is not reasonable because that text is to be compiled later on, not yet compiled. Therefore, there is no way to indicate topics of *Abhidhamma*. On the other word, there is no way to indicate the meanings which are to be explored later on in the text. It is the problem of the time.

The second way is that *tattha* – means in that word “*Abhidhammattha*” and the third way is that in that *Abhidhamma*. These two ways are also not reasonable because the nature of “*ta*” does not indicate the meaning of a minor word at beginning of the texts.¹⁷ It is

¹⁴ Dhs. A. 3.

¹⁵ PD. 20.

¹⁶ Ashin Nandamālābhivamsa, *Paramatthadīpanī (the exposition of true meaning)*, Master’s Degree Thesis, (Sri Lanka: Peradeniya University, 1996), p. 24.

¹⁷ AnDP. 33: The meaning of a minor word: *appadhānāni*, here, it is to know *padhānapada* and *appadhānapada*, minor word and major word. For example,

grammatical problem. Herein, *Dīpanī* gives example sentence in the *Atthasālinī* that “so the meaning of the word, “*ta*” here must be understood as if the word, “*ta*” in the first sentence, “*tattha kenaṭṭhena abhidhammo?*” in *Aṭṭhasālinī*”¹⁸.

Next argument is about the meaning of the word “*sabbathā*”. *Dīpanī* criticizes *Vibhāvinī*’s exposition on “*sabbathā*”, and explains the meaning of the word “*sabbathā*” thus:

evañhi sati, *ṭīkāsu sabbathā vuttāti yojanāpi paṭikkhittā hoti. Sā hi vakkhamānehi ‘sabbathā dvādasa, sabbathāpi aṭṭhārasā ti ādīhi na sameti. Tattha sabbathāti dhammasaṅganiyaṃ vuttena kusalādinā sabbappakārenāpi catudhāva honti. Vibhaṅge vibhattena khandhādinā sabbappakārenāpi catudhāva hontīti attho. Dhātukathāyaṃ vuttentīti ādināpi vattabbaṃ.*¹⁹

if so, the interpretation in all *ṭīkā*s, ‘pointed in all aspects’ is rejected. The interpretation indeed does not accord with these words, *sabbathāpi dvādasa, sabbathāpi aṭṭhārasa*, etc., which will be mentioned above.²⁰ *Sabbathā* means that it is only four in all aspects of divisions, *kusala*, etc. that is said in *Dhammasaṅgani*; it is also four in all division, *khandha*, etc. that is said in *Vibhaṅga*. And it also should be said “in all aspects of division that is said in *Dhātukathā* and so on”.²¹

Rājaputta: son of a king. In the word *Rāja* and *putta*, *Rāja* is *appadhāna* and *putta* is *padhāna*. *Abhidhammatthasaṅgahaṃ*: *Abhidhamma*, *attha*, and *saṅgaha*. The former two words are minor here. “*Appadhānapadānī ti abhidhammatthasaṅgahanti imasmim ekasmim samāsapade purimāni visesana padāni*”.

¹⁸ Its meaning will be explored in the following chapter.

¹⁹ PD. 21.

²⁰ Those words are stated in the following contexts of *Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha*.

²¹ Ashin Nandamālābhivamsa, *Paramatthadīpanī (the exposition of true meaning)*, Master’s Degree Thesis, (Sri Lanka: Peradeniya University, 1996), p. 23.

In this regard, the point is that *Vibhāvinī* regards the meaning of the word “*sabbathā*” by connecting to the word “*vuttā*” that “*sabbathā vuttā*: spoken of in full”.²² *Dīpanī* regards the meaning of the word “*sabbathā*” by connecting to the word “*catudhā*” that “*sabbathā catudhā*: it is only four in all aspects of divisions”.

2.3.3 *Vibhāvinī*'s exposition on “*paramattha*”

Vibhāvinī defines the words ‘*paramattha*’ thus:

*Tattha paramo uttamo aviparīto attho, paramassa vā
uttamassa ñāṇassa attho gocaroti paramattho.*²³

Ultimate means in the ultimate, highest and undistorted sense; or it is the sense that comes within the sphere of knowledge that is highest and ultimate.²⁴

The word “*paramattha*” is a compound word that is combination of ‘*parama*’ and ‘*attha*’. Based on the meaning of ‘*attha*’, *Vibhāvinī* makes two type of *samāsa viggaha*²⁵: compound analytical definition. Here, in the word “*paramattha*” the word “*attha*” bears the meaning of ‘*sabhāva*: nature’ and ‘*visaya*: objects’. In the sense of *sabhāva*, *Vibhāvinī* makes Adjectival Compound definition (*kammadhāraya samāsa*) that “*paramo attho: paramattho*”. In the sense of *visaya*: objects, *Vibhāvinī* makes Dependent Determinative Compound (*tappurisa samāsa*)²⁶ that “*paramassa attho paramattho*”.²⁷ In the first definition, the word ‘*paramo*:

²² Maṇis. 120: *Duraṭṭhassāpi “sabbathā” ti padassa “vuttā” ti imināyeva sambandho ti āha “sabbathā vuttā” ti.*

²³ Abhidh-sṬ. 74.

²⁴ R. P. Wijeratne and Rupert Gettin, **Summary of the topics of Abhidhamma and Exposition of the Topics of Abhidhamma**, (London: PTS, 2007), P. 8.

²⁵ *Viggaha*: it is a way of grammatical analysis definition in Pāli exegesis literature.

²⁶ Parof. A. P. Buddhadatta Maha Thera, **The New Pali Course**, (Buddhist Cultural Center, Sri Lank, Kandy; 2006), Part II), pp. 40-47

²⁷ Maṇis. 122: *Tasmā “paramattho” ti ettha atthasaddopi sabhāvavisayatthesu pavattatīti sabhāvattha vasena parama attha saddānaṃ tulyādhikaraṇasamāsaṃ, visayatthavasena byadhikaraṇasamāsaṅca dassento “paramo” ti ādimāha.*

ultimate’ is modified by the following two words ‘*uttamo*: highest, and *aviparīto*: undistorted’ in order to prevent other meaning of ‘*parama*’ such as *pamāṇa*: measurement, *atireka*: exceeding etc. it means that it is ultimate because of highest. It is highest because of undistorted.²⁸

In the second definition, the word ‘*paramassa*: ultimate’ is modified by the following two words ‘*uttamassa*: highest, and *ñāṇassa*: knowledge’. It said “*uttamassa ñāṇassa*: knowledge that is highest instead of saying ‘*uttamassa bhagavato*: the Buddha who is the highest’ because there is passage that “*sabbe dhammā sabbākārena buddhassa bhagavato ñāṇamukhe āpāthaṃ āgacchanti*.”²⁹ All *dhammas* are coming into the front of the Omniscience of Buddha Enlightened One. Here, the knowledge should be regarded as ‘*sabbaññutañāṇa*: Omniscience’. Therefore, the meaning should be understood that these four *Abhidhamma* topics are preached by the Buddha. They are *paramatta*: ultimate truths.³⁰ The word “*atto*” is modified by the following “*gocaro*: sphere”. It means that the four ultimate truths are like a sphere in which the Omniscience is going around. Therefore, it is said “*paramassa uttamassa ñāṇassa attho gocaroti paramattho*: the ultimate truth is that which is a sphere or of knowledge that is highest.

2. 3. 4 *Dīpanī*’s exposition on “*parammattha*”

Dīpanī explains the meaning of the word “*paramattha*” and related meaning in detail as follow:

*Paramatthatoti paramattha saccato. Dve³¹ hi saccāni
sammutisaccaṃ, paramatthasaccanti, tattha satta puggala*

²⁸ Maṇis. 123: *Uttamoti etena paramasaddassa pamāṇaatirekatthe nivatteti. Aviparītotti etena uttamabhāvassa hetuṃ dasseti. Yasmā aviparīto hoti. Tasmā uttamoti hi attho.*

²⁹ Patis. II. 194.

³⁰ Maṇis. 123: *sabbe dhammā sabbākārena buddhassa bhagavato ñāṇamukhe āpātha māgacchantī’ ti vacanato uttamassa bhagavato” ti avatvā “uttamassa ñāṇassa” ti vuttanti veditabbaṃ. Ñāṇanti ca sabbaññutañāṇameva adhippettaṃ.*

³¹ In the *pāli* texts, there is “*Dve hi saccāni*” but in the *AnuDīpanī* “there is “*duvidhāti hi saccāni*”. (*AnPD*. 15.)

atta jīvādikā paññattiatthā sabhāvato avijjamānāyeva honti. Dhammavavatthānaññāṇarahitānaṃpana³² mahājanānaṃ citte mahantamahantāpi hutvā vijjamānāviya paññāyanti, teca mahājanā samaggā hutvā tesam ekantena atthibhāvaṃ gahetvā tathā tathā voharanti ceva sampaticchantica. Tasmā te mahājanehi samaggehi sammatattātato yevaca vacīsaccaviratisaccānaṃ vatthubhūtattāsammuti saccanti vuccanti. Tasmim sammutisacce thatvā sammā paṭipajantā sabba lokiyasampattiyoca sabbabodhisambhāra dhamme ca ārādhenti. Micchāpaṭipajantā apāyapūrakā honti. Evaṃ mahantañhi sammuti saccanti. Paramatthasaccaṃ pana patvā taṃ saccameva nahoti. Tañhi sayam avijjamānaṃyeva samānaṃ mahājane vijjamānantveva gaṇhāpeti. Sakkāyaditṭhi dvāsaṭṭhiditṭhi tividhamicchādītṭhīnaṃ vatthu hutvā bālayanānaṃ vaṭṭadukkhato niyyātum nadeti. Evaṃ viparītañhi sammutisaccaṃ. Evaṃ mahāsāvajjañcāti.³³

Paramatthato means “according to ultimate truth”. Truth is indeed twofold: the conventional truth (*sammutisacca*) and the ultimate truth (*paramattha sacca*). Of these two, the conventional truth is thus; the things based on concepts (*paññattiattha*) – being (*satta*), person (*puggala*), sould (*atta*), life (*jīva*) and son on- never exist as reality; but they seem to be reality by conjuring up bigger and bigger in the minds of many people who do not have analytical knowledge of dhamma; many people harmoniously talk and accept them in this and that way as if they are real. And they are accepted harmoniously by many people and are the ground of true speech (*vacīsaccā*) true-abstinence (*virati sacca*) as well; therefore, those things are called conventional truth (*sammuti sacca*). Then using the conventional truth those who well practice dhamma

³² In the translation “yathābhūtaññāṇarahitānaṃ”.

³³ PD. 21.

accomplish all worldly happiness and all means of enlightenment. But those who practice dhamma in incorrect way are to be born in woeful states. Thus, the conventional truth ranks very high. However, it is not regarded as truth, if compared with the ultimate truth because it makes many people accept it as reality being itself not reality. And being the ground of the wrong view on aggregate (*sakkāyadiṭṭhi*), the sixty-two views and the threefold wrong view, it does not let fools escape from the circle of suffering. Thus, the conventional truth is so false and with so great fault as well.³⁴

Dīpanī intends to say that the word “*paramatthato*” is *visesanapada*: distinguishing word. It distinguishes “*visesiyapada*: distinguished word “*catudhā*”. The nature of *visesana* sometime modifies to be more obvious realistic of *visesiya* such as *kaṇho kāko*: black crow, *seto bako*: white heron etc. it sometime modifies to differentiate from other such as *nīlo paṭo*: blue garment, *nīlam puppham*: blue flower etc. Herein, in order to differentiate the ultimate truth from the conventional truth and to explain these two types of truth *Dīpanī* say “*dve hi saccāni*” etc.³⁵ The truth is twofold:

- (1) Conventional truth (*sammutisacca*) and
- (2) Ultimate truth (*paramatthasacca*).

The conventional truth is the thing which is recognized and accepted as truth by the people such as being (*satta*), person (*puggala*), soul (*attaa*) life (*jīva*) and so on. These things never exist as reality, but they seem to be reality by conjuring up bigger and bigger in the minds of many people who do not have analytical knowledge of dhamma. The conventional truth has two factors, accepted by many people and the ground of of true speech

³⁴ Ashin Nandamālābhivamsa, *Paramatthadīpanī (the exposition of true meaning)*, Master’s Degree Thesis, (Sri Lanka: Peradeniya University, 1996), p. 24.

³⁵ AnPD. 15: *Visesanapadam nāma katthaci bhūtakathanatthā vā payujjanti kaṇho kāko, seto bako ti. Katthaci aññanivattanatthāya vā payujjatīti nīlo paṭo, nīlam pupphanti. Idha pana aññanivattanatthāyati dassetuṃ “duvidhānai hi saccāni” ti ādimāha.*

(*vacīsaccā*) true- abstinence (*virati sacca*) as well. Here, true speech means abstaining from false speech and true abstinence means abstaining from four verbal misconducts. Those who use this conventional truth righteously will accomplish all worldly happiness and enlightenment³⁶. It means that there are beings (*pāṇa*) in conventional truth.

There are doctrines of noble peoples based on the conventional truth that “*pāṇo na hantabbo*: you should not kill beings, *dānaṃ dāttabbaṃ*: you should donate, *sīlaṃ rakkhitabbaṃ*: you should practice morality” etc. those who use the conventional truth wrongly will have trouble. It means that someone may break the conventional truth thinking that I practice only ultimate truth. There is no being, no merit or demerit, no result of merit or demerit and so on. Such person will hold the view of annihilation [*ucchedadiṭṭhi*].³⁷ And the conventional truth may cause people to hold other wrong views such as wrong view on aggregate (*sakkāyadiṭṭhi*), the sixty-two views and the threefold wrong view because it is not reality but it makes people accept as reality.

*Paramatthasaccaṃpana duvidhaṃ sabhāvasaccaṃ
ariyasaccanti. Tattha dhammasaṅgaṇiādīsū sattasu
pakaraṇesu vibhattā kusalādayo dhammā
sabhāvasaccaṃnāma. Te hi sayamaṃ sabhāvato vijjamānattā
kusalānāma dhammā atthi sukhānāma vedanā atthīti
gaṇhantena viṣaṃvādentīti. Taṃ pana ariyasaccaṃ patvā
kiñci asaccampi hotiyeva. Tathāhi
anubhavanabhedamattaṃ upādāyeva vedanā sukhā dukkhā
adukkhamasukhāti vuttā. Na sabbākārato sukhabhūtattā.
Sabbehi pana aniccatā saṅkhatatādīhi anekasatehi ākārehi
sabbāpi vedanā dukkhāeva. Tathā
anavajjasukhavipākaṭṭhena kusalabhāvopi akusalaṃ*

³⁶ AnPD. 15: *sammāpaṭipajjantā*”ti *pāṇo na hantabbo*. *Sabbe sattā averā hontū ti ādinā sammā paṭipajjantā*.

³⁷ AnPD. 15: *Ahaṃ paramatthasaccameva gaṇhāmīti sammutisaccaṃ na bhinditabbaṃ. Bhindanto hi sabbasampattīhi paribāhiro assāti dasseti. Kathaṅca bhindatīti. Satto nāma natthi sattassa bhavato saṅkanti nāma natthi. Bhavanibbattakaṃ kusalākusalakammaṃ nāma natthīti gaṇhanto ucchedadiṭṭhiyaṃ tiṭṭhati*.

*upādāyeva vutto. Sabbepi hi tebhūmakā kusalasammataṃ dhammā sāsavatā saṅkilesikatā oghaniya yoganiya upādāniyatā saṅkhātehi vajjehi sāvajjāeva honti. Dukkhasaccabhūtānañca vipākānaṃ jananaṭṭhena ekantena dukkhavipākāeva honti.*³⁸

Then the ultimate truth is two-fold; the truth in its own nature (*sabhāva sacca*) and the truth belonging to noble persons (*ariyasacca*). Of these two the truth in its own nature is the dhammas, “*kusala* etc.”, classified in seven texts beginning with Dhamma *saṅgaṇī*. Because they never make people false who accept them as “there exist the *kusala dhammas* and there exists the happy feeling” existing by themselves in their own nature. But it (*sabhāvasacca*) becomes untrue in one aspect, if compared with the truth belonging to noble persons. Let me explain: feeling is said to be happiness referring to the division of mere enjoyment (*anubhavana-bheda*): but it is not because of real happiness in its all aspects. All feelings are actually only “pain” from the point of many hundred views – the state of being impermanence, that of being conditioned things and so on. In the same way, the state of *kusala* in the sense of faultlessness and producing the result of happiness is known by comparing with *Akusala*. All *kusala dhammas* on three-plane are indeed only with faults. The fault of being with canker, with mental defilements, the object of *Ogha*, the object of Yoga and the object of *Upādāna*. And they have pain as their result because they produce an effect that is the truth of suffering.³⁹

The ultimate truth is two-fold:

(1) truth in own nature (*sabhāvasacca*) and

³⁸ PD. 22.

³⁹ Ashin Nandamālābhivamsa, *Paramatthadīpanī (the exposition of true meaning)*, Master’s Degree Thesis, (Sri Lanka: Peradeniya University, 1996), p. 24.

(2) truth belonging to noble persons (*ariyasacca*).

The truth in own nature is the dhammas, “*kusala vedanā* etc., because they exist themselves in their own nature. They never make people false who accept them as “there exist the *Kusaladhammas* and there exists the happy feeling”. But the truth in own nature becomes untruth if compared with the truth belonging to noble persons. The feeling is said as happiness, pain and neutral. It is referring to the mere enjoyment (*anubbhavana-bheda*). The happiness is not real happiness in its all aspects. All feelings are actually only “pain” from the point of views that is the state of being impermanence and of being conditioned things and so on. In the same way, the state of *kusala* in the sense of faultlessness and producing the result of happiness is known by comparing with *Akusala*. All *kusala* dhammas on three-plane are indeed only with faults because they are with canker, with mental defilements, the object of *Ogha*, the object of Yoga and the object of *Upādāna*. They have pain as their result because they produce an effect that is the “truth of suffering”.

Ajjhattattikañca sabbalokiyasammataṃ upādāya vuttaṃ. Sabbepi hi catubbhū makadhammā ekantena attāpināma natthi. Kuto ajjhattānāma. Bahiddhāeva honti. Sañkhāre parato passāti⁴⁰ hi vuttanti. Ayaṃ nayo sesattika dukadhammesupi yathārahaṃ netabbo.⁴¹

Then, the *Ajjhattatika* is said depending on the concept in this world. Actually, all dhammas on the four-planes have nothing to be called even “atta”. Needless to say, they will have something to call “ajjhatta”: but they belong to only others (*bahiddha*). Do see the conditioned things as not self” is truly said. This way should be possibly known in the other dhammas of *tika* and *duka*.⁴²

⁴⁰ S. I. 189.

⁴¹ PD. 22

⁴² Ashin Nandamālābhivamsa, *Paramatthadīpanī (the exposition of true meaning)*, Master’s Degree Thesis, (Sri Lanka: Peradeniya University, 1996), p. 24.

In *Dhammasaṅgaṇī*, the Buddha preaches *ajjhatadhammā*: phenomena that are internal, *bahiddhādhammā*: phenomena that are external, *ajjhatabhiddhādhammā*: phenomena that are internal and external.⁴³ The Buddha preaches the *tika* based on *sammutisacca*: conventional truth. Actually, there is no *atta* in all *dhammas* on four-planes, *kāmāvacara*: sense sphere, *rūpāvacara*: form sphere, *arūpāvacara*: formless sphere and *lokuttara*: supramandane.

Ariya saccaṃnāma sabbesaṃ tebhūmakadhammānaṃ ekanta dukkhabhāvo taṇhāya ekanta dukkhasamudaya bhāvo Nibbānasseva dukkhanirodha bhāvo aṭṭhaṅgikassa maggasseva dukkhanirodhamaggabhāvocāti. Idhameva hi parisuddhabuddhīnaṃ ariyānaṃ ñāṇe acalamānaṃ sabbākāraparipuṇṇaṃ nippariyāyasaccaṃ hotīti. Tesu idha sammutisaccaṃ nivattento paramatthatoti ida māha. Tena vuttaṃ paramatthatoti paramatthasaccatoti. Tattha attho duvidho sabhāvasiddhoca parikappasiddhoca. Tattha yo vinā aññāpadesena kevalaṃ viṣuṃ viṣuṃ attano lakkhaṇena vijjamāno hutvā siddho. So cittādiko attho sabhāvasiddhonāma. Yopana attano lakkhaṇena vijjamānoyeva nahoti. Vijjamānassapana atthassa nānā pavattiākāre upādāya cittaṇa parikappetvā saviggahaṃ katvā gahito cittamayo cittanimmito hutvā citteeva upalabbhamāno hoti. So sattapuggalādiko attho parikappasiddho nāma.⁴⁴

Then, the truth belonging to noble persons is that all dhammas on the three-plane are to be real suffering, craving is to be real cause of suffering, the *Nibbāna* alone is to be the cessation of suffering; Path with eight factors is to be the way leading to the cessation of suffering. This truth alone is the real truth that is unchangeable and perfect in all aspects in the wisdom of Ariyas who have pure knowledge. Then to exclude here the conventional truth of these two truths the

⁴³ Dhms. 2.

⁴⁴ PD. 23.

word, *paramatthato* is said. Therefore, it was said “*paramatthato* means according to the ultimate truth”. In this word “*paramattha*”, *attha* is twofold: thing that exists in own nature (*sabhāvasiddha*) and thing that exists in image (*parikappasiddha*). Of these two, the thing (*attha*), *cittas* etc., that exists separately with its own characteristic without referring to other thing is to be called the thing that exists in own nature. Then the thing which does not exist with its own characteristic but exists only in mind being imagined and conjured by the mind depending on various appearances of the reality that is mind-made and mind-created: such a thing, being (*satta*), person (*puggala*) and so on, is to be called the thing that exists in image.⁴⁵

Then, the truth belonging to noble persons is that all dhammas on the three-plane are to be real suffering; craving is to be real cause of suffering, the *Nibbāna* alone is to be the cessation of suffering. This truth factors are to be the way leading to the cessation of suffering. This truth alone is real truth that is unchangeable and perfect in all aspects in the wisdom of Ariyas who have pure knowledge. Herein, in the exposition on the word “*paramattha*”, to exclude the conventional truth, *Dīpanī* said thus: “*paramatthato ti paramatthasaccato: paramatthato* means according to the ultimate truth”.

In the word ‘*paramattha*’, *attha* is twofold:

- (1) thing that exists in own nature (*sabhāvasiddha*) and
- (2) thing that exists in image (*parikappasiddha*).

Of these two, thing that exists in own nature is *citta*, *kusala* etc., that exists separately with its own characteristic without referring to other things. Here, the things with referring to other things mean the concepts which are designated base on eight inseparable phenomena. They do not have own characteristic and they have to refer to other thing such color,

⁴⁵ Ashin Nandamālābhivamsa, *Paramatthadīpanī (the exposition of true meaning)*, Master’s Degree Thesis, (Sri Lanka: Peradeniya University, 1996), p. 24.

shape and so on⁴⁶. The act of conscious, the act of feeling etc., have own characteristic. They don't need to refer other things to describe own nature.⁴⁷

Thing that exists in image is the thing which does not exist with its own characteristic but exists only in mind. They are imagined and conjured by the mind depending on various appearances of the reality that is mind-made and mind-created such as being (*satta*), person (*puggala*) and so on. The mind creates those things which are not reality, as reality like pictures in dream.⁴⁸ Of these two, the thing that exists in own nature' alone is to be referred as '*paramattha*'.

Dīpanī defines the meaning of "*paramattha*" thus:

*Ekantavijjamānaṭṭhena itarato paramo ukkaṃsagato
atthoti paramattho. Apica ye ayaṃ atthi ayaṃ
upalabbhatīti gahetvā tassa abhiññeyyassa
abhiññatthāya pariññeyyassa pariññatthāya
pahātabbassa pahānatthāya sacckhikātabbassa
sacchikaraṇatthāya bhāvetabbassa bhāvanatthā
paṭipajjanti. Tesam tadatthasādhane
avisamvādakaṭṭhena paramo uttamo atthoti
paramattho.⁴⁹*

It is called "*paramattha*" because it is the *attha* (thing) which is higher (*parama*) than the other in the sense of absolute reality. In other way, it is "*paramattha*" which is an absolute thing in the sense of

⁴⁶ AnPD. 36: *Aññāpadeso nāma aṭṭhadhammasamodhānaṃ nissāya ghaṭasaṇḍānaṃ paññāyati. Paṭasaṇḍānaṃ paññāyati. Taṃ saṇḍānaṃ attano sabhāvena vinā aññāpadesena siddhaṃ hoti.*

⁴⁷ AnPD. 36: *Yā pana cintanakriyānāma atthi. Yaṃ cittanti vuccati. Sā aññāpadeso siddhā na hoti. Attano sabhāvena siddhā. Esanayo phusana kriyā, vedayitakriyā dīsūti. Imamatthaṃ dassetuṃ "yo vinā aññāpadesenāti ādimāha.*

⁴⁸ AnPD. 36: *Cittamao cittanimmitoti supinante diṭṭharūpāniviya cittena pakato cinnatena nimmito.*

⁴⁹ PD. 23.

not failing in reaction accordingly for those who practice to realize what should be realized; to analyze what should be analyzed; to eradicate what should be eradicated; to attain what should be attained; to develop what should be developed with such a confidence.⁵⁰

It is called “*paramattha*” which is higher than other thing. It means that *sabhāvasiddattha* is called “*paramattha*” because it is higher than “*parikkappasiddattha*”. Here, the word “*parama*” bears the meaning of *adhika* or *ukkamsaga*: higher.

On the other hand, these things do not make people failing and support people to accomplish the welfares. It means that there are some people who practice to realize what should be realized [*abhiññeyyadhamma*]; to analyze what should be analyzed [*pariññeyyadhamma*]; to eradicate what should be eradicated [*pahātabbadhamma*]; to attain what should be attained [*sacchikātabbadhamma*]; to develop what should be developed [*bhāvetabbadhamma*]. Here, the *dhamma* what should be realized [*abhiññeyyadhamma*] means ‘*paramatthadhamma*’. The *dhamma* what should be analyzed [*pariññeyyadhamma*] refers to ‘*dukkhasaccadhamma*’. The *dhamma* what should be eradicated [*pahātabbadhamma*] means ‘*samudayasaccadhamma*’. The *dhamma* what should be attained [*sacchikātabbadhamma*] means ‘the fruits [*phala*] and *nirodhasaccadhamma*’. The *dhamma* what should be developed [*bhāvetabbadhamma*] means ‘*maggasaccadhamma*’. The ultimate truths are called “*paramattha*” because they are noble or excellent [*uttama*]. In which way are they noble? They do not make people who practice to realize what should be realized etc., false and they support them to accomplish the good result of their practice. Here, the word “*parama*” bears the meaning of “*uttama*: noble or excellent”. In this regard, *Dīpanī* criticizes *Vibhāvāī* thus:

⁵⁰ Ashin Nandamālābhivamsa, *Paramatthadīpanī (the exposition of true meaning)*, Master’s Degree Thesis, (Sri Lanka: Peradeniya University, 1996), p. 25.

Vibhāvinīyaṃ pana, “paramassa vā uttamassa ñāṇassa attho gocaroti paramattho”⁵¹ tipi vuttaṃ. Taṃ na sundaraṃ. Na hi paramasaddo ñāṇe vattamāno dissati. Na ca atthasaddo gocareti. Yañca anuṭṭikāyaṃ “saccameva saccikaṃ. So eva attho aviparītassa ñāṇassa visayabhāvaṭṭhenāti saccikattho ti”⁵² vuttaṃ. Taṃpi aviparītena ñāṇena araṇīyato upagantabbato atthoti imamatthaṃ dasseti. Na paramasaddassa atthanti.⁵³

However, it is said in *Vibhāvinī*, “or *paramattha* is an object of higher knowledge”. It is not correct. Because it never sees the word, *parama*, to be in the sense of knowledge and the word “*attha*”, to be in the sense of object as well. And it is said in *Anuṭṭikā*⁵⁴ “only the *sacca* is *saccika*: *saccika* alone is *attha* in the sense of object of right understandings: so it is called *saccikattha*. This too points out this meaning: *Attha* is so called because it should be approached by right understanding, not defining the meaning of *parama*.⁵⁵

In this regard, *Vibhāvinī* interprets the word “*parama*” as “knowledge or wisdom” and the word “*attha*” as “an object”. *Dīpanī* says the word “*parama*” does not bear the meaning of knowledge or wisdom and the word “*attha*” does not bear the meaning of object. Therefore, the interpretation of *Vibhāvinī* is not good in grammatical and meaning as well. The four noble truths are the sphere of the wisdom of Paccekabuddha as well. The only five understood dhamma (*pañca ñeyyadhamma*) are the sphere of the wisdom of the Buddha. Therein, the four noble truths comprise only ultimate dhamma (*paramatthadhamma*).

⁵¹ Abhidh-sṬ. 74.

⁵² PpkMṬ. 60.

⁵³ PD. 24.

⁵⁴ PpkMṬ. 60.

⁵⁵ Ashin Nandamālābhivamsa, *Paramatthadīpanī (the exposition of true meaning)*, Master’s Degree Thesis, (Sri Lanka: Peradeniya University, 1996), p. 25.

The five understood *dhammas* are all the ultimate dhammas together with all concepts (*paññatti*). The Enlightenment of the four truth of the Buddha accomplishes concepts. The enlightenment of the four truths of the *Pacceka* Buddha does not accomplish concepts. Therefore, they are unable to teach other the four truths that they enlighten themselves, having putted on name-concept (*nāmapaññatti*). It is said in commentaries that their enlightenment of four truths is similar to a dream of dump person. Therefore, it should say that only five understood dhamma with concept are definitely the sphere of Omniscience.⁵⁶

2.4 The exposition on “*citta*”

After explanation indicated and related meaning of the verse, both *ṭīkās* make definition of each word of the four ultimate truths, *citta*, *cetasika*, *rūpa* and *Nibbāna*. The expositions on the word “*citta*” by both *ṭīkas* have common ground. Both *ṭīkās* make the definition of the word “*citta*” in three ways.

2.4.1 *Vibhāvinī*’s exposition on “*citta*”

Vibhāvinī makes the definition of “*citta*” thus:

*Cintetīta cittaṃ. Ārammaṇaṃ vijānātīti attho. Yathāha
“visayavijānanalakkhaṇaṃ cittaṃ”⁵⁷’ti. Sati pi hi nissaya
samanantarādipaccaye na vinā ārammaṇena citta mujjatīti*

⁵⁶ AnPD. 37: *Catusaccadhammā hi paccekabuddhaññāṇassapi gocarā honti. Pañca ñeyya dhammā pana sabbaññūtaññāṇasseva. Tattha catusaccadhammā nāma paramatthadhammāeva. Pañcañeyya dhammā pana sabbapaññattiyā saha sabbaparamatthadhammā. Sabbaññūbuddhānaṃ catusaccābhisambodho dhammapaññattiyā saha sijjhati. Paccekabuddhānaṃ catusaccasambodho dhammapaññattiyā saha na sijjhati. Tasmā te sayamaṃ paṭividdhamaṃ catusaccadhammaṃ nāmapaññattiṃ nīharitvā pasesamaṃ desetumaṃ na sakkonti. Tesamaṃ catusaccasambodho mūgassa supinadassanaṃ viya hotīti aṭṭhakathāsu vuttaṃ. Tasmā paññattiyā saha pañca ñeyyadhammā eva sabbaññūtaññāṇassa gocaroti sakkā vattunti.*

⁵⁷ in this case, *Vibhāvinī* quotes “yathāha “visayavijānanalakkhaṇaṃ cittaṃ”. Actually it is said only “vijānanalakkhaṇaṃ cittaṃ” in *Aṭṭhasālinī* without *visaya*.

*tassa taṃ lakkhaṇatā vuttā. Etena nirārammaṇavādimattaṃ paṭikkhittaṃ hoti. Cintenti vā etena karaṇabhūtena sampayuttadhammāti cittaṃ. Atha vā cintanamattaṃ cittaṃ. Yathāpaccayaṃ hi pavattimattameva yadidaṃ sabhāvadhammo nāma.*⁵⁸

Consciousness is that which is conscious; the meaning is that it knows (*viñānāti*) an object. So it is said: ‘Consciousness has the characteristic of knowing objects’. For although such causal conditions as those of support and immediate contiguity are also relevant, consciousness does not arise in the absence of an object, and therefore, its characteristic is spoken of with reference to that. This rejects the view that consciousness arises in the absence of an object. Or else consciousness is the meaning by which the associated dhammas are conscious. Alternatively, consciousness is the mere act of being conscious (*cintana*) for it is its mere occurrence in accordance with condition that is called ‘a dhamma with its own particular nature’ (*sabhāvadhamma*).⁵⁹

The first definition “*cintetīti cittaṃ*” is called grammatically “*kattu-sādhana*: way of agency”. Vibhāvinī modify the word “*cinteti*” by “*ārammaṇaṃ viñānāti*” with quotation form *Aṭṭhasālinī* that “*visayaviñānanalakkhaṇaṃ cittaṃ*: Consciousness has the characteristic of knowing objects.” The reason for it is that there are three types of “*cintā*: conscious”, *ūhanacintā*: the conscious of accumulation (consideration), *viñānanacintā*: the conscious of knowing and *pajānanacintā*: the conscious of understanding. Among them, the conscious of accumulation refers to *vitakka*: thought or initial application, the conscious of knowing to *viññāṇa*: consciousness and the conscious of understanding to *paññā*: wisdom. Herein, in order to show that here *citta*: conscious refers to *viññā*:

⁵⁸ Abhidh-sT. 74.

⁵⁹ R. P. Wijeratne and Rupert Getin, **Summary of the topics of Abhidhamma and Exposition of the Topics of Abhidhamma**, (London: PTS, 2007), P. 8.

consciousness, *Vibhāvinī* said “*ārammaṇaṃ vijānāti*”.⁶⁰ On another way, there are three types of knowing an object, knowing by *saññā*: perception, knowing by *viññāṇa*: consciousness and knowing by *paññā*: wisdom. In order to distinguish the knowing by consciousness from other two, *Vibhāvinī* says “*ārammaṇaṃ vijānāti attho*”.⁶¹ Here, the object alone is not a condition which gives rise consciousness. There are other casual conditions such as *nissaya*; supported, *samanantara*: immediate contiguity and so on. But commentary emphasizes the consciousness has the characteristic of knowing objects. It does it with the purpose of rejecting the view that consciousness arises in the absence of an object or without an object.⁶²

The second definition “*cintenti etena karaṇabhūtena sampayuttadhammāti cittaṃ*” is called “*karaṇa-sādhana*: way of instrument”. By the definition ‘*cintenti etenāti*’ it shows that among the *dhammas* which know an object, the consciousness is the chief or forerunner.⁶³ In knowing an object, when the consciousness supports the associated *dhammas*, they also know the object.

The third definition “*cittanamattaṃ cittaṃ*” is called “*bhāva-sādhana*: way of nature”. The word “*matta*: mere” bears the meaning of “*avadhāraṇa*: preventing”. Therefore, the other two ways of definitions, *kattu* and *karaṇa* remains behind. By making definition of “*bhāva-sādhana*: way of nature”, it prevents the assumption that consciousness arises according to one’s wish.⁶⁴ Someone may argue that it should be

⁶⁰ Maṇis. 124: *Sā ca cintā tivadhā hoti ūhanacintā vijānanacintā pajānanacintāti. Tesu ūhanacintā vitakkassa labbhati. Vijānanacintā viññāṇassa. Pajānanacintā paññāya. Idha pana cittassa viññāṇattā vijānanacintāva labbhati.. taṃ dassento “ārammaṇaṃ vijānāti attho” ti āha.*

⁶¹ Maṇis. 125: *Cittassa saññāṇakaraṇapaṭivijjhanasaṅkhātehi saññā paññā kiccehi visiṭṭhaṃ ārammaṇūpaladdhisāṅkhātaṃ ārammaṇaggahaṇaṃ dassetuṃ “ārammaṇaṃ vijānāti attho” ti vuttaṃ.*

⁶² Abhidh-sṬ 74: *Etena nivārammaṇavādimattaṃ paṭikkhattaṃ hoti.*

⁶³ Maṇis. 126: *Cintenti etenāti cintanakriyāya pavattamānānaṃ dhammānaṃ tattha ādhipaccena cittassa paccayataṃ dasseti.*

⁶⁴ Maṇis. 26: *Mattasaddo cettha avadhāraṇattho. Tena kattukaraṇādīni nivatteti. Etena ca bhāvaniddesena cittassa vasavattibhāvaṃ nivāreti.*

defined by way of agency and instrument so that consciousness would be obvious substance. The nature of dhamma just arises according to conditions. It is not arising of agent [*kattu*: doer] and of instrumentality [*karana*: cause].⁶⁵

Regarding these three ways of definition, *Vibhāvinī* say thus:

*Evañca katvā sabbesampi paramatthadhammānaṃ
bhāvasādhanameva nippariyāyakathāti datthbbaṃ.
Kattukaraṇavasena pana nibbacanaṃ pariyāyakathāti
datthabbaṃ. Sakasaka kiccesu hi dhammānaṃ
attappadhānatā samāropanena kattubhāvo ca,
tadanukūlabāvena sahaḥjātadhammasamūhe kattu bhāva
samāropanena paṭipādetabbadhammassa karaṇatthañca
pariyāyatova labbhati. Tathā nidassanaṃ pana
dhammasabhāvavinimuttassa kattādino abhāvaparidīpana-
tthanti veditabbaṃ.*⁶⁶

For it is its own particular nature' (*sabhāvadhamma*). In consideration of this, it is the definition of the particular nature of ultimate dhamma that is taken as absolute; the explanation by way of agent (*kattā*) and instrument (*karana*) should be seen as a relative manner of speaking. For a dhamma's being treated as an agent, by attributing the status of 'self' to the particular function of a dhamma, and also its being [treated] in consequence as an instrument, by attribution the state of agent to a group of consensent dhammas, are both taken as relative manner of speaking. The explanation in these terms should be understood as for the purpose of indicating the non-existence of an agent, etc. apart from the particular nature of a dhamma.⁶⁷

⁶⁵ Mañis. 126: *Etaṃ sabhāvadhammasaṅkhātāṃ dhammajātāṃ yathāpaccayaṃ paccayānurūpato pavattimattameva hoti, na kattukaraṇāni.*

⁶⁶ Abhidh-sT. 74.

⁶⁷ R. P. Wijeratne and Rupert Gettin, **Summary of the topics of Abhidhamma and Exposition of the Topics of Abhidhamma**, (London: PTS, 2007), P. 8.

Among the three definitions, way of agency and way of instrument are alternative definitions (*pariyāyanibbacana*) and only way of nature is definitive definition (*nippariyāyanibbacana*).⁶⁸ It means that the state of agency of dhammas is to be said in term of putting themselves foremost in demonstrating own function. The state of instrumentality of the dhamma in the function of causing is to be said in term of putting themselves as agency among the associated dhammas.⁶⁹ On the other hand, if the way of nature only is definitive definition, it should make the way only. Why are other ways made? The other two ways of definition are made in order to indicate non-existence of agent etc., apart from particular nature of dhamma or there is no agent etc., which is free from the particular nature of dhamma. In this regard, Prof. Y Karunadasa's statement is noteworthy:

Thus both agency and instrumental definitions are resorted to for the convenience of description, and as such they are not to be understood in their direct literal sense. On the other hand, what is called definition by nature (*bhāvasādhana*) is the one that is admissible in an ultimate sense (*nippariyāyato*). This is because this type of definition bring into focus the real nature of a given dhamma without attributing agency of instrumentality to it, an attribution that creates the false notion that there is a duality within a unitary dhamma.⁷⁰

The meaning of the word “*citta*” bears not only “*vijānana*: knowing object” but also other meaning. To elaborate those meaning, Vibhāvinī said thus:

Vicittakaraṇādito pi cittasaddattham papañcenti. Ayaṃ panettha saṅgaho:

⁶⁸ Mahagandharum Sayadaw, **Tikākyaw Nissaya**, (Amarapura: Myanmar, New Burma press, 2000), p. 46

⁶⁹ Maṇis. 127: *Dhammānaṃ kattubhāvo ca sakasakakiccesu attappadhānatāsamāropanena labbhati. Dhammānaṃ paṭipādetabbadhammassa karaṇatthañca saḥajātadhammasamūhe kattubhāvasamāropanena labbhatīti yojanā.*

⁷⁰ Y Kaunadasa, **The theravāda Abhidhamma**, (Hong Kong: The University of Hong Kong, Centre of Buddhist Studies, 2010), pp.10, 35, 36, 76.

vicittakaraṇ cittaṃ. Attano cittatāya vā.

Citaṃ kammakilesehi citaṃ tāyati vā tathā

*Cinoti attasantānaṃ vicittārammaṇanti cāti.*⁷¹

The meaning of the word citta is also elaborated as that which causes variegation and so on. Thus, it is summarized:

It is consciousness because it causes variegation (*vicitta*), or because it is itself variegated: it is gathered (*citta*) by *kamma* and defilements, or it preserves what has been gathered thus: it gathers its own continuity, and it has a variety of objects.⁷²

There are six kinds of definition of consciousness in this verse. First definition is “*vicittakaraṇā cittaṃ*”. It is called “consciousness because it causes variegation. Variegation means various kind of art such as painting, dexterity, craft etc. Consciousness does itself or is conducive to do this kind of works. On the other hand, consciousness is variegation because wholesome or unwholesome consciousness associated with cankers, create various kinds of plane or life etc.⁷³ Second definition is “*attano cittatāya vā cittaṃ*”. It is called “consciousness” because it is itself variegated as birth, plane, associated etc.⁷⁴ Third definition is “*citaṃ kammakilesehi cittaṃ*”. It is called “consciousness” because it gathers or is produced as result by *kamma* associated with defilement. Here it refers to resultant consciousness.⁷⁵ Fourth definition is “*citaṃ tāyatīti cittaṃ*”. It is called “consciousness” because it preserves personality that had been gathered by

⁷¹ Abhidh-sṬ. 74.

⁷² R. P. Wijeratne and Rupert Getin, **Summary of the topics of Abhidhamma and Exposition of the Topics of Abhidhamma**, (London: PTS, 2007), P. 8.

⁷³ Maṇis. 127: *Sāsavakusalākusalaṃ vā vicittagatiādi karaṇato vicittakaraṇaṭṭhena cittaṃ. Vicittaṃ karaṇamassāti vā vicittakaraṇaṃ.*

⁷⁴ Maṇis. 127: *Attano eva jātibhūmisampayogādivasena vicittatāya cittaṃ.*

⁷⁵ Maṇis. 128: *Kammakilesehi citanti cittaṃ. Vipākaviññāṇaṃ. tañhi kilesasahāyakena kammunā phalabhāvena nibbattitaṃ tehi citaṃnāma hoti.*

kamma and defilement⁷⁶. Fifth definition is “*cinoti attasantānanti cittaṃ*”. It is called “consciousness” because it gathers its own continuity. It means that precious consciousness gives arise next consciousness by way immediate-condition etc., not to stop the continuity of consciousness.⁷⁷ Sixth definition is “*vicittārammaṇanti cittaṃ*”. It is called consciousness because it has a variety of objects.

2.4.2 *Dīpanī*’s exposition on “*citta*”

Dīpanī makes the definition of “*citta*” thus:

*Cittanti ettha cintetīti cittaṃ. Etthaca cintanakriyā nāma niccaṃ ārammaṇāpekkhā hoti. Na hi sā ārammaṇena vinā labbhatīti. Tasmā ārammaṇaggahaṇa ārammaṇupaladdhiyeva idha cintanāti daṭṭhabbāti. Evañhi sati bhavaṅgasamaya visaññīsamayesu cittaṃ ārammaṇena vināpi pavattatīti evaṃ vādīnaṃ vādo paṭikkhitto hoti. Santesupica nissaya samanantarādīsū tassa paccayesu tehi nāmaṃ alabhitvā ārammaṇapaccayavasenevassa nāmaṃ siddhanti daṭṭhabbaṃ.*⁷⁸

In the word ‘*citta*’: it is conscious, so it is called *citta*. Herein to be conscious is to turn ever toward an object. It is true, the state of being conscious is not known without an object. To be conscious is, therefore, regarded here only as the accepting object and receiving object. If it is correct meaning, the statement by some commentators, “at the time of *bhavaṅga* or at the time of feeling faint (*visaññīsamaya*), consciousness exists without an object”, is rejected. Then it must be noted that consciousness gets its name only through the *Ārammaṇa* condition, not through the other conditions –

⁷⁶ Maṅḡ. 128: *Kammakilese hi citaṃ sañcitaṃ attabhāvaṃ tāyati rakkhātīti cittaṃ. Vipākaviññānameva.*

⁷⁷ Maṅḡ. 128: *Anantarādīpaccayavasena hi cittasantānassa abbocchinna-pavattikaraṇato sabbameva cittaṃ cittaṃ cittaṃ cinoti nāma.*

⁷⁸ PD. 24.

Nisaya, Samanantara and so on – though these conditions exist.⁷⁹

Citta: consciousness always inclines toward an object. It never arises without an object. The action of consciousness is just taking and receiving an object. By saying so, it rejects someone's theory that consciousness arises without an object at the time of *bhavaṅga* and at time of feeling faint [*visaññīsa*] as well. It means that consciousness certainly receives an object at the time of *bhavaṅga* and at the time of feeling faint. All the words, *Citta, mana, mānasa, viññāṇa*, are the name of consciousness. It must be noted that these entire names are connected with *ārammaṇapacca*: the object-condition. There are other conditions which give rise to the consciousness such as *nissayapaccaya*: support-condition, *samanantarapaccaya*: the immediate-conditions. But they are not connected with getting the name of consciousness.⁸⁰

*Cintenti sampayuttakā dhammā etenāti cittaṃ. Tañhi ārammaṇaggahaṇakicce pubbaṅgamabhūtanti taṃ sampayuttadhammāpi ārammaṇaṃ gaṇhantā tassa vaseneva gaṇhantīti.*⁸¹

On the other way, *citta* is so called, because through which the mental concomitants (*sampayuttakā*) come to be conscious of. The consciousness is indeed the forerunner in the case of perceiving an object; so, the mental concomitants perceive an object through only consciousness whenever they perceive an object.⁸²

⁷⁹ Ashin Nandamālābhivamsa, *Paramatthadīpanī (the exposition of true meaning)*, Master's Degree Thesis, (Peradeniya University, Sri Lanka), p. 25.

⁸⁰ AnDP. 37: *Cittaṃ mano mānasaṃ, viññāṇanti sabbhaṃ dittaṃ nāmaṃ. Ārammaṇapaccayappaṭibaddhaṃ hoti. Na aññapaccayappaṭibaddhaṃ. Na ca aññapaccayena laddhaṃ nāmaṃ. Evarūpassa ārammaṇavijānanasāṅkhātassa atthantarassa bodhakaṃ na hotīti dassetuṃ "santesucā"ti ādi vuttaṃ.*

⁸¹ PD. 24.

⁸² Ashin Nandamālābhivamsa, *Paramatthadīpanī (the exposition of true meaning)*, Master's Degree Thesis, (Peradeniya University, Sri Lanka), p. 26.

Consciousness alone does not know an object. Consciousness and its associated dhamma i.e mental concomitants [*sampayuttadhamma*] know an object at the same time. In the function of knowing an object, consciousness is the chief or the forerunner. The associated *dhammas* know an object because of consciousness. Therefore, it is said that it is called “consciousness through which the mental concomitant come to be conscious of.

*Cintanamattaṃvā cittaṃ. Sabbepi hi dhammā taṃtaṃ kriyāmatāva honti. Na tesu dabbamvā santhānaṃ vā viggahovā upalabbhati. Paccayāyatta vuttino ca honti. Na te attano thāmenavā balenavā vassenavā sattiyāvā uppajjitumpi sakkonti. Paveva cintetumvā phusetumvāti. Khaṇamattaṭṭhāyinoca honti, na kadāci kassaci vase vattitum sakkontīti. Tasmā tesu idaṃ dabbam, ayaṃ satti, aya kriyāti evaṃ vibhāgo nalabbhatīti daṭṭhabbam. Evañca katvā sabbesu paramatthapadesu ekaṃ bhāvasādhanameva padhānato labbhati. Tadañña sādhanānipana pariyāyatova labbhantīti veditabbam.*⁸³

Or *citta* is being merely to be conscious of. It is true all dhammas are known as mere actions of nature. Within those dhammas there is no substance (*dabba*), form (*santhāna*), and entity (*viggaha*) to be known. They also arise depending on conditions: they have not by itself energy (*thāma*), power (*bala*), ability (*vasa*) or quality (*satti*) through which they are able to appear. Needless to say, they cannot be conscious and impinge. And they exist just only for a moment. They can never be able to follow the wish of someone. Therefore, such a division “this is substance; this is quality; this is action” is unknown in those dhammas. Because of this reason, in all words of ultimate truth’ the definition of

⁸³ PD. 24.

bhāvasādhana alone should be mainly known. But the other definitions can be known only in one aspect.⁸⁴

Consciousness is just merely conscious of. Here, it should know that not only consciousness but all other dhammas, such as *phassa*, *vedanā*, *cetanā* etc., are just merely acting their specific function. In those dhammas, there is no substance (*dabba*), no form (*santhāna*), no body (*viggaha*) which cause to the function. These *dhammas* arise due to conditions. They are unable to arise on their own energy, power, and abilities. It is needless to that they are able to be conscious and to be contact etc. they exist just only for a moment. They are unable to appear according to other's desire. Therefore, there is no substance, no quality, and no action in those dhamma. In this way, to make definition all *paramattha dhamma*, only the way of nature (*bhāvasādhana*) is definitive way. It refers to the state of action of all *paramattha dhamma*. All dhamma have just action of their function. The other two ways are to be known as alternative ways [*pariyāya*].

*Ettha ca dabbādivasena abhedassa cintanassa
atthavisesañāpanattham vibhāga kappanāvasena
bhedakaraṇam pariyāyakathāti datṭhabbam. Yathā silā
puttakassasarīranti, tathā karaṇaṅca taṃ taṃ
kriyāsāṅkhāta dhammavimuttassa paraparikappitassa
kārahūṭassa atta jīva satta puggalassa sabbaso
abhāvadīpanattham. Sati hi attādimhi kiṃ abhedassa
bhedakappanāyāti.*⁸⁵

Herein to think of analyzing the consciousness which is indivisible as substance etc., is to be known as talk in one aspect (*pariyāyakathā*) in order to make one know the special meaning, as if in this example: “the body of a small stone (*silāputtakassa sarīram*).” And to do so is to describe the total non-existence of soul (*atta*), life (*jīva*) being (*satta*)

⁸⁴ Ashin Nandamālābhivamsa, *Paramatthadīpanī (the exposition of true meaning)*, Master's Degree Thesis, (Sri Lanka: Peradeniya University, 1996), p. 26.

⁸⁵ PD. 25.

and person (*puggala*) which are excluded from reality (*dhamavimutta*), imagery of others (*paraparikappita*) and known as doers (*karaka*). If there exists soul, etc., what is the use of thinking of dividing which is indivisible.⁸⁶

The consciousness and the action of conscious are indivisible. But the first definition the way of agent, “*cintetīti cittaṃ*” seems to indicate that there is some substance or self or doer etc., apart from consciousness which conscious or knows. It said indivisible as dividing in alternative way [*pariyāyakathā*] in order to know special meanings. It should be known as example: “*silaputtakassa sarīraṃ*: the body of small stone”. In the example, stone and body of stone are indivisible but it is as dividing. This alternative way is done to show that there is no soul, life, being and person apart from the *paramattha dhamma*. Actually, they are just imagery of other viewers. If there exists soul, life etc., there will be useless that thinking indivisible as dividing way.

*Vibhāvaniyaṃ pana sasavisānaṃ viya abhūtaṃ bhūta kappanā vuttā viya dissati. Ayamassādhippāyodhammesu kattāvā kāre tāvā koci natthi. Lokepana attappadhāno kriyā nipphādako kattānāma siddho. Tasmā cintanakicce attappadhānatā dīpanatthaṃ taṃ kattubhāvaṃ citte āropetvā cintetīti cittaṃ vuttam.*⁸⁷

However, *Vibhāvinī* seem to say, ‘thinking of reality which is not reality (*abhūtaṃ bhūtakappanā*)’ ‘as if in this example ‘the horn of hare (*sasavisānaṃ*)’ It is the meaning what he wants to say: there is none who is to be called either doer (*kattā*)’ or ‘one who commands to do (*kāretā*)’ in dhammas. However, there is a doer (*kattā*) in the world that performs a deed by himself. So, the definition, *cintetīti cittaṃ*, is given by placing ‘the

⁸⁶ Ashin Nandamālābhivamsa, *Paramatthadīpanī (the exposition of true meaning)*, Master’s Degree Thesis, (Sri Lanka: Peradeniya University, 1996), p. 26.

⁸⁷ PD. 25.

state of doer' upon consciousness to explain that in the act of being consciousness *citta* is reliable by itself.⁸⁸

In *Vibhāvinī* it is said thus: “*Sakasaka kiccesu hi dhammānaṃ attappadhānatā samāropanena kattubhāvo*: For a dhamma's being treated as an agent, by attributing the status of 'self' to the particular function of a dhamma,”. It seems to say “thinking of unreality as reality (*abhūta bhūtakappanā*)” as in the example “the horn of hare (*sasavisāṇa*). it means that there is no doer (*kattā*) nor no one who commands to do (*kāretā*) in the *paramattha dhamma*. However, there is a doer [*kaattā*] who or which put on itself foremost in accomplishing specific action. Therefore, the definition way of agent, *cinteti cittaṃ*, is said to explain that *citta* is foremost in functioning conscious by placing “the state of doer [*kattubhāva*]” upon consciousness.

*Cittassaca balena taṃsampayuttānaṃpi tasmim kicce tadanukūlappavattidīpanattham punakaraṇabhāvaṃ citte kattubhāvaṅca tesu āropetvā cintenti sampayuttakā dhammā etenāti cittanti vuttanti.*⁸⁹

Then, the definition, *cintenti sampayuttakā dhammā etenāti cittaṃ*., is given by putting again ‘the state of means to do (*karaṇabhāva*)’ upon the consciousness and ‘the state of doer (*kattubhāva*)’ upon mental concomitants to explain that through the power of consciousness those mental concomitants performs properly in the act of being conscious.⁹⁰

The second definition, way of instrument, is said to explain that the associated dhammas know an object properly by the power of consciousness. When doing this definition, the state of instrument

⁸⁸ Ashin Nandamālābhivamsa, *Paramatthadīpanī (the exposition of true meaning)*, Master's Degree Thesis, (Sri Lanka: Peradeniya University, 1996), p. 27.

⁸⁹ PD. 25.

⁹⁰ Ashin Nandamālābhivamsa, *Paramatthadīpanī (the exposition of true meaning)*, Master's Degree Thesis, (Sri Lanka: Peradeniya University, 1996), p. 27.

[*karaṇabhāva*] is placed upon consciousness and the state of doer [*kattubhāva*] is placed upon associated dhamma.

*Api cettha cittasaddo vicitratthavācako daṭṭhabbo. Vuttañhe taṃ saṃyuttake – Diṭṭhaṃ vo bhikkhave caraṇaṃnāma cittanti. Evaṃ bhante. Tampi kho bhikkhave caraṇaṃ cittaṃ citteneva cintitanti. Tenāpi kho bhikkhave caraṇena cittena cittaññeva cittataranti, nā haṃ bhikkhave aññaṃ ekanikāyaṃpi samanupassāmi yaṃ evaṃ cittaṃ. Yathayidaṃ bhikkhave tiracchānagatā pāṇā. Tepi kho bhikkhave tiracchānagatā pāṇā citteneva cittikatā. Tehipi kho bhikkhave tiracchāna gatehi pāṇehi cittaññeva cittataranti.*⁹¹ *Tattha caraṇaṃnāma cittanti yatthavicitrāni dibbavimānādīni cittakammāni katvā idañcidañca puññaṃ karontā idhacidhaca nibbattāti dassento vicaranti. Tassa paṭakoṭṭhakassetam nāmaṃ. Cittenāti nissakke karaṇavacanaṃ. Yathayidanti yathā ime. Cittikatāti vicitrā katā. Etthaca cittavicittakāya saññāvicittā. Saññāvicittatāya taṇhāvicittā. Taṇhāvicittatāya kammāni vicittāni. Kammavicitta tāya yoniyo vicittā. Yonivicittatāya tesam tiracchā nagatānaṃ vicittatā veditabbā.*⁹²

In other way, the word, *citta*, conveys the meaning of variety (*vicitra vicako*). It is truly said in *Saṃyutta nikāya*: “*bhikkhus*, have you ever seen an exhibition of paintings (*caraṇaṃ nāma cittaṃ*)? Yes, Lord! *Bhikkhus*, the exhibition of painting is designed by mind. *Bhikkhus*, indeed, only mind is more in variety even than that exhibition of painting”. “And *Bhikkhus*, I have never seen any other communities as animal which is in variety, *Bhikkhus*, the animals

⁹¹ S. II. 123.

⁹² PD. 25.

are made various by only mind as well. *Bhikkhus*, even than those animals it is mind that is more various.” Herein, ‘the exhibition of painting’ is a sheet of cloth on which various pictures, the divine abode etc., are painted; and they wander about and exhibit it explaining thus: “those who act this and that merit can be born in such and such abode. “in the word, *cittena*, the ending ‘*ena*’ is a particle, *karanavacaṇa*, in the sense of ablative case. *Yathayidaṃ* means ‘as if these.’ *Cittīkatā* means making it various. Furthermore, herein it is known that mind is various, so perception is various. And as perception is various, so attachment is various. And as attachment is various, so *kamma* is various. And *kamma* is various, so genus (*yoni*) is various. And as genus is various, so are animals.⁹³

After explaining the direct meaning of the word “*citta*”, [*vacanattha*] by three ways of definitions, Dīpanī explains implied meaning of the word “*citta*” [*abhidhānattha*] with quotation from *Pāli* cannon.⁹⁴ In the *Samyuttanikāya*, the word “*citta*” bears the meaning of variegated. The Buddha used the word “*citta*” for a painting or a picture instead of consciousness. The picture is variegated. It is made by mind. So, mind is more variegated than picture. The communities of animal are variety. The various animals are created by mind. So, the mind is more various than those variety of the animals. In this case, mind is various, so perception is various. As perception is various, an attachment is various. As an attachment is various, *kamma* is various. As *kamma* is various genus is various. As genus is various the animals are various.

⁹³ Ashin Nandamālābhivamsa, *Paramatthadīpanī (the exposition of true meaning)*, Master’s Degree Thesis, (Peradeniya University, Sri Lanka), p. 28.

⁹⁴ AnDP. 38: *Evaṃ cittassa vacanatthaṃ dassetvā idāni tassa abhidhānatthaṃ dassento “apicethā” ti ādimāha.*

*Taṃ taṃ sabhāvo lakkhaṇaṃ, kiccasampattiyo
raso;*

Gayhākāro phalaṃvāpi, paccupaṭṭhāna saññitaṃ.

*Āsannakāraṇaṃ yaṃ taṃ, padaṭṭhānanti taṃ
mataṃ;*

Dhammānaṃ vavatthānāya, alaṃ ete vibuddhino.

*Ārammaṇavijānanalakkhaṇaṃ cittaṃ,
pubbaṅgamarasaṃ, sandhānapaccupaṭṭhānaṃ,
nāmarūpapadaṭṭhānaṃ.⁹⁵*

Lakkhaṇa is this and that own nature;

Rasa is function or accomplishment;

Paccupaṭṭhāna is said to be manifestation or
advantage;

Padaṭṭhāna is known to be a proximate cause;

These are to classify dhammas for the wise.

Citta has the awareness of an object as its
characteristic; the preceding as its functions: the
ceaseless process is its manifestation; mind and
matter are its proximate cause.⁹⁶

The wise men classify *paramatthadhammas* by four that are
characteristic (*lakkhaṇ*), function (*rasa*), manifestation (*paccupaṭṭhāna*)
and proximate cause (*padaṭṭhāna*). *Lakkhaṇa* means own nature such as
knowing, contacting etc., like the heat is the nature of fire. *Rasa* means
function [*kicca*] or accomplishment [*sampatti*] or the work by it and the
result of working by it like the cooked thing is the function of fire

⁹⁵ PD. 26.

⁹⁶ Ashin Nandamālābhivamsa, *Paramatthadīpanī (the exposition of true meaning)*, Master's Degree Thesis, (Sri Lanka: Peradeniya University, 1996), p. 28.

[*kiccarasa*] and the light or luster is also the function of fire [*sampattirasa*]. *Paccupaṭṭhāna* means the advantage like the smoke is the advantage of fire. *Padatṭhāna* means a proximate cause like kindling by a man.

The characteristic of *citta* is awareness of an object. The function of *citta* is preceding. The manifestation of *citta* is the ceaseless process. The proximate causes of *citta* are mind and matter.⁹⁷

2.5 The exposition on “*cetasika*”

In the definition of *cetasika*, Vibhāvinī explains the meaning of *cetasika* in short measurement. On the other side, Dīpanī explains a bit detail and criticizes one point of Vibhāvinī. The different exposition between these two sub-commentaries is to be studied.

2.5.1 Vibhāvinī’s exposition on “*cetasika*”

*Cetasi bhavaṃ tadāyattavuttitāyāti cetasikaṃ. Na hi taṃ cittena vinā ārammaṇaggahaṇasamatthaṃ asati citte sabbena sabbaṃ anuppajjanato, cittaṃ pana kenaci cetasikena vināpi ārammaṇe pavattatīti taṃ cetasikameva cittāyattavuttikaṃ nāma. Tenāha bhagavā ‘manopubbaṅgamā dhammā’ ti, etena sukhādīnaṃ acetanattaniccattādayo vippatipattiyopi paṭikkhittā honti. Cetasi niyuttaṃ vā cetasikaṃ.*⁹⁸

That which exists in the mind (*cetasi*) by occurring in dependence upon it is mentality (*cetasika*). For it is unable

⁹⁷ AnDP. 39: *Taṃ taṃ sabhāvo ti vijjānanaphusanādiko sabhāvo. Aggissa unṅho viya. Kiccasampattiyo raso ti tena tena dhamme karaṇakiccañca. Taṃ kiaccaṃ katvā laddho sampattiguṇo ca. Aggissa vatthumhi paripācana kiccaṃ viya. Obhāsanaguṇoviya ca. “gayhākāro” ti nāṇena gahetabbo tassa tassa dhammassa dhajabhūto ākāro. Sampattirasoyeva vuccati. Phalaṃ vāpīti kāriyapphalaṃ vāpi. Aggissa dhūmovi. Āsannakāraṇanti attano anantare phalanibbattaṃ kāraṇaṃ. Aggissa aggikārapuriso viya.*

⁹⁸ Abhidh-sṬ. 74.

to take an object without consciousness; in the absence of consciousness there is no arising of any mentality at all. But consciousness does occur with an object in the absence of certain mentalities; so, mentality is said to occur in dependence upon consciousness. Therefore, the Blessed One has said: ‘Dhammas have mind as their forefunner.’⁹⁹ This refutes erroneous opinions such as that happiness, etc., are permanent and exist in the absence of consciousness.¹⁰⁰ Alternatively mentality is that which is combined with consciousness.¹⁰¹

It is called “*cetasika*: mentality” because it exists in the mind. It occurs in dependence upon mind or other word, its occurrence is related to mind. Here, mentality is said as “*cittāyattavutti*: occurrence related to mind”. Some may argue that consciousness’s occurrence is as related to mentality. So, consciousness should be said as “*cetasikāyattavutti*: occurrence related to mentality”. To prevent this argument, *Vibhāvinī* explains that mentality cannot arise or cannot take an object without consciousness, but consciousness can occur or can take an object without some kinds of mentalities. Therefore, only mentality is said as “*cittāyattavutti*”.¹⁰² Therefore, the Buddha said “*manao pubbaṅgamā dhamma*” etc. by saying so, it rejects erroneous opinions such as that happiness, etc., are permanent and exist in the absence of consciousness. To show that *tiddhita* suffix “*ṇika*” bears several meanings, *Vibhāvā* explains alternative way of definition of “*cetasika*” that “*cetasi niyuttaṃ cetasikaṃ*: mentality is that which is combined with consciousness”. Here, *taddhita* suffix bears *niyutta*: combined”.

⁹⁹ Dhp 1.

¹⁰⁰ Visu 511 (Chapter XVI, & 85).

¹⁰¹ R. P. Wijeratne and Rupert Gettin, **Summary of the topics of Abhidhamma and Exposition of the Topics of Abhidhamma**, (London: PTS, 2007), P. 8.

¹⁰² Maṇis. 131: *Iti tasmā cetasikassa cittena vinā ārammaṅgagahaṇa-samatthatābhāvato. Cittassa pana kenaci cetasikena vināpi ārammaṅgagahaṇasamatthabhāvato taṃ cetasikameva cittāyattavuttikaṃ nāma. Na cittaṃ cetasikāyattavuttikaṃ nāmāti yojanā.*

2. 5. 2 *Dīpanī*'s exposition on “*cetasika*”

*Cetasikanti ettha cetasi bhavaṃ tadāyattavuttitāyāti cetasikaṃ. Phassādi dhammajātaṃ. Etthaca tadāyattavuttitā nāma ekuppādatādīhi lakkhaṇehi cittena saha ekī bhūtassa viya pavatti. Etena yā cittassa jāti. Sāeva phassādīnaṃ. Yā cittassa jarā, yaṃ cittassa maraṇaṃ, yaṃ cittassa ārammaṇaṃ, yaṃ cittassa vatthu, tadeva phassādīnanti evaṃ ekapuppha mañjariyaṃ ekavaṇṭupanibbandhāni pupphāni viya cittena saha ekajātiyādi upanibbandhā phassādayo dhammā idha cetasikaṃnāmāti siddhā honti.*¹⁰³

In the word, *cetasika*: *cetasika* is that which is born in *citta* since it arises depending on it. It is a term for the dhammas beginning with *phassa*. And herein, ‘the state of appearance depending on it’ is to arise together with *citta* as if it seems to be one according to the characteristic, “arising together, etc.” by this word, it is clearly known that *cetasika*, is only those dhammas, *phassa*, etc., which are seemed to unite with consciousness having the same birth etc., like flowers in a branching flower-stalk on a single stem, being in this position – “only the birth of *citta* is the birth of *phassa*, etc., the decay of *citta* is the decay of *phassa*, etc., the death of *citta* is the death of *phassa*, etc., the object of *citta* is the object of *phassa*, etc., the seat of *citta* is the seat of *phassa*, etc.”¹⁰⁴

Ledi Sayadaw defines the meaning of “*cetasika*” that *cetasi bhavaṃ cetasikaṃ*: that which is born in consciousness is mentality”. It is said “born in consciousness” because it arises depending upon consciousness.

¹⁰³ PD. 27.

¹⁰⁴ Ashin Nandamālābhivamsa, *Paramatthadīpanī (the exposition of true meaning)*, Master’s Degree Thesis, (Sri Lanka: Peradeniya University, 1996), p. 28.

“depending upon consciousness” means that mentality seems to unite with consciousness by way of characteristics such as arising together, ceasing together and so on. When consciousness arises, mentalities arise. When consciousness decays, mentalities decay. When consciousness ceases, Mentalities cease. The object of consciousness is the object of mentalities. The seat of consciousness is the seat of mentalities. It refers to mental states such *vittakka*, *phassa*, *vedanā* etc.

*Evañca sati cittaṃpi tehi phassādīhi saha tatheva āyattaṃ pavattatīti taṃpi phassikaṃ vedanikantiādinā vattabbanti ce. Na. Cittasseva jeṭṭhakattā. Manopubbaṅgamā dhammā, manoseṭṭhā manomayāti hi vuttaṃ. Etthaca manomayāti manasāeva pakatā nimmitā cittakriyā bhūtāti attho. Etena te phassādayo dhammā cittena vinā nupalabbhantīti dasseti. Cittaṃpana tehi kehici vināpi pavattatiyeva. Pañcaviññāṇa cittañhitehi kehici vitakkādīhi vinā uppajjatīti. Tasmā tesaññeva tadāyatta vuttitā vattabbā na cittassāti.*¹⁰⁵

If asked – if so, *citta* also must be called *phassika*, *vedanika* and so on, because it exists, as said above, together with those dhamma, *phassa*, etc. – the answer is “No”. Because *citta* alone is the chief. The Buddha truly say, “dhammas have mind as their forerunner; have mind as their chief; have mind as their source.”¹⁰⁶ Herein, “*manomayā*” is made or created only by mind; it is meant the act of mind’. By the two lines of verse, it denotes that those dhammas, *phassa*, etc., cannot be known without *citta*. However, *citta* can exist even without some of those dhammas. For example, the “five-*viññāṇa*” *citta* arise without some of those dhammas

¹⁰⁵ PD. 27.

¹⁰⁶ Note 25

Vittaka, etc. So ‘the state of existence depending on it’ is spoken only for those dhammas, not for *citta*.¹⁰⁷

There may be argument that consciousness must be called “*phassika*: born in *phassa*”, *vedanika*: born in *vedanā*” and so on because consciousness arises together with *phassa*, *vedanā* etc., and cease together with *phassa*, *vedanā* etc. It cannot be called because consciousness is indeed chief, or leader. The Buddha said in Dhammapada that “dhammas have mind as their forerunner; have mind as their chief; have mind as their source.” It means that mentalities arise together with consciousness and they cannot arise without consciousness. on the other hand, consciousness can arise without some types of mentalities such as *vitakka*, *vicāra* etc. therefore, *citta* cannot be called as *phassika*, *vedanika* and so on.

*Vibhāvaniyaṃ pana Ekāmbaṇatā mattena tesam tadāyattavuttitaṃ cetasi kattañca vibhāveti. Taṃ na sundaraṃ. Na hi ekāmbaṇatāmattena cetasikaṃnāma jātanti. Ettha ca loke nānāvaṇṇadhātuyo udake ghaṃsitvā vatthumhi nānā cittaṃkammāni karonti, tattha vatthumhi pharaṇaṃ bandhanañca udakasseva kiccaṃ, na vaṇṇadhātūnaṃ. Nānārūpa dassanaṃ vaṇṇadhātūnameva kiccaṃ, na udakassa. Tattha vatthuviya ārammaṇaṃ datṭhabbaṃ. Udaṃviya cittaṃ. Nānā vaṇṇadhātuyoviya cetasikadhammāti.*¹⁰⁸

However, *Vibhāvinī* explains those dhammas to be in ‘the state of dependent’ and in ‘the state of being *Cetasika*’ through merely being on the same object. (p. 74-5). It is not correct. Because, merely through the state of being on the same object it cannot be called *Cetasika*. In addition, suppose people in the world paint various pictures on a canvass mixing varied colored paints in water. Herein, the absorption on the canvass and remaining on it is only the

¹⁰⁷ Ashin Nandamālābhivamsa, *Paramatthadīpanī (the exposition of true meaning)*, Master’s Degree Thesis, (Sri Lanka: Peradeniya University, 1996), p. 28.

¹⁰⁸ PD. 27.

function of water, not of coloured materials; displaying the various forms is only the function of coloured materials, not of water. Of these, the object is compared to the painting canvas; *Citta* to water, *Cetasikas* to varied coloured paints.¹⁰⁹

In the *Vibhāvinī*, Sumaṅgala Mahathera explains “the state of dependence and the state of being mentality” is just because of the same objects. It means that Sumaṅgala Mahathera himself will explain full characteristic of mentality next chapter. Actually, these characteristics should be explained here because of the place where the exact meaning of the word “*cetasika*” is to be defined.¹¹⁰ Each function of consciousness and mentality should be understood as in example of picture. Suppose, people paints various picture on a canvass mixing varied colored paints in water. The absorption on the canvass and remaining on it is only the function of water, not function of coloured material. Displaying the various forms is only the function of coloured material, not function of water. Here, the object is compared to the painting canvass; consciousness to water, mentality to varied coloured paints.

2. 6 The exposition on “*rūpa*”

In the definition of *rūpa*, *Vibhāvinī* explains the meaning of *rūpa* in short measurement. On the other side, *Dīpanī* explains a bit detail and criticizes two points of *Vibhāvinī*. The different exposition between these two sub-commentaries is to be studied.

2. 6. 1 *Vibhāvinī*'s exposition on “*rūpa*”

*Ruppatīti rūpaṃ, sītuṅhādivirodhipaccayehi
vikāramāpajjati, āpādīyatīti vā attho. Tenāha bhagavā*

¹⁰⁹ Ashin Nandamālābhivamsa, *Paramatthadīpanī (the exposition of true meaning)*, Master's Degree Thesis, (Sri Lanka: Peradeniya University, 1996), p. 29.

¹¹⁰ AnDP. 40: *Paripuṇṇāni cetasikaṅgāni upari therena sayameva vakkhamānattāti adhippāyo. Idha pana padatthavibhāvanaṭṭhānattā paripuṇṇehi aṅgehi vibhāvetuṃ vaṭṭatīti āha “taṃ na sundaraṃ”*.

‘*sītenapi ruppāti, uñhenapi ruppāti*’¹¹¹
ruppanañcetta sītādivirodhipaccayasamavāye
visadisuppattiyeva. Yadi evaṃ arūpadhammānampi
rūpavohāro āpajjātī? Nāpajjati sītādiggaṇa-
sāmatthiyato vibhūtatarasseva rupanassādhippetattā.
Itarathā hi ‘ruppāti’^{ti} avisesavacaneneva pariyattanti kiṃ
sītādiggaṇena, taṃ pana sītādinā phuṭṭhassa rupanam
vibhūtataṃ, tasmā tadevetthādhippetanti ñāpanattham
sītādiggaṇam kataṃ.¹¹²

That which is afflicted (*ruppāti*) is materiality (*rūpa*); that which ‘comes to or is brought to change (*vikāra*) as a result of such opposing conditions as cold and heat’ is what is meant. So the Blessed One spoke the words beginning: ‘it is afflicted by cold, it is afflicted by heat.’ Here, being afflicted [58] is just taking a different form in the presence of opposing conditions like cold. If this is so, does not the designation ‘materiality’ apply to immaterial dhammas? It does not apply. That fact of referring to cold, etc., show that only great affliction is meant. When the ordinary expression ‘it is afflicted’ alone is sufficient elsewhere, why are cold, etc., referred to? It is because the afflictions of what is touched by cold, etc., are greater. Therefore, in order to show that just this is what is meant here, cold, etc., are referred to.¹¹³

It is called “*rūpa*: materiality” because it changes due to opposite conditions such as cold, heat etc. Changing means becoming different from previous form to another form when conditions take place. Then there would be argument that immaterial dhamma (*arūpadhamma*) too can be

¹¹¹ S. III. 86.

¹¹² Abhidh-sṬ. 75.

¹¹³ R. P. Wijeratne and Rupert Gettin, **Summary of the topics of Abhidhamma and Exposition of the Topics of Abhidhamma**, (London: PTS, 2007), P. 9.

called “*rūpa*: materiality” because they also change constantly. It cannot be called because changing here, refers to only obvious different due to cold, heat etc. The sentence “*sītuṅhādivirodhipaccayehi*” is said to prevent such argument. Otherwise, it would say only “*ruppatīti rūpaṃ*”.

*Yadi evaṃ kathaṃ brahmaloke rūpavohāro, na hi tattha upaghātakā sītādayo atthīti? Kiñcāpi upaghātakā natthi, anuggāhakā pana atthi, tasmā taṃvasenettha ruppanaṃ sambhavatīti, atha vā taṃsabhāvānavattanato tattha rūpavohāroti alamatippapañcena.*¹¹⁴

If this is so how is the designation ‘materiality’ used with reference to the Brahmā World, for there is no cold, etc., to cause harm there? Although there is none that causes harm, there is that which comforts: therefore, in that way ‘affliction’ is obtained there. Alternatively, it is enough to explain that, since the particular nature of affliction is not overcome there, the designation ‘materiality’ is used.¹¹⁵

Then, next argument would be that materiality in Brahma world has no oppressive condition, such as cold, heat etc., so it could not be called “*rūpa*: materiality” in Brahma world. There is no oppressive condition but supporting condition such as cold. Therefore, it can be called. On the other hand, the material in Brahma world also is not able to overcome the nature of changing. Therefore, the materiality in Brahma world cannot be called “*rūpa*”.

2.6.2 *Dīpanī*’s exposition on “*rūpa*”

Rūpanti ettha ruppatīti rūpaṃ. Sītuṅhādīhi virodhi paccayehi visama pavatti vasena vikāraṃ āpajjati, tehi vā vikāraṃ āpādīyatīti attho. Yathāha – Ruppatīti kho bhikkhave tasmā rūpanti vuccati. Kena

¹¹⁴ Abhidh-sT. 75.

¹¹⁵ R. P. Wijeratne and Rupert Gethin, Summary of the topics of Abhidhamma and Exposition of the Topics of Abhidhamma, (London: PTS, 2007), P. 9.

*ruppati. Sitenapi ruppati. Uñhenapi ruppati. Jighacchāyapi ruppati. Vipāsāyapi ruppati. Daṃsa makasa vātātapa sariṃ sapa sapphassehipi ruppatīti.*¹¹⁶ *Ruppatītica ruppati, kuppati, ghaṭṭīyati, piḷi yati, bhijjatīti. Mahāniddese vuttaṃ.*¹¹⁷ *Ayamettha piṇḍattho, ye dhammā ciraṭṭhitikāca honti sappatighasabhāvāca. Tesaññeva ṭhitikkhaṇesu virodhipaccayehi samāgamonāma hoti. Napanaññesaṃ parittakkhaṇānaṃ appatighasabhāvānanti. Tesañhi appatighasabhāvānaṃ sukhuma rūpānaṃpi bahiddhā sītādīhi samāgamonāma natthi. Kuto parittakkhaṇānaṃ appatighasabhāvānañca arūpadhammānanti.*¹¹⁸

rūpaṃ: herein, it changes; so it is called *rūpa*. It means that it changes into a different state through harmful conditions (*virodhipaccaya*)- cold, heat, and so on, or it is changed by those harmful conditions. It should be quoted:

“*Bhikkhu*, it changes; so it is called *Rūpa*. By which does it change? It changes by cold; changes by heat; changes by hunger; changes by thirst; changes by biting of tsetse fly or mosquito; or by the effect of wind, heat; by biting of poisonous reptiles.” “*Ruppati*” means changes, perishes, being attacked, oppressed, and being broken”, is said in *Mahāniddesa*. This is a concise meaning: only those dhammas which remain long and have the nature of impact (*sappatighasabhāvā*) meet harmful condition at the static moment: but not those which are in short term and have not the nature of impact (*appatighasabhāvā*). It is true, even the subtle matters

¹¹⁶ S. II. 71.

¹¹⁷ Nd¹. 4.

¹¹⁸ PD. 28.

without the nature of impact do not meet external conditions, cold, etc. Needless to say, the mental dhammas (*arūadhamma*) in short term and without the nature of impact do not meet external conditions.¹¹⁹

It is called “*rūpa*: materiality” because it changes due to harmful conditions such as cold, heat, hungry etc. or it is changed by harmful conditions such as cold, heat, hungry etc. In grammatical perspective, the word “*rūpati*” is used in two senses, in the sense of agent (*kattri*) and in the sense of passive or causative object (*hetukammani*).¹²⁰ The Buddha preaches the cause of changing in *Samyuttanikāya*. *Rūpa* is changed by cold, heat, hunger, thirst, biting of tsetse fly or mosquito, effect of wind, biting of poisonous reptiles. Harmful conditions meet with only those dhammas which remain long and have the nature of impact at time of standing moment (*thitikkhaṇa*). they do not meet with those dhamma which remain in short term and have no nature of impact. Therefore, subtle matters (*sukhumarūpa*) which have no nature of impact do not meet with harmful conditions. Needless to say that mental phenomena which are in short term and have no nature of impact surely do not meet with external conditions.

*Yadievam sukhumarūpānaṃ arūpatāpatti siyāti.
Nasiyā. Oḷārikarūpehi samānagati kattā. Tānihi oḷārikesu
ruppamānesu ruppantiyevāti. Samāgamoca nāma idha
thapetvā āpātagamaṇaṃ ārammaṇakaraṇaṇca
aññamaññaviruddhānaṃ thitipattānaṃ oḷārikarūpānaṃ
mahābhūtānamevavā aññamaññābhighaṭṭanaṃ vuccati,
ruppati ghaṭṭiyati pīḷiyatīti hi vuttaṃ. Ruppanañcanāma
parasenāyuddhena raṭṭhakhobhoviya kalāpantara-
gatadhātūnaṃ kuppanaṃ bhijjanaṃca vuccati. Kuppati
bhijjatīti hi vuttaṃ. Etthaca kuppātīti khobhati cañcalati,
bhijjatīti vikāraṃ āpajjati. Yasmiṃ khaṇe*

¹¹⁹ Ashin Nandamālābhivamsa, *Paramatthadīpanī (the exposition of true meaning)*, Master’s Degree Thesis, (Sri Lanka: Peradeniya University, 1996), p. 29.

¹²⁰ AnPD. 40: *Ruppātīti padaṃ kattari vā hetukammani vā siddham.*

*virodhipaccayasamāgamaṃ labhanti. Tato paṭṭhāya sayampi vikārapattā honti. Omattādhimattarūpa-santatīnaṃ uppattiyā paccayabhāvaṃ pattā hontīti attho.*¹²¹

If so, ‘the subtle matters (*sukhumarūpa*)’ may be the mental dhamma? No, it may be so; because they are in the same nature as if that of ‘the gross matters’. Indeed, they change when the gross matters change. Or ‘the meeting’ here is, it is said, ‘the mutual impingement’ of the gross matters or of only the great elements which contradict each other and are at the static moment, apart from getting into the avenue (*āpātagamana*) and perceiving an object (*ārammaṇakaraṇ*). It is, indeed, said: “*Ruppati* means being attacked (*ghaṭṭīyati*) and oppressed (*pīṭīyati*).” Changing (*ruppana*)’ is said to be the state of ruin (*kuppana*) and perishing (*bhijjana*) of the elements which are in different matter-unit, as if a country is in a state of chaos caused by war waged by enemies. It is truly said that “becoming ruined (*kuppati*) and broken (*bhijjati*)”. In addition, herein *Kuppati* means to be in a state of chaos and moving about. *Bhijjati* means to be distorted. When they meet harmful conditions, since that moment they become distorted by themselves. It means that they work as conditions to produce material process, more or less.¹²²

Then, the subtle matters may be mentality or non-matters (*arūpadhamma*). They are not mentality, they are matter because they have the same destination with gross matters (*oḷārikarūpa*). When the gross matters change, they also change. The meeting means the touching each other of gross matters and great elements apart from getting into sense and becoming an object. The changing means a state of ruin and perishing of elements which are in different matter-units like a country is in a state of chaos cause by another army. When they meet harmful conditions, the

¹²¹ PD. 28.

¹²² Ashin Nandamālābhivamsa, *Paramatthadīpanī (the exposition of true meaning)*, Master’s Degree Thesis, (Sri Lanka: Peradeniya University, 1996), p. 30.

great elements themselves become distorted. It means that they themselves become states of conditions that cause material process of exceeding and falling.

Apicettha ruppanaṃ duvidhaṃ vaḍḍhanaṃ, hāyanañca. Tadubhayampi kappavuṭṭhāne kappasaṅṭhāne nānāyukappa saṃvacchara utu māsa ratti divādīnaṃ parivattaneca pākaṭaṃ hotīti. Kasmā pana rūpanti nāmaṃ ghaṭṭanavasena ruppanadhammānameva siddhanti. Tesameva saviggahattā. Rūpadhammā hi samūhasaṅṭhānādi bhāvapattiyā saviggahā honti. Tasmā tesameva ruppanaṃ paccakkhatopi lokassa pākaṭanti tesveva rūpanti nāmaṃ siddhanti daṭṭhabbaṃ. Arūpadhammā pana aviggahāti na tesam vikāro paccakkhato lokassa pākaṭo hoti. Taṃ taṃ rūpavikāraṃ disvāvā sutvā vā pucchitvāyeva vā so lokena jānitabbo aññatra paracittavidūhi. Tasmā tesam rūpatāpatti natthīti.¹²³

In another way, ‘changing (*ruppana*) is two-fold: increasing and decreasing. Both of these are clearly known at the time of destruction and construction of universe and in changing of various life-span, years, season, moth, night, day, etc.

Why is the term, rūpa., used for only the dhammas which change through impact? Because only they have substance. Matters have substance being in a state of gathering and forming, etc. So it is noted that ‘change’ pertaining to only those matters is common to the world and the term, rūa, is used only for those. On the contrary, mind exists without substance; so the state of distortion pertaining to those cannot be seen directly (*paccakkhato*); it can be known on seeing or

¹²³ PD. 29.

hearing or asking about this and that distortion of matters by the world except those who can read other minds. So, mind is not in the state of matter.¹²⁴

After explanation of *rūpa* according to *Pāli* cannon, to show that the different mode of previous and next process of materiality is called “*rūpa*” alternatively,¹²⁵ Ledī Sayadaw said that on the other hand, there are two kinds of changing, increasing and decreasing. Both are clearly known at the time of destruction and construction of universe, and in changing of various life-span, years, season, month, night, day and so on. The term “*rūpa*” is used for only dhammas which changes through impact because they have substance. *Rūpa* dhammas have nature of gross. They become form of substance when many of them are united. They have substance when gathered many groups of materiality at a moment.¹²⁶ Therefore, the term “*rūpa*” is used only for the dhammas which have substance and their chaining is common to the people. On the contrary, mentalities have no substance and their changing is not common to the people. Their changing can be understood only when seeing or hearing the change of materiality or having asked. Therefore, mentality is not called “*rūpa*”.

*Vibhāvaniyaṃ pana Tesam rūpatāpattippasaṅgo
sītādiggaḥaṇa sāmattihiyena nivattito. Yasmā pana
vohāronāma lokopacārena vinā nasijjhati.
Lokopacāroca pākāṭanimittavase neva pavatto. Tasmā
idha sītādiggaḥaṇena vināpi tappasaṅganivatti
lokato va siddhāti daṭṭhabbā.*¹²⁷

¹²⁴ Ashin Nandamālābhivamsa, *Paramatthadīpanī (the exposition of true meaning)*, Master’s Degree Thesis, (Sri Lanka: Peradeniya University, 1996), p. 30.

¹²⁵ AnPD. 41: *Evaṃ pāli nayena vipattivasena ruppanaṃ vatvā idāni vipatti vā hotu. Sampatti vā. Purima pacchima sanātīnaṃ visadisappavattibhūto vikāropi ekena pariyāyena ruppanaṃ nāmāti katvā puna taṃ ruppanaṃ dassento “api cetth”āti ādimāha.*

¹²⁶ AnPD. 41: *Bahūnaṃ sannicaye sati dappasaṅghanatthāya samvattanti. Ekakkhaṇe ca bahukalāpi ekābaddhā hutvā pavattanti. Tasmā t saviggahā hontīti.*

¹²⁷ PD. 29.

However, Vibhāvinī dismisses the suppositions – mind may be in a state of matter (*rūpatā patti ppasaṅgo*)’ – by the implicitly of these terms, *Sīta* etc. Actually, terms (*vohāro*) cannot be used without general consensus of the world’ (*lokopacāra*); the general consensus of the world is only through widely known signs. Hence, it should be noted that without the term, *sīta*, etc., such a supposition (*pasāṅga*) can be removed only through the general consensus of the world’.¹²⁸

In *Vibhāvinī*, Sumaṅgala Mahathera expels the supposition that mentality could be called “*rūpa*”, by the ability of the terms “*sīta, uṅha* etc.” it means that there is saying that *sītenapi ruppanti*: it changes due to cold, *uṅhenapi ruppanti*: it changes due to heat, etc. it is well known to the world. It shows that the changing of mentality which is not well known to the world, is here, not to be taken.¹²⁹ The terms are used with consensus of the world. The consensus of the world is widely known. The term “*arūpa*” is itself well known. Therefore, without the terms “*sīta, uṅha* etc.”, the supposition can be removed by consensus of the world.

*Yasmā ca brahmaloke brahmānaṃ kāyavikāra
vacīvikārā ca iddhivikuppanāvasappavattā
nānārūpavikārāca dissantiyeva. Teca ekena
pariyāyena ruppanākārāeva nāma honti, tasmā tesam
vasena tattha rūpānaṃ rūpatāsiddhi hotīti veditabbaṃ.
Rūpayati vā attano sabhāvena pakāsati rūpaṃ.
Arūpadhamā hi na attano sabhāvena pākātā honti.
Rūpasannissayeneva gahetabbā. Idaṃ pana attano
sabhāvene va pākataṃ pañcaviññāṇehipi gahetabbanti.*

¹²⁸ Ashin Nandamālābhivaṃsa, *Paramatthadīpanī (the exposition of true meaning)*, Master’s Degree Thesis, (Sri Lanka: Peradeniya University, 1996), p. 31.

¹²⁹ AnPD. 41: *Sītādiggaḥaṇasāmatthiyenā ti sītenapi ruppanti. Uṅhenapi ruppanti ādinā lokassa paccakkhato pākāssa sītādi vacanassa sāmattiyaena. Taṃ hi vacanaṃ lokassa apākataṃ arūpadhamānaṃ ruppanaṃ idha nādippetanti dīpetīti adhippāyo.*

*Imasmim atthe sati brahmaloke rūpānaṃpi uju katova rūpatāsiddhi hotīti.*¹³⁰

Then, in Braham world it can be seen that Brahmas have physical gesture, verbal gesture and various forms created by psychic power. These, too, can be a sort of material changing in one aspect. Therefore, it is understood that according to this aspect the matter in Brahma world can be in a state of matter.

In other way, “Rūpa” is so called, because they become manifest by themselves in their own nature. It is true mind cannot become manifest in their own nature. They are to be known only through matter on which they depend. However, matter being manifest by itself in its own nature is be known by five-consciousness. If it is the meaning, the matters in Brahma world can be directly known to be in a state of matter.¹³¹

In Brahma world, it can be seen that the Brahams have physical changing, verbal changing, and various forms created by psychic power. They are also called “changing” in on aspect. Therefore, it is to be noted that the matter in Brahma world has a state of being matter. On the other hand, it is called “rūpa” because it manifests itself in own nature. Mentalities cannot become manifest in their own nature. They are to be known only through matter on which they depend. Here, matter becomes manifest in its own nature and it is to be taken by five-consciousness. In this way, the matter in Brhama world can be directly known as being matter.

Vibhāvaniyaṃ pana Anuggāhakānaṃ sītādīnaṃ vasena taṃ sabhāvā nātivattana vasenaca tattha rūpatāsiddhi vibhāvitā. Yasmāpana sīte nāpi uñhenāpītiādivacanaṃ nidassanamattaṃ hoti. Kamma

¹³⁰ PD. 30.

¹³¹ Ashin Nandamālābhivaṃsa, *Paramatthadīpanī (the exposition of true meaning)*, Master’s Degree Thesis, (Sri Lanka: Peradeniya University, 1996), p. 31.

*cittāhārānaṃpi vasena ruppanassa sambhavato, tathāhi saññā viññāṇānipi rūpārammaṇa-rasārammaṇehi eva pāliyaṃ niddiṭṭhāni. Na hi saññā rūpaṃeva sañjānāti. Na ca viññāṇaṃ rasa meva vijānāti. Nidassanamattena desanā hotīti viññāyatīti. Tasmā sītādiggaṇaṃ amuñcivāva tattha rūpatāsiddhivibhāvanena payojana natthīti.*¹³²

In *Vibhāvinī* it is explained: “The matter in Brahma world can be known through either beneficial cold, etc., or going not beyond the nature of matter’ However, these words, *sītenāpi uñhenāpi*, etc., are used to indicated a mere point (*nidassana mattanṃ*). Because ‘the changing’ can be through mind and nutriment as well. It is true *saññā* (perception) and *viññāṇa* (consciousness) are explained in Pāli canon only through the objects, form and taste. However, perception does not perceive only form; consciousness is not aware of taste alone; so it should be understood that discourse is given to indicate a mere point; therefore it is useless to explain the matter in Brahma world referring to the word, beginning with the, *sīta*.¹³³

In *Vibhāvinī*, Sumaṅgala Mahathera said that matter in Brahma world can be called “*rūpa*” because of two reasons: there is supporting conditions such as cold etc., and these matters are not able to overcome the nature of changing. Sumaṅgala Mahathera try to explain it without giving up the words *sīta* etc. actually, these worlds, *sītenapi*, *uñhenapi* etc., are just for examples because the changing can be known through *kamma*, mind and nutriments as well. In Pāli cannon, *saññā* (perception) and *viññāṇa* (consciousness) are explained only through the object of forms and of taste respectively. Perception perceives not only forms but also sounds, smell, taste etc. Consciousness is aware of not only taste but also forms, sounds,

¹³² PD. 30.

¹³³ Ashin Nandamālābhivamsa, *Paramatthadīpanī (the exposition of true meaning)*, Master’s Degree Thesis, (Sri Lanka: Peradeniya University, 1996), p. 31.

smell etc. The doctrines are given just to indicate respective points. Therefore, without giving up these words *sīta* etc., it is useless to explain that the matter in Brahma can be called *rūpa*.

2.7 The exposition on “*Nibbāna*”

In the definition of *Nibbāna*, *Vibhāvinī* explains the meaning of *Nibbāna* in short measurement. On the other side, *Dīpanī* explains a bit detail and criticizes two points of *Vibhāvinī*. The different exposition between these two sub-commentaries is to be studied.

2.7.1 *Vibhāvinī*'s exposition on “*Nibbāna*”

*Bhavābhavaṃ vinanato saṃsibbanato vānasaṅkhātāya taṇhāya nikkhantaṃ, nibbāti vā etena rāgaggiādikoti Nibbānaṃ*¹³⁴

That which is deliverance (*nikkhante*) from craving, considered as ‘entanglement’ (*vāna*) because it stitches and weaves together existence and non-existence¹³⁵, or that by means of which the fires of greed, etc., are extinguished (*nibbāti*) is *Nibbāna*.¹³⁶

It is called “*nibbana*” because it is free from craving “*vāna*” which stitches the existence and great-existence. On the other hand, it is called “*Nibbāna*” because it causes greed etc., to be extinguished. It means that greed, hatred, delusion etc., are extinguished because of *nibbana*. Here, Sumaṅgala Mahathera uses the word “*bhavābhava*” which is combination of *bhava* and *abhava*. The word “*a*” of *abhava* bears the meaning of “*vuddhi*: prosperity or growth”. *Bhava* refers to woeful, inferior and small

¹³⁴ Abhidh-sṬ. 75.

¹³⁵ Rupert Gethin translates *abhava* non-existence. But here, the word “*a*” does not refer to negative sense. It bears positive sense “*vuddhi*”. Therefore, I translate “*abhava*: great-existence”.

¹³⁶ R. P. Wijeratne and Rupert Gethin, **Summary of the topics of Abhidhamma and Exposition of the Topics of Abhidhamma**, (London: PTS, 2007), P. 9.

existences. *Abhava* refers to happy, superior and great existences.¹³⁷ In first definition, the word “*nibbana*” is *pañcamī tappurisa samāsa*. In second definition, it is *karaṇasādhana*.¹³⁸

2.7.2 *Dīpanī*’s exposition on “*Nibbāna*”

*Nibbānanti ettha nibbāyanti sabbe vaṭṭadukkkhasantāpā etasminti Nibbānaṃ. Nibbāyantīti ye kilesāvā khandhāvā abhāvitamaggassa āyatim uppajjanārahapakkhe thitā hontī. Teyeva bhāvitamaggassa anuppajjanārahapakkham pāpuṇantīti attho. Na hi khaṇattayaṃ patvā niruddhā atītadhammā nibbāyanti nāma. Paccuppannesu āyatim avassaṃ uppajjamānesuca dhammesu vattabbameva natthīti.*¹³⁹

In the word, *Nibbāna*: in this state all burning miseries (*dukkhasantāpa*) in birth-and-death circle (*vaṭṭa*) become extinct; so it is called *Nibbāna*. ‘to become extinct (*nibbāyanti*)’ means that only those mental defilements (*kilesā*) and aggregates (*khandha*) that are worthy of arising in future within those who have not developed their Path are put in the state of not worthy of arising within those who have already developed their Path. Dhammas in the past, it is true, which have ceased after being for three moments cannot be called “to become extinct (*nibbāyanti*).” Needless to say the dhammas in present and will certainly arise in the future can be called ‘to become extinct’.¹⁴⁰

It is called “*nibbana*” because all burning miseries in the cycle of rebirth [*vaṭṭa*] extinguish in that state [*Nibbāna*].

¹³⁷ Mañis. 137: *Bhavābhavanti duggati sugativasena, hīna pañita vasena ca khuddakaṃ, mahantañca bhavanti attho.*

¹³⁸ Mañis. 137: *Ettha ca pathama vikappe nibbana saddo ca pañcamī tappurisa samāso. Dutiyavikappe, nibbana saddo ca karaṇasāadhanoti viseso veditabbo.*

¹³⁹ PD. 30.

¹⁴⁰ Ashin Nandamālābhivamsa, *Paramatthadīpanī (the exposition of true meaning)*, Master’s Degree Thesis, (Sri Lanka: Peradeniya University, 1996), p. 32.

“*nibbāyanti*: extinguish” means that the defilements and aggregates of one who has not developed the path [*magga*] will arise in the future. These defilements and aggregates become extinguish when the one has developed the path [*magga*]. The extinguishment of those defilements and aggregates of one who has developed the path [*magga*] is called *nibbana*: extinguish. Extinguishment does not mean the disappear of past dhammas. It is needless to say for disappearance of presence dhammas and future dhammas because the presence dhamma now oppress beings and the future dhammas will certainly oppress beings in the future.¹⁴¹

*Vaṭṭadukkkhasantāpāti kilesavaṭṭa kammavaṭṭa vipākavaṭṭa dukkhasantāpā. Na hi tividha vaṭṭadukkkhasantāpā-rahitānaṃ rukkhādīnaṃ anuppādanirodho Nibbānaṃnāma hotīti. Etasminti visaye bhumaṃ. Yathā ākāse sakuṇā pakkhantīti. Yehi te nibbāyanti. Tesam tabbinimuttaṃ aññaṃ nibbutiṭṭhānaṃnāma kiñci natthīti.*¹⁴²

The burning misery in birth-death circle (*vaṭṭaduddhasantāpā*)’ is that the burning misery which is in the circle of mental defilement (*kilesavaṭṭa*), in the circle of kamma (*kammavaṭṭa*) and in the circle of result (*vipākavaṭṭa*). it is true ‘the complete extinction (*anuppāda-nirodha*)’ concerning with trees, etc., which are without the burning suffering in the three circles cannot be called *Nibbāna*. *Etasmim*: the inflectional ending ‘*smim*’ is in the sense of location (*bumaṃ*) as if in the example, “*ākāse sakuṇa pakkhandanti*= in the sky birds fly.” Indeed, there is no other

¹⁴¹ AnPD. 42: *Na hi atītadhammā nibbāyanti nāma satte pīletvā niruddhattāti adhippāyo. Paccuppannā ca dhamma etarahi pīlenti. Avassaṃ uppajjamānā anāgatadhammā ca anāgate pīlessanti.*

¹⁴² PD. 31.

locality apart from those burning miseries which become extinct.¹⁴³

“*vaṭṭadukkhasantāpa*” means that there are three types of cycle, cycle of defilement (*kilesavaṭṭa*), cycle of kamma (*kammavaṭṭa*) and cycle of result (*vipākavaṭṭa*). the dhamma of these three cycles are called “*vaṭṭadukkhasantāpa*: burning miseries in cycle of rebirth”. The disappearance of tree etc., which are not related to any one of three cycles cannot be called ‘*Nibbāna*’.

“*Etasmiṃ*” means that the case ending “*smiṃ*” is used in the sense of locative (*bumma*) as in example “*ākāse sakuṇa pakkhandanti*= in the sky birds fly.” Here, two kinds of locative should be noted: *mukkyādhāra*: absolute locative, and *visayādhāra*: locative by mode of domain where one becomes part of it or an integral element in it.¹⁴⁴ *Mukkyādhāra* is as in example “*manussā bhūmiyaṃ gacchanti*: people go around on earth.” *Visayādhāra* is as in example “*ākāse sakuṇā pakkhanti*: birds fly in the sky.” In the case of nibbana definition, this locative is not *mukkyādhāra* but *visayādhāra*. It means that just as action of flying of the birds cannot be done without the sky, extinguishment of burning miseries is impossible without nibbana. Therefore, it is said that there is no other location apart from those burning miseries which become extinct.¹⁴⁵

*Nibbāyanti vā ariyajanaṃ etasmiṃti Nibbānaṃ. Nibbanti dhīrā yathayaṃ padīpoti hi vuttaṃ.*¹⁴⁶ *Nibbāyantīti taṃ taṃ*

¹⁴³ Ashin Nandamālābhivamsa, *Paramatthadīpanī (the exposition of true meaning)*, Master’s Degree Thesis, (Sri Lanka: Peradeniya University, 1996), p. 32.

¹⁴⁴ A. Thitzana, *Kaccāyana Pali Grammar*, (USA: Pariyatti Press, 2016), P. 408.

¹⁴⁵ AnuPD. 42: *Visaye bhummanti visayādhāre bhummaṃ. Visayādhāro nāma manussābhūmiyaṃ gacchantīti ādisuviya mukhyādhāro na hoti. Tena pana vinā aññattha taṃ kiriyaṃ kātuṃ na sakkoti. Tasmā ādhārahāvena parikkappito ādhāroti dassetuṃ “yathā ākāwe” ti ādi vuttaṃ. Yathā sakuṇānaṃ pakkhanakiriyaṇāma ākāse na vinā aññattha na sijjhati. Tathā vaṭṭadukkhasattānpadhammānaṃ nibbutikiriyaṇāpi nibbānena vinā aññattha na sijjhatīti dassetuṃ “ye hi te” ti ādimāha.*

¹⁴⁶ Kh. 7.

*kilesānaṃvā khandhānaṃvā puna appaṭisandhikabhāvaṃ pāpuṇantīti attho. Ekasminti visayeeva bhumbaṃ, etasmiṃ adhi gatetipi yojenti. Ṭikāsupana bhavābhavaṃ vinanato saṃsibbana to vānaṃ vuccati taṇhā. Tato nikkhantanti Nibbānanti vuttaṃ.*¹⁴⁷

In other way, *Nibbāna* is so called because in this state the noble persons (*ariyajana*) become extinguished. It is said: “the wise become like the extinguished flame of a lamp.” ‘to become extinguished’ means that such and such defilements and aggregates are to be in a state of non-rebirth. *Etasmiṃ*: the ending, *smiṃ*, is only in the sense of location. Or that word is connected with the word, *adhigate*. (it is the meaning “when this state is attained). However, it is said in *Ṭikāsa*:¹⁴⁸ “Craving is to be called ‘*vāna*,’ because it sews lives together; and from that craving it departs, so it is called *Nibbāna*.¹⁴⁹

Alternatively, it is called “*Nibbāna*” because noble persons become extinguished in that state. There is teaching that the wise men become extinguished like the extinguishment of flame a lamp. *Nibbāyanti*: extinguish means that the defilements and aggregates become a state of non-rebirth. The case ending “*smiṃ*” is in the sense of locative. In *Ṭikāsa*, the word “*Nibbāna*” is defined that nibbana is combination of two words “*ni*” and “*vāna*”. Craving is called “*vāna*” because it sews existences and great-existences. The word “*ni*” bears the meaning of “*nikkhanta*: depart”. It is called “nibbana” because it departs from the craving which sews existences and great-existences

Vibhāvaniyaṃ pana ‘Nibbābhivā etena rāgaggiādikoti Nibbāna’ntipi vuttaṃ. Taṃ na sundaraṃ. Na hi maggeviya nibbāne katthaci

¹⁴⁷ PD. 31.

¹⁴⁸ Abhidh-sṬ. 75.

¹⁴⁹ Ashin Nandamālābhivamsa, *Paramatthadīpanī (the exposition of true meaning)*, Master’s Degree Thesis, (Peradeniya University, Sri Lanka), p. 33.

*karaṇasādhanam diṭṭham, naca Nibbānam nibbūti kriyāsādhane rāgādikassa kattuno saha kāripaccayo hotīti.*¹⁵⁰

However, it is said in *Bibhāvanī*: “*Nibbāna* is that through which the fire of craving, etc., becomes extinguished.” This is not correct. Because *Nibbāna* is not known as an instrumental case like Path: besides *Nibbāna* cannot be the cooperating cause (*sahakārī-paccaya*) of craving which works as a subject to do that act of extinguishing.¹⁵¹

In *Vibhāvinī*, Sumaṅgala Mahathera makes a definition of nibbana that “*nibbāti etena rāgaggiādikoti Nibbānan*: nibbana is that through which the fire of craving, etc., becomes extinguished”. It is not good because the instrumental sense is not seen in *nibbana* like the path (*magga*). It means that the instrumental sense is seen in the path as in example “*addhā imāya paṭipattiyā jarāmarañamhā parimuccissāmi*: may I free from aging and death by this practice”. The characteristic of instrumental is not seen in nibbana. Here, the characteristic of instrumental means a state of condition that is together with agent. There is pāli texts that “*anupādisesāya Nibbānadhātuyā nibbāyanti*: [they] extinguish by the element of nibbana without remainder”. There, instrumental sense can be seen in the pāli texts. It is third case ending in the sense of adjective, not in the sense of instrumental. It is said to prevent nibbana element with remainder (*saupādisesaNibbānadhātu*).¹⁵²

¹⁵⁰ PD. 31.

¹⁵¹ Ashin Nandamālābhivaṃsa, *Paramatthadīpanī (the exposition of true meaning)*, Master’s Degree Thesis, (Sri Lanka: Peradeniya University, 1996), p. 34.

¹⁵² AnPD. 43: *Tasmā nibbāne karaṇavacanaṃ na dissati. Karaṇalakkhaṇasseva abhāvatoti dassetuṃ “na ca nibbān’ti ādi vuttaṃ. Karaṇalakkhaṇam nāma kattuno sahakārī paccayabhāvo. Na nu anupādisesāya nibbānadhātuyā nibbāyantīti dissatīti. Saccaṃ. Tattha pana visesane karaṇavacanaṃ. Na karaṇakārake. Tañhi saupādisesanibbānadhātuyā nivattanatthaṃ vuttanti.*

2.8 Conclusion Remark

As seen above, Sumaṅgala Mahāthera explains second verse in brief but in its key commentary “*Maṅṣārāmañjūsā*”, Ariyavaṃsa Mahāthera explains *Vibhāvinī*’s expositions in detail. Ledī Sayadaw explains the second verse quite detail but in its key commentary “*Anudīpanī*”, he explains only some points in brief. In the exposition on second verse, Ledī Sayadaw criticizes eight points in former sub-commentaries. Two points are concerned with old sub-commentaries and *Vibhāvinī*. The rest six points are concerned with *Vibhāvinī* only. The two are indicated meaning of “*tattha*” and the contextual meaning of “*sabbathā*”. The six are the meaning of “*paramattha*”, the definition of “*citta*”, of “*cetasika*”, of “*rūpa*”, and of “*Nibbāna*”. In the case of “*sabbathā*”, it is interesting that *Maṅṣārāmañjūsā* explains the contextual meaning of “*sabbathā*” with positive point of view and *Dīpanī* explains it with another point of view.

It means that before *Dīpanī*’s explanation, *Maṅṣārāmañjūsā* had recognized some points that had been criticized by *Dīpanī*. In the case of “*paramattha*”, *Dīpanī* criticizes *Vibhāvinī* for the definition that the word “*parama*” bears the meaning of knowledge and the word “*attha*” bears the meaning of sphere. In the case of “*citta*”, both *ṭīkā*s explains in three ways of definition, but *Dīpanī*s criticizes *Vibhāvinī* for the reasoning that making the definition of way of agency (*kattusādhanā*). In the case of “*cetasika*”, *Dīpanī* criticizes *Vibhāvinī* for incomplete reason for being *cetasika*. In the case of “*rūpa*”, *Dīpanī* criticizes *Vibhāvinī* for arguing the mentality would be called *rūpa* and for the reasoning that materiality in Brahma world is entitled *rūpa* too. In the case of *nibbana*, *Dīpanī* criticizes *Vibhāvinī* for making the definition of way of instrumental (*karaṇasādhaṇa*). These criticized points are to be discussed next chapter.

Chapter III

General Survey on the controversy points in *Cittasaṅgaha*

3.1 Controversy points in introductory verse

Anuruddha Mahāthera composes initiative verse that expresses a paying respect to the Triple Gem and an acknowledgement to write an *Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha* texts.

Sammāsambuddha matulaṃ sasaddhamma gaṇuttamaṃ

Abhivādiya bhāsissaṃ abhidhammatthasaṅgahaṃ.

The peerless very Buddha, with the Law

Of Righteousness and the Fraternity

Of worth supreme, with reverence I salute.

Now will I speak in summaries concise

Of things in Abhidhamma-lore contained.¹

According to commentarial tradition, the commentators used to explore the condensed meaning of initiative verse and explains each word that which word expresses what sort of meaning. therefore, herein, both sub-commentators, *Vibhāvinī* and *Dīpanī*, explain the verse accordingly. Both agree on the point that this verse conveys five condensed meaning (*pañcapiṇḍattha*). These meanings are:

1. Paying respect to the Triple Gem (*ratanattayapaṇāma*)
2. The Theme of the Text (*ganthābhidheyya*)
3. The Writing style of the Text (*ganthappakāra*)

¹ Shwe Zan Aung, **Compendium of Philosophy**, (London: PTS, 1972), p. 81.

4. The Title of the Text (*ganthābhidhāna*)
5. The Advantage of the Text (*ganthappayojana*).

Regarding first meaning, both agree that in the verse, the meaning of “paying respect to the Triple Gem” is indicated by the words “*sammāsambuddha matulaṃ sasaddhamma gaṇuttamaṃ abhivādiya*”.² Regarding the rest four, there are different exposition.

Controversy [1]

Vibhāvinī said that the Theme of the Text (*abhidheyyattha*)” is indicated by the word “*Abhidhammatthasaṅghaṃ*”. It means that the word “*abhidhammatthasaṅghaṃ*” expresses the state of being compendium text which summarizes the meaning of *Abhidhamma*. This compendium texts enables to understand the meaning of *Abhidhamma*. The theme of this text is to understand the meaning of *Abhidhamma*. It is indicated by the word “*abhidhammatthasaṅgha*”.³

Dīpanī explains that the Theme of the Text means the four topics of *Abhidhamma*, the major subjects which are set forth by the whole treaties. The Theme of the Text” is indicated by the word “*abhidhammattha*”, a part of combination word of “*abhidhammattha-saṅghaṃ*”.⁴ And he criticizes that *Vibhāvinī* said “the Theme of the Text” is indicate by the whole word “*abhidhammatthasaṅghaṃ*”, assuming that the summarizing also should be the Theme. It is not good because of that the summarizing which is not major meaning here, should not be the Theme when indicating the condensed meaning.⁵

² Abhis-Ṭ. 70: *Ettha hi “sammāsambuddha...pa... abhivādiyā”ti iminā ratanattayapaṇāmo vutto.*

³ Abhidh-sṬ. 73: “*abhidhammatthasaṅghaṃ*”ti *abhidheyyakaraṇappakāra-pakaraṇābhidhānāni. Abhidhammatthānaṃ idha saṅghetabbabhāvadassanena tesam iminā samuditena paṭipādetabbabhāvadīpanato.*

⁴ PD. 2: *Sakalena ganthena abhihitā padhānatthabhūtā cattāro abhidhammatthā ganthābhidheyyo. So abhidhammatthasaṅghanti pade abhidhammattha saddena dassito.*

⁵ PD. 2: *Vibhāvaniyam pana saṅghitabhāvopi abhidheyyoyevāti katvā abhidheyyo abhidhammatthasaṅghapadena dassitoti vuttaṃ. Taṃ na sundaraṃ. Na hi so appadhānatthabhūto saṅghitabhāvo imasmim piṇḍatthadassne abhidheyyo nāma bhavituṃ yuttoti. (Dīpanī, 2).*

Controversy [2]

Vibhāvinī explains that the writing style of the Text (*ganthappakāra*) is indicated by the word “*abhidhammatthasaṅgaha*”. It means that the word “*abhidhammatthasaṅgahaṃ*” expresses the state of being compendium text which summarizes the meaning of Abhidhamma. Therefore, it indicates the writing style of the texts which has complied solitary.⁶

Dīpanī explains that the writing style of the text (*ganthappakāra*) is the style of compilation by gathering common subjects. It is indicated by the word “*saṅgaha*”. And he criticizes that *Vibhāvinī* said “the writing style of the Text (*ganthappakāra*)” is indicated by the word “*abhidhammatthasaṅgaha*”. It is not good because the word “*abhidhammattha*” does not indicate the writing style of the texts.⁷

Controversy [3]

Regarding the meaning of “the Title of the Text (*ganthābhidhāna*)”, both agrees on that is indicated by the word “*abhidhammatthasaṅgahaṃ*” because this word expresses the name that accords with the meaning.⁸

Vibhāvinī explains that the Advantage of the Text (*ganthappayojana*) is indicated by the word “*saṅgaha*”. It means that the word “*abhidhammatthasaṅgahaṃ*” expresses the state of being compendium text which summarizes the meaning of Abhidhamma. This compendium text enables to understand the meaning of Abhidhamma. Those who understand the meaning of Abhidhamma will get benefits in this life and next lives. Therefore, the advantage of the text is indicated by the word “*abhidhammatthasaṅgahaṃ*”.⁹

⁶ Abhis-Ṭ. 70: *Ekattha saṅgahya kathanākāradīpanato.*

⁷ PD. 3: *Sabhāgadhammasaṅgahavasena ganthavidhānākāro ganthappakāro. So pana saṅgahasaddena dassito. Vibhāvanīyaṃ pana abhidhammatthasaṅgahapadenāti vuttaṃ taṃ na sundaraṃ. Na hi abhidhammatthasaddo ganthavidhānākāraṃ dīpetīti.*

⁸ Abhis-Ṭ. 70: *Atthānugatasamaññāparidīpanato.*

⁹ Abhis-Ṭ. 70: *Payojanaṃ pana saṅgahapadena sāmattiyato dassitameva abhidhammatthānaṃ ekattha saṅgahe sati taduggahaparipucchādivasena tesam*

Dīpanī explains that there are many kinds of advantage such as the original and the subsequent advantage. Original advantage is understanding the nature of dhamma and subsequent advantage is the complete extinction free from grasping (*anupādāparinibbāna*). These advantages can be attained by learning this compendium text without trouble. Therefore, the advantage of the text is indicated by the word “*abhidhammatthasaṅgha*”. And he criticizes that *Vibhāvinī* said it is indicated by the word “*saṅgha*”. It is not good because this word, without the combination word “*abhidhammattha*”, cannot convey such a special advantage of complete extinction free from grasping. And another reason is that the word “*saṅgha*” can convey other meaning such as the summarizing of untrue dhamma.¹⁰

Controversy [4]

This controversy concerns *Abhidhamma* perspective and it occurs in the exposition on the benefits of paying respect to the Triple Gem.

Vibhāvinī explains that the paying respect to the Triple Gem is, as to core meaning, the wholesome volition (*kasalacetanā*) which produces the action of paying respect to the Triple Gem. The volition functions as immediately effective *kamma* (*diṭṭhadhammavedanīyakamma*) because it possesses two conditions: The Triple Gem, to which the author pays respect, is the soil of the merits (*puññakhetta*) and the author who pays respect to the Triple Gem has pious intention (*ajjhāsayā*). This immediately effective *kamma* supports to reproductive *kamma* (*janaka*) which is the cause of successful life. The reproductive *kamma* might be hindered by obstructive *kamma* (*upapīḷaka*) and destructive *kamma* (*upacchedaka*). Or on the other word, the successful life might be destroyed

sarūpāvabodhassa, tammūlikāya ca diṭṭhadhammika samparāyikatthasiddhiyā anāyāsena saṃsijjhanato.

¹⁰ PD. 3: *saṅghaganthe kate sati taduggahaparipucchādivasena anāyāsato laddhabbaṃ dhammaṇaṃ sarūpāvabodhādikaṃ anupādāparinibbānantaṃ ganthassa phalānuphalaṃ ganthappayojanaṃ. Taṃpi abhidhammatthasaṅghapadeneva sāmattihiyato dassitaṃ. Vibhāvaniyaṃ pana saṅghasaddena vuttaṃ. Taṃ na sundaraṃ. Na hi abhidhammatthasaddena vinā anāyāsato saṃsiddhimattadīpakena saṅghasaddamattena tādiso anupādāparinibbānanto payojanaviseso sakkā viññātum. Asaddhammasaṅghānaṃpi loke sandissanatoti.*

by the occurrence of disease etc. then, the author could not accomplish the text successfully. The wholesome volition accomplishes a desirable benefit that is non-occurrence of the obstacles of disease etc., so that the author can accomplish the text successfully.¹¹

Dīpanī explains that the paying respect to the Triple Gem is a process of great merit (*puññābhisanda*), a stream of great merit (*puññapavāha*) which produces the action of paying respect to the Triple Gem. The process arises seven impulsion-moments in each term and it accumulates many hundred thousand terms in number. The process is superior merit and it produces great benefits because of two conditions: it grows on the soil of merits, and it is fertilized by pious intention, faith and wisdom of the author.

The process of merits supports to reproductive *kamma* (*janaka*) which has a chance already since the time of rebirth and to other good *kammās* as well which do not have yet a chance of giving results. These *kammās* produce powerful physical and mental processes in the continuity of the author. Then, undesirable results, the obstacles of disease etc., have no chance to arise in the continuity of the author and the bad *kammās* which produce undesirable result are removed in the continuity of the author. In this way, the process of great merits prevents the obstacles of the text that is to say the benefits for the author. The benefits of paying respect to the Triple Gem are not only for the author, but for the students as well.

Ledi Sayadaw criticizes that *Vibhāvinī* seems to explain that the paying respect to the Triple Gem, as to core meaning, is the first impulsion-moment [*pathamajavana*] of wholesome *kamma* because he said the volition functions as immediately effective *kamma* (*diṭṭhadhammavedanīyakamma*). It is not good because it needs here only the function of supporting (*upatthambanakkicca*) and the function of

¹¹ Abhidhs-Ṭ. 70: *Ratanattayapaṇāmo hi atthato paṇāmakiriyābhinipphādikā kusalacetanā. Sā ca vandaneyyavandakānaṃ khettajjhāsayasampadāhi diṭṭhadhammavedanīyā yathāladdhasampattinimittakassa kammaṃ anubalappadānavasena tannibbattitavipākasantatiyā antarāyakarāni upapīlaka upacchedaka kammāni paṭibāhitvā tannidānānaṃ yathādhippetasiddhivibandhakānaṃ rogādiantarāyānam-appavattiṃ sādheti.*

supporting is also found in all of seven impulsion-moments of wholesome *kamma*.¹²

Controversy [5]

This controversy concerns a contextual meaning between two words “*sammāsambuddhaṃ* and *atula*”.¹³ These two words are said with the purpose of paying respect to the Buddha. Herein, only the word “*sammāsambuddhaṃ*” is sufficient for the purpose but it is said another word “*atulaṃ*”. Both Ṭīkās explain the reason of saying the word “*atula*”.

Vibhāvinī explains that the word “*sammāsambuddhaṃ*” expresses only an appellation of the Buddha. It needs to be qualified by the virtues of the Buddha. Therefore, the word “*atulaṃ*” is said to qualify the word “*sammāsambuddhaṃ*”.¹⁴

Dīpanī explains that Anuruddha Mahāthera says the word “*atulaṃ*” to makes his veneration more powerful. It is noted that the veneration by uttering several words of the virtues of the Buddha is more powerful. Herein, there might be a question that the veneration by uttering a single word can accomplish the benefits of preventing dangers. Then, why is it said a second word? The answer is that it can accomplish but the wise men do not limit themselves to utterance of the virtues of the Buddha. Anuruddha Mahāthera is one of the wise men. Moreover, the desirable benefit of veneration is not only prevention of dangers. The benefits of having high intelligence, of accomplishment of the text successfully and of being qualified text are also to be desired. Contemplation on the virtues of the Buddha can support to concentration of the mind. The concentrated mind can develop the quality of intelligent. The Buddha said “*samāhito*

¹² PD. 4, 5: *Ratanattayavandanā hi nāma vandanākiriyaḥhinipphādako satta-kkhattuṃ satta-kkhattuṃ anekakoṭṭisatasahassavāre pavattamāno mahanto puññābhisando paññappavāho...pa.. vibhāvanīyaṃ pana sattasu javanesu pathamajavanavaseneva vandanāpayojanaṃ vibhāvitam viya dissati. “diṭṭhadhammavedanīyabhñtā”ti hi tattha vuttam. Tam na sundaram. Upatthambhanakiccasseva idha adhippetattā. Tassa ca sattasu javanesu upaladdhattāti.*

¹³ *sammāsambuddha*: Perfectly Awakened One, *atula*: incomparable.

¹⁴ Abhidhs-Ṭ. 55: *yathāvuttavacanatthayogepi sammāsambuddhasaddassa bhagavati samaññāvasena pavattattā “atulan”ti iminā viseseti.*

bhikkhave yathābūtaṃ pajānāti:¹⁵ Oh, Monks, the concentrated mind can see as they really are”. Therefore, Anuruddha Mahāthera says the word “atulaṃ” to make his veneration more powerful for such benefits.

Ledi Sayadaw criticizes that *Vibhāvinī* seems to explain that the word “*sammāsambuddhaṃ*” expresses only an appellation of the Buddha. It needs to be qualified by the virtues of the Buddha. Therefore, the word “*atulaṃ*” is said to qualify the word “*sammāsambuddhaṃ*”. It is not good because the word “*sammāsambuddhaṃ*” is great word among the words of virtue of the Buddha like the moon among the stars. Therefore, the word should not be just appellation for those who know pāli language. For the others, who do not know the pāli language, even thousand words would be appellation.¹⁶

Controversy [6]

This controversy concerns a philological perspective of the word “*tula*”, a partial word of *atulaṃ*.

Vibhāvinī explains the formation of the word “*tula*” that *tulāya sammito tulyo. So yeva tulo yakāralopavasena*. The person who is measured [by a knowledge] is *tulya*: comparable one. The word “*tulya*” becomes “*tula*” because of elision of the letter “*y*”. in other way, by using “*a*” suffix in the sense of measurement (*sammitattha*), *tulāya sammito tulo*: The person who is measured [by a knowledge] is “*tula*: comparable one”. *Na tulo atulo*: he is not comparable person: incomparable person.¹⁷

It means that the word “*tula*” is secondary derivative form (*taddhita*). The formation of it could be two ways, “*tula*” stem with “*ya*”

¹⁵ S. III. 13.

¹⁶ PD. 8, 9: *Idāni thero attano vandanaṃ suṭṭhubalavaṃ karonto atulanti āha. Anekaguṇapadavisayā hi vandanā suṭṭhutaraṃ balavatī hoti...pa... vibhāvanīyaṃ pana yathāvuttavacanattayogepi sammāsambuddhasaddassa bhagavati samaññāvasena pavattattā atulanti iminā visesotīti vuttaṃ. Taṃ na sundaraṃ. Mahantaṃ hi satthuguṇapadānaṃ majjhe etaṃ sammāsambuddhapadaṃ cando viya tārakānaṃ majjhe. Tasmā taṃ sabhāvaniruttiṃ jānantānaṃ santike sabhāvattahasuññaṃ satthusamaññāmattaṃ bhavituṃ nārahati. Aññesaṃ pana padasahassaṃ vuccamānānaṃ satthu samaññāmattameva sampajjatīti.*

¹⁷ Abhidhs-Ṭ. 71: *Tulāya sammito tulyo. Soyeva tulo yakārassalopavasena. Atha vā sammitatthe akārapaccayavasena tulāya sammito tulo.*

suffix or “a” suffix. Both are used in the sense of measurement (*sammita*). In the first way, the combination of “tula” stem and “ya” suffix becomes *tulya*. (*tula+ya= tulya*). In this step, the “y” is elided, then becomes “tula”. In the second way, it is combination of “tula” and “a”, it simply becomes “tula” (*tula+a= tula*).¹⁸

Dīpanī explains that *tulayitabbo aññena saha pamitabboti tulo*: one who can be compared with another is called “tula”. It means that the word “tula” is primary derivative form, a combination of “tula” root and “a” suffix. The “a” suffix is used in the sense of accusative (*Kammasādhana*). It simply becomes “tula” ($\sqrt{tul+a} = tula$)

Ledi Sayadaw criticizes that *Vibhāvinī* said the “tula” is formed by means of using “yya” or “a” in sense of measured (*sammitattha*). It is not good because the word “tula” is possible to be formed by means of root and in the sense of accusative (*Kammasādhana*). The word “atula” is defined in *Ṭīkā* that *tulayituṃ asakkuṇeyyoti atulo. Appameyyoti*: “atula” is so called because one cannot be measure; it means ‘measureless one’. The definition denotes that the word “tula” is in the sense of accusative (*Kammasādhana*). If so, the desirable meaning is complete with *Kammasādhana*. It is useless to think of using ‘yya’ or ‘a’ in the sense of measured (*sammitattha*). There might be an argument that there is a rule: “*vatticchānugato saddappayogo*: the terminology is according to a speaker”. It should be noted because it is thinking of a way what has not been heard, having put aside the way what has been heard and appropriated.¹⁹

¹⁸ Ashin Janakābhivamsa, *Ṭīkāyāw Nissaya*, (Amarapura: Mahāgandhārum Press, 1998), p. 27.

¹⁹ PD. 10: *Tulayitabbo aññena saha pamitabboti atulo. Vibhāvanīyaṃ pana sammitatthe yyakārassa akārassa vā vasena etaṃ siddhanti vuttaṃ. Taṃ na sundaraṃ. Na hi tulasaddo dhātusiddho kammasādhano ca bhavituṃ na yutto. Tulayituṃ asakkuṇeyyoti atulo. Appameyyoti hi ṭīkāyaṃ vuttaṃ. Etena tulasaddo kammasādhano dīpeti. Evañca sati kammasādhaneneva tadatthasiddhito kiṃ tato sammitatthe yyakārassa akārassa vā cintanāyāti. Vatticchānugato saddappayogoti katvā etaṃ vuttanti ce. Na. yathā suttaṃ yuttaṃ vajjetvā assutassa parikkappanāya payoanābhāvatoti.*

Controversy [7], [8], [9]

These controversy points concern implied meaning (*neyyattha*) of the two words “sammāsambuddhaṃ, atulaṃ”. Both Ṭīkās agree on that these two words imply three accomplishments (*sampadā*) that are being to the Buddha. They are:

The accomplishment of the cause (*hetusampadā*)

The accomplishment of result (*phalasampadā*), and

The accomplishment of great help to beings (*sattupakārasampadā*).

Among these three, the accomplishment of result is four-fold. Regarding these four, two Ṭīkās explain slightly different.²⁰

Vibhāvinī explains that the accomplishment of result is fourfold. They are:

The accomplishment of knowledge (*ñāṇasampadā*),

The accomplishment of removing (*pahānasampadā*),

The accomplishment of majesty (*ānubhāvasampadā*), and

The accomplishment of physical appearance (*rūpakāyasampadā*).

Among these, the accomplishment of knowledge is the path-knowledge (*maggañāṇa*) which is a proximate cause of Omniscience (*sabbaññutañāṇa*) and the knowledges that consist of ten powers etc., that are the sequence of the path-knowledge. The accomplishment of removing (*pahānasampadā*) is achieving the state of complete non-arising of all the defilements together with habitual impression (*vāsanā*).

²⁰ AbhidhsṬ. 72: *Ettāvatā ca hetuphalasattupakārasampadāvasena tīhākārehi bhagavato thomanā kata hoti. Pahālasampadā pana ñāṇapahāna ānubhāva rūpakāya sampadāvasena catubbidhā. Tattha sabbaññutañāṇapadaṭṭhānaṃ maggañāṇaṃ, tammūlakāni ca dasabalādiñāṇāni ñāṇasampadā.*

Dīpanī explains that the accomplishment of result is fourfold. They are:

The accomplishment of removing (*pahānasampadā*),
 The accomplishment of knowledge (*ñāṇasampadā*),
 The accomplishment of majesty (*ānubhāvasampadā*), and
 The accomplishment of physical appearance (*rūpakāyasampadā*)

Among these, the accomplishment of removing is expelling the mental defilements together with habitual impression (*vāsanā*). It is absolute eradication. As to core meaning, it is the noble path (*ariyamagga*) or it is the highest-knowledge [i.e. *arahattamaggañāṇa*].²¹

The accomplishment of knowledge is the knowledge of Omniscience Buddha, the knowledge of tenfold power (*dasabala*) and so on.

[7] *Dīpanī* criticizes *Vibhāvinī* for the order of accomplishment that *Vibhāvini* states *ñāṇasampadā* first and then, *pahānasampadā*. *Pahānasampadā* should be stated first because it is the forerunner and the cause of *ñāṇasampadā* as well.²² It is stated first in *Mahāṭīkā*.²³

[8] *Vibhāvinī* said the accomplishment of knowledge is the highest-knowledge (*aggamaggañāṇa*)²⁴ which is a proximate cause of Omniscience (*sabbaññutañāṇa*). it is not reasonable because the highest-

²¹ PD. 11: *Phalasampadā catubbidhā pahānasampadā ñāṇasampadā ānubhāva-sampadā rūpakāyasampadā cāti. Tattha saha vāsanāya kilesappahānaṃ pahānasampadā nāma. Pahānassa sabbapāripūritāti attho. Atthato pana ariyamaggo, aggamaggaññāṇameva vā.*

²² PD. 11: *Sabbaññuta ññāṇa dasabalaññāṇādīni ñāṇasampadā vibhāvaniyaṃ pana Etāsu dvīsu sampadāsu ñāṇasampadā pathamaṃ vuttā, tato pahānasampadā. ahānasampadāyeva pana pathamaṃ vattabbā. Sā hi ñāṇasampadāyapubbaṅgamabhūtā paccay abhūtā ca. Mahāṭīkāyañca sāyeva pathamaṃ vuttāti.*

²³ *VismT*, I. 3.

²⁴ Here, the *pāli* in *Vibhāvinī* is *maggañāṇaṃ*, but the *Pāli* in the quotation by *Dīpanī* is *aggamaggañāṇaṃ*. as to core meaning, it is the same meaning.

knowledge should be certainly the accomplishment of removing (*pahānasampadā*). There is no other thing apart from highest-knowledge to be called the accomplishment of removing. Perhaps, someone may say that the path-knowledge is either knowledge (*ñāṇa*) or eradication (*pahāna*). Therefore, it should be both (*ñāṇa* and *pahāna*). It is also not reasonable because it would be a mixture of accomplishment (*sampadāpasāṅga*).²⁵

[9] *Vibhāvinī* should mention the knowledge of Omniscience Buddha first in the explanation on accomplishment of knowledge but it did not mention. It is not good. Someone may say that by the word “*ādi*” in the phrase “*tammulakāni ca dasabalādiñānāni*”, the knowledge of Omniscience Buddha is also included. It is also not reasonable because it is not proper way to express the minor points directly and the major point by the word “*ādi*”.²⁶

Controversy [10]

This controversy concerns a terminology and contextual meaning of the word “*sasaddhammagāṇuttama*”.

Vibhāvinī explains that Anuruddha Mahāthera has worshipped to the Buddha by the words “*sammāsambuddhaṃ and atulaṃ*” that express three accomplishments. Now he said the word “*sasaddhammagāṇuttamaṃ*” to worship the other two Gem, the Dhamma and the Saṅgha. The fact should be known that the Dhamma and Saṅgha are worth to be worshipped (*abhivādettabba*) though they are here placed at minor position (*guṇībhūta*) because they associate with the Buddha. It is like an example

²⁵ PD. 11: *Yaṅca vibhāvanīyaṃ ‘Sabbaññutaññānapadaṭṭhānaṃ aggamaṅga-ññāna’nti ñāṇasampadāyaṃ vuttaṃ. Taṃpi na yujjati. Aggamaṅgaññānañhi pahānasampadā eva bhavituṃ arahati. Na hi maggaññānato aññā pahānasampadānāma atthīti. Yaṅca koci vadeyya maggaññānaṃ ñāṇaṅca hoti pahānaṅca. Tasmā ubhayattha vattuṃ yuttanti. Taṃpi na yujjati. Evañhi sati sampadāsaṅkaro hotīti.*

²⁶ PD. 12: *Tathā vibhāvanīyaṃ Ñāṇasampadāyaṃ sabbaññutaññānaṃ sabba-pathamaṃ vattabbaṃpi na vuttaṃ. Taṃpi na sundaraṃ. Nanu ‘tammūlakāni ca dasabalādi ñāṇāni’ ti ettha ādisaddena sabbaññutaññānaṃpi gahitanti ce. Taṃpi na yujjati. Na hi appadhānaṃ sarūpato niddisitivā padhānaṃ pākātaṃ ādisaddena gahitanti ñāyāgataṃ hotīti*

such as “he come together with his wife and children’, [one understands that] the wife and the children come too”.²⁷

Dīpanī explains that Anuruddha Mahāthera said the word, “*sasaddhamma ganuttamaṃ*” to make his worship more powerful. By this word, he pays respect to the Dhamma and the *Saṅgha* too. it is like a passage that “from distance, I pay respect to the Lord of the word together with the *Saṅgha*”. Herein, the paying respect to the *Saṅgha* can be known through the word “together (*sa*)”. the same way is to be applied here too.²⁸

Dīpanī criticizes *Vibhāvinī* for a usage of “*tabba*” suffix in the word “*abhivādetabba*”. It should not be said “*abhivādetabbabhāvo*” (worth to be worshipped), but it should be said “*abhivāditabhāvo*” (have been worshipped) or “*abhivādanam*” (worshipping). Then, the meaning will be that Anuruddhathera worships the Dhamma and the *Saṅgha* too because these words convey the desirable action of worshipping. Otherwise, the word “*abhivādetabbabhūto*” would convey the meaning of the group of virtues that is worth to be worshipped because the suffix “*tabba*” conveys the meaning of “deserving”. It is not desirable here and it is also not according with his example “one comes together with his wife and children”.²⁹

It is possible to say that Anuruddhathera paid respect to the Triple Gem when he is about to begin compiling his text; then, he composed this

²⁷ AbhidhsṬ. 72: *Tadevaṃ tividhāvatthāsaṅgahitathomanāpubbaṅgamaṃ buddha-ratanaṃ vanditvā idāni sesaratanānampi paṇāmamārabhanto āha “sasaddhamma-gaṇuttama”nti. Guṇībhūtānampi hi dhammasaṅghānaṃ abhivādetabbabhāvo sahayogena viññāyati yathā “saputtadāro āgatoti puttadārassāpi āgamana”nti.*

²⁸ PD. 12: *Punapi thero attano vandanaṃ balavataraṃ karonto sasaddhamma-gaṇuttamanti āha. Etena dhammasaṅghānaṃpi vandanā katā hoti. Dūratohaṃ namassissaṃ, sasaṅghaṃ lokanāyakanti hi vutte saṅghassapi namanakriyāpatti sahasaddena viññāyati. Eva midam daṭṭhabbam*

²⁹ PD. 12: *Yampana vibhāvaniyam “Guṇībhūtānampi hi dhammasaṅghānaṃ abhivādetabba bhāvo sahayogena viññāyatī”ti vuttaṃ. Tattha abhivādetabba bhāvoti navattabbaṃ. Abhivāditabhāvoti pana abhivādananti vā vattabbaṃ. Evañhi sati idha adhippetassa kriyā samavāyassa siddhattā dhammasaṅghānaṃpi therassa vandanā kriyāpatti siddhā hotīti. Itarathā tabbapaccayassa arahatthadīpanato abhivādanā rahatā saṅkhāta guṇasamavāyo vutto siyā. Soca idha nādhippeto. Attano nidassanena ca saha na sameti saputtadāro āgatoti.*

verse to denote his worship together with his acknowledgement to write the text. Therefore, he used the word “*abhivādiya* (having worshipped)”, not used the word “*abhivādiyāmi* (I worship).³⁰

Controversy [11]

This controversy concerns philological perspective that is making a formal definition of the word “*gaṇuttamo*”, a partial word of “*sasaddhammagāṇuttamo*”.

Vibhāvinī explains the meaning of the word “*gaṇuttamo*” by making three types of formal definitions (*viggaha*); Adjectival Compound (*kammadhārayasamāsa*) and two Dependent Determinative Compounds (*chaṭṭhī-tappurisa*, *sattamī-tappurisasamāsa*).³¹

Adjectival Compound is that *gaṇo ca so aṭṭhannaṃ ariyapuggalānaṃ samūhabhāvato*: the community (*gaṇa*) is so called because it is a state of gathering of noble persons. *Uttamo ca suppaṭipannatādiguṇavisesayogato*: the supreme (*uttama*) is so called because it is associated with special qualities beginning with “well-practice” etc. Its core definition is that *gaṇo ca so uttamo cāti gaṇuttamo*; the community that is supreme is called supreme-community (*gaṇuttamo*).

Dependent Determinative Compound is that *gaṇānaṃ, gaṇesu vā devamanussādisamūhesu uttamo yathāvuttaguṇavasenāti gaṇuttamo*: it is called supreme community because it the most supreme of, or among, communities, gathering of gods and men, by way of qualities that have been said. Its core definition is that *gaṇānaṃ or gaṇesu uttamo gaṇuttamo*: the supreme community is so called because it is the most supreme of, or among the communities.³²

³⁰ PD. 12: *Apica thero imaṃ ganthaṃ racayissāmīti pubbabhāgeyeva tīṇi ratanāni vandi, atha taṃ attano vandanaṃ ganthappaṭiññāya saha ghaṭetvā dassento imaṃ gāthaṃ racayītipi na na sakkā vattunti. Tathāhi abhivādiyāti vuttaṃ. Na abhivādiyāmīti.*

³¹ Prof. A. P. Buddhadatta Maha Thera, **The New Pāḷi Course**, Vol. II, (Kandy: Buddhist Cultureal Centre, 2006), pp. 40, 46.

³² Abhidhṭ. 73: *gaṇo ca so aṭṭhannaṃ ariyapuggalānaṃ samūhabhāvato uttamoca suppaṭipannatādi guṇavisesayogato. Gaṇānaṃ, gaṇesu vā devamanussādi samūhesu uttamo yathāvuttaguṇavasenāti gaṇuttamo.*

Dīpanī explains the meaning of the word “*gaṇuttamo*” by formal definition of Adjectival Compound (*kammadhārayasamāsa*) that the word community (*gaṇa*) is used for the community of those have common views and moralities in the word. The high is used for the Saṅha, disciples of the Buddha because of high virtues of moralities etc. the core meaning if that *uttamo ca gaṇo cāti uttamagaṇo*: that high that is community is called “*uttamagaṇo*”. This word “*uttamagaṇo*” is used as “*gaṇuttamo*” in reversed order, like “*muniseṭṭho* (noble sage) and “*munivaro* (exalted sage)”³³.

Dīpanī criticizes *Vibhāvinī* for the formal definition of Dependent Determinative Compound: *gaṇānaṃ or gaṇesu uttamo gaṇuttamo*: the supreme community is so called because it is the most supreme of, or among the communities. It is not good because in the definition, the word “*uttama*” would convey a major meaning (*padhānabhūta*). The word “*uttama*” conveys only the sense of adjective or minor meaning (*guṇībhūta*). Therefore, it cannot convey the meaning of the *Ariyaśaṅgha*.³⁴

3.2 The controversy points in second verse

Tattha vuttā bhidhammatthā catudhā paramatthato

Cittaṃ cetasikaṃ rūpaṃ nibbānamīti sabbathā.

These things are set forth, in their ultimate sense,

As Categories Four – first, Consciousness:

Next Mental Properties; the Qualities

³³ PD. 16: *Gaṇuttamapade loke samāna diṭṭhisīlānaṃ sahadhammikānaṃ samūho gaṇoti vuccati. Idha pana uttamehi sīlādiguṇehi yutto bhagavato sāvakaśaṅgho uttamoca so gaṇocāti atthena uttamagaṇonāma. Soyeva idha gaṇuttamoti vuccati yathā muniseṭṭho munivaroti*

³⁴ PD. 16: *Vibhāvaniyaṃ pana “Gaṇānaṃ gaṇesuvā devamanussādisamūhesu uttamo gaṇuttamo”ti ca vuttaṃ. Taṃ na sundaraṃ. Etasmiñhi atthe sati uttamasaddo padhānabhūto hoti. Soca guṇamhiyeva pavattaṭṭi tena idha ariyaśaṅgho vuttoti nasijjhatīti.*

Material, Bodily; Nibbana last.³⁵

Controversy [12], [13]

These controversies concern a demonstrative meaning of *tattha* and a contextual meaning of “*sabbathā*”.

Vibhāvinī explains that *tattha tasmim̐ abhidhamme sabbathā kusalādivasena ca khandhādivasena ca vuttā*: therein – in the Abhidhamma – the topic to Abhidhamma spoken of in full, as wholesome and so on, and as aggregates and so on.³⁶ It means that the word “ta” of *tattha* demonstrates the meaning of the word “*abhidhammattha*”, a partial word of *abhidhammatthasaṅgahaṃ* that had been said in previous verse. The word “*sabbathā*” contacts to the word “*vuttā*” in the verse, i.e. spoken of in full or spoken of in all.³⁷

Dīpanī explains that *tattha tatthāti bhāsissaṃ abhidhammatthasaṅgahanti vutte tasmim̐ abhidhammatthasaṅgahapade mañā vuttā abhidhammatthā sabbathā paramatthato catudhā hontīti yojana*: herein, *Tattha* means “in that word “*Abhidhammatthasaṅgahaṃ*” which is used in this phrase “*bhāsissaṃ abhidhammatthasaṅgahaṃ*”, the topics in *Abhidhamma* (*abhidhammattha*) pointed out by me are fourfold in all aspects under the name of *paramattha* (ultimate reality). This is interpretation.³⁸ It means that the word “ta” of *tattha* demonstrates the meaning of the word “*abhidhammatthasaṅgahaṃ*” which had been said in previous verse. The word “*sabbathā*” contacts to the word “*catudhā*”, i.e. fourfold in all aspects.³⁹

³⁵ Shwe Zan Aung, **Compendium of Philosophy**, (London: PTS, 1972), p. 81.

³⁶ R. P. Wijeratne and Rupert Gettin, **Summary of the topics of Abhidhamma and Exposition of the Topics of Abhidhamma**, (London: PTS, 2007), P. 7.

³⁷ AbhidhsṬ. 73: *Tattha tasmim̐ abhidhamme sabbathā kusalādivasena, khandhādivasena ca vuttā*

³⁸ Ashin Nandamālābhivamsa, **Paramatthadīpanī (the exposition of true meaning)**, Master’s Degree Thesis, (Sri Lanka: Peradeniya University, 1996), p. 23.

³⁹ PD. 23: *tatthāti bhāsissaṃ abhidhammattha saṅgahanti vutte tasmim̐ abhidhammatthasaṅgahapade mayā vuttā abhidhammatthā sabbathāparamatthato catudhā hontīti yojanā*.

[12] Dipanī criticizes old Ṭīkās and *Vibhāvinī* that in Ṭīkās, the word “*ta*” of *tattha* demonstrates “in that text, “*abhidhammatthasaṅgaha*”, or in that word “*abhidhammattha*”, or in that *Abhidhamma*. In the *Vibhāvinī* says “in that *Abhidhamma*”. All are not good. Because the meaning – the topics in *Abhidhamma* which I have already mentioned in this book, *Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha*- is not reasonable. Even the book is not yet compiled, it will be compiled later. Then, where are the topics in *Abhidhamma*? Moreover, there is no such word “*ta*” that demonstrates a minor meaning at the beginning in the commentaries. Therefore, the demonstrative meaning of the word “*ta*” here must be understood as if the word “*ta*” in the first sentence, *tattha kenatthena abhidhammo*” in the *Aṭṭhasālinī*.⁴⁰

[13] Then, the interpretation in all Ṭīkās “pointed in all aspects” is rejected because the interpretation does not accord with these upcoming word “*sabbathā dvādasa, sabbathāpi aṭṭhārasa* etc.”. Herein, “*sabbathā*” means that it is only four in all aspects of divisions, wholesome etc., that is preached in *Dhammasaṅgaṇī*; it is also four in all aspects of division, aggregates etc., that is preached in *Vibhaṅgaha*. And it also should be said “in all aspects of division that is preached in *Dhātukathā* and so on.”⁴¹

Controversy [14]

This controversy concerns the definition of the words “*paramma*” and “*attha*”.

⁴⁰ PD. 23: *Etthaca Ṭīkāyaṃ tāva Tattha tasmim abhidhammatthasaṅgaha-pakaraṇetivā abhidhammattha padetivā abhidhammetivā tasaddattho niddiṭṭho. Vibhāvaniyaṃ pana tasmim abhidhammeti. Sabbam nasundaram. Na hi abhidhammattha saṅgahapakaraṇe mayā vuttā abhidhammatthāti yujjati. Pakaraṇampi hi upari vuccamānameva hoti. Natu vuttaṃ. Kuto abhidhammatthāti. Na ca saṃvaṇṇanāpakaraṇesu ādimhiyeva tāva tasaddo appadhānapadāni paccāmasatīti atthi. Tasmā aṭṭhasāliniyaṃ ādimhi tattha kena ṭṭhena abhidhammoti vākyeviya idha tasaddattho veditabboti. Evañhi sati.*

⁴¹ PD. 23: *Evañhi sati Ṭīkāsu Sabbathā vuttāti yojanāpi paṭikkhittā hoti. Sā hi vakkhamānehi sabbayāpi dvādasa, sabbathāpi aṭṭhārasātiādīhi nasameṭīti. Tatta sabbathāti dhammasaṅgaṇiyaṃ vuttana kusalādinā sabbappakārenapi catudhāva honti, vibhaṅge vibhatte na khandhādinā sabbappakārenapi catudhāva hontīti attho. Dhātu kathāyaṃ vuttenātiādīnāpi vattabbam*

Vibhāvinī explains the meaning of the word “*paramattha*” by the two types of formal definitions; Adjectival compound and Dependent determinative compound. Adjectival compound is that *paramo uttamo aviparito attho paramattho*: the sense that is highest, undistorted is called “ultimate true (*paramattha*)”. Depended determinative compound is that *paramassa uttassa ñāṇassa attho gocaroti paramattho*: the sense that is a sphere of the ultimate, the knowledge, the highest is called ultimate true (*paramattha*). It means that in the first definition, the word “*parama*” conveys the meaning of *uttama* or *aviparita*, in the second definition, the word “*parama*” conveys the meaning of *ñāṇa* and the word “*attha*” conveys the meaning of “*gocara*”.⁴²

Dīpanī explains the meaning of the word “*paramattha*” that It is called “*paramattha*” because it is the *attha* (thing) which is higher (*parama*) than the other in the sense of absolute reality. In other way, it is “*paramattha*” which is an absolute thing in the sense of not failing in reaction accordingly for those who practice realizing what should be realized; to analyze what should be analyzed; to eradicate what should be eradicated; to attain what should be attained; to develop what should be developed with such a confidence. In this exposition, the point is that *paramo uttamo attho paramatto*.⁴³

Dīpanī criticizes *Vibhāvinī* for the interpretation of the word “*parama*” as “knowledge” and the word “*attha*” as “an object” because word “*parama*” does not conveys the meaning of knowledge and the word “*attha*” does not conveys the meaning of object. Therefore, the interpretation of *Vibhāvinī* not good in grammatical and meaning as well.⁴⁴

⁴² AbhidhsṬ. 74: *paramo uttamo aviparīto attho, paramassa vā uttamassa ñāṇassa attho gocaroti paramattho*:

⁴³ PD. 23: *Ekantavijjamānaṭṭhena itarato paramo ukkaṃsagato atthoti paramattho. Apica ye ayaṃ atthi ayaṃ upalabbhatīti gahetvā tassa abhiññeyyassa abhiññatthāya pariññeyyassa pariññatthāya pahātabbassa pahānatthāya sacchikātabbassa sacchikaraṇatthāya bhāvetabbassa bhāvanatthā paṭipajjanti. Tesam tadatthasādhane avisaṃvādakaṭṭhena paramo uttamo atthoti paramattho*

⁴⁴ PD. 23: *Vibhāvinīyaṃ pana, “paramassa vā uttamassa ñāṇassa attho gocaroti paramattho” tipi vuttaṃ. Taṃ na sundaraṃ. Na hi paramasaddo ñāṇe vattamāno dissati. Na ca atthasaddo gocareti.*

Controversy [15]

This controversy concerns the formal definition of the words “*citta*”.

Vibhāvinī explains the meaning of the word “*citta*” by three ways of formal definition:

1. *Cintetīti cittaṃ*; that which is conscious is called consciousness. it is called a way of agent (*kattusādhan*).
2. *Cintenti vā etena karaṇabhūtena sampayuttadhammāti cittaṃ*: Or else consciousness is the meaning by which the associated dhammas are conscious. it is called a way of instrumental (*karaṇasādhana*) and
3. *Cintanamattaṃ cittaṃ*: a consciousness is the mere act of being conscious. It is called a way of nature (*bhāvasādhana*).

Regarding these three ways of definition, *Vibhāvinī* say thus: Among the three definitions, the way of agent and way of instrumental are alternative definitions (*pariyāyanibbacana*) and only the way of nature is definitive definition (*nippariyāyanibbacana*).⁴⁵ It means that the state of agent of dhammas is to be said in term of putting themselves foremost in demonstrating own function. The state of instrumentality of the dhamma in the function of causing is to be said in term of putting themselves as agent among the associated dhammas. On the other hand, the two alternative definitions are made to indicate a non-existence of agent etc., apart from a particular nature of dhamma.⁴⁶

Dīpanī explains the meaning of the word “*citta*” by three ways of formal definition:

⁴⁵ Mahagandharum Sayadaw, **Tikākyaw Nissaya**, (Amarapura: Myanmar, New Burma press, 2000), p. 46.

⁴⁶AbhidhsṬ. 73: *Evañca katvā sabbesampi paramatthadhammānaṃ bhāvasādhanameva nippariyāyato labbhati, kattukaraṇavasena pana nibbacanaṃ pariyāyakathāti daṭṭhabbaṃ. Sakasakakiccesu hi dhammānaṃ attappadhānatā-samāropanena kattubhāvo ca, tadanukūlabhāvena sahaṅgādhammasamūhe kattubhāvasamāropanena paṭipādetabbadhammassa karaṇattañca pariyāyatova labbhati, tathānidassanaṃ pana dhammasabhāvavinimuttassa kattādino abhāvaparidīpanatthanti veditabbaṃ.*

1. *Cintetīti cittaṃ*: that which is conscious is called consciousness. . it is called a way of agent (*kattusāadhan*).
2. *Cintenti sampayuttakā dhamma etenāti cittaṃ*: so called, because through which the mental concomitants (*sampayuttakā*) come to be conscious of. it is called a way of instrumental (*karaṇasādhana*) and
3. *Cintanamattaṃ cittaṃ*: a consciousness is being merely to be conscious of. It is called a way of nature (*bhāvasādhana*).

Regarding these three ways of definition, *Dīpanī* says thus: to make definition all *paramattha dhamma*, only the way of nature (*bhāvasādhana*) is definitive way. It refers to the state of action of all paramattha dhamma. All dhamma have just action of their function. The other two ways are to be known as alternative ways [*pariyāya*]. The consciousness and the action of conscious are indivisible. But the first definition, the way of agent seems to indicate that there is some substance or self or doer etc., apart from consciousness which conscious or knows. It said indivisible as dividing in alternative way [*pariyāyakathā*] in order to know special meanings. It should be known as example: “*silaputtakassa sarīraṃ*: the body of small stone”. In the example, stone and body of stone are indivisible but it is as dividing. This alternative way is done to show that there is no soul, no life, no being and no person apart from the *paramattha dhamma*. Actually, they are just imagery of other viewers. If there exists soul, life etc., there will be useless that thinking indivisible as dividing way.

Dīpanī criticizes that *Vibhāvinī* said thus: “*Sakasaka kiccesu hi dhammānaṃ attappadhānatā samāropanena kattubhāvo*: For a dhamma’s being treated as an agent, by attributing the status of ‘self’ to the particular function of a dhamma,”. It seems to say “thinking of unreality as reality (*abhūtaśa bhūtakappaṇā*)” as in the example “the horn of hare (*sasavisāṇa*). it means that there is no doer (*kattā*) nor no one who commands to do (*kāretā*) in the *paramattha dhamma*. However, there is a doer [*kaattā*] who or which put on itself foremost in accomplishing specific action. Therefore, the definition way of agent, *cintetīti cittaṃ*, is said to explain that *citta* is foremost in functioning conscious by placing “the state of doer [*kattubhāva*]” upon consciousness.

Controversy [16]

This controversy concerns the explanation of mentality (*cetasika*).

Vibhāvinī explains the meaning of mentality that It is called “*cetasika*: mentality” because it exists in the mind. It occurs in dependence upon mind or other word, its occurrence is related to mind. Here, mentality is said as “*cittāyattavutti*: occurrence related to mind”. Some may argue that consciousness’s occurrence is also related to mentality. So, consciousness should be said as “*cetasikāyattavutti*: occurrence related to mentality”. To prevent this argument, *Vibhāvinī* explains that mentality cannot arise or cannot take an object without consciousness, but consciousness can occur or can take an object without some kinds of mentalities. Therefore, only mentality is said as “*cittāyattavutti*”.⁴⁷

Dīpanī explains the meaning of mentality that *cetasi bhavaṃ cetasikaṃ*: that which is born in consciousness is mentality”. It is said “born in consciousness” because it arises depending upon consciousness. “depending upon consciousness” means that mentality seems to unite with consciousness by way of characteristics such as arising together, ceasing together and so on. When consciousness arises, mentalities arise. When consciousness decays, mentalities decay. When consciousness ceases, Mentalities cease. The object of consciousness is the object of mentalities. The seat of consciousness is the seat of mentalities. It refers to mental states such *vittakka*, *phassa*, *vedanā* etc.⁴⁸ The *vitakka*, *phassa* ect., which are bonded with consciousness by ways of arising together etc., are called mentality. They are similar to variety of flowers in a garland that are bonded on a stalk.

⁴⁷ Abhids-Ṭ. 75: *Cetasi bhavaṃ tadāyattavuttitāyāti cetasikaṃ. Na hi taṃ cittaṇa vinā ārammaṇaggahaṇasamatthaṃ asati citte sabbena sabbaṃ anuppajjanato, cittaṃ pana kenaci cetasikena vināpi ārammaṇe pavattaṭṭi taṃ cetasikameva cittāyattavuttikaṃ nāma.*

⁴⁸ PD. 27: *Cetasikanti ettha cetasi bhavaṃ tadāyattavuttitāyāti cetasikaṃ. Phassādi dhammajātaṃ. Etthaca tadāyattavuttitā nāma ekuppādatādīhi lakkhaṇehi cittaṇa saha ekī bhūtaṇa viya pavatti. Etena yā cittaṇa jāti. Sāeva phassādīnaṃ. Yā cittaṇa jarā, yaṃ cittaṇa maraṇaṃ, yaṃ cittaṇa ārammaṇaṃ, yaṃ cittaṇa vatthu, tadeva phassādīnanti evaṃ ekapuppha maṅjariyaṃ ekavaṇṭupanibbandhāni pupphāni viya cittaṇa saha ekajātiyādi upanibbandhā phassādayo dhammā idha cetasikaṃnāmāti siddhā honti.*

Dīpanī criticizes *Vibhāvinī* for showing only one reason that is to be called mentality that *Vibhāvinī* explains the state of depended upon mind and the state of being mentality is through merely being on the same object. It is not correct. Because it cannot be called *Cetasika* merely through the state of being on the same object. It means that Sumaṅgala Mahathera himself will explain full characteristic of mentality next chapter. Actually, these characteristics should be explained here because of the place where the exact meaning of the word “*cetasika*” is to be defined.⁴⁹

Controversy [17]

This controversy concerns the explanation of an argument about whether the immaterial dhamma (*arūpadhamma*) would be called “*rūpa*”.

Vibhāvinī explains the meaning of *rūpa* and the immaterial dhamma cannot be called *rūpa* that It is called “*rūpa*: materiality” because it changes due to opposite conditions such as cold, heat etc. The Buddha said “*sītenapi ruppanti*: change due to cool, *uñhenapi ruppanti*: change due to heat” etc. Changing means becoming different from previous form to another form when conditions take place. Then there would be an argument that immaterial dhamma (*arūpadhamma*) too can be called “*rūpa*: materiality” because they also change constantly. It cannot be called because changing here, refers to only obvious different due to cold, heat etc. The words “*sītenapi uñhenapi*” are said to prevent such argument. Otherwise, it would say only “*ruppanti*”.⁵⁰

Dīpanī explains It is called “*rūpa*: materiality” because it changes due to harmful conditions such as cold, hear, hungry etc. or it is changed by harmful conditions such as cold, heat, hungry etc. there are two kinds of changing, increasing and decreasing. Both are clearly known at the time of destruction and construction of universe, and in changing of various life-

⁴⁹ PD. 27: *Vibhāvaniyaṃ pana Ekālamāṇatā mattena tesaṃ tadāyattavuttitaṃ cetasi kattañca vibhāveti. Taṃ na sundaraṃ. Na hi ekālamāṇatāmattena cetasikaṃnāma jātanti.*

⁵⁰ Abhidhs-Ṭ. 75: *Ruppanti rūpaṃ, sītuñhādivirodhipaccayehi vikāramāpajjati, āpādīyānti vā attho. Tenāha bhagavā ‘sītenapi ruppanti, uñhenapi ruppanti’ tyādi⁵⁰ ruppanañcetha sītādivirodhipaccayasamavāye visadisuppattiyeva. Yadi evaṃ arūpadhammānampi rūpavohāro āpajjanti? Nāpajjati sītādiggaḥaṇasāmatthiyato vibhūtatarasseva rupanassādhippetattā. Itarathā hi ‘ruppanti’ ti avisesavacaneneva pariyattanti kiṃ sītādiggaḥaṇena*

span, years, season, month, night, day and so on. The term “*rūpa*” is used for only dhammas which changes through impact because they have substance. *Rūpa* dhammas have nature of gross. They become form of substance when many of them are united. They have substance when gathered many groups of materiality at a moment.⁵¹ Therefore, the term “*rūpa*” is used only for the dhammas which have substance and their chaining is common to the people. On the contrary, mentalities (*arūpadhamma*) have no substance and their changing is not common to the people. Their changing can be understood only when seeing or hearing the change of materiality or having asked. Therefore, mentality is not called “*rūpa*”.⁵²

Dīpanī criticizes *Vibhāvinī* that it expels the supposition that mentality could be called “*rūpa*”, by the ability of the terms “*sīta, uṇha* etc.” it means that there is saying that *sītenapi ruppanti*: it changes due to cold, *uṇhenapi ruppanti*: it changes due to heat, etc. it is well known to the world. It shows that the changing of mentality which is not well known to the world, is here, not to be taken.⁵³ The terms are used with consensus of the world. The consensus of the world is widely known. The term “*arūpa*” is itself well known. Therefore, without the terms “*sīta, uṇha* etc.”, the supposition can be removed by consensus of the world.⁵⁴

⁵¹ AnPD. 41: *Bahūnaṃ sannicaye sati dappasaṅghanatthāya saṃvattanti. Ekakkhaṇe ca bahukalāpi ekābaddhā hutvā pavattanti. Tasmā t saviggahā hontīti.*

⁵² PD. 29: *Apicettha ruppanaṃ duvidhaṃ vaḍḍhanaṃ, hāyanañca. Tadubhayaṃpi kappavutṭhāne kappasaṅghāne nānāyukappa saṃvacchara utu māsa ratti divādīnaṃ parivattaneca pākaṭaṃ hotīti. Kasmā pana rūpanti nāmaṃ ghaṭṭanavasena ruppanadhammānameva siddhanti. Tesameva saviggahattā. Rūpadhammā hi samūhasaṅghānādi bhāvapattiyā saviggahā hontī. Tasmā tesameva ruppanaṃ paccakkhatopi lokassa pākaṭanti tesveva rūpanti nāmaṃ siddhanti daṭṭhabbaṃ. Arūpadhammā pana aviggahātī na tesam vikāro paccakkhato lokassa pākaṭo hoti. Taṃ taṃ rūpavikāraṃ disvāvā sutvā vā pucchitvāyeva vā so lokena jānitabbo aññatra paracittavidūhi. Tasmā tesam rūpatāpatti natthīti*

⁵³ AnPD. 41: *Sītādiggaḥaṇasāmatthiyenā ti sītenapi ruppanti. Uṇhenapi ruppantī ādinā lokassa paccakkhato pākaṭassa sītādi vacanassa sāmattiyena. Taṃ hi vacanaṃ lokassa apākaṭaṃ arūpadhammānaṃ ruppanaṃ idha nādippetanti dīpetīti adhippāyo.*

⁵⁴ PD. 29: *Vibhāvanīyaṃ pana Tesam rūpatāpattippasaṅgo sītādiggaḥaṇa sāmattiyena nivattito. Yasmā pana vohāronāma lokopacārena vinā nasijjhati.*

Controversy [18]

This controversy concerns the explanation of an argument about whether the immaterial dhamma in Brahma world would be called “*rūpa*”.

Vibhāvinī explains that a next argument would be that materiality in Brahma world has no oppressive condition, such as cold, heat etc., so it could not be called “*rūpa*: materiality” in Brahma world. There is no oppressive condition but supporting condition such as cold. Therefore, it can be called. On the other hand, the material in Brahma world also is not able to overcome the nature of changing. Therefore, the materiality in Brahma world cannot be called “*rūpa*”.⁵⁵

Dīpanī explains that In Brahma world, the Brahams have physical changing, verbal changing, and various forms created by psychic power. They are also called “changing” in on aspect. Therefore, it is to be noted that the matter in Brahma world has a state of being matter. On the other hand, it is called “*rūpa*” because it manifests itself in own nature. Mentalities cannot become manifest in their own nature. They are to be known only through matter on which they depend. Here, matter becomes manifest in its own nature and it is to be taken by five-consciousness. In this way, the matter in Brhama world can be directly known as being matter.⁵⁶

Dīpanī criticize *Vibhāvinī* that matter in Brahma world can be called “*rūpa*” because of two reasons: there is supporting conditions such as cold etc., and these matters are not able to overcome the nature of changing. Sumaṅgala Mahathera try to explain it without giving up the words *sīta* etc.

Lokopacāroca pākaṭanimittavase neva pavatto. Tasmā idha sītādiggaḥaṇena vināpi tappasaṅganivatti lokatova siddhāti daṭṭhabbā

⁵⁵ Abhidhs-Ṭ. 75: *Yadi evaṃ kathaṃ brahmaloke rūpavohāro, na hi tattha upaghātakā sītādayo atthīti? Kiñcāpi upaghātakā natthi, anuggāhakā pana atthi, tasmā taṃvasenettha ruppanaṃ sambhavatīti, atha vā taṃsabhāvānavattanato tattha rūpavohāroti alomatippapañcena*

⁵⁶ PD. 30: *Yasmā ca brahmaloke brahmānaṃ kāyavikāra vacīvikārā ca iddhi-vikuppanāvasappavattā nānārūpavikārāca dissantiyeva. Teca ekena pariyāyena ruppanākārāeva nāma honti, tasmā tesam vasena tattha rūpānaṃ rūpatāsiddhi hotīti veditabbaṃ. Rūpayati vā attano sabhāvena pakāsati rūpaṃ. Arūpadhammā hi na attano sabhāvena pākaṭā honti. Rūpasannissayeneva gahetabbā. Idaṃ pana attano sabhāveneva pākaṭaṃ pañcaviññāṇehipi gahetabbanti. Imasmim atthe sati brahmaloke rūpānaṃpi uju katova rūpatāsiddhi hotīti.*

actually, these worlds, *sītenapi*, *uñhenapi* etc., are just for examples because the changing can be known through *kamma*, mind and nutriments as well. In Pāli cannon, *saññā* (perception) and *viññāna* (consciousness) are explained only through the object of forms and of taste respectively. Perception perceives not only forms but also sounds, smell, taste etc. Consciousness is aware of not only taste but also forms, sounds, smell etc. The doctrines are given just to indicate respective points. Therefore, without giving up these words *sīta* etc., it is useless to explain that the matter in Brahma can be called *rūpa*.⁵⁷

Controversy [19]

This controversy concerns the formal definition of *nibbāna*.

Vibhāvinī explains the meaning of the word “*nibbāna*” by two ways of formal definition; a way of Dependent determinative compound (*tappurisasamāsa*) and a way of instrumental (*karanaśādhana*). *Bhavābhavaṃ vinanato saṃsibbanato vānasāṅkhātāya taṇhāya nikkhantaṃ nibbānaṃ*: It is called “*nibbana*” because it is free from craving “*vāna*” which stitches the existence and great-existence. This is a way of Dependent determinative compound. *Nibbāti vā etena rāgaggiādikoti nibbānaṃ*: On the other hand, it is called “*Nibbāna*” because it causes greed etc., to be extinguished. This is a way of instrumental. It means that greed, hatred, delusion etc., extinguish because of *nibbana*.⁵⁸

Dīpanī explains the meaning of the word “*nibbāna*” by two ways of formal definition: two ways of locative sense (*adhikaranaśādhana*) *nibbāyanti sabbe vaṭṭadukkhasantāpā etasminti nibbānaṃ*: It is called “*nibbana*” because all burning miseries in the cycle of rebirth [*vaṭṭa*] extinguish in that state [*nibbana*]. *Nibbāyanti vā ariyajanā etasminti nibbānaṃ*: Alternatively, it is called “*nibbana*” because noble persons

⁵⁷ PD. 30: *Vibhāvanīyaṃ pana Anuggāhakānaṃ sītādīnaṃ vasena taṃ sabhāvā nātivattana vasenaca tattha rūpatāsiddhi vibhāvitā. Yasmāpana sīte nāpi uñhenāpītiādivacanaṃ nidassanamattaṃ hoti. Kamma cittāhārānampi vasena ruppanassa sambhavato, tathāhi saññā viññāṇānīpi rūpārammaṇarasārammaṇehi eva pāliyaṃ niddiṭṭhāni. Na hi saññā rūpaṃeva sañjānāti. Na ca viññānaṃ rasa meva vijānāti. Nidassanamattena desanā hotīti viññāyatīti. Tasmā sītādiggahaṇaṃ amuñcivāva tattha rūpatāsiddhivibhāvanena payojana natthīti.*

⁵⁸ Abhidhs-Ṭ 75: *Bhavābhavaṃ vinanato saṃsibbanato vānasāṅkhātāya taṇhāya nikkhantaṃ, nibbāti vā etena rāgaggiādikoti nibbānaṃ*

become extinguished in that state. For this definition Dipanī provides a quotation that There is teaching that the wise men become extinguished like the extinguishment of flame a lamp.

Dipanī criticizes *Vibhāvinī* for the second formal definition that it makes a definition of nibbana that “*nibbāti etena rāgaggiādikoti nibbānan*: nibbana is that through which the fire of craving, etc., becomes extinguished”. It is not good because the instrumental sense is not seen in *nibbana* like the path (*magga*) and moreover, Nibbāna cannot be the cooperating cause (*sahakārī-paccaya*) of craving which words as a subject to do that act of extinguishing.⁵⁹

3.3 Controversy points in third verse

Tattha cittaṃ tāva catubbidhaṃ hoti

kāmāvaraṃ rūpāvacaraṃ arūpāvacaraṃ lokuttarañceti.

Of these, first, Consciousness is fourfold, to wit: Consciousness as experienced in *Kāmaloka*, Consciousness as experienced in *Rūpaloka*, Consciousness as experienced in *Arūpāloka*, Transcendental (supramundane) Consciousness.⁶⁰

Controversy [20]

This controversy concerns the explanation of threefold plane.

Vibhāvinī explains the meaning of sensuous sphere (*kāmāvacara*) that the word “*kāma*” conveys two meanings, craving for sense-object (*kāmataṇhā*) and the existence of sense-object (*kāmabhava*). In the sense

⁵⁹ PD. 31: *Vibhāvanīyaṃ pana ‘Nibbābhivā etena rāgaggiādikoti nibbāna’ntipi vuttaṃ. Taṃ na sundaraṃ. Na hi maggeviya nibbāne katthaci karaṇasādhanaṃ diṭṭhaṃ, naca nibbānaṃ nibbūti kriyāsādhane rāgādikassa kattuno saha kāripaccayo hotīti*

⁶⁰ Shwe Zan Aung, **Compendium of Philosophy**, (London: PTS, 1972), p. 82.

of craving, the consciousness is called “sensuous sphere (*kāmāvacara*) because it is the sphere of the craving in terms of taking object.⁶¹

In the sense of existence, the consciousness is called sensuous sphere (*kāmāvacara*) because it occurs mostly (*yebhuyyena*) in elevenfold sense-sphere (*kāmabhava*).⁶² Herein, the word “mostly” indicates that though this consciousness occurs in the form-sphere (*rūpabhava*) and formless-sphere (*arūpabhava*), it is called sense-sphere (*kāmāvacara*) because it occurs mostly in the sense-sphere.

The existence is called sense-sphere in which the sense-objects (*vatthukāma*) and craving for sense-objects (*kilesakāma*) take place. The consciousness which occurs in the sense-sphere is also called “sense-sphere” by means of metaphorical usage that is depending (*nissita*) and depended (*nissaya*). It means that the consciousness is depending (*nissita*) and the existence is depended (*nissaya*) on which the consciousness depends. The sense-sphere is the mane of depended. The name of depended is used for the consciousness which is depending on it. It is similar to the example “*mañjā ukkuṭṭhiṃ karonti*: a bed makes a noise”. In this example, the bed itself cannot make a noise. A man on the bed makes a noise. It is metaphorical usage that the name of depended is used for the man who is depending on the bed.⁶³ In the same way, the meaning of form-sphere (*rūpāvacara*) and formless-sphere (*arūpāvacara*) should be known accordingly.⁶⁴

Dipani explains the meaning of sensuous-sphere (*kāmāvacara*) that sensuous-sphere (*kāmāvacara*) is so called because it occurs or includes in eleven-fold *kāma* planes. In this case, the meaning of the word “*avacarati*” should not be regard as “*uppajjati*: to arise”. It is not accord with Pāli canon and it may cause various misunderstanding as well. It is said in Pāli canon

⁶¹ Abhidhs-Ṭ 76 *kāmetīti kāmo, kāmataṇhā, sā ettha avacarati ārammaṇa-karaṇavasenāti kāmāvacaraṃ.*

⁶² Abhidhs-Ṭ 76 *Kāmīyatīti vā kāmo, ekādasavidho kāmabhavo, tasmim yebhuyyena avacaratīti kāmāvacaraṃ.*

⁶³ Abhidhs-Ṭ 76 *Kāmabhavoyeva vā kāmo ettha avacaratīti kāmāvacaro, tattha pavattampi cittaṃ nissite nissayavohārena kāmāvacaraṃ ‘mañcā ukkuṭṭhiṃ karontī’ tyādīsu viyāti*

⁶⁴ Abhidhs-Ṭ 76 *Rūpārūpāvacaresupi eseva nayo yathārahaṃ daṭṭhabbo.*

that “*yaṃ etasmim̐ antare etthāvacarā ettha pariyāpannā* (whatever there is in this inclusion, occurring therein, included therein)”.⁶⁵ If the meaning is necessary, it may say here “*etthāvacarā, etthuppannā*”. But it does not say so. It cannot say that the word “*pariyāpanna*” has equal meaning with the word “*uppanna*”. Because the supramundane consciousnesses (*lokuttaracitta*) do not include in threefold existences (*tīsu bhavesu*) even though they occur or arise in threefold existences. Thus, the meaning of *uppajjati* for *avacarati* is not accord with Pāli cannon.⁶⁶

If the meaning of *uppajjati* is to be regarded, then there may be such misunderstanding thus: the form and formless phenomena (*mahaggatadhamma*) and the supramundane phenomena (*lokuttaradhamma*) which arise or occur in *kāma* plane, would be named as “phenomena in sensuous-sphere (*kāmāvacaradhamma*)” and They would not be called as “form-sphere and formless-sphere (*rūpāvacara* and *arūpāvacara*)”. The sensuous phenomena (*kāmāvacaradhamma*) which arise or occur in *rūpa* and *arūpa* plane, would be named as form-sphere and formless-sphere (*rūpāvacara* and *arūpāvacara*) and they would not be called as “sensuous-sphere (*kāmāvacaradhamma*)”.⁶⁷

In this case, there may be argument that a name is obtainable on account of generality (*yebhuyyavutti*) like ‘*vanacarako* (hunter) and *saṅgāma vacaro* (soldier). Therefore, those dhammas get specific name such as *kāmāvacara*, *rūpāvacara* and *arūpāvacara* because they arise mostly in their own planes. It is not wrong for their name. The answer is “no”. if so, the specific plane in which the supramundane phenomena

⁶⁵ Dhams. 353.

⁶⁶ PD. 32: *Tasmim̐ kāme avacaratīti kāmāvacaraṃ. Etthaca avacaratīti padassa uppajjatīti attho na gahetabbo. So hi attho pāḷiyāca nasameti. Nānādosayuttoca hotīti. Yaṃ etasmim̐ antare etthāvacarā ettha pariyāpannāti hi pāḷiyaṃ vuttaṃ. Yadi cettha so attho adhippeto siyā. Evaṃ sabhi etthāvacarā etthuppannāti vuttaṃ siyā. Napana vuttaṃ. Naca pariyāpannasaddo uppannasaddena saha samānatthoti sakkā vuttaṃ. Na hi lokuttaracittāni tīsu bhavesu uppannā nipi tatra pariyāpannāniyeva hontīti. Evaṃ tāva pāḷiyā nasametīti.*

⁶⁷ PD. 33: *Yadica so attho gahito siyā. Evañca sati tasmim̐ kāme ye mahaggata lokuttaradhammā uppajjanti. Tesampi kāmā vacaratāpattidoso rūpāvacaratādi muttidosoca āpajjati. Yeca kāmāvacaradhammā rūpārūpabhūmīsu uppajjanti. Tesañca rūpārūpā vacaratā pattidoso kāmāvacaratā muttidosoca āpajjati.*

(*lokuttaradhamma*) arise mostly, is to be said so that the supramundane phenomena can avoid the name of *kāma* or *rūpa* or *arūpa*. There is no such plane for the supramundane phenomena. These supramundane phenomena arise only in the threefold planes of *kāma*, *rūpa* and *arūpa*. Therefore, it hardly prevents the supramundane phenomena from getting the name of *kāma*, *rūpa*, and *arūpa*. In this way, the meaning of *uppajjati* cause various misunderstanding. Therefore, the meaning of *paripanna* for *avacarati* should be taken because it accords with the exposition by the Buddha.⁶⁸

This is the meaning of *kāmāvacara*. It is called sense-sphere (*kāmāvacara*) because it occurs in *kāma* plane as a state of including in and plunging into *kāma* plane. The state of inclusion means that it reaches to *kāma* plane together with its based (*kāma*) by means of common race, clan and name. the state of inclusion is made by sensual desire (*kāmatanḥā*).⁶⁹

In this way, the phenomena which arise within *Rūpa* *brhama* and *Arūpa* *Brahma*, are included in *kāma* plane and are to be named as sensuous-sphere because they are grasped by sensual desire (*kāmatanḥā*) as “they are mine”. In the same way, the meaning of *rūpāvacara* and *arūpāvacara* should be know and therein, the form-desired (*rūpatanḥā*) and formless-desired (*arūpatanḥā*) are to be known as occupying desire (*pariggāhinī-tanḥā*).⁷⁰

⁶⁸ PD. 33: *Nanu yebhuyyavuttivasenapi kesañci nāmalābho hoti. Yathā vanacarako saṅgāmāvacaroti. Tasmā idhapi tesam dhammānaṃ attano attano bhummīsu uppannabahulattā kāmāvacarādi nāmalābhe sati na koci dosoti. Na. Evañhi sati lokuttara dhammānaṃ kāmāvacaratādi muccanattamaṃ yebhuyyena uppannabhūmi visuṃ vattabbā siyā. Na ca sā nāmabhūmi atthi. Yattha te yebhuyyena uppajjantīti. Tehi uppajjantā tīsu bhavesu eva uppajjanti. Tasmā tesam kāma rūpārūpāvacaratāpattidoso dunnivāro siyāti. Evaṃ nānādosayutto hotīti. Tasmāssa tathā attham aggahetvā etthāvacarā ettha pariyāpannāti bhagavatā samvaṇṇitena pālinayenevassa attho gahetabboti.*

⁶⁹ PD. 33: *Ayañhettha attho. Kāme avacarati pariyāpannabhāvena tasmim ajjhogāhetvā carati pavattatīti kāmāvacaranti. Pariyāpannabhāvocanāma attano ādhārabhūtena tena kāmena saha samānajātigottanāmatā saṅkhātehi paritobhāgehi tasmim kāme āpannabhāvo anuppaviṭṭha bhāvo. Antogadhabhāvoti vuttaṃ hoti. Soca tathā pariyāpannabhāvo pariggāhiniyā kāmatanḥāya katoti daṭṭhabbo*

⁷⁰ PD. 34: *Ettāvata yedhammā rūpārūpasattasantānabhūtāpi mayhaṃ eteti kāma tanḥāya pariggahitā kāme pariyāpannāva honti. Te kāmāvacarānāmāti siddhā honti.*

Dīpanī criticizes former sub-commentaries for their explanation that is made without following the way of Pāli text as said above. Their explanations are not note-worthy. *Dīpanī* does not take the explanation of Aṭṭhasālinī into account saying thus: then, those and other definition are given even in Aṭṭhasālinī? True. But having known the correct meaning which is simple and accord with Pāli text, it is useless to think of various ways.⁷¹

3. 4 Controversy points in *akusalacitta*

Controversy [21], [22]

This controversy concerns the reasoning of the order of consciousness.

Anuruddha Mahāthera arranges the order of consciousness that unwholesome(*akusala*), without roots (*ahetuka*), and with roots (*sahetuka*). In the unwholesome consciousness, he arranges the order of consciousness that the consciousness rooted in greed (*lobhamūlacitta*), in hatred (*dosamūlacitta*) and in delusion (*mohamūlacitta*).

In this regard, Vibhāvini explains that Anuruddha Mahāthera will divide the all consciousnesses into two groups by saying upcoming verse “*pāpāhetukamuttāni sobhanānīti vuccare*”. The verse means that except unwholesome consciousness (*pāpa*) and the consciousness without roots (*ahetuka*), the rest consciousnesses are called beautiful consciousness (*sobhanacitta*). According to the verse, Anuruddha Mahāthera arranges unwholesome consciousness (*akusalacitta*) and the consciousness without roots (*ahetukacitta*) first for the convenience of naming beautiful consciousness (*sobhanacitta*). Among twelve types of unwholesome

Rūpārūpā vacaresupi ayaṃ nayo netabbo. Tesupana rūpataṇhā arūpataṇhāca pariggāhinī taṇhā daṭṭhabbā.

⁷¹ PD. 36: *Ṭīkāsu pana Yathāvuttam suvisadam pālinayam aggahetvā aññathā vacanatthāca vinicchayāca ettha vuttā. Sabbe te sārato na paccetabbāti. Nanu aṭṭhasāliniyameva teca aññeca atthā vuttāti. Saccam. Bhūtampana suvisadam pālianugataṃ atthaṃ ñatvā kimvikkhepenāti.*

consciousnesses, the consciousness rooted in greed (*lobhamūlacitta*) is said first because it arises from the start in the consciousness processes of one who has taken rebirth in the state of existence (*bhava*).⁷²

Dīpanī explains that in the second verse the order of consciousness is arranged by lower and higher level. According to the arrangement, sensuous-sphere consciousness (*kāmāvacaracitta*) is lower. Therefore, it is stated first. Among the sensuous-sphere consciousnesses, non-beautiful consciousness (*asobhaṇacitta*) is lower. And among those, unwholesome consciousness (*akusalacitta*) is lowest. The order of *akusla*, *ahetuka* and *sahetuka* is arranged according to lower and higher level.⁷³

[21] *Dīpanī* criticizes *Vibhāvinī* for saying that Anuruddha Mahāthera arranges unwholesome consciousness (*akusalacitta*) and the consciousness without roots (*ahetukacitta*) first for the convenience of naming beautiful consciousness (*sobhaṇacitta*). It is not good because the meaning is very clear that it is arranged according to level of lower and higher.⁷⁴

[22] *Dīpanī* criticizes *Vihāvinī* for saying that among twelve types of unwholesome consciousnesses, the consciousness rooted in greed (*lobhamūlacitta*) is said first because it arises from the start in the consciousness processes of one who has taken rebirth in the state of existence (*bhava*). It is also not reasonable because only *Manodvāravajjhana-citta* arise at very first, in *vīthicittas* (thought-

⁷² Abhidhs-Ṭ. 76: *kāmāvacaracittassa kusalākusalavipākakiriyabhedenā catu-bbidhabhāvepi pāpāhetukavajjānaṃ ekūnasatthiyā, ekanavutiyā vā cittānaṃ sobhananāmena vohārakaraṇatthaṃ ‘pāpāhetukamuttāni ‘sobhanāni’ ti vuccare’ ti evaṃ vakkhamānanayassa anurūpato pāpāhetukeyeva paṭhamaṃ dassento, tesu ca bhavesu gahitapaṭisandhikassa sattassa ādito vīthicittavasena lobhasahagatacittuppādānameva sambhavato teyeva paṭhamaṃ dassetvā*

⁷³ PD. 37: *Tatthaca sabbahīnaṃ akusalacittaṃ tāva dassetuṃ somanassasaha gatantiādīmāha. Etthaca kāmāvacaracittassapi akusalāhetuka sahetukānukkamo hīna paṇītānukkamavasena vuttoti daṭṭhabbo.*

⁷⁴ PD. 37: *Vibhāvaniyaṃ pana Upari vuccamānānaṃ bahūnaṃ cittānaṃ sobhaṇa-saññākaraṇasukhatthaṃ appake pāpāhetukeyeva pathamaṃ dassentoti vuttaṃ. Taṃ na sundaraṃ. Tadattho hi yathāvuttahīnādikkameneva siddhoti.*

process).⁷⁵ It should note that the consciousness rooted in greed is more in number. It is distinct because of association with two roots of birth-and-death circle (*vaṭṭamūla*). Therefore, it is stated first.⁷⁶

Controversy [23], [24], [25], [26], [27]

These controversies concern the definition of *sasaṅkhārika* and *asaṅkhārika*.

Vibhāvinī explains the meaning of *sasaṅkhārika* and *asaṅkhārika* that in the word ‘sa’ of *sasaṅkhārika*, is derivative form of the word “*saha*”. It conveys two meanings: association or arising together (*tulyayoga*) and existing or presence (*vijjamāna*).⁷⁷

In the first meaning, it is called *saṅkhāra* because it supplies a consciousness by means of making sharpness of the consciousness. Or it is *saṅkhāra* by which a consciousness is supplied or equipped by means of making sharpness. It is earlier exertion (*pubbapayogo*) of oneself or others which supplies a consciousness that is losing in particular function by way of giving proper assistance. Herein, the earlier exertion is in continuity of preceding consciousness of oneself or others. *Saṅkhāra* is the distinction state of consciousness that is a state of sharpness supported by the earlier exertion. A consciousness which has no *saṅkhāra* is called *asaṅkhāra*. *Asaṅkhāra* itself is called *asaṅkhārika*. The consciousness which is with *saṅkhāra* is called *sasaṅkhārika*.⁷⁸ It is said thus:

⁷⁵ PD. 37: *Yañca tattha tesu tesuca bhavesu gahitappaṭisandhikassa sattassa ādito vīthicittavasena lobhasahagata cittuppādāna meva sambhavato teyeva pathamanti vuttaṃ. Taṃpi nayujjati.*

⁷⁶ PD. 37: *Ādito vīthicittavasena manodvārā vajjanasseva sabbapathamam uppajjanatoti. Akusalesu pana lobhamūla cittaṃ bahukañca hoti. Dvīhi vaṭṭamūlehi yuttatā padhānam pākāṭaṇca hotīti tadeva pathamam vuttanti daṭṭhabbam.*

⁷⁷ Ashin Janakābhivamsa, **Ṭikākyaw Nissaya**, (Amarapura: Mahāgandhārum press, 1997), pp. 68,69.

⁷⁸ Abhidhs-Ṭ. 77: *Saṅkharoti cittaṃ tikkhabhāvasaṅkhātamaṇḍanavisesena sajjeti, saṅkharīyati vā taṃ etena yathāvuttanayena sajjīyatīti saṅkhāro, tattha tattha kicce saṃsīdamānassa cittaṃ anubalappadānavasena attano vā paresam vā pavattapubbappayogo, so pana attano pubbabhāgappavatte cittasantāne ceva parasantāne ca pavattatīti tannibbattito cittaṃ tikkhabhāvasaṅkhāto visesovidha saṅkhāro, so yassa natthi taṃ asaṅkhāram, tadeva asaṅkhārikam. Saṅkhārena sahitam sasaṅkhārikam.*

The distinction state that arise in next consciousness because of preceding exertion is called *saṅkhāra*. Because of this *saṅkhāra*, there is a state of *asaṅkhārika* etc.⁷⁹

In the meaning of association or arising together (*tulyayoga*), the *saṅkhāra* is either in preceding consciousness of oneself or in other. The *saṅkhāra* cannot associate with *sasaṅkhāriya* consciousness. therefore, to associate or to arise together, the *saṅkhāra* must refer to a state of sharpness of *sasaṅkhārika* consciousness that is supplied by earlier exertion, in terms of metaphorical usage. It means that the name of the cause is used for the name of the result (*kāraṇupacāra*).⁸⁰

In the meaning of existence or presence (*vijjamāna*), the *sasaṅkhārika* and *asaṅkhārika* is said with reference to existence and non-existence or presence and absence of *saṅkhāra* which is earlier exertion (*paubbayoga*), without reference to association and disassociation or arising together with *saṅkhāra* which is earlier exertion (*pubbayoga*). A consciousness that has *saṅkhāra* which is earlier exertion (*pubbayoga*) is called *sasaṅkhārika*. The word “*saha*” conveys the meaning of existence or presence (*vijjamāna*) like the example such as *salomako* (a person with body hair) and *sapakkhako* (a bird with wings). The opposite consciousness of *sasaṅkhārika* is called *asaṅkhārika* because it does not have *saṅkhāra*.⁸¹

Dīpanī explains the meaning of *asaṅkhārika* and *sasaṅkhārika* that. *Saṅkhāra* is earlier preparation (*pubbābhisāṅkhāra*). It has two kinds: action (*payoga*) and instruction (*upāya*). Of the two, action is physical, and a verbal action performed by other through command or request or

⁷⁹ Abhidhs-Ṭ. 78: *Tathā ca vadanti – ‘Pubbappayogasambhūto, viseso cittasambhavī; Saṅkhāro taṃvasenettha, hotyāsaṅkhārikādītā’*ti.

⁸⁰ Ashin Janakābhivamsa, **Ṭikākyaw Nissaya**, (Amarapura: Mahāgandhārum press, 1997), pp. 68,69.

⁸¹ Abhidhs-Ṭ. 78: *Atha vā ‘sasaṅkhārikaṃ asaṅkhārika’*nti cetam kevalam saṅkhārassa bhāvābhāvaṃ sandhāya vuttam, na tassa sahappavattisabbhāvābhāvatoti bhinnasantānappavattinopi saṅkhārassa idamatthitāya taṃvasena nibbattaṃ cittaṃ saṅkhāro assa atthīti **sasaṅkhārikaṃ** ‘salomako sapakkhako’*tyādīsu viya saha-saddassa vijjamānatthaparidīpanato. Tabbiparītaṃ pana tadabhāvato vuttanayena asaṅkhārikaṃ*

threatening “you must do this”. The instruction has many types such as thus: some others explain this and that to do a word without command, request or threatening; the advantages of doing and disadvantages of not doing. They let one commitment; impose terms of punishment; or oneself recalls this and that case, contemplates this and that case. These two kinds of preparation are called *saṅkhāra*. It is *saṅkhāra* which organizes and encourage the inactive mind without letting it not to do in this and that deed.⁸²

The group of condition (*paccayagaṇa*) which has no *saṅkhāra* is called *asaṅkhāra*. The group of condition (*paccayagaṇa*) which has *saṅkhāra* is called *sasaṅkhāra*. It is said in Aṭṭhasālinī thus: That which is with *saṅkhāra* is called *sasaṅkhāra*. It means that it is with group of condition; with an action; with an instruction.⁸³

Herein, the commentary said that the group of condition is associated with objects etc.⁸⁴ however, it should be said the group of condition with is not associated object etc., such as the association with good people in the case of wholesome, the association with bad people in the case of unwholesome etc.⁸⁵

⁸² PD. 38: *Asaṅkhārikamekaṃ sasaṅkhārikamekanti ettha saṅkhāroti pubbā-tisaṅkhāro. Soca duvidho payogo, upāyocāti. Tattha āṇattiyāvā ajjhesanāyavā tajjtvā vā idaṃ karohīti parehi kato kāyavacīpayogo payogonāma. Āṇattādināpana vināva kammaṣa karaṇatthaṃ taṃ taṃ upāyaṃ pare ācikkhanti. Akaraṇe ādinavaṃ karaṇeca ānisaṃsaṃ dassenti, katikaṃvā karonti, daṇḍaṃvā thapenti, sayameva vā taṃ taṃ kāraṇaṃ anussarati, paccavekkhati. Evamādinā nayena upāyo anekavidho. So duvidhopi idha saṅkhāro nāma. Saṅkharoti attano pakatiyā kātuṃ anicchamānaṃ citta santānaṃ akātuṃ adatvā karaṇatthāya saṃvidahati tasmīṃ tasmīṃ kamme payojetīti katvā. Yopana paccayagaṇo tena saṅkhārena virahito hoti. So asaṅkhāro. Yopana tenasahito hoti. So sasaṅkhāroti.*

⁸³ DhsA. 99.

⁸⁴ DhsA. 200: *Yena hi ārammaṇādinā paccayagaṇena paṭhamaṃ mahācittam uppajjati, teneva sappayogena saupāyena idaṃ uppajjati*

⁸⁵ PD. 39: *Vuttañhetam aṭṭhakathāyaṃ –Saha saṅkhārenāti sasaṅkhāro. Tena sasaṅkhārena sappayogena saupāyena paccayagaṇenāti atthoti. Etthaca paccayagaṇoti ārammaṇādiko sādharmaṇo paccaya gaṇo aṭṭhakathāyaṃ vutto. Asādharmaṇopana kusalakammesu sappurisupanissayādiko akusalakammesu asappurisupanissayādiko paccayagaṇo visesetvā yojetuṃ yutto.*

The group of condition is called *asaṅkhāra* when it makes mind arise itself without two types of earlier preparation. The group of condition is called *sasaṅkhāra* when it makes mind arise with two types of earlier preparation because it cannot make mind arise without two types of earlier preparation. In this way, the name of *asaṅkhāra* and *sasaṅkhāra* is just the name of the group of conditions. It is not the name of consciousness.⁸⁶

The consciousness which arises due to the group of condition without *saṅkhāra* is called *asaṅkhārika*. The consciousness which arises due to the group of conditions with *saṅkhāra* is called *sasaṅkhārika*. The suffix “*ika*” of *asaṅkhārika* and *sasaṅkhārika* is used in the sense of arising. This is the true meaning of *asaṅkhārika* and *sasaṅkhārika*.

[23] *Dīpanī* criticizes former sub-commentaries that in *Ṭikās*, without noticing this meaning and thinking of only mind to be *asaṅkhāra* and *sasaṅkhāra* it is said (Purāṇa, p. 288; Vibhāvanī, p. 77-8; saṅkhepa, p. 219):

It has not *saṅkhāra*, so it is called *asaṅkhāra*. Only *asaṅkhāra* is used as *asaṅkhārika*. And it exists with *saṅkhāra*, it is to be called *sasaṅkhāra*. Only *sasaṅkhāra* is used as *sasaṅkhārika*. Then, it does not possess it, or it is *saṅkhāra*. Only *asaṅkhāra* is spoken as *asaṅkhārika*. And it arises together with *saṅkhāra*, so it is *sasaṅkhārika*.’ This is all not reasonable.⁸⁷

[24] *Dīpanī* criticizes *Vibhāvinī* for saying that it is called *saṅkhāra* because it supplies a consciousness by means of making sharpness of the

⁸⁶ PD. 39: *Sopana yadā duvidhena saṅkhārena vinā sayameva cittaṃ asaṃsīdamānaṃ katvā uṭṭhāpeti samuṭṭhāpeti, tadā soasaṅkhāronāma. Yadāpana tena vinā sayameva cittaṃ uṭṭhāpetuṃ samuṭṭhāpetuṃ nasakkoti, saṅkhāraṃ sahāyaṃ labhitvāva sakkoti, tadā so sasaṅkhāronāma. Iti asaṅkhāro sasaṅkhārotica idaṃ paccaya gaṇasseva nāmaṃ. Na cittaṃ. Cittaṃpana asaṅkhārena suddhena paccayagaṇena uppannaṃ asaṅkhārikaṃ. Sasaṅkhārena paccayagaṇena uppannaṃ sasaṅkhārikaṃ, uppannatthe hi ayaṃ ikapaccayoti*

⁸⁷ PD. 40: *Ṭikāsu pana Imamatthaṃ asallakkhetvā cittameva asaṅkhāraṃ sasaṅkhāranti ca gahetvā yaṃ vuttaṃ, ‘natthi saṅkhāro assāti asaṅkhāraṃ. Tadeva asaṅkhārikaṃ. Saha saṅkhārena vattatīti sasaṅkhāraṃ. Sasaṅkhārameva sasaṅkhārikanti ca. So yassa natthi. Taṃ asaṅkhāraṃ. Tadeva asaṅkhārikaṃ. Saṅkhārena sahitaṃ sasaṅkhāri kanti ca’’. Sabbametaṃ na yujjatiyeva.*

consciousness. Or it is *saṅkhāra* by which a consciousness is supplied or equipped by means of making sharpness. It is also not good because, if so, the consciousness with *saṅkhāra* would be the consciousness of sharpness.⁸⁸

[25] *Dīpanī* criticizes *Vibhāvinī* for saying that it is earlier exertion (*pubbapayogo*) of oneself or others which supplies a consciousness that is losing in particular function by way of giving proper assistance. Herein, the earlier exertion is in continuity of preceding consciousness of oneself or others. *Saṅkhāra* is the distinction state of consciousness that is a state of sharpness supported by the earlier exertion. It is too not reasonable because giving the definition wrongly of these words, *asaṅkhārika* and *sasaṅkhārika*. The *saṅkhāra*, according to it is said depending on that wrong idea.⁸⁹

[26] *Dīpanī* criticizes *Vibhāvinī* for the stanza that is the distinction state that arise in next consciousness because of preceding exertion is called *saṅkhāra*. Because of this *saṅkhāra*, there is a state of *asaṅkhārika* etc.⁹⁰

[27] *Dīpanī* criticizes *Vibhāvinī* for saying that the *sasaṅkhārika* and *asaṅkhārika* is said with reference to existence and non-existence or presence and absence of *saṅkhāra* which is earlier exertion (*pubbayoga*), without reference to association and disassociation or arising together with *saṅkhāra* which is earlier exertion (*pubbayoga*). A consciousness that has *saṅkhāra* which is earlier exertion (*pubbayoga*) is called *sasaṅkhārika*. The word “*saha*” conveys the meaning of existence or presence (*vijjānāna*) like the example such as *salomako* (a person with body hair) and *sapakkhako* (a bird with wings). The opposite consciousness of

⁸⁸ PD. 40: *Yañca vibhāvanīyaṃ Saṅkharoti cittaṃ tikkhabhāvasaṅkhātamaṇḍana-visesena sajjeti. Saṅkharīyatīvā taṃ etena yathāvuttanayena sajjīyatīti saṅkhāroti vuttaṃ. Taṃpi na sundaraṃ. Evañhi sati sasaṅkhārikapi cittaṃ tikkhaṃnāma siyāti.*

⁸⁹ PD. 40: *Yañca tattha “So pana attano pubbabhāgappavatte cittasantāneceva parasantāneca pavattatīti taṃ nibbattito cittassa tikkhabhāva saṅkhāto visesova idha saṅkhāroti” vuttaṃ. Taṃpi asaṅkhārika sasaṅkhārikapadānaṃ vacanatthesu virajjhītvā tadana rūpassa saṅkhārassa parikkappanāvasena vuttattā nayuttameva.*

⁹⁰ PD. 41: *Etana Pubbappayogasambhūto, viseso cittasambhapī; Saṅkhāro taṃ vasenettha, hotyāsaṅkhārikādītīti. Sādhakagāthāpi paṭikkhittā hotīti.*

sasaṅkhāriaka is called *asaṅkhārika* because it does not have *saṅkhāra*. The statement too should not be noted, because it is said depending on his own idea without referring to the direct and apparent meaning that is given in Pāli and Commentaries.⁹¹

Herein, the consciousness which arises due to others' command, or request, or appeal, without own's wish, is called the consciousness produced by action (*payogasamuṭṭhita*). The consciousness which arises due to fear of others, or shame, or respect, or agreement, or fear of punishment, without own's wish, is called the consciousness produced by instruction (*upāyasamuṭṭhita*). Or the consciousness which arises due to instruction given in various ways by oneself, after having noticed one's mind to be in a state of hesitation, or by recalled such and such ways is called the consciousness produced by instruction (*upāyasamuṭṭhita*). That is just revealing the way.

Controversy [28]

This controversy concerns the usage of the words “*somanassa*, *diṭṭhi*, *saṅkhārika* and *lobha*” that distinguish between the consciousness rooted in greed (*lobhamūlacitta*), and other consciousness.

In this case, Anuruddha Thera uses the term “*somanassasahagataṃ diṭṭhigatasampayuttaṃ asaṅkhārika mekaṃ* etc., to mark the consciousness rooted in greed (*lobhamūlacitta*). The consciousness rooted in greed (*lobhamūlacitta*), associate with 22 mental concomitants (*cetasika*) such as *phassa*: contact, *vitakka*: thought, *moha*: delusion etc. Anuruddha Thera use *vedanā*: feeling, *diṭṭhi*: wrong view etc., instead of using *phassa*: contact etc.,. Why?

⁹¹ PD. 41: *Yañca tattha ‘‘Athavā, sasaṅkhārikaṃ asaṅkhārikanti ce taṃ kevalaṃ-saṅkhāraṃ bhāvābhāvaṃ sandhāya vuttaṃ. Natassa sahapavattisabbhā vā bhāvatoti. Bhinnasantānappavattinopi saṅkhāraṃ idhamatthitāya taṃ vasena nibbattaṃ cittaṃ saṅkhāro assa atthīti sasaṅkhārikaṃ. Salomako sapakkhakoṭyādīsuvīya saha saddassa vijjamaṇatthaparidīpanato. Tabbiparītampana tadabhāvato vuttanayena asaṅkhārika’nti vuttaṃ. Taṃpi pāliatṭhakathāsiddhaṃ ujum visadaṃ atthaṃ muñcitvā attano parikkapaṇā vasena vuttattā na gahetabbameva.*

Vibhāvinī explains that the words “*somanassa*, *diṭṭhi*, *saṅkhārika* and *lobha*” are used to distinguish because they are not related to all types of consciousness. It means that some mental concomitants, such as *phassa*: contact etc., are related to all types of consciousness, some to wholesome consciousness etc., some concomitants such as *moha*: delusion etc., are related to all types of unwholesome consciousness. Therefore, it is not able to distinguish by these mental concomitants. *Somanassa* etc., are very distinctive. They are related to some types of consciousness and not related to some types of consciousness. Therefore, it is very clear to distinguish by these dhamma, between the consciousness rooted in greed (*lobhamūlacitta*) and other consciousness.⁹²

Dīpanī explains that the mental concomitants, such as *phassa*, *vitakka*, *moha*, are not like *vedanā*, *diṭṭhi* and *saṅkhāra*. It means that *vedanā* have division, such as *somanassa*, *domanassa*, *upekkhā*. *diṭṭhi* and *saṅkhāra* have the nature of that they are related to some types of consciousness and not to some types of consciousness. *Lobha* distinguishes *diṭṭhi* and *saṅkhāra* from other consciousness. *Vedanā*, *diṭṭhi* and *saṅkhāra* distinguish within the *lobhamūlacitta*. Therefore, Anuruddha Thera uses the terms “*lobha*; *vedanā* (*somanassa*, *upekkhā*); *diṭṭhi* and *saṅkhāra*.”⁹³

In this case, *Dīpanī* points out the *Vibhāvinī* for its explanation that because *somanassa* etc., are not related to all types of consciousness. It means that some mental concomitants, such as *phassa*: contact etc., are related to all types of consciousness, some to wholesome consciousness etc., some concomitants such as *moha*: delusion etc., are related to all types

⁹² Abhidhs-Ṭ. 78 *Kasmā panettha aññesupi phassādīsū sampayuttadhammesu vijjamānesu somanassasahagatādibhāvova vuttoti? Somanassādīnameva asādhāraṇa-bhāvato. Phassādayo hi keci sabbacittasādhāraṇā, keci kusalādisādhāraṇā, mohādayo ca sabbākusalasādhāraṇāti na tehi sakkā cittaṃ visesetum, somanassādayo pana katthaci citte honti, katthaci na hontīti pākaṭova taṃvasena cittassa viseso.*

⁹³ PD. 42: *Etthaca kiñcāpi phassādayo vitakkādayo mohādayoca dhammā iminā sakalena aṭṭhavidhena cittena saha gatā sampayuttāca honti, na pana te vedanāviya sayampī bhedavantā honti. Naca diṭṭhisāṅkhārānaṃ viyatesaṃ imasmiṃ citte katthaci honti katthacinahontīti ayaṃ vikappo atthi. Tasmāte imassacittassa bhedakarā nahontīti idha nagahitāti daṭṭhabbā. Lobhopana aññehi imassa aṭṭhavidhassa bhedakaro hoti. Vedanādiṭṭhi saṅkhārāca imassa aññamaññassa bhedakarā hontīti teeva idha gahitāti daṭṭhabbā.*

of unwholesome consciousness. Because if it is so, *somanassa*, *upekkhā* and *saṅkhāra* are used in other consciousnesses, then these terms are not able to distinguish between the consciousnesses rooted in greed and other consciousness. if so, these terms would not be used.⁹⁴

Controversy [29]

This controversy concerns the usage of the words “*domanassa* that distinguish between the consciousness rooted in hatred (*dosamūlacitta*), and other consciousness.

Vibhāvinī explains that the word “*domanassa*” is used to characterize the consciousness rooted in hatred (*dosamūlacitta*) by means of that unhappiness is not common to all types of consciousness, although there is no division by feeling for the consciousness rooted in hatred (*dosamūlacitta*).⁹⁵

Dīpanī explains that the word, *domanassa*, is used to avoid the supposition (*pasāṅga*) which this *citta* may sometimes associate with other feeling. It means that when the kings order to execute the robbers smilingly or when people delight in the death of their enemies, or when wicked people happily kill beats and birds, there occurs the supposition (*pasāṅha*) that perhaps the *citta* may associates with pleasant feeling (*somanassa*). Therefore, the term “*domanassa*” is used to avoid such a supposition.⁹⁶

Dīpanī criticizes *Vibhāvinī* for saying that the word “*domanassa*” is used to characterize the consciousness rooted in hatred (*dosamūlacitta*) by means of that unhappiness is not common to all types of consciousness. the

⁹⁴ PD. 42: *Evañhi sati somanassupekkhā saṅkhārāpi aññesu dissantīti tepi aññehi imassa visesaṃ nakarontī. Tasmā tepi idha nagahetabbā siyuntī.*

⁹⁵ Abhidhs-Ṭ. 80 *Domanassasahagatassa vedanāvasena abhedepi asādhāraṇa-dhammavasena cittassa upalakkhaṇatthaṃ domanassaggahaṇaṃ,*

⁹⁶ PD. 45: *domanassaggahaṇaṃ tāva imassa cittassa kadāci aññavedanāyogatā pasāṅganivattanatthanti. Yadāhi rājāno hasamānāyeva coravadhaṃ pesenti. Yadāca janā attano verīnaṃ maraṇe tuṭṭhiṃ pavedenti. Maraṇaṃ abhinandanti. Yadāca bālajanā hasamānāva migapakkhino mārenti. Tadā idamaṃ nukho somanassena yuttanti attheva pasāṅgo. Upekkhāyogepana vattabbameva natthi. Tappasaṅganivattanatthaṃ domanassaggahaṇanti*

usage “unhappiness is not common to all types of consciousness” is not proper because the meaning would be that the consciousness rooted in hatred associates with *somanassa* and *upekkhā*, but these feelings are not used to characterized. The word “*domanassa*” which is uncommon to other dhamma is used. This meaning is not correct. For example, the consciousness rooted in greed and the consciousness rooted in hatred associate with delusion (*moha*) but the word “*moha*” is not used. The word “*lobha* and *paṭigha*” which are uncommon to other dhamma, are used to characterize.

The usage “*upalakkhaṇa*: to characterize” also should not be said. If said, the meaning would be that the other feelings which are not clearly known, are marked by means of *domanassa* which is clearly known in this consciousness. it is similar to the example that a prince who has received a parasol.⁹⁷

Controversy [30]

This controversy concerns the usage of the words *paṭigha*.

Vibhāvinī explains that the word “*paṭigha*” is used to show that both (*domanassa* and *paṭigha*) always exist together.⁹⁸

Dīpanī explains that the word “*paṭigha*” is used to avoid the supposition that perhaps the other dhammas associate with this consciousness. it means that some people who hold wrong views believe that there is no evil in committing execution of living beings, some also believe that there are big merits which lead to birth in the deity world for those who practice sacrifice by slaughtering animals. They, holding the

⁹⁷ PD. 46: *Vibhāvanīyaṃ pana mahāṭīkāyaṅca ‘‘Asādhāraṇa dhammavasena cittaṣṣa upalakkhaṇatthaṃ domanassaggahaṇa’’nti vuttaṃ. Tattha asādhāraṇadhammavasenāti idaṃ tāva nayujjati. Satipi imassa somanassupekkhāsahagatabhāve anaññasādhāraṇeneva domanassena imassa upalakkhaṇatthanti atthassa āpajjanato. Yathātaṃ satipi purimassa imassaca cittaṣṣa mohasahagatabhāve anaññasādhāraṇeneva lobhena paṭighenaca upalakkhaṇatthaṃ lobhasahagatapaṭigha sampayuttaggahaṇanti. Upalakkhaṇatthanti ca na vattabbaṃ. Evañhi sati pākaṭena domanassena apākaṭānaṃ aññavedanā naṃpi idha laddhabhāvaṃ upalakkhetīti āpajjati. Yathā laddhātapatto rājakumāroti.*

⁹⁸ Abhidhs-Ṭ. 80 *paṭighasampayuttabhāvo pana ubhinnaṃ ekantasahacāritā dassanattaṃ vuttoti daṭṭhabbaṃ.*

false view of *sakkāya*, commit killing living beings by themselves, or let others commit killing; so perhaps, this consciousness (*dosamūlacitta*) associates with wrong view. Then, there also may occur such a supposition;

Some of foolish and unintelligent people who hold right view are at first doubtful when they try to slaughter living beings following the manner of those who hold wrong view. At the time, this consciousness perhaps associates with doubt (*vicikicchā*). To avoid such supposition, the word “*paṭigha*” is used.⁹⁹

Dipanī criticizes Vibhāvini for saying that the word “*paṭigha*” is used to show that both (*domanassa* and *paṭigha*) always exist together. It is not good because such a significant can be known only through the minor conclusion.¹⁰⁰

Controversy [31]

This controversy concerns consciousness rooted in delusion (*momūhacitta*) that associates with equanimity feeling (*upekkhā*).

Vibhāvini explains the reason for association with *upekkhāvedanā* only that these two types of consciousness have no other root, and being associated with doubt and restlessness, their nature is instability by virtue of being scattered and diffuse because of delusion; therefore, they always occur free from attachment and hostility, and accompanied by just equanimity.¹⁰¹

⁹⁹ PD. 46: *Paṭighaggahaṇaṃpi aññadhammasampayuttatā pasaṅganivattana-tthaṃ. Tathāhi ye natthikāhetukā kiriyamicchā diṭṭhikā pāṇavadhe apuññaṃnāma natthīti gaṇhanti. Yeca manussapāṇa vadheeva apuññaṃ hoti, tiracchānagatapāṇavadhe apuññaṃ natthīti gaṇhanti. Yeca pāṇavadhaṃ katvā yaññaṃ yajantānaṃ mahantaṃ puññaṃ hoti, dibbasaṃvattanikanti gaṇhanti. Te sakkāyadiṭṭhiyā vissatṭhā pāṇavadhaṃ sayamvā karonti. Aññevā pesenti. Tadā idam diṭṭhiyāpi sampayuttaṃ siyāti pasaṅgo hotiyeva. Yepana sammādiṭṭhikesu bālā abyattā, te kadāci tesam micchādiṭṭhikānaṃ laddhiṃ gahetvā pāṇaṃ vadhantā ādito vematikajātāva honti. Tadātesam idam vicikicchāyapi yuttaṃ siyāti pasaṅgo hoti. Tappasaṅga nivattanatthaṃ paṭighaggahaṇanti.*

¹⁰⁰ PD. 47: *Yañca vibhāvaniyaṃ ‘Paṭighasampayuttabhāvopana ubhinnaṃ ekanta saha-cāritā dassanattaṃ vutto’ ti vuttaṃ. Taṃpi na sundaraṃ. Imassa cūlanigameneva tadatthasiddhitoti.*

¹⁰¹ Abhidhs-Ṭ. 81 *Imāni pana dve cittāni mūlantaravirahato atisammūḥhatāya, saṃsappanavikkhipanavasena pavattavicikicchuddhaccasamāyogena cañcalatāya ca*

Dīpanī explains the reason for association with *upekkhāvedanā* only that Especially, this *citta* associates with *moha* (delusion), which has a chance being free from other roots and is very powerful and *vicikicchā* (doubt) and *uddhacca* (restlessness) which are in a state of wavering and derangement. So, the feeling in this mind cannot enjoy fully an object and only *upekkhā* (the indifferent feeling) associates with this *citta*. Moreover, there may occur such a supposition: this mind perhaps associates with the two feelings, pleasant and indifferent, because this mind arises just after the mind associated with pleasure or displeasure'. To avoid such a supposition the word “*upekkhā*” is used.¹⁰²

Dīpanī does not agree with *Vibhāvinī*'s reason that their nature is instability by virtue of being scattered and diffuse because of delusion; therefore, they always occur free from attachment and hostility, and accompanied by just equanimity. It is not good because the consciousness rooted in greed (*lobhamūlacitta*) associates with *upekkhā* although they have an attachment.¹⁰³

Controversy [32] [33]

This controversy concerns whether *momūhacitta* is prompted or unprompted. *Vibhāvinī* and Mahāṭīkā said it is free from the division according to prompting. *Dīpanī* said it is *asaṅkhārika*.

sabbatthāpi rajjanadussanarahitāni upekkhāsahagatāneva pavattanti, tato yeva ca sabhāvatikkhatāya ussāhetabbatāya abhāvato saṅkhārabhedopi nesam natthi.

¹⁰² PD: 47: *Yasmāpana idaṃ cittaṃ mūlantaravirahena laddhokāsenā suṭṭhubalavantena mohenaceva saṃsappamānavikkhipamānehi vicikicchuddhaccehi ca yuttaṃ hoti. Tasmā idha vedanāpi ārammaṇaṃ adhimattato anubhavitum na sakkotīti upekkhāvedanāva yuttā hoti. Evaṃ santepi idaṃ cittaṃ somanassa domanassa sahatānampi anantare uppajjati. Tasmā tadubhayavedanāhipi idaṃ yuttaṃ siyāti pasaṅgo hotīti tappasaṅganivattanatthaṃ idha upekkhāgahaṇaṃ kataṃ.*

¹⁰³ PD: 48: *Vibhāvanīyaṃ pana Imāni dve cittāni atisammūḷhatāya aticañcalatāya ca sabbatthapi rajjanadussanarahitāni honti. Tasmā upekkhā sahatāneva pavattantīti vuttaṃ. Taṃ na sundaraṃ. Rajjana sahitānampi lobhamūla cittaṇaṃ upekkhā yogassa diṭṭhattāti.*

Vibhāvinī say that because it is not of their nature to be instigated by energy, there is no division according to prompting.¹⁰⁴

Dīpanī explains that these two *cittā* are in the nature of sentient beings; they cannot be generated by means, effort, or way and they arise without drawing back, sinking, difficulty and trouble like bhavaṅga-citta; so they are definitely *asaṅkhāra* and in this citta, the division of *saṅkhāra* is not mentioned. And for only that reason in this citta, the term of the second mind *sasaṅkhārena* is not said like preceding cittas in Pāli Cannon.¹⁰⁵

Dīpanī criticizes *Vibhāvinī* and Mahāṭikā that it is said that *Vibhāvinī* and Mahāṭikā as well: “these two cittas have no division of *saṅkhāra*. Because they are absent from the natural activity and the encouragement. Herein, by this assertion “absent from the natural activity”, it rejects that this citta is to be absent from the prior action; by this, “absent from encouragement”, it rejects the state of being prior action, by both, it denotes that these two cittas are totally absent from the prior action. This does not correspond even with Commentary. The Commentary on the analysis of *paṭiccasamuppāda*, it is said “*avijjā* (ignorance) is to be of twofold only by the division of *saṅkhāra*. If these two *cittas* are absent from *saṅkhāra*, *moha* (delusion) too, in this *citta*, may be absent from *saṅkhāra*. This *moha* is nothing but *avijjā* (ignorance). Hence, *avijjā* should be said to be of threefold in that Commentary but said no so.”¹⁰⁶

¹⁰⁴ Abhidhs-Ṭ. 81 *tatoyeva ca sabhāvatikkhatāya ussāhetabbatāya abhāvato saṅkhārabhedopi nesaṃ natthi.*

¹⁰⁵ PD: 48: *Yasmāca idaṃcittadvayaṃ sattānaṃ pakatisabhāvabhūtanti payogena vā upāyena vā kenaci uppādetabbaṃ nāma natthi. Sabbakālampi bhavaṅgacittaṃviya anosakkamānaṃ asaṃsīdamānaṃ akicchena akasirena pavattati. Tasmā ekantena asaṅkhārikameva hotīti katvā idha saṅkhārabhedo na gahitoti daṭṭhabbaṃ. Tenevaca pāḷiyampi purimacittesuviya idha sasaṅkhārenāti dutīyacittavāro navuttoti.*

¹⁰⁶ PD: 48: *Yañca tattha mahāṭikāyañca “Tatoyevaca sabhāvatikkhatāya ussāhetabbatāyaca abhāvato saṅkhārabhedopi nesaṃ natthī”ti vuttaṃ. Tattha sabhāvatikkhatāya abhāvato iminā imassa asaṅkhārikabhāvaṃ paṭikkhipati. Ussāhetabbatāya abhāvato iminā sasaṅkhārikabhāvaṃ paṭikkhipati. Tadubhaye pana idaṃ cittadvayaṃ sabbaso saṅkhāravimuttaṃ hotīti dasseti. Taṃ aṭṭhakathāyapi tāva na sameti. Paṭiccasamuppādavibhaṅgaatṭhakathāyañhi saṅkhārabhedena avijjāya duvidhabhāvova vutto. Yadica idaṃdvayaṃ saṅkhāramuttaṃ siyā. Evaṃ sati idha*

[33] Then, the state of sharpness of mind (*tikkhabhāva*) is here said to be able to arise through the mere group of usual conditions, without a prior action. So this *citta* appears in such a way. Therefore, it cannot be said that this *citta* has no activity in its nature.¹⁰⁷

Controversy [34]

This controversy concerns with the definition of *sabbathā*.

Vibhāvinī defines the meaning of *sabbathā* that so in this way, in the manner stated, in full, by association with happiness, equanimity and view, etc., by association with aversion, etc., by association with doubt and restlessness – by all these modes of association, the twelve unwholesome consciousness have been given, are complete.¹⁰⁸

Dīpanī defines the meaning of *sabbathā* that *sabbathāpi* means that it is only twelve through the division which is mentioned in Dhammasaṅgaṇī, it is only twelve through the division which is classified in Vibhaṅga, it is only twelve through the division which is expressed in Dhātukathā, etc., it is only twelve through the division which is classified as time, locality, continuity, etc. How do they become twelve? If asked, “in this way, they become twelve” is the interpretation.¹⁰⁹

Dīpanī point out *Vibhāvinī* that however, *Vibhāvini* explains only the mode of association, etc., that is said before. That is clear only by the word “*iccevaṃ*”.¹¹⁰

mohopi saṅkhāramutto siyā. Soca avijjāyevāti tividhabhāvova avijjāya tattha vattabbo. Naca vuttoti. Evaṃ tāva aṭṭhakathāya nasameti.

¹⁰⁷ PD: 48: *Yasmāca idha tikkhabhāvonāma vinā saṅkhārena kevalaṃ pakati paccaya gaṇa vaseneva pavattanasamatthatā vuccati. Idañca cittaṃ tatheva pavattati. Tasmā idaṃ sabhāvatikkhaṃ na hotīti na sakkā vattunti.*

¹⁰⁸ Abhidhs-Ṭ. 81: ***sabbathāpi*** somanassupekkhādīṭṭhisampayogādinā paṭigha-sampayogādinā vicikicchuddhaccayogenāti sabbenāpi sampayogādiākārena dvādasa akusalacittāni ***samattāni*** pariniṭṭhitāni,

¹⁰⁹ PD: 50: ***Sabbathāpīti*** dhammasaṅgaṇīyaṃ vuttana pakārenāpi dvādaseva. Vibhaṅge vibhāttena pakārenāpi dvādaseva. Dhātukathādīsū vuttana pakārenāpi dvādaseva. Tesu tesu suttantesu vuttana pakārenāpi dvādaseva. Kāladesa santānādi bhedabhinnena pakārenāpi dvādaseva. Kathaṃ dvādasevāti. *Icevaṃ dvādasevāti yojetabbaṃ.*

¹¹⁰ PD: 50. ***Vibhāvaniyaṃ*** pana Heṭṭhā vutto sampayogādi ākārova vibhāvito. *Sopana iccevaṃ imināva siddhoti.*

3.5 the controversy points in *ahetukacitta*

Controversy [35]

This controversy concerns the order of *ahetukacitta*. Anuruddha Mahāthera arranges the order of consciousness that *akusakacitta*, *ahetukacitta*, and *kāmāvacaracitta* and so on. The order of *ahetukacitta* is *akusalavipākacitta*, *kusalavipākacitta* and *ahetukakriyacitta*. Herein, according to commentarial tradition both *tīkā*s explains the reason of putting *akusalavipāka* first while analyzing *ahetukacitta* after *akusalacitta*.

In this regard, *Vibhāvinī* explains that Having analyzed *akusalacitta* which is threefold by roots, as to twelfefolds by means of association etc., now, he said *upekkhāsahagataṃ cakkhuvīññāṇaṃ* etc., to analyze *akusalavipākacitta* next to *akusalacitta* as to sevenfold by division according to the base of eye etc, and function of receiving etc., even though *ahetukacitta* are of threefold.¹¹¹

Dīpanī explains that having thus summarized *akusalacitta*, the lowest of all, now Mahā Anuruddhathera said the word, *upekkhāsahagataṃ* etc., to summarize *Ahetukacitta*, then to expound at first, *akusalavipākacitta*, the lowest of them all.

Dīpanī criticizes *Vibhāvinī* for the idea that *citta*, being a result of *akusala*, is described just after *akusala*: although these *ahetukacittas* have three types, the result of *akusasa*, etc., to classify only the results of *akusala*’ just after *akusala*. This is not correct. If so, the results of *kusala*’ also should be said just after only the *kusala*.¹¹²

¹¹¹ Abhidhs-Ṭ. 82. *Evaṃ mūlabhedato tividhampi akusalaṃ sampayogādibhedato dvādasadhā vibhajitvā idāni ahetukacittāni niddisanto tesam akusalavipākādivasena tividhabhāvepi akusalānantaram akusalavipākeyeva cakkhādinissaya-sampañchanādikiccabhedena sattadhā vibhajitum “upekkhāsahagataṃ cakkhuvīññāṇa”ntyādimāha.*

¹¹² PD: 52. *Evaṃ sabbanihīnaṃ akusalaṃ saṅgahetvā idāni ahetukaṃ saṅgaṅhanto tatthaca sabbanihīnaṃ akusalavipākaṃ tāva dassetum upekkhāsahagatantiādimāha. Vibhāvaniyaṃ pana taṃ akusala vipākattāyeva akusalānantaram pathamaṃ dassitanti adhippāyena yaṃ vuttaṃ “tesam*

Controversy [36]

This controversy concerns a naming *kusalavipākāhetukacitta*.

Vibhāvinī explains that the consciousness that are the results of *kusala* and rootless due to lacking associated roots, are called *kusalavipākāhetukacitta*. Although they are produced by producing cause (*nibbatakahetu*), they get the name of *ahetuka* by means of associated roots. Otherwise, there would not be different from great resultant citta (*mahāvīpākacitta*).¹¹³

Dīpanī explains that *kusalavipāhetukacittas* is the *cittas* which are either results of or *ahetuka* being absence of associated *hetus*.

Dīpanī criticizes *Vibhāvinī* for supposition that *vipāka* can be *sahetuka* even through the producing cause which is borne together with previous *kamma*. This is not correct. Because there is not such place in *Abhidhamma* where *vipāka* is denoted to have the possibility of *sahetuka* or *ahetuka* through the producing cause which is borne together with previous *kamma*.¹¹⁴

Controversy [37]

This controversy concerns about the meaning of *manodvāra* (mind-door).

Vibhāvinī explains that *manodvāra* (mind-door) is life-continuum consciousness (*bhavaṅgacitta*) which is contiguity condition (*anantarapaccaya*) for *āvajjana* (adverting) because it is the entrance for the occurrence of the process consciousness (*vīthiccitta*). It is called *manodvārāvajjana* (mind-door-adverting) because it adverts (*āvajjati*) an

akusalavipākā divasena tividhabhāvepi akusalānantaraṃ akusalavipākeyeva vibhajitu'nti. Taṃ na sundaraṃ.

¹¹³ Abhidhs-Ṭ. 85. *Kusalassa vipākāni, sampayuttahetuvirahato ahetukacittāni cāti kuslavipākāhetukacittāni. Nibbatakahetuvaseṇa nipphannāni pi hetāni sampayutta-hetuvaseṇeva ahetukavohāraṃ labhanti, itarathā mahāvīpākehi imesaṃ nānattāsambhavato.*

¹¹⁴ PD: 57. *Kusalassa vipākāni sampayutta hetuvirahato ahetukānicāti kuslavipākā hetuka cittāni. Vibhāvanīyaṃ pana pubbakammasahajātena nibbatakahetunāpi idha vipākassa sahetukatāpasaṅgokato. So na sundaro. na hi abhidhamme katthaci pubbakammasahajātena nibbatakahetunā vipākassa sahetukāhetukatā sambhavonāma atthi.*

object which is presenting by means of seeing, hearing, sensing etc., at the mind-door (*tasmī manodvāre*) or it diverts the flow of consciousness by meaning of what has been said. It is *kiriyāhetukamanoviññādhātu upekkhāsahagatacitta*.¹¹⁵

Dīpanī explains that *Manodvārāvajjana* is an *āvajjana* which arises in mind-door, that is *bhavaṅga*. It arises, indeed, being aware of an object, which manifests in that mind-door. Herein, *manodāra* is to be known as the entire *bhavaṅga citta*.

However, it is at first said in *Ṭīkā*: in the word, *manodvāra*, *mana* is the *bhavaṅga* which is the immediate condition of *āvajjana*; only that *mana* is to be a *dvāra* (door) being the entry of *vīthiccittas* beginning with *āvajjana*, *javana*, etc. And it is also said *Vibhāvinī*; “*Manodvāra* is the *bhavaṅgacitta* which is the immediate condition of *āvajjana*; because it is the entry *vīthicitta*.”

All are not reasonable. Because, if it is the meaning ‘only this *bhavaṅga* just after which *vīthicitta* arise is to be actually called *manodvāra*. The entry of *vīthicitta*, not the other *bhavaṅga* cittas which preceded’ - such unnecessary meaning arises; “only these bases, eyes, etc., upon which the objects, visible object, etc., impinge and the *vīthicitta* *āvajjana*, etc., arise, are to be called *dvāra* (door), the entry of those *vīthicitta*, not the others’. However, there are not such eyes, etc., which are not to be door. And all of these will be clear in *dvārasaṅgaha* later.¹¹⁶

¹¹⁵ Abhidhs-Ṭ: 85. *Āvajjanassa anantarapaccayabhūtaṃ bhavaṅgacittaṃ manodvāraṃ vīthiccittānaṃ pavattimukhabhāvato. Tasmim diṭṭhasutamutādivasena āpāthamāgatamārammaṇaṃ āvajjeti, vuttanayena vā cittasantānaṃ pariṇāmetīti manodvārāvajjanaṃ, kiriyāhetukamanoviññādhātupekkhāsahagatacittaṃ.*

¹¹⁶ PD: 58. *Bhavaṅgasaṅkhāte manodvāre uppannaṃ āvajjanaṃ manodvārāvajjanaṃ. Tañhi tasmim āpātaṃ āgacchantaṃ ārammaṇaṃ gahetvā āvajjantaṃ pavattatīti. Etthaca manodvāranti sakalaṃ bhavaṅgacittaṃ daṭṭhabbaṃ. Yampana ṭīkāyaṃ Tāva “manodvāranti ettha āvajjanassa anantara paccayabhūtaṃ bhavaṅgacittaṃ manoti vuccati. Tadeva dvāraṃ āvajjanajavanādi thicitta pavattiyā mukhattā”ti vuttaṃ. Yañca vibhāvanīyaṃ “Āvajjanassa anantara paccayabhūtaṃ bhavaṅgacittaṃ manodvāraṃ, pīthiccittānaṃ pavattimukhabhāvato”ti vuttaṃ. Taṃ sabbampi na yujjatiyeva. Yadihi yassa bhavaṅgassa anantaraṃ vīthiccittāni pavattanti. Tadeva ekantena tesam pavattimukhattā manodvāraṃnāma hoti.*

Controversy [38]

This controversy concerns about the reason for being equanimity feeling (*upekkhāvedanā*) of receiving consciousness (*sampaṭicchānaccitta*).

Vibhāvinī explains that the pair of receiving consciousness (*sampaticchanayugala*) is always accompanied by equanimity only because it doesn't get contiguity condition (*anantarapaccaya*) from the same bases (*samānanissaya*) because it arises immediately next to eye-consciousness etc., which have not the same bases with it, that is why it is not so strong and not able to enjoy the tastes of the objects in every way like a man who doesn't get a support from another on the same base.¹¹⁷

Dīpanī explains that *Sampaticchana* arises just after five -viññāṇas which are the weakest and it is always weak; hence it associates only with different feeling toward every object. *Dīpanī* point out *Vibhāvinī* for the reason that these *cittas* receives a condition from those which have different bases.¹¹⁸

Controversy [39]

This controversy concerns about association with equanimity of the pair of adverting consciousness (*āvajjanadvaya*).

Vibhāvinī explains that the first (*pañcadvāravajjana*) arises only once with an object what have not previously been taken by any consciousness, and the next (*manodvāravajjana*) anticipates the difference in task by diverting the flow of consciousness to a different kind. So it is unable to enjoy the taste of the object in every way and are therefore it associates with only neutral feeling.¹¹⁹

¹¹⁷ Abhidhs-Ṭ: 84. *Sampaṭicchānayugaḷhaṃ pana attanā asamānanissayānaṃ cakkhuviññāṇādīnāmanantaraṃ uppajjatīti samānanissayato aladdhānantarapaccayatāya sabhāgūpatthambharahito viya puriso nātibalavaṃ sabbathāpi visayarasamanubhavitum na sakkotīti sabbathāpi upekkhāsahagatameva.*

¹¹⁸ PD: 58. *Sampaṭicchānaccittaṃpana sabbadubbalaṇaṃ pañcaviññāṇānaṃ anantaraṃ uppajjatīti niccaṃ dubbalaṃ hutvā sabbattha upekkhāsahagatamevāti. Vibhāvanīyaṃ pana asamānanissaye hi tehi laddhapaccayatāvasena ayamattho vibhāvito.*

¹¹⁹ Abhidhs-Ṭ: 85. *tattha pana purimaṃ pubbe kenaci aggahiteyeva ārammaṇe ekavārameva pavattati, pacchimampi visadisacittasantānaparāvattanavasena byāpārantarasāpekkhanti na sabbathāpi visayarasamanubhavitum sakkoti, tasmā majjhattavedanāsampayuttamevāti.*

Dīpanī explains that the two *āvajjanas* have a little more strength than *santīraṇa*. they have no own powerful effort to produce *vipāka*. Those which arise depending on powerful *kamma* conditions etc., have the great power, and those which arise depending on powerless *kamma* condition etc., have less power. Although there is such a condition, the *āvajjanas* are both actually less power being absent from *kammic* power and receiving a condition from the process of *vipāka*. Therefore, it always associates with only indifferent feeling.

Dīpanī criticizes *Vibhāvinī* for saying that *Pañcadvārāvajjana* arises once on the object which is not received by any other *cittas* before. *Manodvārāvajjana*, too, has another function to perform as altering the different thought-processes. Hence, they are unable to enjoy well the taste of object and associate with indifferent feeling on all objects.

Herein, the statement “*manodvārāvajjana* has another function to perform” is not proper. Because the discrimination of *cittas*, powerful or not powerful, cannot be said through the *citta* just after arisen. But it can be said by means of own condition alone. Otherwise, *santīraṇa* also may has another function to perform. Indeed, this *citta* too alters thought-processes.¹²⁰

Controversy [40]

This controversy concerns about the definition *sabbathā*.

¹²⁰ PD: 61. *Āvajjanadvayaṃpana santīraṇatopi thokaṃ balavaṃ hoti. Vipākānañhi pavattitūṃpi attano ussāhabalaṃnāma natthi. Balavantehipana kammādiṃpaccayehi jātāni balavantānināma honti. Dubbalehi jātāni dubbalāni nāmāti. Evaṃ santēpi taṃ āvajjanadvayaṃ kammānubhāvatoca mucchivā vipākasantānatoca paccayaṃ gahetvā uṭṭhitattā dubbalameva hotīti sadāpi upekkhāsahagatamevāti. Vibhāvanīyaṃ pana pañcadvārāvajjanaṃ pubbe kenaci aggahite ārammaṇe ekavārameva pavattattā manodvārāvajjanañca visadisacittasantānaparāvattanavasena byāpārantarāsāpekkhattā ārammaṇarasam adhimattato anubhavitūṃ nasakkotīti sabbatthapi majjhata vedanāyuttamevāti vuttaṃ. Tattha byāpārantarāsāpekkhattāti idaṃ na yujjati. Na hi cittānaṃ balavadubbalatāvisesoattanopacchā pavattassa cittassa vasena sakkā vattūṃ. Attanopana paccayehiva so sakkā vattuntī. Itarathā santīraṇassapi byāpārantarāsāpekkhattā siyā. Taṃpi hi visadisacittasantānaṃ attanāparaṃ vatteti yevāti.*

Vibhāvinī explains that *sabbathā* means by division according to unwholesome resultant, wholesome resultant, and *kiriya*.¹²¹

Dīpanī explains that the meaning of *sabbatha* should be understood in the way said before. *Dīpanī* criticizes *Vibhāvīnī* for saying that *sabbathā* means by division according to unwholesome resultant, wholesome resultant, and *kiriya*. It is not correct because this division has been taken by only the word, “*iccevaṃ*”.¹²²

3.6 Controversy points in *sobhaṇacittavaṇṇanā*

Controversy [41]

This controversy concerns about the possible numbers of *mahākusalacitta*.

Vibhāvinī explains that for multiplying each of these eight consciousnesses by ten, since each occurs by way of the ten bases of meritorious action, they become eighty consciousness. And when each of these is counted as six, since it occurs in respect of six kinds of object, they become 480. By the further distinction of dominants those 240 [consciousnesses] dissociated from knowledge, by virtue of the three dominants apart from the dominant of investigation, are each counted as three and become 720. Similarly, those associated with knowledge, by virtue of the four dominants, are counted as four and become 960. Thus, by virtue of dominance there are 1680. These, by virtue of the threefold kamma of body, speech, and mind, are multiplied by three to become 5040. And these, by virtue of the distinctions of slight, medium, and excellent, are multiplied by three and become 15120.¹²³

¹²¹ Abhidhs-Ṭ: 86. *Sabbathāpīti akusalavipākakusalavipākakiriyabhedenā.*

¹²² PD: 62. *Sabbathāpīti padassa attho heṭṭhā vuttanayeneva veditabbo. Vibhāvaniyaṃ pana Sabbathāpīti akusalavipāka kusalavipāka kriyabhede nāti vuttaṃ. Taṃ na sundaraṃ.*

¹²³ Abhidhs-Ṭ: 88. *Imāni hi aṭṭha cittāni dasapuñṇakiriyavattuvasena pavattanato paccekaṃ dasa dasāti katvā asīti cittāni honti, tāni ca chasu ārammaṇesu pavattanato paccekaṃ chaggunītāni sāsītikāni cattāri satāni honti, adhipatibhedena pana ñānavippayuttānaṃ cattālīsādhikadvisataparimāṇānaṃ vīmaṃsādhipatisampayogā-bhāvato tāni tiṇṇaṃ adhipatīnaṃ vasena tiguṇītāni*

Dīpanī explains that these eight types of *cittas* multiplied by tenfold condition of meritorious action (*puññakriyavatthu*) are eighty ($8 \times 10 = 80$). Then these eighty types of *cittas* multiplied by six objects (*ārammaṇa*) come to be four hundred and eighty ($80 \times 6 = 480$). Those (480) multiplied by three actions (*kamma*) are one thousand four hundred and forty ($480 \times 3 = 1440$). Then those (1440) again multiplied by three qualities – inferiority, medium and superiority – come to be four thousand three hundred and twenty ($1440 \times 3 = 4320$).

These should be put on two places with this idea that these are pure (*suddhika*). Taking one out of these two, it should be divided into two; then, the *citta* that associates with knowledge is two thousand one hundred and sixty (2160). Then *citta* that dissociates from knowledge is the same in number as well. Then, the *cittas* that associate with knowledge (2,160) multiplied by four Dominating Factors (*adhipati*) are eight thousand six hundred and forty (8,640). But the *cittas* that dissociate from knowledge multiplied by three Dominating Factors except *vīmaṃsa* are six thousand four hundred and eighty (6,480). Again, if both of these are added, these types of *cittas* totally fifteen thousand one hundred and twenty ($8,640 + 6,480 = 15,120$). Again if one adds these 15,120 types of *cittas* to the 4,320 pure types of *cittas* which separately have been set aside, these types of *cittas* altogether come to be nineteen thousand four hundred and forty ($15,120 + 4,320 = 19,440$).

Then, in *Ṭīkā* without taking *suddhika* and *ñāṇavippayutta* separately as mentioned here, these all *cittas* are equally multiplied by *puññakriya*, etc., to be seventeen thousand two hundred and eighty (17,280). Then, in *Vibhāvanī* without taking *suddhika* separately and keeping separately only *ñāṇavippayutta*, these all *cittas* are multiplied as before to be fifteen thousand one hundred and twenty (15,120).

vīsādhikāni sattasatāni, tathā ñāṇasampayuttāni ca catunnaṃ adhipatīnaṃ vasena catugguṇitāni sasaṭṭhikāni nava satānīti evaṃ adhipativasena sahaṣṣaṃ sāsītikāni ca cha satāni honti, tāni kāyavacīmanokammasaṅkhātakammattikavasena tigūṇitāni cattālīsādhikāni pañca sahaṣṣāni honti, tāni ca hīnamajjhimaṇṭabhedato tigūṇitāni vīsasatādhikapannarasahasāni honti.

All of these are not reasonable. If so, these *kusalacittas* of *kāmāvacara* are always with dominating factor and perhaps they are to be called *ninyatādhipatika* (*cittas* being with permanent dominating factor). But, those do not have the permanent dominating factors like the higher moral *cittas* and Supramundane *cittas* mentioned above.

According to the way in *Ṭīkā* it is implicit that *cittas* without knowledge associate with *vīmaṃsa* domination. In other way, it is not impossible to say thus; “it is *kusala* that is in the sense of being born of wisdom; according to this definition, these *cittas* without knowledge are also to be called *kusala*, because they arise through the condition of wisdom, the skillfulness, which arise in the thought-process, that has different *āvajjana*, similarly, these *cittas* without knowledge are also here to be called *vīmaṃsādhipatayya* (*cittas* being born of such domination) being produced by the wisdom, the *vīmaṃsādhipati*’. With this idea, perhaps these *cittas* without knowledge are not separated. Anyhow, these *kusala cittas* in *kāma* are mostly absent from Domination factors. So, all these *kusalas* in *kāma* cannot be rooted in *vīmaṃsa*, a dominating factor.¹²⁴

Controversy [42]

This controversy concerns about *mahāvīpākacitta* (great resultant consciousness) which are not multiplied by tenfold meritorious deeds etc.

Vibhāvinī explains that wholesome consciousness occur by way of meritorious deeds, the doors of kamma, kamma itself, and dominance [mentality], but not so *mahāvīpākacitta* (the resultant consciousness) because they do not occur by way of generosity, etc., they do not cause the arising of the two communications, they do not produce the results and they do not occur surround by wish etc. Therefore, the enumeration of

¹²⁴ PD: 65. *Tena imesaṃ idha vuttappakārato aññehi pakārehi anekavidhataṃ sampiṇḍeti. Tatrāyaṃ nayo. Imāni aṭṭhacittāni dasahi puññakriyāvatthūhi guṇitāni asīti honti. Puna tāni chahi ārammaṇehi guṇitāni cattārisatāniceva asīti ca honti. ... Yañca vibhāvaniyaṃ Suddhikāni visuṃ akatvā ñāṇavippayuttānieva visuṃ katvā tathā guṇitāni vīsa satādhika pannarasa sahasāni hontīti vuttaṃ. Taṃ sabbaṃ na yuttaṃ. Evamidhapi tāni teneva vīmaṃsādhipatibhūtena sambhūtattā vīmaṃsādhipateyyānīpi nāma hontīti na nasakkā vattunti iminā adhippāyena tāni visuṃ akatāni siyuntī. Evaṃsantepi kāmakusalānināma adhipativimuttāni eva bahutarāni honti. Tasmā nasakkā sabbāni kāmakusalāni vīmaṃsādhipatimūlikāni bhavituntī.*

mahāvipākacitta should be calculated accordingly without taking by way of meritorious deeds etc.¹²⁵

Dīpanī explains that these *mahāvipākacitta* cannot be multiplied by means of the conditions of meritorious deeds (*puññakiriyavatthu*), kamma and dominating factors (*adhipati*), because they never perform the function of giving (*dāna*), etc., the function of bodily action (*kāyakamma*), etc., and they do not depend on *chanda*, etc.

Dīpanī points out *Vibhāvinī* for saying that these *citta* never perform the function of *kammadvāra* due to the fact that they do not produce information (*viññatti*); never perform the function of *kamma* because of not being in the nature of effectuating. This should be examined because it was said before that *kusala* is multiplied only through the triad of *kamma*, but not through the *kammadvāra* separately. The triad of *kamma* (*kammatika*) exist only through the threefold *kamma* door.¹²⁶

Controversy [43]

This controversy concerns about *mahākiriya*citta (great functional consciousness) which are to be stated by indirect way.

Vibhāvinī states that the accompaniment of happiness etc., for the great functional consciousness should be understood by the way in the wholesome consciousness.¹²⁷

Dīpanī states that in *mahākiriya*citta, the division of feeling (*vedanābheda*) will be said by himself later only through object like in the

¹²⁵ Abhidhs-Ṭ: 89. *Yathā panetāni puññakiriyavasena, kammadvāravasena, kamma-vasena, adhipativasena ca pavattanti, nevaṃ vipākāni dānādivasena appavattanato, viññattisamuṭṭhāpanābhāvato, avipākasabhāvato, chandādīni purakkhatvā appavattito ca, tasmā taṃvasena parihāpetvā yathārahaṃ gaṇanabhedo yojetabbo.*

¹²⁶ PD: 68. *Yasmā panetāni dānādivasena kāyakammādivasena chandādīni dhuraṃ katvā ca na pavattanti. Tasmā tāni puññakiriyāvatthūnaṃ kammādhapatīnañca vasena vaḍḍhanaṃ nalabhantīti. Vibhāvanīyaṃ pana Imāni viññattisamuṭṭhāpanābhāvato kammadvāra vasena na pavattanti. Avipākasabhāvato ca kammavasena napavattantīti vuttaṃ. Taṃ vicāretabbaṃ. Heṭṭhāhi kusalesu kammattikavaseneva vaḍḍhanaṃ vuttaṃ. Napana visuṃ kammadvāravasena. Kammattikañcanāma tividha kammadvāra vaseneva siddhanti.*

¹²⁷ Abhidhs-Ṭ: 89. *Kiriya*cittānampi kusale vuttanayena yathārahaṃ somanassa-sahagatādītā veditabbā

mahāvīpāka. However, the division concerning with the association with knowledge, the dissociation from knowledge, the absence of *saṅkhāra* and being with *saṅkhāra*, should be known as said in *kusala*.

Dīpanī points out *Vibhāvinī*'s statement that without examining such meaning, *Vibhāvinī* states that the accompaniment of happiness etc., for the great functional consciousness should be understood by the way in the wholesome consciousness. It is not reasonable¹²⁸

Controversy [44]

This controversy concerns about contractual meaning of the word *sahetuka* of *sahetukakāmāvacarakusalavīpākakiriyacittāni*.

Vibhāvinī explains that in the phrase “*sahetukakāmāvacarakusalavīpākakiriyacittāni*”, the word “*sahetuka*” modifies the words *vīpāka* and *kirīya* because *kusala* is indeed itself *sahetuka*. It is to be regarded in accordance with possibility (*yathālābha*) as in example “stones and pebbles and shoals of fish wandering and standing” since moving about of stones and pebbles make no sense, the activity of moving about is to be regarded with shoals of fish.¹²⁹

Dīpanī explains that the word of *sahetukakāmāvacarakusalavīpākakiriyacittāni*, if it relates with the word “*kusala*”, is a qualifier of *bhūtakathana* (revealing as it is). For that reason, it has not been mentioned in minor conclusion of *kusala*. If it relates with the words “*vīpāka* and *kirīya*” it is to be regarded as a qualifier of *byavacchedaka* (excluding).

¹²⁸ PD: 69. *Mahākriyacittesupi mahāvīpākesuviya ārammaṇa vaseneva vedenābhedo upari sayameva vakkhati. Nāṇasampayutta, vippayutta, asaṅkhārika, sasaṅkhārikabhedopana yathārahaṃ kusalesu vuttanayena veditabbo. Vibhāvanīyaṃ pana Tathā avicāretvā kriyacittānaṃpi kusale vuttanayena yathārahaṃ somanassa sahatatādītā veditabbāti vuttaṃ. Taṃ na yujjati.*

¹²⁹ Abhidhs-Ṭ: 90. ***Sahetukakāmāvacarakusalavīpākakiriyacittānī ettha sahetuka-ggahaṇaṃ vipākakiriyāpekkhaṃ visesaṇaṃ kusalassa ekantasahetukattā. Hoti hi yathālābhayojanā, “sakkharakathalampi macchagumbampi carantampi tiṭṭhantampi” tyādīsū (dī. ni. 1.249) viya sakkharakathalassa caraṇāyogato macchagumbāpekkhāya caraṇakiriyā yojīyatī***

Dīpanī points out *Vibhāvinī* for saying that it should be understood as in example “stones and pebbles and shoals of fish wandering and standing” since moving about of stones and pebbles make no sense, the activity of wandering is to be regarded with shoals of fish. There is no resemblance between them. There it is suitable for that stone and pebbles are not wandering” but it is not suitable for that *kusala* is not *sahetuka*.¹³⁰

Controversy [45]

This controversy concerns about contactual meaning of the word *bhedena*.

Vibhāvinī explains that the consciousness of *sahekukakāmāvacarakusala*, *vipāka* and *kiriya*, – each being twofold by division of feeling, fourfold by division of knowledge, eightfold by division of prompting – taking them all together, are to be known twenty-four. In this explanation, the division of feeling is appropriated because feelings are different by nature. The knowledge and prompting are not different by nature. Then, how is their division? The answer is that the division depends on the presence or absence of knowledge and prompting. It should be understood as in example that plenty and famine depends on rain. Therefore, the division of knowledge and prompting is reasonable and no inconsistency.¹³¹

Dīpanī explains that *vedanāññāsaṅkhārābhedenā* means that through the division of feeling; through the division of knowledge; through the division of *saṅkhāra*. Herein, it is the meaning: *vedanābheda* means that through the division of citta which is clear by the division of feeling. *Ñāṇābhedenā* means through the division of citta which is clear by

¹³⁰ PD: 69. *Sahetuka kāmāvacara kusala vipāka kriya cittānīti ettha sahetu kaggahaṇaṃ kusala sadda sambandhe bhūtakathana visesaṇaṃ. Tenevahi taṃ kusalacittānaṃ cūlanigamena gahitaṃ. Vipāka kriya saddasambandhepana byavacchedakavisesaṇaṃ daṭṭhabbaṃ. Vibhāvaniyaṃ pana Sakkharakathalikāṃpi macchagumbāṃpi tiṭṭhantāṃpi carantāṃpi passatīti suttapade viya idha yathālābha yojanāti vuttaṃ. Taṃ na sameti. Tatthahi sakkharakathalikāṃnāma nacaratīti yuttaṃ. Idhapaṇa kusalaṃ sahetukaṃ nahotīti nayuttametanti.*

¹³¹ Abhidhs-Ṭ: 90. *Nanu ca vedanābhedo tāva yutto tāsaṃ bhinnasabhāvattā. Ñāṇa-saṅkhārābhedo pana kathanti? Ñāṇasaṅkhārānaṃ bhāvābhāvakatopi bhedo ñāṇasaṅkhārakatova yathā vassakato subhikkho dubbhikkhoti, tasmā ñāṇasaṅkhārakatō bhedo ñāṇasaṅkhārābhedoti na ettha koci virodhoti*

association with and dissociation from knowledge. *Saṅkhārabhedena* means that through the division of citta which is clear by the unity of condition without or with *saṅkhāra*. It is true. It is the quality of the compound words (*samāsa*) that they can describe the various meanings known easily through a few words.

Dīpanī rejects *Vibhāvinī*'s supposition that by such explanation, it clarifies that there is no chance of such a question put forward *Vibhāvinī* regarding to the division of knowledge and *saṅkhāra* which have no division by themselves and to the classification of cittas.¹³²

Controversy [46] [47]

This controversy concerns about the meaning of *sabbathā*.

Vibhāvinī explains the meaning of *sabbathā* that *sabbathā*: all together, by internal division of wholesome, unwholesome, resultants and functional, there are just fifty-four consciousness, although they are innumerable by division of time, place and individual consciousness continuity; this is the meaning.¹³³

Dīpanī explains the meaning of *sabbathā* that in the word *sabbathā*, the word “*pi*” is omitted the meaning of it was mentioned before. They are only fifty-four in all aspects as said in *Dhammasaṅgaṇī*; they are only fifty-four in all aspects as classified in *Vibhaṅga* and so on. By this statement, it rejects the explanation of *Vibhāvinī* which is explained through the inclusive divisions of *kusla* etc.

Dīpanī points out the interpretation of the word *kāma* by the *Vibhāvinī* that is *kāme* means *kāme bhava*. This interpretation should be examined because the term *bhava* can be found in *Abhidhamma* being in the sense of *kusala* and *akusala kamma* and resultant mind and *kaṭattā* matters which are produced by *kamma*, not being in the sense of other

¹³² PD: 70. *Saṅkhārabhedenāti saṅkhārena vinā sahaca pavattapaccaya-gaṇabheda-siddhena cittabhedenāti attho. Idañhi samāsapadānaṃ sāmattiyaṃ, yadidaṃ suviññātānaṃ nānāppakārānaṃ padatthānaṃ appakena byañjana dīpanasamatthatāti. Etena vibhāvaniyaṃ Sayamaṃ abhinnānaṃ ñāṇasaṅkhārānaṃ bhedavacane cittassa bhedakara bhāve ca codanāya anokāsata sādhitā hotīti.*

¹³³ *Abhidhs-Ṭ: 90. sabbathāpi kusalākusalavipākakiriyānaṃ antogadhabhedena catupaññāseva kāladesasantānādibhedena anekavidhabhāvepīyattho.*

dhammas, mind and matter. Here the expression, *kāma*, is a synonymous word for *bhūmi*. And *bhūmi* is said to be the unity of dhamma which concerns animated and inanimate together with their locality. So the meaning should be noted that *kāme* is ‘in *kāma* plane’ or the word *bhava* is used for only *bhūmi* by defining in the way of *suttanta* thus: *bhava* is that where living beings and conditioned things come into being’. This way should be known later, too.¹³⁴

3.7 Controversy points in *rūpāvacaracitta*

Controversy [48] [49] [50]

This controversy concerns being *asaṅkhārika* or *sasaṅkhārika* of *rūpāvacaracittas*.

Vibhāvinī explains that why is no division in prompting made here similar to in *kāmāvacarakusalacitta*? Is it possible to state that *jhāna* is *sasaṅkhārika* when it is obtained by way of *samatha* alone and *jhāna* is unprompted when it is obtained by way of attaining *magga* (*maggādhikata*)? It is not possible to state so because the *jhāna* obtained by way of attaining *magga* arises later by way of preparation (*parikamma*). Therefore, it is not possible to state either that *jhānas* are *asaṅkhārika* because they do not arise by a right (*adhikāra*) alone without preparation (*parikamma*) or *jhānas* are *sasaṅkhārikas* because they do not arise by the preparatory practice (*abhisāṅkhāra*) alone without a right (*adhikāra*). On the other hand, *jhāna* is not said as *asaṅkhārika* because the state of

¹³⁴ PD: 71. *Sabbathāti cettha visaddo lutta niddiṭṭho. Dhammasaṅganiyaṃ vuttena sabbappakārenapi catuppaññāsaeva. Vibhaṅge vibhattena sabbappakārenapi catuppaññāsa evātiādinā tassa attho heṭṭhā vuttoyevāti. Etena vibhāvaniyaṃ Idha vuttānaṃ kusalādīnaṃ antogadhabhedavasena tassa atthavibhāvanā paṭisiddhā hoti. Yañca vibhāvaniyaṃ Kāme bhaveti vuttaṃ. Taṃpi vicāretabbaṃ. Bhavasaddo hi kusalākusalakammesu kammanibbattesuca vipāka kaṭattārūpesu vattamāno abhidhamme diṭṭho. Na tadaññesu nāmarūpadhammesūthi. Bhūmipariyāyoca idha kāmasaddo. Bhūmītica saḥokāso indriyā nindriyabaddhadhammasamūho vuccatīti kāme kāmabhūmiantī ayamattho daṭṭhabbo. Bhavotivā bhūmieva vuccatīti suttantapariyāyena bhavanti ettha sattā saṅkhārācāti katvā. Esanayo paratthapīti.*

asañkhārika is never found nor *sasañkhārika* because it is surely being *sasañkhārika*.¹³⁵

Dīpanī explains that herein a question may be posed: why is the division of *sañkhāra* not said here? Because it is not said in Pāḷi Cannon. Why is it not said in Pāḷi Canon? Because it can be known only through the word on the division of ways (*paṭipadā*). To be explained: if all *jhānas*, mundane or supramundane, have easy ways (*sukhapaṭipadā*) it has already said to be *asañkhārika*. And if they have difficult ways (*dukkhapaṭipadā*), it has already been said to be *sasañkhārika*.¹³⁶

[48] *Dīpanī* points out *Vibhāvini*'s statement that all *jhānas* are not to be said *asañkhārikas* because they do not arise by a right (*adhikāra*) alone without preparation (*parikamma*). It is not reasonable because the preparation (*parikamma*) is not to be regarded as *sañkhāra* in division of *sañkhāra* and the preparation is an original condition which brings about *jhānas*.¹³⁷

¹³⁵ Abhidhs-Ṭ: 94. *Athettha kāmāvacarakusalesu viya sañkhārabhedo kasmā na gahito. Idampi hi kevalaṃ samathānuyogavasena paṭiladdhaṃ sasañkhārikaṃ, maggādhigamavasena paṭiladdhaṃ asañkhārikanti sakkā vattunti? Nayidamevaṃ maggādhigamavasenasattito paṭiladdhassāpi aparabhāge parikammavaseneva uppajjanato, tasmā sabbassapi jhānassa parikammasañkhātapubbābhisañkhārena vinā kevalaṃ adhikāravasena anuppajjanato ‘asañkhārika’ntipi, adhikārena ca vinā kevalaṃ parikammābhisañkhāreneva anuppajjanato ‘sasañkhārika’ntipi na sakkā vattunti. Atha vā pubbābhisañkhāravaseneva uppajjamānassa na kadāci asañkhārikabhāvo sambhavatīti ‘asañkhārika’nti ca byabhicārābhāvato ‘sasañkhārika’nti ca na vuttanti.*

¹³⁶ PD: 74. *Ettha siyā. Kasmā idha sañkhārabhedo navuttoti. Pāḷiyameva avuttattā. Kasmāca so pāḷiyaṃ avuttoti. Paṭipadā bhedavacaneneva siddhattāti. Tathāhi sabbesaṃpi lokiya lokuttarajjhānānaṃ sukhappaṭipadabhāve siddhe asañkhārikabhāvo siddhoyeva hoti. Dukkappaṭipadabhāveca siddhe tesam sasañkhārikabhāvo siddhoyeva hotīti.*

¹³⁷ PD: 74. *Yaṃpana vibhāvaniyaṃ ‘Sabbassapi jhānassa parikammasañkhāta-pubbābhisañkhārena vinā kevalaṃ adhikāravasena anuppajjanato asañkhārikantipi. Adhikārenaca vinā kevalaṃ parikammābhisañkhāravaseneva anuppajjanato sasañkhārikantipi nasakkā vattu’nti vuttaṃ. Tattha parikammasañkhāta.La. Asañkhārikantipi nasakkā vattunti idaṃ tāva nayujjati. Na hi parikammasañkhāta-pubbābhisañkhāro imasmiṃ sañkhārabhede sañkhāro evanāma hoti. Kasmā, jhānuppattiyā pakatipaccaya bhūtattā, tathāhi loke sāsaneca sabbasāpi kusalākusala kammaṃ attano anurūpena parikammasañkhāta-pubbābhisañkhārena vinā uppamaṇṇāma natthi.*

[49] The statement that all *jhānasa* are not to be said as *sasaṅkhārika* because they do not arise by the preparatory practice (*abhisāṅkhāra*) alone without a right (*adhikāra*). It is also not reasonable because it cannot be said that the mundane *jhāna* arises without *adhikāra*. In commentaries it is said that the *jhāna* which has an easy way (*sukkhapaṭipadā*) arise within those who have *adhikāra* in *samatha* meditation in previous lives. And the *jhāna* which has painful way (*dukkhapaṭipadā*) arises within those how have not such an *adhikāra*. Actually, to examine here the division of *saṅkhāra* referring to right (*adhikāra*) that was completed in previous life is not reasonable.¹³⁸

[50] It is reasonable to examine such a division only through the nvearby conditions in the *jhāna kusala* and *kiriya*. Therefore, the second explanation of *Vibhāvinī* also rejected.¹³⁹

Controversy [52] [53]

This controversy concerns the interpretation of *jhānabedena* and *pañcadhā*.

Vibhāvinī makes interpretation of *jhānabedena* that *jhānabeda* means by division according to the combinations of five, four, three, tow, and again two *jhāna*-factor. *Pañcadhā* means having five factors, four factors, three factors, two factors, and again two factors.

Dipanī makes interpretation of *jhānabedena* and *pañcadhā* that *jhānabedena* means through the division of association with five *jhānas* beginning with the first *jhāna*. It is interpretation: the *rūpāvacaracitta* is five-fold through the division of *jhānascitta* that associated with the first *jhāna*, associated with second *jhāna*, associated with the third *jhāna*,

¹³⁸ PD: 78. *Yañca tattha Adhikārenaca vinā kevalaṃ.La. Sasaṅkhārikantipi nasakkā vattunti vuttaṃ. Taṃpi na yujjatiyeva. Na hi lokiyajjhānānināma adhikārena vinā nuppajjantīti atthi. Kevalaṃpana pubbe samathakammesu katādhikārassa sukhapaṭipadajjhānaṃ uppajjati.*

¹³⁹ PD: 79. *Apica, purimabhava siddhaṃ adhikāraṃ gahetvā idha saṅkhārabhedavīcāraṇāpi nayuttāeva. Kusalakriyajjhānesu hi sanni hitapaccayavaseneva tabbicāraṇā yuttāti. Ettāvatā Athavātīādiko pacchima vikappopi paṭikkhitto eva hotīti.*

associated with fourth *jhāna* and associated with the fifth *jhāna*; thus, it is five-fold.¹⁴⁰

[52] *Dīpanī* criticizes that *Vibhāvinī* said that *jhānabhedena* that *jhānabeda* means by division according to the combinations of five, four, three, two, and again two *jhāna*-factor. It is not good because the division of *jhāna* is one thing. The division of *jhāna* factor is another. Herein, the division of *jhāna* is that the first *jhāna*, the second *jhāna* and so on. The division of *jhāna* factor is that the first *jhāna* which has five factors, the second *jhāna* which has four factors and so on. Of these only division of *jhāna* is necessary here, not the division of *jhāna* factor. It is true *citta* is five-fold only through the division of *jhāna*, not through the division of *jhāna* factor. It is, indeed, the only *jhāna* which is five-fold through the division of *jhāna* factor.¹⁴¹

[53] *Vibhāvinī* said that *Pañcadhā* means having five factors, four factors, three factors, two factors, and again two factors. This is also not correct because it is only *jhāna* which has five factors, etc., not *citta*.¹⁴²

3.8 Controversy points in *arūpāvacaracitta*

Controversy [54]

This controversy concerns the definition of *viññāṇañcāyatana*.

Vibhāvinī explains the meaning of *viññāṇañcāyatana* that *viññāṇa* itself being infinitive is *viññāṇānanta*. It is *pathamāruppaviññāṇa*

¹⁴⁰ PD: 80. *jhānabhedenāti pathamajjhānādīhi pañcahi jhānehi sampayogabhedenā. Rūpāvacaramānasam jhānabhedenā pañcadhā hoti. Pathamajjhānikaṃ, dutīyajjhānikaṃ, tatīyajjhānikaṃ, catutthajjhānikaṃ, pañcamajjhānikanti evaṃ pañcavidhaṃ hotīti attho. Tameva puññapākakriyābhedenā pañcadasadhā bhaveti yojanā.*

¹⁴¹ PD: 80. *Vibhāvanīyaṃ pana Jhānabhedenāti jhānaṅgehi sampayogabhedenāti vuttaṃ. Taṃ na sundaraṃ. Añño hi jhānabhedo. Añño jhānaṅgabhedo. Tattha pathamaṃ jhānaṃ dutīyaṃ jhānantiādi jhānabhedo. Pathamajjhāne pañca āṅgāni. Dutīyajjhāne cattārītiādi jhānaṅgabhedo. Tesu idha jhānabhedova adhippeto. Na jhānaṅgabhedo. Cittañhi jhānabhede neva pañcavidhaṃ hoti. Najhānaṅgabhedena. Jhānameva pana jhānaṅgabhedena pañcavidhanti.*

¹⁴² PD: 80. *Yañca tattha ‘Pañcadhāti pañcaṅgikaṃ caturaṅgikaṃ tivaṅgikaṃ duvaṅgikaṃ puna duvaṅgikanti pañcavidhaṃ hotī’ ti vuttaṃ. Tampi na sundaraṃ. Jhānameva hi pañcaṅgikādi hoti. Na cittanti.*

[consciousness dwelling on “infinity of space”]. It is called *ananta* [infinite] because it occurs in respect of infinite space, and because it occurs by way of pervading boundlessly, although this consciousness possesses boundary in the sense of arising etc. *viññāṇānata* itself becomes *viññāṇaṅca* with the *a* shortened and the *na* elided. On the other way, *viññāṇaṅca* is what one should incline towards or arrive at by the second formless consciousness. The *viññāṇa* is *viññāṇaṅcāyatana* because it is being the support of the second formless consciousness.¹⁴³

Dīpanī explains that in the word *viññāṇaṅcāyatana*, *viññāṇa* is only *ākāsānaṅcāyatana*. The *viññāṇa* is called *ananta* ‘infinite’ because it is being on infinite space although it has limit beginning with arising. It is called *ananta* because it arises through the mental culture on that object which is received all its parts without focusing on one part, the part of arising etc. or it arises on the object of space which is infinite, so *jhāna* is *ananta*; it arises on the infinite object through the mental culture on the object of infinity, so *citta* is called *ananta*. Or it is reasonable to say that it is *ananta* from the point of prevailing on the object of space which is infinite. *Viññāṇānanta* is used as *viññāṇaṅca* according to the grammatical method. *Viññāṇaṅcāyatana* is a *jhāna* that has an infinite mind as its ground.¹⁴⁴

Dīpanī criticizes *Vibhāvinī* for saying that the *viññāṇa* is *viññāṇaṅcāyatana* because it is being the support of the *second* formless consciousness.

¹⁴³ Abhidhs-Ṭ: 95. *Viññāṇameva anantaṃ viññāṇānantaṃ, paṭhamārūppaviññāṇaṃ. Tañhi uppādādiavantampi anantākāse pavattanato attānaṃ ārabha pavattāya bhāvanāya uppādādiantaṃ aggahetvā anantato pharaṇavasena pavattanato ca ‘ananta’nti vuccati. Viññāṇānantaṃ viññāṇaṅcaṃ ākāssa rassattaṃ, na-kāssa lopaṅca katvā. Dutiyārūppaviññāṇena vā añcitabbaṃ pāpuṇitabbanti viññāṇaṅcaṃ, tadeva āyatanaṃ dutiyārūppassa adhiṭṭhānattāti viññāṇaṅcāyatanaṃ.*

¹⁴⁴ PD: 82. *Viññāṇaṅcāyatanaṃ ettha viññāṇaṃnāma ākāsaṅcāyatanaṃ. Taṃpana sayāṃ uppādādi antavantampi anantasaññite ākāse pavattanato anantanti vuccati. Koṭṭhāsathovā antasaddo. Attano uppādādīsū koṭṭhāsesu ekadesa aṭṭhatvā sakalassa pharaṇavasena tadārammaṇāya bhāvanāya pavattanato anantanti vuccati. Anantasaññitevā ākāse pavattanato anantanti evaṃ tadārammaṇāya bhāvanāya pavattattā anantanti vuccati.*

It does not accord with the following Pāli. It is said that “*anantaṃ viññāṇaṃ* means to only that *viññāṇa* a yogi pays attention discerning by knowledge and wide it with the intention of infinity. For this reason, it is called *anantaṃ viññāṇaṃ*”.¹⁴⁵

3.9 Controversy points in *lokuttaracitta*

Controversy [55], [56], [57]

This controversy concerns the definition of *sotāpattimaggacitta*.

Vibhāvinī defines the meaning of *sotāpattimaggacitta* that it is called *magga* because it seeks *nibbana* or it is sought by those who wish *nibbana* or because it proceeds by killing the defilements. The consciousness which associates with the path is called path-consciousness (*maggacitta*). The path-consciousness obtained by entering the stream is *sotāpattimaggacitta*. On the other hand, the one who reaches the stream of being noble persons at first earlier than *sakadāgāmi* etc., is called *sotāpatti*. It is a person. The path of the person is called *sotāpattimagga*. The consciousness that associates with the *sotāpattimagga* is called *sotāpattimaggacitta*.¹⁴⁶

Dīpanī explains the meaning of *sotāpattimaggacitta* that it flows without back; so, it is called *sota*. The term is used for the current in the river *gaṅgā* etc., that current truly flows without going back from the source up to the great ocean. It is similar to the current; so, it is called *sota*. That is a term for the path (*magga*) with eight-fold factors. It is true. This eight-fold Noble path, too, since it commences until the element of *Nibbāna*

¹⁴⁵ PD: 82. *Vibhāvaniyaṃ pana mahāṭīkāyaṅca ‘‘Dutiyā ruppa viññāṇena añcitabbaṃ pāpūṇitabbanti viññāṇaṅca’’ntipi vuttaṃ. Taṃ pāḷiyā na sameti. Anantaṃ viññāṇanti tadeva viññāṇaṃ ñāṇena phutṭhaṃ manasikaroti, anantaṃ pharati. Tena vuccati anantaṃ viññāṇantīhi vuttaṃ. Etena ca taṃviññāṇaṃ ekantena anantavisesanayuttaṃ hotīti viññāyatīti.*

¹⁴⁶ Abhidhs-Ṭ: 96. *Nibbānaṃ maggeti, nibbānatthikehi vā maggīyati, kilese mārento gacchatīti vā maggo, tena sampayuttaṃ cittaṃ maggacittaṃ, sotāpattiyā laddhaṃ maggacittaṃ sotāpattimaggacittaṃ. Atha vā ariyamaggasotassa ādito pajjanaṃ etassāti sotāpatti, puggalo, tassa maggo sotāpattimaggo, tena sampayuttaṃ cittaṃ sotāpattimaggacittaṃ.*

without any of the rest of consequences of kamma and passion, flows spreading its power without going back. Herein, “going on without turning back” is noted as not approaching again to the passions which have been eradicated by such and such *maggas* and as reaching regularly the state of maturity of the faculties beginning with confidence. To reach that *sota* at the very beginning is to be said *sotāpatti*. The *maggā* which must be attained by reaching the *sota* at the very beginning is *sotāpattimagga*.¹⁴⁷

In the other way, referring to this passage “a noble person is he who has attained the dhamma”, the whole dhammas of *bodhipakkiya*, mundane or supramundane, which occur within noble person are called *sota* in the sense of flowing without going back as inclining to the higher knowledge and to the *saupādisesanibbāna*. A person attains that *sota* through the practice at the very beginning, so it is called *sotāpatti*. It is either *sotāpatti* or *maggā*, so it is called *sotāpattimagga*. *Sotāpattimagga* is a *citta* which associates with the *sotāpattimagga*.¹⁴⁸

[55] *Dīpanī* criticizes *Vibhāvinī* for saying that the one who reaches the stream of being noble persons at first earlier than *sakadāgāmi* etc., is called *sotāpatti*. It is a person. It is not good because the word, *sotāpatti*, which describes a person cannot be found anywhere. [56] in this meaning, the statement “The path of the person is called *sotāpattimagga*” is also rejected.¹⁴⁹

¹⁴⁷ PD: 85. *Idāni yathānuppattaṃ lokuttara cittaṃ dassento sotāpattimagga-cittantiādīmāha. Tattha savati sandati anivattagamanavasena pavattatīti soto, gaṅgādīsū jalappavāho. Sohi pabhavato paṭṭhāya yāvamaḥāsamuddā antarā anivatta māno savati sandati pavattatīti. Sotoviyāti soto.*

¹⁴⁸ PD: 86. *Athavā, dhammasota samāpanno ariyoti pavuccatīti vuttattā sabbe ariyasantānagatā lokiya lokuttarabhūtā bodhipakkiyadhammā upari sambodhiparā yanatāvasena anupādisesanibbāna parāyanatāvasenaca anivatta gatiyā pavattamānā yathāvuttena atthena sototi vuccanti. Taṃ sotam ādito pajjanti pāpuṇanti etāya paṭipadāyāti sotāpatti. Sotāpattica sā maggocāti sotāpattimaggo, pathamamaggasaṅkhātāya sotāpattiyā aṅganti sotāpatti yaṅgantihi aṭṭhakathāyaṃ vuttaṃ, maggotica patho upāyo. Nibbānaṃ maggeti, nibbānatthikehi maggīyati, kilese mārento gacchatīti maggotica vadanti.*

¹⁴⁹ PD: 87. *Vibhāvanīyaṃ pana Ariyamaggasotassa ādito pajjanaṃ etassāti sotāpatti. Puggaloti vuttaṃ. Taṃ na sundaraṃ. Na hi puggale pavatto sotāpattisaddo*

[57] The path-consciousness obtained by entering the stream is *sotāpattimaggacitta*. This statement is not correct because the word ‘*sotāpatti*’ that connects with the word ‘*citta*’ is not found in any Pāli text.¹⁵⁰

Controversy [58] [59]

These controversies concern the definition of *sakadāgāmi*.

Vibhāvinī explains the meaning of once-returner (*sakadāgāmi*) and five kinds of once-returner that the once-returner is one who returns to the world of humans by way of rebirth only one more time.

- (1) One, having attained [the path of once-return] here, attains complete *nibbāna* here (*idha patvā idha parinibbāyī*).
- (2) One, having attained there, attains complete *nibbāna* there (*tattha patvā tattha parinibbāyī*).
- (3) One, having attained here, attains complete *nibbana* there (*idha patvā tattha parinibbāyī*).
- (4) One, having attained there, attains complete *nibbana* here (*tattha patvā idha parinibbāyī*).
- (5) One, having attained here, and having been born there, attains complete *nibbana* here (*idha patvā tattha nibbattitvā idha parinibbāyī*).

Among these five kinds of once-returner, the fifth is to be taken here. For he departs from there but returns here once again. The path of once-returner is *sakadāgāmimagga*.

Although, since there is no possibility of the one possessing the path returning in this manner, only one who has the fruit is called a once-returner, yet, in order to exclude the other paths and to distinguish him from the one who has the fruit, the previously arisen path that is the cause for

katthaci diṭṭhoti. Etena tassa maggo sotāpattimaggoti idampi paṭikkhittam hoti. Sotāpattimaggena sampayuttam cittam sotāpattimaggaṅgam.

¹⁵⁰ PD: 87. *Ṭikāsu pana sotāpattiyā laddham maggaṅgam sotāpatti maggaṅgantanti vuttam. Tam na sundaram. Na hi cittaśaddasambandho sotāpattisaddo katthaci pāḷiyam diṭṭhoti.*

him is stated as the once-returner path. Similarly, with the non-returner path.¹⁵¹

Dīpanī explains that *sakadāgāmī* is one who is in the habit of coming once to this world as being born. This term is used for a person who has attained the second fruition [*sakadāgāmī*]. Herein, the meaning of the word “to this world [*imaṃ lokam*]” is given in two ways in commentaries: to this human world or to this *kāma* world. Of these two, if the former meaning, “come” means ‘one comes from deity world’, if the latter, ‘come’ means ‘one comes even from brahma world’. However, in this Pāli, it seems to say only the later. This once-returner is six kinds:

- (1) One, having attained [the path of once-returner] here, attains complete nibbana here (*idha patvā idha parinibbāyī*).
- (2) One, having attained there, attains complete *nibbāna* there (*tattha patvā tattha parinibbāyī*)
- (3) One, having attained here, attains complete *nibbana* there (*idha patvā tattha parinibbāyī*)
- (4) One, having attained there, attains complete *nibbana* here (*tattha patvā idha parinibbāyī*)
- (5) One, having attained here, and having been born there, attains complete *nibbana* here (*idha patvā tattha nibbattitvā idha parinibbāyī*).

¹⁵¹ Abhidhs-Ṭ: 96. *Sakiṃ ekavāraṃ paṭisandhivasena imaṃ manussalokaṃ āgacchatīti sakadāgāmī, idha patvā idha parinibbāyī, tattha patvā tattha parinibbāyī, idha patvā tattha parinibbāyī, tattha patvā idha parinibbāyī, idha patvā tattha nibbattitvā idha parinibbāyīti pañcasu sakadāgāmīsu pañcamako idhādhippeto. So hi ito gantvā puna sakiṃ idha āgacchatīti. Tassa maggo sakadāgāmimaggo. Kiñcāpi maggasamaṅgino tathāgamanāsambhavato phalaṭṭhoyeva sakadāgāmī nāma, tassa pana kāraṇabhūto purimuppanno maggo maggantarāvacchedanattaṃ phalaṭṭhena visesetvā vuccati ‘sakadāgāmimaggo’’ti. Evaṃ anāgāmimaggoti. Sakadāgāmimaggena sampayuttaṃ cittaṃ sakadāgāmimaggaṃcittaṃ.*

(6) One, having attained there, and having been born here, attains complete nibbana there complete *nibbana* there (*tattha patvā idha nibbattitvā tattha parinibbāyī*).¹⁵²

[58] *Dīpanī* criticizes *Vibhāvinī* that some commentators say the meaning of the word “*imaṃ lokam*”, to be in the sense of “to this human world”. In such a meaning, the person of “once-returned” is only five kinds and the sixth person is not to be said here. [58] It is said *Vibhāvinī* that Among these five kinds of once-returned, the fifth is to be taken here. For he departs from there but returns here once again. However, in the commentary on Mahāparinibbānasutta and on Mahāvaggasamyutta, it mentions even the sixth persons in the sense of “once-returned”.¹⁵³

Sakadāgāmimagga is a path which belongs to the person of once-returned. That path, it is true, being itself a “producing” (*janaka*), brings about the “produced” (*janetabba*) that belongs to the person of “once-returned”. So, to be “qualifier and qualified” is reasonable here by relating as “produced” and “producing” like these terms *tissa mātā*, *phussassa mātā* etc. (Tissa’s mother and Phussa’s mother).

[59] It is said *Vibhāvinī* with this idea that to be “qualifier and qualified” is not reasonable; but there is something which is useful; as the useful thing there is nothing contradictory: “Although, since there is no possibility of

¹⁵² PD: 87. *Paṭisandhivasena sakim imamlokam āgacchati sīlenāti sakadāgāmī. Dutīyaphalaṭṭho. So hi asamucchinnakāma rāgānusayattā kāmālokāgamana kilesasabbhāvena taṃ sabhāvānāti vattanato upari bhavagge ṭhitopi paṭisandhivasena puna imaṃ kāmādhātum āgamanappakatikoeva hotīti Sopana chabbidho hoti. Idhapatvā idhaparinibbāyī, tattha patvā tattha parinibbāyī, idhapatvā tattha parinibbāyī, tattha patvā idha parinibbāyī, idhapatvā tatthanibbattitvā idha parinibbāyī. Tatthapatvā idhanibbattitvā tatthaparinibbāyīti. Tattha idha patvā idha parinibbāyīti idha manussabhava sakadāgāmimaggaṃ patvā idhamanussa bhavēyeva arahattamaggaṃ labhitvā parinibbāyanadhammo. Tattha patvā tattha parinibbāyīti tasmimdevaloke sakadāgāmimaggaṃ patvā tasmim devalokeyeva arahattamaggaṃ labhitvā parinibbāyanadhammo. Nibbattitvāti paṭisandhiggaṇavasena uppajjitvā. Yesam pana imaṃ lokanti padassa imaṃ manussalokanti attho. Tesam so pañcavidhoyeva vutto, na chaṭṭho puggalo*

¹⁵³ PD: 91. *Vibhāvaniyaṅca ‘Pañcasu sakadāgāmīsu pañcamakova idhādhippeto, so hi ito gantvā puna sakim idha āgacchatī’ ti vuttaṃ. Mahāparinibbāna suttaṭṭhakathāyaṃ pana mahāvagga samyuttaṭṭhakathā yaṅca sopi chaṭṭho puggalo sakim āgamanatṭhena āgatoyeva*

the one possessing the path returning in this manner, only one who has the fruit is called a once-returner, yet, in order to exclude the other paths and to distinguish him from the one who has the fruit, the previously arisen path that is the cause for him is stated as the once-returner path. Similarly, with the non-returner path. It is not reasonable.¹⁵⁴

Controversy [60] [61] [62]

These controversies concern the explanation of the word “*pi*”.

Vibhāvinī explains the meaning of “*pi*” that with the word “*pi*”, it is summarized, in the manner stated above, the variation too: the method of classification by four thousand, by way of one thousand for each magga, and the method of classification by sixty thousand, which are mentioned in *Saccavibhaṅga*. Therein, the explanation of just the thousand ways is this. How? The path of stream-entry, without reference to classification by the kinds of progress according to *jhāna*, is first simply divided into two as *suññata* and *appaṇihita*; by applying in addition the four kinds of practice, each one is divided into four, giving a total division of ten according to *jhāna*.¹⁵⁵

Dīpanī explains that by the word “*pi*”, the number of *magga citta*s which are divided in Pāli text are added. Herein, it is a way of division in *Dhammasaṅgani*. Regarding the first Path, there are nine *citta*s in the first section of *suddhika-paṭipadā* out of the five sections of *jhāna* in the two ways – four sets and five sets. In the same way there are nine *citta*s each in these sections *suddhika-suññatā* (pure emptiness), *suññatā paṭipadā* (the way of emptiness), *suddhika-ppaṇihitā* (pure non-desire) and *appaṇihita-*

¹⁵⁴ PD: 92. *Vibhāvānīyaṃ pana Sāññāyāgatāeva nahoti. Payojanaṃ pana kiñci atthi. Payojanavasena aviruddhā hotīti iminā adhippāyenayaṃ vuttaṃ ‘kiñcāpi maggasaṅgino tathāgamanāsambhavato phalaṭṭhoyeva sakadāgāmīnāma. Tassapana kāraṇabhūto purimuppanno maggo maggantarāvacchedanattama phalaṭṭhena visesetvā vuccati sakadāgāmimaggoti. Evaṃ anāgāmimaggo’ ti. Taṃ na yujjati.*

¹⁵⁵ Abhidhs-Ṭ: 96. *Pi-saddena ekekassa maggassa nayasahassavasena catunnaṃ catusahassabhedam saccavibhaṅge (vibha. 206; vibha. aṭṭha. 206-214) āgataṃ saṭṭhisahassabhedam nayaṃ heṭṭhā vuttanayena anekavidhattampi saṅgaṇhāti. Tatthāyaṃ nayasahassamattaparidīpanā, kathaṃ? Sotāpattimaggo tāva jhānanāmena paṭipadābhedaṃ anāmasitvā kevalaṃ suññato appaṇihitoti dvidhā vibhatto, puna paṭipadācatukkena yojetvā paccekaṃ catudhā vibhattoti evaṃ jhānanāmena dasadhā vibhatto.*

paṭipadā (the way of non-desired). Thus, in these five sections there are 45 cittas according to ten ways. And in the same way there are 45 cittas each in five sections which are mentioned by the name of *magga*, *satipaṭṭhāna*, etc., numbering 19. Thus, there are 900 citta according to two hundred ways in one hundred sections which are mentioned by the twenty names.

Again, there are 3,600 cittas according to eight hundred ways in the four hundred sections which are mentioned by mixing with four Dominating Factors. Thus, in the first *magga* there are 4500 cittas according to one thousand ways. The same way in the rest of the *maggas*, too. Thus, in four *maggas* there are 18000 cittas according to the four thousand ways.

However, in the *Sacca* and *satipaṭṭhāna vibhaṅga*, there are 90000 cittas according to twenty thousand ways. In the *Magga Vibhaṅga*, there are 126000 cittas according to twenty-eight thousand ways. Then, in Commentaries, there talk about only the number of ways, not that of cittas.

[60] *Dīpanī* criticizes *Vibhāvinī* that it is said by the word “*pi*”, it is summarized the sixty-thousand ways which are mentioned in *Sacca Vibhaṅga*. That should not be said in the conclusion of *kusala*. Because the way of sixty thousand divisions is described in Commentary to be explained only in the place of *vipāka*.¹⁵⁶

[61] And it is also said in it: without touching the division of *paṭipadā*, it is divided twofold: *suññata* and *appaṇihita*. This is not reasonable because in Pāli text, the division of *paṭipadā* is mentioned only at the beginning. But at the beginning there is no immediate section that is divided into two: *suññata* and *appaṇihita*.¹⁵⁷

¹⁵⁶ PD: 94. *Yampana vibhāvaniyaṃ Pisaddena saccavibhaṅge āgataṃ saṭṭhisahassa-bhedam nayaṃ saṅgaṇhātīti vuttam. Tam imasmiṃ kusalanigame na vattabam. Sohi saṭṭhisahassabhedo nayo vipākaṭṭhāneeva aṭṭhakathāyaṃ āgatoti.*

¹⁵⁷ PD: 94. *Yañca tattha Paṭipadābhedaṃ anāmasitvā kevalam suññato appaṇihīti totī dvidhā vibhattoti vuttam. Tam nayujjati. Pāliyañhi paṭipadābhedo ādimhiyeva āgatoti. Naca ādimhi suññato appaṇihitoti dvidhā vibhatto nirantaravāro atthīti.*

[62] And it is also said in it: *suññata* is one way: *appaṇihita* one; *suññatas* which are associated with *paṭapadā* are four; *appaṇihitas* fours; thus there are ten ways. With this idea, it is classified in to ten by the name of *jhāna*. This is not reasonable because these *suññata* etc., are not a way here. Indeed, only these two ways, tetrad and pentad- are to be a way here in each of them. By this all of these assertions, *tathā maggasatipaṭṭhānāti* etc., are rejected¹⁵⁸

Controversy [63]

These controversy concerns the explanation of the word “*lokuttara*”.

Vibhāvinī explains the classification of all type of consciousness by means of plane (*bhūmibheda*) that herein, consciousness that are included (*pariyāpanna*) in *kāma* plane etc., (*kāmabhavādi*) by coming withing the range of sensual craving etc., although they exist in other planes, are called the consciousness in *kāma* planes. It is like the example that an animal, althouth born from the womb of a human woman, is classed in animals because it belongs to animal types. The nine *lokuttaradhamma* that are not included (*apariyāpanna*) anywhere, are stated as the consciousness in unsurpassed (*anuttare citta*) like the branch of tree.¹⁵⁹

Dīpanī explains that the types of consciousness pertaining to *kāma* plane must be said to be of fifty-four kinds; *rūpa* plane to be of fifteen kinds; *Arūpa* plane to be of twelve kinds; then the types of consciousness pertaining to the noblest must be said to be of eight kinds.

¹⁵⁸ PD: 94. *Yañca tattha Suññato eko nayo, appaṇihito eko, paṭipadā viṣiṭṭhā suññatā cattāro, appaṇihitā cattāroti katvā dasanayā hontīti adhippāyena evaṃ jhāna nāmena dasadhā vibhattoti vuttaṃ. Tampi na yujjatiyeva. Na hi suññatādayo idha nayānāma hontī. Tesu pana eke kasmim̐ dve dve catukkapañcakanayāeva idha nayānāmāti. Etena tathā maggasatipaṭṭhāniccādīkampi sabbam̐ paṭikkhattam̐ hotīti.*

¹⁵⁹ Abhidhs-Ṭ: 100. **Kāme** bhava cittāni catupaññāsadhā īraye, **rūpe** bhava panna-rasa īraye, **āruppe** bhava dvādasa īraye, **anuttare** pana navavidhe dhammasamudāye cittāni aṭṭhadhā īraye, katheyāyatto. Ettha ca kāmataṇhādivisayabhāvena kāmabhavādipariyāpannāni cittāni sakasakabhūmito aññattha pavattamānānīpi kāmabhavādīsu cittānīti vuttāni, yathā manussitthiyā kucchismiṃ nibbattopi tiracchānagato tiracchānāyonipariyāpannattā tiracchānesveva saṅgayhati. Katthaci apariyāpannāni
navavidhalokuttaradhammasamūhekadesabhūtāni “rukkhe sākha”tyādīsu viya anuttare cittānīti vuttāni.

Herein, *Anuttara* is the stage of supramundane. And it is two-fold; the stage of conditioned things (*saṅkhatabhūmi*) and the stage of unconditioned things (*asaṅkhatabhūmi*). Then the stage of conditioned things is of four kinds. It should be quoted: “on the occasion one practices Jhāna of supramundane in order to attain the first stage The second . . . the third . . . the fourth stage. Herein, it is said that *bhūmi* is a fruition of monkhood (*sāmaññaphala*). Or it is also reasonable; the pair of the first magga and phala is the first stage; the pair of the fourth magga and phala is the fourth stage. But in ultimate sense *bhūmi* here is a special dhamma with the particular moment, that is a state of non-inclusion in the dhamma of three planes, due to being free from the grasping of the threefold desire. It becomes fourfold according to getting rid of mental defilements.¹⁶⁰

Dīpanī criticizes *Vibhāvinī* for the idea that there is not a particular plane of supramundane like the other planes; only the unity nine-fold dhamma is spoken as the plane of them. Those that exist in one place as a group of nine transcendent dhamma and are not included (*apariyāpanna*) anywhere are stated as “consciousness in the unsurpassed”, as in such expressions as “the branches in a tree”. It is not reasonable because *bhūmi* is twofold: the moment (*avatthā*) and the locality (*okāsa*). Of them, only the moment is regarded as real *bhūmi*, not other. Because the locality must be known only through such and such a particular moment of *dhammas*.¹⁶¹

Controversy [65] [66] [67]

These controversies concern the explanation of *pathamajjhānasotāpattimagacitta*.

¹⁶⁰ PD. 97. *Kāme-pariyā-pannāni cittāni catupaññāsadhā īraye katheyya. Rūpe pannarasa. Arūpe dvādasa. Tathā anuttare pariyāpannāni cittāni aṭṭhadhā īrayeti yojanā. Etthaca anuttareti lokuttara bhūmiyaṃ. Sā pana duvidhā saṅkhatabhūmi, asaṅkhatabhūmīti. Saṅkhatāpi catubbidhā.*

¹⁶¹ PD: 97. *Vibhāvaniyaṃ pana Itarabhūmiyoviya lokuttarabhūmināma visum natthi. Nava vidhadhammasamūhoeva tesam bhūmi-pariyāyoti katvā yaṃ vuttaṃ. ‘Katthaci apariyāpannāni navavidhalokuttara dhammasamūhekadesabhūtāni rukkhe sākhā tyādīsu viya anuttare cittānīti vuttānī’ ti. Taṃ nayujjati. Duvidhāhi bhūmi avatthābhūmi, okāsabhūmīti. Tattha avatthā bhūmieva nipariyāyabhūmi. Na itarā. Sā hi okāsabhūmināma dhammānaṃ taṃ taṃ avatthāvisesavaseneva siddhāti. Taṃ taṃ avatthā visesotica heṭṭhā vuttanayena kāmvacaratādi avatthā viseso daṭṭhabbo.*

Vibhāvinī explains the meaning of *paṭhamajjhānasotāpattimaggacitta* that either *paṭhamajjhāna* or *sotāpattimaggacitta* is called *paṭhamajjhānasotāpattimaggacitta* because it is similar to the first *jhāna* by means of *jhāna* factors. The four maggas get the name of *paṭhamajjhā* etc., with the appearance of the factors of *vitakka* ect., because of being similarity of such and such *jhāna* among the three points – the basic *jhāna*, the contemplated *jhāna* and the will of a person – and they are classified into five respectively.¹⁶²

Dīpanī explains that *sotāpattimaggā* which associates with first *jhāna* endowed with five factors is called *paṭhamajjhānasotāpattimaggā*. A consciousness which associates with *paṭhamajjhānasotāpattimaggā* is called *paṭhamajjhānasotāpattimaggacitta*.

[65] *Dīpanī* criticizes *Vibhāvinī* for saying that either *paṭhamajjhāna* or *sotāpattimaggacitta* is called *paṭhamajjhānasotāpattimaggacitta*. It is not reasonable because *jhāna* is not a *citta* and *citta* is no *jhāna* as well, because *jhāna* is one thing and *citta* is one thing.¹⁶³

[66] *Dīpanī* criticizes *Vibhāvinī* for saying that it is [*lokuttara*] first *jhāna* because it is similar to the [*lokiya*] first *jhāna* by means of *jhāna* factors. It is not reasonable because it is impossible to say that the supramundane *jhāna* with five factors is to be called the first *jhāna* due to

¹⁶² Abhidhs-Ṭ: 100. *Jhānaṅgavasena paṭhamajjhānasadisattā paṭhamajjhānañca taṃ sotāpattimaggacittañceti paṭhamajjhānasotāpattimaggacittaṃ. Pāḍakajjhāna-sammasitajjhāna-puggalajjhāsayesupi, hi aññataravasena taṃtaṃjhānasadisattā vitakkādiṅgapātubhāvena cattāropi maggā paṭhamajjhānādivohāraṃ labhantā paccekaṃ pañcadhā vibhajanti. Tenāha ‘jhānaṅgayogabhedenā’ tyādi, tattha paṭhamajjhānādīsu yaṃ yaṃ jhānaṃ samāpajjitvā tato tato vuṭṭhāya saṅkhāre sammasantassa vuṭṭhānagāminivipassanā pavattā, taṃ pāḍakajjhānaṃ vuṭṭhānagāminivipassanāya padaṭṭhānabhāvato. Yaṃ yaṃ jhānaṃ sammasantassa sā pavattā, taṃ sammasitajjhānaṃ.*

¹⁶³ PD: 99. *paṭhamajjhāna sotāpattimaggacittanti ettha pañcaṅgikena pathamajjhānena yutto sotāpattimaggo paṭhamajjhānasotāpattimaggo. Tena sampayuttam cittanti samāso. Ṭikāsu pana ‘Paṭhamajjhānañca taṃ sotāpattimaggacittañcā’ ti yojenti. Taṃ na yuttam. Na hi jhānaṃ cittaṃ hoti. Naca cittaṃ jhānaṃ. Aññañhi jhānaṃ, aññaṃ cittanti.*

being similar to the first *jhāna*. The supramundane *jhāna* directly obtains the name of first *jhāna* by itself as it has five factors of *jhāna*.¹⁶⁴

[67] *Dīpanī* criticizes *Vibhāvinī* for saying that the four *maggas* get the name of *pathamajjhā* etc., with the appearance of the factors of *vitakka* ect., because of being similarity of such and such *jhāna* among the three points – the basic *jhāna*, the contemplated *jhāna* and the will of a person-, and they are classified into five respectively. This is also not reasonable because the *magga* are not to be called *pathamajjhāna*. *Magga* is one thing and *jhāna* is one thing.¹⁶⁵

Controversy [68] [69] [70]

These controversies concern the explanation of the three points – the basic *jhāna*, the contemplated *jhāna* and the will of a person.

Vibhāvinī explains the notion of *Pādakajhāna*, *sammasitajhāna* and *puggalajjhāsaya* that for one who produces the *magga* by attaining one of the five *jhānas*, emerging from it and observing various formations, the *magga* is similar to whichever of the five *jhānas*. this is the *pādakajhāna*.

If there is no particular *jhāna* which is foundation of *vipassana*, one produces the *magga* just by observing one of the five *jhānas*. The *magga* is similar to the observed *jhāna*. This is *sammasitajhāna*.

When one produces the *magga* by attaining one of the five *jhānas*, emerging from it, and observing another *jhāna*, then it is similar to one of these two according to one's personal will. This is *puggalajjhāsaya*.¹⁶⁶

¹⁶⁴ PD: 99. *Yañca vibhāvanīyaṃ ‘‘Jhānaṅgavasena pathamajjhāna sadisattā pathamajjhānañcā’’ti vuttaṃ. Tampi na yuttaṃ.*

¹⁶⁵ PD: 99. *Yañca tattha Sadisabhāveneva lokuttare tesam pañcaṅgikādīnaṃ jhāna vohārasiddhatādīpanatthaṃ. ‘‘Pādakajjhāna sammasitajjhāna puggalajjhāsayaesu hi aññataravasena taṃ taṃ jhānasadisattā vitakkādiṅgapātubhāvena cattāropi maggā pathamajjhānādi vohāraṃ labhantā paccekam pañcadhā vibhajanti’’ti vuttaṃ. Tampi nayujjatiyeva Na hi maggā pathamajjhānādi vohāraṃ labhanti. Añño hi maggo, aññaṃ jhānanti.*

¹⁶⁶ Abhidhs-Ṭ: 102. *yena paṭhamajjhānādīsu aññataraṃ jhānaṃ samāpajjitvā tato vuṭṭhāya pakiñṇakasankhāre sammasitvā maggo uppādito hoti, tassa so maggo paṭhamajjhānādīsu taṃtaṃpādakajjhānasadiso hoti. Sace pana vipassanāpādakam kiñci jhānaṃ natthi, kevalaṃ paṭhamajjhānādīsu aññataraṃ jhānaṃ sammasitvā*

If a person has no such will and, having emerged from some lower *jhāna*, he has observed the *dhammas* of some higher *jhāna*, the *magga* he produces is similar to the observed *jhāna*, paying no attention to the *pādakajjhāna*. But having emerged from some higher *jhāna* and having observed the *dhammas* of some lower *jhāna*, the *magga* he produces is similar to the *pādakajjhāna*, paying no attention to observed *jhāna* because the higher *jhānas* are stronger than lower *jhānas*. The decision of feeling in all case is fixed by the decision of *vipassanā* leading to *magga* (*vuṭṭhānagāminīvipassanā*). In the same way, it is fixed all the factors of *sukkhavipassaka* person (by the decision of *vipassanā* leading to *magga* (*vuṭṭhānagāminīvipassanā*). It is true. He (*sukkhavipassaka*) has no *pādakajjhāna* etc. So there is no decision by that *jhāna*. The *magga* of the person is of the five *jhāna* factors by the decision of *vipassana*.¹⁶⁷

Dīpanī explains that one of all *jhānas* which is just absorbed to be the base of *vipassanā*, is to be said the *pādakajjhāna*. If it is first *jhāna*, the *vipassana* is only usual. If second, the *vipassana* has an ability to remove *vitakka*. In *magga*, it can define *jhāna* to absent from *vitakka*. This way is known as *pādakajjhāna*.

If one of the *jhāna*, *pādakajjhāna*, or the others, is contemplated. If it is the first *jhāna*, the *vipassana* is only usual. If the second, the *vipassana* has an ability to remove *vitakka*. It can define the *jhāna* to be absent from *vitakka*. The same way in the rest contemplated *jhānas* as well. This is *sammasitavāda*. This is assertion concerning with the “contemplated” (*sammasitajjhāna*). It means that only the *jhāna* that is contemplated is

maggo uppādito hoti, tassa so sammasitajjhānasadiso hoti. Yadā pana yaṃ kiñci jhānaṃ samāpajjitvā tato vuṭṭhāya aññataraṃ sammasitvā maggo uppādito hoti, tadā puggalajjhāsayavasena dvīsu aññatarasadiso hoti.

¹⁶⁷ Abhidhs-Ṭ: 102. *Sace pana puggalassa tathāvidho ajjhāsayo natthi, heṭṭhimaheṭṭhimajjhānato vuṭṭhāya uparūparijhānadhamme sammasitvā uppāditamaggo pādakajjhānaṃ anapekkhitvā sammasitajjhānasadiso hoti. Uparūparijhānato pana vuṭṭhāya heṭṭhimahēṭṭhimajjhānadhamme sammasitvā uppāditamaggo sammasitajjhānaṃ anapekkhitvā pādakajjhānasadiso hoti. Heṭṭhimahēṭṭhimajjhānato hi uparūparijhānaṃ balavataranti. Vedanāniyamo pana sabbatthāpi vuṭṭhānagāminīvipassanāniyamena hoti. Tathā sukkhavipassakassa sakalajjhānaṅaniyamo. Tassa hi pādakajjhānādīnaṃ abhāvena tesāṃ vasena niyamābhāvato vipassanāniyamena pañcaṅgikova maggo hotīti.*

more powerful than the *pādakajjhāna* and personal will due to being together with the object of the *vipassana*.

[68] Regarding this assertion, *Dīpanī* criticizes *Vibhāvinī* for saying that there is no particular *jhāna* which is foundation of *vipassana*, one produces the *magga* just by observing one of the five *jhānas*. This is not fit to the commentary.¹⁶⁸

[69] The statement *Vibhāvinī* “If a person has no such will and, having emerged from some lower *jhāna*, he has observed the *dhammas* of some higher *jhāna*, the *magga* he produces is similar to the observed *jhāna*, paying no attention to the *pādakajjhāna*” should be examined because the contemplated *jhāna*, which is just object, although it is higher, should not be more stronger than the *jhāna* from which one has just withdrawn. Because the *jhāna* alone from which one has just withdrawn can make thought-process to be distinct.¹⁶⁹

[70] *Vibhāvinī* states that “having emerged from some higher *pādakajjhāna* and having observed the *dhammas* of some lower *jhāna*, the *magga* he attained is similar to the *pādakajjhāna*, paying no attention to observed *jhāna* because the higher *jhānas* are stronger than lower *jhānas*”.

¹⁶⁸ PD: 102. *Tattha yaṃ yaṃ jhānaṃ tassā vipassanāya pādakathāya āsanne samāpajjīyati. Taṃtaṃ pādakajjhānaṃnāma. Taṃce pathamajjhānaṃ hoti. Vipassanā pākatikāeva. Sace dutīyajjhānaṃ hoti. Vipassanā vitakkavirāgasattiyuttā hoti. Magge avitakkaṃ jhānaṃ niyāmetuṃ sakkoti. Esanayo sesesupi pādakajjhānesūti ayaṃ pādakavādo. Pādakajjhāne sati taṃsadisameva magge jhānaṃ hoti. Asatipana magge pathamajjhānameva hoti. Sammasi tajjhānaṃvā puggalajjhāsayovā magge jhānaṅgaṃ niyāmetuṃ nasakkotīti adhippāyoti. Pādakajjhāne sati taṃvā aññaṃvā yaṃyaṃ jhānaṃ sammasīyati. Taṃce pathamajjhānaṃ hoti. Vipassanā pākatī kāeva. Sace dutīyajjhānaṃ hoti. Vipassanā vitakkavirāgasatti yuttā hoti. Magge avitakkaṃ jhānaṃ niyāmetuṃ sakkoti. Esanayo sesesupi sammasitajjhānesūti ayaṃ sammasitavādo. Vipassanāya ārammaṇabhāvena saha caritattā sammasitajjhānameva pādakajjhānato ajjhāsayatoca balavataranti adhippāyoti. Vibhāvanīyaṃ pana Vipassanāpādakam kiñcijjhānaṃ natthīti imasmiṃ vāde vuttaṃ. Taṃ atthakathāya na sameti.*

¹⁶⁹ PD: 106. *Yaṃpana vibhāvanīyaṃ “Sacepana puggalassa tathāvidho ajjhāsayo natthi. Heṭṭhimahēṭṭhimajjhānato vuṭṭhāya uparuparijjhānadhamme sammasitvā uppāditamaggo pādakajjhānaṃ anapekkhitvā sammasitajjhānasadiso hotīti vuttaṃ. Taṃ vicāretabbaṃ. Na hi ārammaṇamattabhūtaṃ sammasitajjhānaṃ uparimāṃpi samānaṃ āsanne vuṭṭhitajjhānato balavataṃ bhavituṃ arahati. Āsanne vuṭṭhitasseva cittasantānaṃ visesetuṃ samatthabhāvato.*

It is also rejected because the *pādakajjhāna* is more powerful not because of being higher stage, but because of being the foundation.¹⁷⁰

3.10 Conclusion Remark

This chapter has learned 70 points of controversy contained in *cittasaṅgaha* of *Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha* text. There are six sub-division of *cittasaṅgaha*, *akusalacitta*, *ahetukacitta*, *kāmāvacarasobhanacitta*, *rūpāvacaracitta*, *arūpāvacaracitta* and *lokuttaracitta*. As seen above, the theme of the controversy points varies based on the sub-division. Some points concern the indicated meaning of certain words, some concern grammatical perspective, some concern contactual meanings of the two words, some concern *abhidhamma* perspective. We can draw conclusion for controversy point that although naming *Abhidhamma* debate, the controversy points made by *Dīpanī* are not only *Abhidhamma* perspectives but also other Pāli commentarial perspective. To understand these controversy points, one must have profound knowledges about not only *Abhidhamma* perspective but also Pāli commentarial tradition. Without these knowledges one cannot tackle these controversy points. After knowing the nature of controversy points, it is time to study comparatively, as example studies, the controversy points that are discussed by scholars contributing to the *Abhidhamma* debate. That is next chapter.

¹⁷⁰ PD: 107. *Etena yaṃ tattha vuttaṃ. ‘‘Uparuparijñānato pana vuṭṭhāya heṭṭhima heṭṭhimajjhāna dhamme sammāsītva uppāditamaggo sammāsītajjhānaṃ anapekkhitvā pāda kajjhānasadiso hoti. Heṭṭhimahēṭṭhimajjhānato hi uparu pariññānaṃ balavatara’’nti. Taṃpi paṭikkhittaṃ hoti. Na hi pādakajjhānaṃ uparima bhūtatāyeva balavataraṃ hoti. Pādakabhūtatāyeva pana balavataraṃ hotīti.*

Chapter IV

Comparative study of selected points of controversy

4.1 Introduction

Third chapter has studied the composition on the second verse of *Saṅgaha*. Therein, eight points of controversy are found: 1. Demonstrative meaning of “*tattha*”, 2. The contextual meaning of “*sabbathā*”, 3. The definition of “*paramattha*”, 4. The definition of “*citta*”, 5. The definition of “*cetasika*”, 6. The definition of “*rūpa*”, 7. The concept of “*rūpa*” in Brahma word and 8. The formal definition of “*nibbana*”. Regarding these points, Sumaṅgala Mahāthera knew nothing and says nothing about the critiques by Ledī Sayadaw as he was in twelfth centuries and the critique was made in nineteenth century. After appearance of *Saṅgaha*, there are nineteen *Pāli* sub-commentaries on the *Saṅgaha* recorded in *History of Piṭaka Literature*.¹ Moreover, there are some Myanmar sub-commentaries that make exposition on *Saṅgaha* in Myanmar language. They contribute to the controversy points in some ways. After appearance of *Dīpanī*, there appears some *Pāli* and Myanmar texts that contribute specifically to the controversy points. This chapter will study two, out of eight, the first and the last because these two will explore the nature of commentarial tradition. The first is about demonstrative meaning of “*tattha*” and the second is about the formal definition of “*Nibbāna*”.

4.2 Controversy about a demonstrative meaning of *tattha*.

Anuruddha Mahāthera composes two verses at the beginning of *Saṅgaha*.

¹ U Yam, **History of Piṭaka Literature**, (Yangon: Myanmar, Hamsathavathi publishing house, 1957), p.125

Sammāsambuddha matulaṃ sasaddhammagañuttamaṃ

Abhivādiya bhāsissaṃ AbhidhammatthaSaṅghaṃ.

Tattha vutt' ābhidhammatthā catudhā paramatthato

Cittaṃ cetasiṃ rūpaṃ Nibbānam' iti sabbathā.

In the second verse, the word “*tattha*” is combination of “*ta*”: demonstrative pronoun and “*ttha*” suffix. As demonstrative pronoun, the pronoun “*ta*” has no own meaning and it is to demonstrate the meanings what had been said previously or elsewhere. In making an exposition on *Saṅgha*, the sub-commentaries have dissent ideas about demonstrative meaning of “*tattha*”. The different expositions are as follow:

*Tattha tasmim̐ abhidhamme,*²

*Tattha tasmim̐ pakaraṇe, Abhidhammatthapade vā, abhidhamme vā,*³

*Tatthāti bhāsissaṃ AbhidhammatthaSaṅghanti vutte tasmim̐ Abhidhammatthasaṅghapade,*⁴

In this regarding, Ledī Sayadaw criticizes that the exposition “*tattha tasmim̐ pakaraṇe*” is not reasonable because the text is to be compiled later on, not yet compiled. It is the problem of the time. The exposition “*tattha Abhidhammatthapade vā, abhidhamme vā*” are also not reasonable because the nature of “*ta*” does not demonstrate the meaning of a minor word (*appadhānattha*) at beginning of the texts. It is grammatical problem. Ledī Sayadaw argues that the word “*ta*” does not demonstrate that what have not yet been said and the minor meaning of previous words or sentences.

Here, the problematic issue is what the exact demonstrative meaning of *tattha* is. To solve this problem, there is a phrase “*tattha vuttā: therein, said*” in the second verse. As this phrase gives rise a question that who said

² Abhidh-sṬ. 73.

³ Abhidhs-Ṭ. 301.

⁴ PD. 20.

there, the contributors were taking a consideration of the subject of “*vuttā*” and “major meaning (*padhānattha*) and minor meaning (*appadhānattha*). Their argument is that If the subject of “*vuttā*” is Anuruddha Mahāthera, the exposition “*tattha tasmim̐ pakaraṇe*” will not be reasonable but if it is the Buddha, the exposition will be reasonable. if the word “*ta*” could demonstrate the minor meaning (*appadhānattha*), the exposition “*tattha Abhidhammatthapade vā, abhidhamme vā*” will be reasonable.

4.2.1 The subject of *vuttā*

Regarding the subject of “*vuttā*”, Ariyavaṃsa Sayadaw explains the intended meaning of Vibhāviṇī in *Maṇisāramañjūsā*⁵ that Sumaṅgala Mahāthera makes such exposition to prevent the assumption that the word “*ta*” would demonstrate the word “*AbhidhammaSaṅgaha*” or the text [i.e. *AbhidhammaSaṅgaha* text]. If the word “*ta*” demonstrates the word or the text, the meaning would be that I had said in the *AbhidhammataSaṅgaha* text. It is not preferable because Anuruddha Mahāthera had not been said things contained in *Abhidhamma* and the text. If the word “*ta*” demonstrates the *Abhidhamma pitaka*, the meaning would be that “*tattha bhagavatā vuttā*: the Buddha had said in that *Abhidhamma pitaka*. It is preferable because these things had been said in *Abhidhamma pitaka*. Therefore, in order to show that the word “*ta*” demonstrates *Abhidhamma pitaka*, Sumaṅgala Mahāthera writes “*tatthāti tasmim̐ abhidhamme*: therein – in the *Abhidhamma*” in *Vibhāvinī*.

In *Paramatthavisodhanīṭṭhāthit Pāḷi*⁶ Dhammārum Sayadaw supports to *Vibhāvinī*’s exposition and agrees with Ariyavaṃsa Sayadaw’s explanation in *Maṇisāramañjūsā* that the word “*ta*” has the meaning of what had been said previously (*pakkantavisaya*). Therefore, the word “*ta*” would demonstrate the word “*AbhidhammatthaSaṅgaha*” or the texts. To prevent such demonstration, Ācariya Sumaṅgalasāmi said “*tattha tasmim̐ abhidhamme*”. If the word “*ta*” demonstrates the word or the texts, the meaning would be that “*tattha mayā vuttā*: therein I had said”. Actually, it

⁵ Maṇis. 120.

⁶ Dhammārum Sayadaw Dīpamālā, *Paramatthavisodhanīṭṭhāthitpāli*, (Yangon: Sāsanāṅkāra Press, 1909), p.15.

is not agreeable because the teacher has not yet said the categories of *Abhidhamma*, consciousness etc. it is said only the text in the word “*AbhidhammatthaSaṅgahaṃ*”. It is not said the consciousness etc. The text is also to be said, not has been said. If the word “*ta*” demonstrates *Abhidhamma* teaching, the meaning would be that “*tattha bhagavatā vuttā*: therein, the Buddha has said”. It is agreeable because the Buddha has preached consciousness in the *Abhidhamma* teaching. Therefore, it is noted that the word “*ta*” demonstrates the *Abhidhamma* teaching and the critique by Ledī Sayadaw is wrong accusation.

In *Atisundaraṃyam*⁷ U Natthar and supports *Vibhāvinī*'s exposition that in the sentences “*tattha vuttā bhidhammatthā*”, the subject of the verb “*vuttā*” is the key factor for this argument. What is the subject of the verb “*vuttā*” in the verse, Anuruddha Mahāthera or the Buddha?

To answer this question, U Natthar point out two verses from *AbhidhammatthaSaṅgaha* text, the content verse and the closing verse.

The content verse is:

Tattha vutt' ābhidhammatthā catudhā paramatthato

Cittaṃ cetasikaṃ rūpaṃ Nibbānam' iti sabbathā.

In an ultimate sense the categories of *Abhidhamma*, mentioned therein, are fourfold in all: i. Consciousness, ii. Mental states, iii. Matter, and iv. *Nibbāna*.

The closing verse is:

Iti cittaṃ cetasikaṃ rūpaṃ Nibbānamiccapi.

Paramatthaṃ pakāśenti catudhāva tathāgatā.

Thus, as fourfold, the *Tathāgatas* reveal the Ultimate entities: - consciousness, mental states, matter, and *Nibbāna*.⁸

⁷ U Natthar, *Atisundaraṃyam*, (Yangon: Sāsanālaṅkāra Press, 1910), P. 19.

⁸ Bhikkhu Bodhi, *A Comprehensive Manual of Abhidhamma*, (Kandy: Sri Lanka, the Buddhist Missionary Society, 1993), pp. 21, 354.

These verses are homogeneous. Therefore, the subject of closing verse, which is “*tathāgata*”, should be the subject of content verse. The subject of the verb “*vuttā*” is the Buddha, not Anuruddha Mahāthera. Then, the meaning would be that “*tattha tasmim Abhidhammatthapakaraṇe tathāgatehi vuttā*”. Therefore, the exposition of *Vibhāvinī* and old sub-commentary is closed to the opinion of Anuruddha Mahāthera. Minkhin Sayadaw also support the ides in Minkhigīkākyaawgaṇṭhit.⁹

4.2.2 *padhānattha* and *appadhānattha*

In commentarial tradition, the usage “major (*padhāna*) and minor (*appadhāna*)” is very important to understand the true meaning of certain words or sentences or verses. The qualifying word or sentence (*visesana*) is called “minor meaning (*appadhānattha*)” and the qualified word or sentence (*visesitabba*) is called “major meaning (*padhānattha*)”.¹⁰ To understand the major and minor meaning, the simple example is “*rañño putto rājaputto*: a son of king: the prince”. In this example, the king is minor meaning (*appadhānattha*) and the son or the prince is major meaning (*padhānattha*).

Regarding “*padhānattha* and *appadhānattha*” of the word “*tattha*”, Talaingkone Sayadaw explains in *Aṅkuraṭīkā*¹¹ that the word “*ta*” demonstrates the meaning of the word “*Abhidhamma*” which is minor meaning, instead of demonstrating the meaning of the word “*Saṅgha*” which is major meaning. It is reasonable because of conformity of the minor meaning “*Abhidhamma*” in term of mode of meaning (*atthappakaraṇa*). Sayadaw quotes example from *NettipakaraṇaPāli* and its commentary:

“*yaṃ loko pūjayate salokapālo sadā namassati ca.*”

⁹ Minking Saydaw, *Ṭīkākyaawgaṇṭhithit*, (Mandalay: Paññāsippam press, 1920) p. 24.

¹⁰ *Visesanabhūtāni appadhānānīti visesitabbabhūtānaṃ padhānānaṃ* (PpDhAnṬ. 15.)

¹¹ Talaingkone Sayadaw, *Aṅkuraṭīkā*, (Yangon: Pyigyimandaing Press, 1909), p.14.

*tass'eta sāsanaṃ vidūhi ñeyyaṃ naravarassa.*¹²

Wise men can know the Dispensation. Glorious of Glorious Man, Whom the world and world-protectors. Ever honour and revere.¹³

The verse is explained in various ways in the *Nettipakaraṇa* commentary. One of these ways is that some arrange word order that “*taṃ tassa*”. According to the way, the word “*yaṃ*” is the same reference or relationship with the word “*sāsana*”. Then the meaning would be that whatever *sāsana* is honoured and saluted by the world together with world-protector [*salokapāla*], that *sāsanā* is to be known by the wise men. In this way, the word “*lokapāla*” refers to the Buddha. The Buddha is definitively word-protector. Therefore, it should be interpreted that *tassa: lokapālassa satthuno*. Here, the word “*lokapāla*” of “*salokapāla*” intent upon the word “*sāsana*” because it refers to the Buddha. Therefore, it can be interpreted as major meaning in term of contextual relation as “*sambandha* and *sanbandhī*”.¹⁴ In the verse, the word “*salokapālo*” is *bahubbīhisamāsa*: Relative or Attributive compound word.¹⁵ Its major meaning is the flock of beings and minor meaning is the Buddha. Here, the word “*ta*” of “*tassetam*” should demonstrate the minor meaning “the Buddha” because it is reasonable in term of mode of meaning etc. therefore, the demonstration that “*tattha tasmim abhidhamme*” is reasonable by mode of meaning [*atthapakaraṇa*] and it is fixed with *Nettipakaraṇa* commentary.

¹² Nett. 1.

¹³ Bhikkhu Ñāṇamoli, **The Guide**, (London: PTS, 2008.), p. 3.

¹⁴ “*apare pana taṃ tassa sāsanaṃ paṭhanti. Tesam matena yaṃsaddo sāsanasaddena samānādhikaraṇatoti daṭṭhabbo. ... sambandhīvisesabhūto padhānabhūto viya paṭiniddesaṃ arahaṭīti.* (NettA. 8.)

¹⁵ *Bahubbīhisamāsa* is that: When two or more substantives are combined together and the resultant denotes something other than what is meant by the two members severally, the compound is called *Bahubbīhī* = Relative or Attributive. This compound requires the additional of such relative pronouns as: “he, who, that, which,” etc. to express its full meaning; therefore, this is used as an adjective and takes any gender according to that of the noun which it qualifies. (The New Pāli Course, Vol. II, p. 58).

Hmankyang Sayadaw explains in *Abhidhammattha-Vibhāvinīyojanā*¹⁶ that the word “*ta*” has the meaning of what has been said previously (*pakkantavisaya*). The nature of “*ta*” usually demonstrates major meaning but sometimes it is to demonstrate in the case of pulling other words (*saddantarasannidhāna*). Here, to explain demonstrative meaning of “*ta*”, *Vibhāvinī* said “*tattha tasmim abhidhamme*”. It means that the word “*ta*” demonstrates the *Abhidhamma*. It is here minor meaning but there is other word “*vuttā bhidhammatthā*”. Therefore, the word “*ta*” deserves to demonstrate the minor meaning because of other words “*vuttā bhidhammatthā*”.¹⁷

In this case, Hmankyaung Sayadaw quotes the explanation of *Mūlaṭīkā* on *Aṭṭhasālinī* verses. In *Aṭṭhasālinī*, it is said thus:

Karuṇā viya sattesu paññā yassa mahesino

Ñṇeyyadhammesu sabbesu pavattittha yathā ruci.

Dayāya tāya sattesu samussāhitamānaso.

*Pāṭihīrā vasānamhi vasanto tidasālaye.*¹⁸

As on all beings his pity, rolled at will

The Sage’s insight through all knowable things.

His heart by that world-pitying love inspired,

When, after the Twin Miracle, he dwelt at the high mansion of the Thirty-three.¹⁹

In the first verse, compassion is minor meaning and wisdom is major meaning. In the second verse, the word “*ta*” of “*tāya*” demonstrates the

¹⁶ Hmankyaung Sayadaw, *Vibhāvinīyojanā* (Yangon: Phigyimandaind Pitaka Press, 1281) p. 47

¹⁷ *Vibhāvinīyojanā*: 37: *Tatthāti taṃ saddassa pakkantavisayattā tena paccāmasitabbaṃ dassento āha “tattha tasmim abhidhamme”ti appadhānampi hi “vuttā Abhidhammatthā” ti saddantara sannidhānena paccāmasitu marahati.*

¹⁸ Dhs.A. 1.

¹⁹ Pe Maung Tin, M.A., *The expositor*, (Landon: PTS, 1976), p. 1.

meaning of what has been said in the first verse. Which meaning does the word “*ta*” demonstrate; minor or major? Here, the word “*ta*” demonstrates minor meaning “compassion” because it is accompanied by “*dayāya*” which refers to compassion.²⁰ Ledī Sayadaw did not aware of such explanation. So he rejects *Vibhāvini*’s and other sub-commentaries’ expositions in *Paramatthadīpanī*.

Minkhin Sayadaw explains in Minkhiḡṭikākyawgaṅḡhit²¹ that in the word “*AbhidhammatthaSaṅgahaṃ*” in previous verse, the meaning of *Abhidhamma* is seven *Abhidhamma* treaties, it is *apaṭṭhāattha*: minor meaning. The meaning of *Saṅgaha* is *AbhidhammatthaSaṅgaha* text, it is *paṭṭhānattha*: major meaning. It is reasonable that the word “*ta*” of *tattha* demonstrates minor meaning that *tattha tasmim abhidhamme* in term of two reasons: “*athhapakarāṇa*: the mode of meaning” and *saddantara sannitṭhāna*: putting other word. Sayadaw quotes example verse from *Nettipakaranapāli* as in *Aṅkuraṭṭikā*.

Ledī Sayadaw quotes “*tattha kenatthena abhidhammo*” from *Aṭṭhasālinī* in which the word “*tattha*” indicates major meaning. There is no *saddantara* “*vuttā*” which supports to indicate minor meaning. There is only *saddantara* “*kenatthena*” which supports to indicate major meaning. These two sentences are different. Therefore, the *Aṭṭhasālinī*’s *Pāli* is not to be considered in this case.

4. 2. 3 Three kinds of *ta*

Sayadaw Sāgarābhidhaja supports *Vibhāvini*’s exposition in *Abhidhammatthaanuvibhāvani*²² and explains three kinds of “*ta*” taking from *Saddasāratthajālīni*²³ that there are three kinds of “*ta*”: 1. *pakkantavisaya*, 2. *Pasiddhavisaya* and 3. *Anubhutavisaya*. The word “*ta*” that demonstrates any meaning or any word or any sentence or any text that

²⁰ PpKMṬ. 5: *Tena vuttaṃ mūlaṭṭikāyaṃ “padhānaṅca paññaṃ vajjetvā dayāyā ti etena sambajjhamāno tāyāti ayaṃ “ta” saddo appadhānāya karuṇāya paṭiniddeso bhavitu marahati.*

²¹ Minking Saydaw, *Ṭikākyawgaṅḡhithit*, (Mandalay: Paññāsippaṃ press, 1920) p. 24.

²² Ashin Sāgarābhidhaja, *Abhidhammatthaanuvibhāvani*, (Yangon: Sāsanaṅkaṅkāra Press, 1910)

²³ Nāḡita Mahā Thera, *Saddasāratthajālīni*, (it is including in Fifteen Volumes of mini-grammar texts, *Saddangesenyaung*) (Yangon: Icchāsaya Press, 1326), p. 81.

exists at least in different sentence or far-away, is called “*pakkantavisaya*: the meaning that has been said in different place”. The word “*ta*” that demonstrates any meaning or any word or any sentence or any text that is obvious and exists in the same sentence is called “*pasiddhavisaya*: the meaning that is obvious”. The word “*ta*” that demonstrates any meaning or any word that exists in previous sentence or previous sentence is called “*anubhūtavisaṃyaya*”. In this *Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha*, the word “*ta*” is “*pakkantavisaya*” because it demonstrates *Abhidhamma* pitaka that is far-away.

Sayadaw Sāgarābhīdhaja explains that the word “*Abhidhammattha*” should be defined as Dependent Determinative Compound (*tappurisasamāsa*)²⁴ that *abhidhamme vuttā atthā Abhidhammatthā*: the meaning that had been said in *Abhidhamma*. Then, the subject of the verb “*vuttā*” should be the Buddhas “*tathāgatehi*”. It should not be the Anuruddha Mahāthera. In the compound, the word “*vuttā*” should contact the word “*atthā*”. In the sentence too, the word “*vuttā*” should contact the word “*atthā*”. Then, in the sentence, the meaning would be that “*mayā vuttā Abhidhammatthā*”. If so, in compound sentence, the meaning would not be that “*tathāgatehi vuttā Abhidhammatthā*”. It is opposition. Therefore, the way of *ParamatthaDīpanī* is not note-worthy. Here, the meaning of compound is agreeable. It is not that “*mayā vuttā Abhidhammatthā honti*”. It is that “*tathāgatehi Abhidhammatthā Abhidhammapiṭakeva vuttā*”. It is not that “*Abhidhammatthasaṅgahapade*”. The word “*Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha*” does not convey the meaning of *Abhidhamma*. In the compound sentence, the word “*Abhidhamma*” conveys the meaning of *Abhidhamma*. Therefore, it is not reasonable that the word “*ta*” demonstrates the word “*Abhidhammasaṅgaha*”.

²⁴ If two nouns, related to each other by some oblique case, are joined together, it is called *Tappurisa* Compound. The New Pāli Course, Vol. II, p. 47).

4.3 Controversy about formal definition of *Nibbāna*

According to commentarial tradition, Sumaṅgala Mahāthera makes two kinds of formal definition (*viggaha*) of “*Nibbāna*” thus: *Bhavābhavaṃ vinanato saṃsibbanato vānasaṅkhātāya taṇhāya nikkhantaṃ, nibbāti vā etena rāgaggiādikoti Nibbānaṃ*.²⁵ That which is deliverance (*nikkhante*) from craving, considered as ‘entanglement’ (*vāna*) because it stitches and weaves together existence and non-existence²⁶, or that by means of which the fires of greed, etc., are extinguished (*nibbāti*) is *Nibbāna*.²⁷

Ledi Sayadaw said the formal definition “*nibbāti etena rāgaggiādikoti Nibbānan*” is not good because the instrumental sense is not seen in *nibbana* like the path (*magga*). It means that the instrumental sense is seen in the path as in example “*addhā imāya paṭipattiyā jarāmaraṇamhā parimuccissāmi*: may I free from aging and death by this practice”. The characteristic of instrumental is not seen in *nibbana*. Here, the characteristic of instrumental means a state of condition that is cooperating together with agent.

Herein, the point is that the formal definition of “*Nibbāna*” should not be made by means of instrumental sense (*kaṇasādhana*) because *Nibbāna* is not a condition which is cooperating with agent (*kattu*). In the definition, *Nibbāna* (*etena*) is an instrumental (*kaṇa*), greed-fire etc. (*rāgaggiādiko*) is agent (*kattu*), and to extinguish (*nibbāti*) is action or verb (*kiriya*). the nature of instrumental cooperates with agent in accomplishing action (verb). Herein, *Nibbāna* does not cooperate with greed-fire etc., in accomplishing the action of extinguishment.

4.3.1 The cooperating condition (*sahakārīpaccaya*)

Sayadaw Sāgarābhīdhaja explains a cooperating condition (*sahakārīpaccaya*) in his *Abhidhammattha Anuvibhāvinī*²⁸ that when agent

²⁵ Abhidh-sT. 75.

²⁶ Here, Rupert Gethin translates *abhava* non-existence. But here, the word “a” does not refer to negative sense. It bears positive sense “*vuddhi*”. Therefore, I translate here “*abhava*: great-existence”.

²⁷ R. P. Wijeratne and Rupert Gethin, *Summary of the topics of Abhidhamma and Exposition of the Topics of Abhidhamma*, (London: PTS, 2007), P. 9.

²⁸ Sayadaw Sāgarābhīdhaja, *Abhidhammattha-Anuvibhāvinī*, (Yangon: Myanmar, Sāsanaṅkāra Press, 1910), p. 84.

(*kattu*) and instrumental (*kaṛaṇa*) accomplish an action together, then the cause of action is said as “a cooperating condition (*sahakārīpaccaya*)”. The cooperating condition cannot always be found in all instances. It is founded in some instances and is not in others.

For instance, *dattena vīhiṃ lunāti*: a man cut off paddy by sword. In this instance, the instrumental factor expressed by “*dattena*: by sword” is the cooperating condition of the agent factor expressed by “the man”, because the substance of sword exists in the substances of agent.

Attho me āvuso cīvarena: Friend; I am in need of a robe etc., [lit. there is need for me, friend, by a robe]. This is the example without cooperating condition. In the sentence, “*cīvarena*: by a robe” is instrumental relation. The word “*me*” is not cooperating condition of the relation of agent because the robe doesn’t exist in the substance of agent expressed by “*me*”. The robe is the future because of intended. It is not the present. Therefore, the cooperating condition is not the feature of instrumental relation. Ledī Sayadaw’s reason is removed well.

However, herein, *Nibbāna* is possible to be a condition or a cause of agent of greed-fire etc. (*rāgādikattu*). It is said in Saṃyuttanikāya that “*rāgakkhayo dosakkhayo mohakkhayo – idaṃ vuccati Nibbānanti*²⁹: The destruction of lust, the destruction of hatred, the destruction of delusion: this, friend, is called *Nibbāna*. ”³⁰ in the Sutta, *Nibbāna* is said the nature of the cause of destruction of lust etc. It should be said that *Nibbāna* is the instrumental or the cause of the relation of agent that is greed etc.

The relation of agent is only the ability that is able to accomplish the action of extinguishment of greed etc. *Nibbāna* is said instrumental because it supports and gives strength to the ability. With the reference to this meaning, Sumaṅgala Mahāthera said *Nibbāna* is that by which greed-fire etc., are extinguished.

²⁹ S. IV. 251.

³⁰ Bhikkhu Bodhi, *The Connected Discourse of the Buddha*, (London: PTS, 2000), p. II. 251.

4.3.2 Instrumental and causative (*Karaṇattha* and *hetvattha*)

In this regard, Talainkone Sayadaw said it is not an instrumental (*karaṇa*) but causative (*hetu*) and he explains that in the definition “*nibbanti rāgaggiādayo etenāti Nibbānaṃ*”, *etena* refers to the unconditioned dhamma which is a causative (*hetu*), which is not an instrumental (*kāraṇa*). *Nibbāna* is not a condition which is cooperating with agent [i.e. *rāga*, *dosa* etc.] in accomplish of action of extinguishment. Therefore, *Nibbāna* has no nature of instrumental (*karaṇabhāva*).³¹ Therefore, it is said in *Samyutta* commentary that “*taṇhakkhayapaccayattā taṇhakkhayo*”.³² Ledī Saydadaw considers *etena* as instrumental (*karaṇa*) and said there is no cooperating condition in *Nibbāna*. Therefore, rejects *Vibhāvinī* because he did not consider such meaning.³³

According to Talainkone Sayadaw, it is necessary to understand the distinction between instrumental and causative. The distinction is mentioned in *Majjhimaṇṇāsa* sub-commentary thus: *Hetu attho hi kriyakāraṇaṃ, na karaṇaṃ viya kriyattho*.³⁴ The *hetvattha* is just the cause of action [i.e. verb], it is not like a instrumental (*karaṇa*) which has the profit of action [i.e. verb].

For further explanation, I consult with *Pāli* grammar texts, *Kaccāyanabhāsāṭṭikā* by Ashin Janakābhivaṃsa. Therein, it is explained that both are the cause of action [verb], what is different between *hetu* and *karaṇa*? The *karaṇa* is *kāraṇa*, the *hetu* is not *kāraṇa*. The direct cause of verb is *karaṇa*, the indirect cause of verb is *hetu*. On the other hand, the cause which is able to accomplish directly an action or verb is *karaṇa*. The cause that is not able to accomplish directly an action or verb is *hetu*. For example, “*annaṃ vasati*: [he] stays because of rice”. The rice is just the cause of action of staying; it cannot accomplish directly the action of staying. It can accomplish directly the action of eating. He stays because

³¹ Aṅkura p. 19: *Etenāti asaṅkhatadhammajātena hetubhūtena. Na karaṇabhūtena. Na hi nibbānaṃ nibbutikriyāsādhane rāgādikattuno sahakārīpaccayo hoti. Evañca sati karaṇabhāvopi natthi.*

³² S III. 112.

³³ Sayadaw Vimalābhivaṃsālankāra, *Aṅkuraṭṭikā*, (Yangon: Pyigyimandain press house, 1920), p. 19.

³⁴ MAT. I. 109.

of rice. He eats because of staying. Thus; the *hetu* is just a cause of action or verb, it cannot accomplish the action directly. “*parasunā chindati*: [it is] cut by an axe”. The axe is the cause of action of cutting. The action of cutting is not separated from axe. Therefore, the axe has a profit of action of cutting. Thus: the *karaṇa* is the cause of an action and has direct profit that is action.³⁵

4.3.3 Five kinds of instrumental

Minkhin Sayadaw explains that *Nibbāna* is actually not a cooperating condition in accomplishing the action of extinguishing the defilements but it has an ability to support, especially for accomplishing the action of the extinguishment of the defilements. It should not be noted that it is called the instrumental only when it becomes a cooperating condition with the agent because there are fivefold instrumental, namely:

1. *abhāvapaññattikaraṇa*: instrumental of concept of absence,
2. *abhinnakaraṇa*: integral instrumental,
3. *sahakārikāraṇakaraṇa*: instrumental of cooperating condition,
4. *sādhakatamakaraṇa*: most efficient instrumental and
5. *paripunnakaraṇā*: complete instrumental.

Among those five, the instrumental that is neither cooperating condition with agent nor with accomplishing action, is called instrumental of concept of absence (*abhāvapaññattikaraṇa*).

The instrumental which is not different from the action is called integral instrumental (*abhinnakaraṇa*).

That instrumental which is only a cooperating condition with the agent but is unable to accomplish the action is called instrumental of cooperating condition (*sahakārikāraṇakaraṇa*).

³⁵ Ashin Janakābhivaṃsa, **Kaccāyanabhāsāṭṭhikā**, (Amarapūra: Myanmar, New Burma Press, 1995), p. 390.

That instrumental which is not a cooperating condition with the agent but is most able to accomplish the action is called most efficient instrumental (*sādhakatamakaraṇa*).

That instrumental which is a cooperating condition with the agent and also most able to accomplish action is called complete instrumental (*paripuṇṇakaraṇā*).

4.3.3.1 Instrumental of concept of absence

Among those five, the instrumental that is neither cooperating condition with agent nor with accomplishing action, is called instrumental of concept of absence (*abhāvapaññatikaraṇa*).

Bhagavā sujātāya dinnam piṇḍapātam paribhuñjitvā saupādisesāya Nibbānadhātuyā parinibbuto: The Bhagavan, after eating the alms food given by Sujātā, was fully extinguished through the *Nibbāna* element with remainder.³⁶

Kilesaparinibbānena parinibbūto: Fully extinguished through the extinction of the defilements.³⁷

Saupādisesa nibbānapattiyā kilesadukkhena nidukkhatā: absence of suffering caused by the defilements through reaching extinction with remainder.³⁸

In these texts, these are instrumentals of concept of absence (*abhāvapaññatikaraṇa*), because they simply express a concept of absence, that is to say cessation, dissolution, disappearance of defilements at the moment of [entering the] path of the Arahat. It is also said integral instrumental (*abhidnnakaraṇa*), because the action of the instrumental is not different from the action of the verb, which expresses the concept of absence, that is to say cessation, dissolution, disappearance of the defilements.

³⁶ DA. II. 571. UdA. 405.

³⁷ DA. III. 841., SA. I. 270.

³⁸ MAT. II. 41.

4.3.3.2 Integral instrumental

The instrumental which is not different from the action is called integral instrumental (*abhinnakaraṇa*).

Saṅkhāradukkhatāya pana loko anupādisesāya Nibbānadhātuyā muccati: The world, however, is liberated from the suffering of formations through the *Nibbāna* element without reminder.³⁹

Khandhaparinihbānena ca parinibbuto: Fully extinguished through the full extinction of the aggregates.⁴⁰

AnupādisesaNibbānappattiyā vipākadukkheṇa nidukkhatā: The absence of suffering caused by resulting suffering through reaching the extinction without reminder.⁴¹

In these texts too, the instrumentals are of concept of absence due to merely being concept of absence that is cessation, extinction, no-more arising of aggregates of the Buddha and Arahants once passing away. It is also called integral instrumental because the action is also not different from the instrumental. (The action is nothing but the instrumental. That instrumental which is not different from the action is called integral instrumental.) Third case is used in sense of an indication of [someone or something being in]⁴² this or that state or condition (*itthambhūtalakkanattha*) because these instrumentals of concept of absence are not real instrumentals i.e. they are unable to accomplish action.

Tāya anupādisesāya Nibbānadhātuyā, itthambhūtalakkhaṇe cāyaṃ karaṇaniddeso. Nibbānadhātūti ca nibbāyanamattaṃ: By that *Nibbāna* element without remainder: it is showing instrumental in the sense of an indication of [someone or

³⁹ Nett. 12.

⁴⁰ ItA. II. 14.

⁴¹ MAT. II. 41.

⁴² Ole Holten Pind, *Studies in Pāli grammarians*, JPTS, Vol. XIV. (1990), P. 180.

something being in] this or that state or condition. *Nibbāna* element also means merely extinguishment.⁴³

Nibbānadhātūti ca khandhapañcakassa nibbāyanamattaṃ adhippetam. Na asaṅkhatadhātu: The *Nibbāna* element also means merely extinguishment of a group of five aggregate, not the element of unconditioned.⁴⁴

Cundena dinnam paribhuñjivā anupādisesāya Nibbānadhātuyā parinibbūto: (the Buddha), after eating the alms food given by Cunda, was fully extinguished through the *Nibbāna* element without remainder.⁴⁵

Sabbe hi saññino sattā bhavaṅgacitte ñhitvā bhavaṅgapariyosānena cuticcitena kālam karonti: All beings of concepts, existing on life-continuum consciousness, pass away by dead consciousness which is the end of life-continuum consciousness.⁴⁶

In these texts of the canon, the commentary, the instrumentals are integral instrumentals (*abhinnakarāṇa*) because the core of instrumental and the core of the verb [action] are not different i.e. The core of instrumental is dead consciousness and the core of the verb is also dead consciousness. The third case is used in sense of adjective because it is not real instrumental, that is to say; the integral instrumentals are unable to accomplish the action.

Anupādisesāya Nibbānadhātuyā parinibbāyīti pariNibbānameva pariNibbānassa pariNibbānantarato visesanattham karaṇabhāvena vuttaṃ: The commentator said that the Buddha fully extinguished through the element of *Nibbāna*. In this sentence, he [the commentator] used instrumental sense as “*Nibbānadhātuyā*: through element of *Nibbāna*” because he intends to distinguish the element of

⁴³ Nett. 65.

⁴⁴ NettT 91.

⁴⁵ DA. II. 571.

⁴⁶ KvuA. 196.

nibbāna without remainder [*anupādisesa Nibbāna*] from the element of *Nibbāna* with remainder [*saupādisesa Nibbāna*].⁴⁷

PariNibbānameva ...la.... Vuttaṃ abhinnabhāvampi atthaṃ tadaññadhammato visesova bhodhanatthaṃ aññaṃviya katvā voharanti. Yathā attano sabhāvaṃ dhārentīti dhammāti: In the sentence, the instrumental case [*Nibbānadhātu*] and the verb [*nibbāyanti*] are not different and they have the same core. That is extinguishment [*Nibbāna*]. But in the sentence, it is said likely different. The purpose of doing so is to distinguish *anupādisesa Nibbānadhātu* from *saupādisesa Nibbānadhātu*. It is similar to example such as *attano sabhāvaṃ dhārentīti dhammā* : those that bears own nature are called dhamma”.⁴⁸

According to these *Mūlaṭīkā* and *Anuṭīkā*, third case is used in the sense of adjective that is to say in the integral instrumental.

4.3.3.3 Instrumental of cooperating condition

In the text “*Ūnapañcabhandhanena pattena aññaṃ navaṃ pattam cetāpeyya:* [a monk] should ask another new bowl by a bowl which has less than five bondages”,⁴⁹ the instrumental expressed by “*pattena*” is “*sahakārīkāraṇa karaṇa*” because it is only cooperating condition with agent expressed by “*bhikkhu*” and it doesn’t accomplish the action of asking. The third case is used in sense of in the sense of an indication of [someone or something being in] this or that state or condition that is to say in the integral instrumental.

4.3.3.4 Most efficient instrumental

That instrumental which is not a cooperating condition with the agent but is most able to accomplish the action is called most efficient instrumental (*sādhakatamakaraṇa*).

⁴⁷ PpkMT. 47.

⁴⁸ PpkAnT. 57.

⁴⁹ Vin. III. 246.

Anupādisesāya Nibbānadhātuyā parinibbāyīti: The buddha fully extinguished through the element of *Nibbāna*.⁵⁰ (*Kathāvatthu aṭṭhakathā*)

Yāya vā adhikatāya pacchimaṃ cittaṃ apaṭisandhikaṃ jātaṃ. Sā tassa apaṭisandhikavūpasamassa karaṇabhāvena vuttā: The dead consciousness is not linking with another life when the element of unconditioned is obtained. The element of unconditioned is said as the cause of extinguishment of dead consciousness in way of unlinking with another life.⁵¹ (*Kathāvatthumūlaṭṭhikā*)

Sāti asaṅkhatadhātu karaṇabhāvena vuttā yathāvuttassa upasamassa sādhakatamabhāvaṃ sandhāya: The element of unconditioned is said as the cause [i.e. instrumental sense] because it support exceedingly the extinguishment of dead consciousness in way of unlinking with another life.⁵² (*Anuṭṭikā*)

In these commentaries and Sub-commentaries, the instrumental of unconditioned element is “*sādhakatama*” most efficient instrumental because it is supporting exceedingly the action of extinguishment that is no more-rebirth by most efficient power although it is not cooperating condition with agent of dead consciousness. The third case is used in sense of instrumental that is to say in the most efficient instrumental (*sādhakatamakaraṇa*).

4.3.3.5 Complete instrumental

That instrumental which is a cooperating condition with the agent and also most able to accomplish action is called complete instrumental (*paripuṇṇakaraṇā*).

In the example such as “*cakkhunā rūpaṃ passati*” [a man] see a tangible object by the eyes” etc., the instrumental is “*paripuṇṇakaraṇa*”

⁵⁰ KhA. 1.

⁵¹ PpkMT. 47.

⁵² PpkAnT. 57.

complete instrumental because it is complete with two factors, namely cooperating with agent and being able to accomplish action. The third case is used in the sense of instrumental that is to say in the complete instrumental (*paripuṇṇakaraṇā*).

According to these Commentary and Sub-commentary, it could not be noted certainly that it is certainly instrumental only in case of cooperating with agent. It should be understood that unconditioned *Nibbāna* is able to extinguish all action of extinguishment of suffering in round birth by the power of supporting action.

Therefore, it should be surly understood that the second definition as “*etena vā*” in the *Vibhāvinī* is said with reference to having power of accomplishing extinguishment action of unconditioned *Nibbāna* as in the commentary of *Mūlapaṇṇāsa*, *Kathāvatthu* and their Sub-commentaries. Therefore, new sub-commentary which rejects saying “*vibhāvanīyaṃ pana...pa... hotīti*” is simply unawareness of the different type of instrumental and the statements of commentaries and sub-commentaries.

4.3.4 On account of that (*taṃ āgamma*)

U Natthar explains from other point of view in *Atisundaramkyam* that the fire of aggregates is extinguished by *Nibbāna* and the fire of aggregates is extinguished because of *Nibbāna*. These two sentences are the same. The meaning should be regard that the fire of defilements is extinguished by the *Nibbāna*. The fire of aggregates is extinguished because the fire of defilement is extinguished. There are many *Pāli* texts which prove the extinguishment of the fire of defilement.

*atthato pana sabbāneva etāni Nibbānassa vevcanāni.
Paramatthato hi dukkhanirodhaṃ ariyasaccanti Nibbānaṃ
vuccati. Yasmā pana taṃ āgamma taṇhā virajjati ceva
nirujjati ca. tasmā virāgotica nirodhotica vuccati*⁵³

But as to meaning, all of them are synonyms for *Nibbāna*. For in the ultimate sense it is *Nibbāna* that is called

⁵³ Vism. 507.

“the noble truth of the cessation of suffering. But as to meaning, all of them are synonyms for *Nibbāna*. For in the ultimate sense it is *Nibbāna* that is called “the noble truth of the cessation of suffering.”⁵⁴

In this passage, the word “*āgamma*: on account of” is to be understood. On account of *Nibbāna*, attachment becomes detachment and ceases. It is conformity with *Vibhāvinī*. Why does the noble path (*ariyamagga*) eradicate the defilement? It does because of *Nibbāna*. By which, does the noble path eradicate the defilement? It does by the *Nibbāna*. The noble path is agent (*kattu*), *Nibbāna* is instrumental (*karāṇa*) and the extinguishment of defilement is action (*kriya*). Therefore, Ledī Sayadaw’s rejection is removed well.⁵⁵

Ñānindāsabha Sayadaw explains in *Vibhāvinīyojanā* that even though “*Nibbāna*” is not a condition which cooperates with agent of greed-fire etc., in accomplishing action of extinguishment, however it should also be understood, figuratively, that it is the condition which cooperates with agent, like the path, because of being object of the path which cooperates with agent. Referring to this meaning, Dīghanikāya commentary said that “*Nibbānaṃ yasmā taṃ āgamma taṇhā saṅkhiyati vinassati tasmā taṇhāsaṅkhayo*.”⁵⁶ for craving is destruction, i.e. perished owing reaching to *Nibbāna*, therefore *Nibbāna* is “destruction of craving”.⁵⁷

Sayadaw Nāgindasāmithera points out the exposition of Dīghanikāya commentary in his *Mahāatulaṭṭikā*.⁵⁸

*taṇhāsaṅkhayavimuttāti taṇhāsaṅkhayoti maggopi
Nibbānampi. Maggo taṇhaṃ saṅkhiṇāti vināsetīti
taṇhāsaṅkhayo. Nibbānaṃ yasmā taṃ āgamma taṇhā
saṅkhiyati vinassati. Tasmā taṇhāsaṅkhayo. Taṇhāsaṅkhayena*

⁵⁴ Bhikkhu Ñāṇamoli, **The Path of Purification**, (Kandy: Buddhist Publication Society, 2010,) p. 519.

⁵⁵ U Natthar, **Atisundaramkay**, (Yangon: Sāsanaṅkāra Press, 1910,) p. 23.

⁵⁶ DA. III. 737.

⁵⁷ Ashin Ñānindāsabha Sayadaw, **Vibhāvinīyojanā**, (Yangon: Pyigyimandain Press, 1919), p. 60.

⁵⁸ Sayadaw Nāgindasāmithera, **Mahāatulaṭṭikā**, (Yangon: Myanmar, Sāsanaṅkāra Pitakat press, 1924), p. 27.

*maggena vimuttā, taṇhāsāṅkhaye nibbāne vimuttā adhimuttāti taṇhāsāṅkhayavimuttā:*⁵⁹

In the “*taṇhāsāṅkhayavimuttā*”, *taṇhāsāṅkhaya*: entire destruction of craving means the path [*magga*] and the *Nibbāna*. The path is called “entire destruction of craving” because it destroys craving. *Nibbāna* is called “entire destruction of craving” because of that on account of which craving perished or on the other word, craving perishes on account of *Nibbāna* (*taṃ āgamma*). Those are called “*taṇhāsāṅkhayavimutta*” who are free from cycle of rebirth (*vaṭṭa*) through the path which destroys craving or those are called “*taṇhāsāṅkhayavimutta*” who are incline to *Nibbāna* on account of which craving perishes.⁶⁰

Sayadaw Nāgindasāmithera explains that in this commentary, the usage “*taṃ āgamma*: on account of that” signifies the instrumental sense. It can be applied to *Nibbāna*. Ledī Sayadaw said *Nibbāna* is not a condition which cooperates with agent of greed-fire etc., in accomplishing the action of extinguishment. It should be noted as in example such as “the sun shines having removed the dark”. *Maṇisāramañjūṭikā* also explains that the word *Nibbāna* is instrumental sense. Ledī Sayadaw did not aware of the explanation of commentary and sub-commentary.

4.3.5 Two kinds of *Nibbāna*

The *Pāli* “*anupādisesāya Nibbānadhātuyā parinibbāyi*: [the Buddha] extinguished by the *Nibbāna* element without remainder”, is very often quoted by the contributors. The exposition on the *Pāli* by *Mūlaṭīkā* is to be noted here.

Mūlaṭīkā states that *Anupādisesāya Nibbānadhātuyā parinibbāyīti pariNibbānameva pariNibbānassa pariNibbānantarato visesanatthaṃ karaṇabhāvena vuttaṃ. Yāya vā Nibbānadhātuyā adhigatāya*

⁵⁹ DA. III. 738.

⁶⁰ Ashin Janakābhivamsa, *Mahāvābhāsātīkā*, (Amarapūra: Myanmar, New Burma Press, 1998), III. p. 345.

*pacchimacittaṃ appaṭisandhikaṃ jātaṃ, sā tassa appaṭisandhivūpa-samassa karaṇabhāvena vuttāti.*⁶¹

Mūla ṭīkā explains the sentence “*anupādisesāya Nibbānadhātuā parinibbāyī*: [the buddha] extinguishes by the element of nibbana which is without remainder” in two ways.

The first way is that “*pariNibbānameva pariNibbānassa pariNibbānantarato visesanatthaṃ karaṇabhāvena vuttaṃ.*⁶² it is said in a form of an instrumental to distinguish *nibbana* without remainder (*anupādisesaNibbāna*) from *nibbana* with remainder (*saupādisesaNibbāna*”. It means by this exposition that in the sentence, “*anupādisesāya Nibbānadhātuyā parinibbāyī*”, the word “*parainibbāyī*” expresses death-consciousness [*cuticitta*] of the Buddha and phrase “*anupādisesāya Nibbānadhātuyā*” also expresses death-consciousness [*cuticitta*] of the Buddha. Though expressed one is the same, it is said likely separated one because it intends to differentiate from *nibbana* element with remainder (*saupādisesaNibbānadhātu*). Therefore, it is said in term of instrumental sense (*karaṇabhāva*).⁶³ It is similar to the example that “*attano sabhāvaṃ dhāretīti dhammo*: it is dhamma which holds own nature”. In this example, “*attano sabhāvaṃ*: expresses the natural phenomena and “*dhārentī*” expresses the natural phenomena.⁶⁴

The second way is that “*yāya vā Nibbānadhātuyā adhiगतāya pacchimacittaṃ appaṭisandhikaṃ jātaṃ. Sā tassa appaṭisandhivūpasamassa karaṇabhāvena vuttā*: the last consciousness becomes non-rebirth on account of *Nibbāna* element. That *Nibbāna* element is said in the form of instrumental which is the cause of becoming the state of non-rebirth”. It means by that exposition that in the sentence “*anupādisesāya Nibbānadhātuyā parinibbāyī*”, the phrase “*anupādisesāya Nibbānadhātuyā*” expresses unconditioned element [*asaṅkhatadhātu*]⁶⁵ which is called “*nirodhaisacca*” and the word “*parinibbāyī*” expresses the

⁶¹ PpkMṬ. 47.

⁶² PpkMṬ. 47.

⁶³ Ashin Janakābhivamsa, *Kathāvutthubhāsāṭīkā*, (Amarapura: Myanmar, New Burma Press, 1980), p.6.

⁶⁴ PpkAt. 57.

⁶⁵ PpAt. 57: *Sāti asaṅkhatadhātu*.

death-consciousness [*cuticitta*] of the Buddha. The death-consciousness of the Buddha has no potentiality to link rebirth-consciousness because an ignorance and a craving become perished when the Buddha enlightens the *asaṅkhatadhātu*. Then, the death-consciousness of the Buddha ceases without linking to rebirth-consciousness. The unconditioned element (*asaṅkhatadhātu*) is said in the form of instrumental (*karaṇabhāva*)⁶⁶ because it has an accomplished power (*sādhakatamasatti*) that is supporting the last consciousness of the Buddha (*pariNibbānacuti*) to be ceased without linking rebirth-consciousness.⁶⁷ *Anuṭṭikā* states that

According to *Mūlaṭṭikā* exposition, there are two kinds of *Nibbāna*: the last consciousness of the Buddha or Arahanta (*pariNibbānacuti*), and the unconditioned element (*asaṅkhatadhātu*). The unconditioned element is one of the four noble truths that is enlightened by the Buddha under Bodhi tree. It is the object of *Phalasamāpatti* whenever the Buddha take absorption and it exist forever.⁶⁸

4.4 Conclusion and assumptions for the controversy points

As we have seen above, the demonstrative meaning of “*tattha*” is vary. However, the word “*tattha*” is said to explain the condensed word “*Abhidhammatthasaṅgahaṃ*” in previous verse. Therefore, to cover the absolute meaning of condensed word, it should demonstrate “*tattha tasmim Abhidhammatthasaṅgahanti pade*”. It is conformity with the exposition on *Aṭṭhasālinī* commentary by *Mūlaṭṭikā*. it is said in *Aṭṭhasālinī* that “*kenatthena abhidhammo*”.⁶⁹ On the passage, *Mūlaṭṭikā* makes exposition that “*tatthā ti vā Abhidhammakathaṃ ti etasmim vacane yo abhidhammo vutto, so kenatthena abhidhammoti attho*”⁷⁰.

⁶⁶ PpAṭ. 57: *Karaṇabhāvena vuttā yathāvuttassa upasamassa sādakatama-bhāvaṃ sandhāya.*

⁶⁷ Ashin Janakābhivamsa, *Mūlaṭṭikā Nissaya*, (Amarapūpa: Myanmar, New Burma Press, 1981), p. 284.

⁶⁸ Ashin Janakābhivamsa, *Mūlaṭṭikā Nissaya*, (Amarapūpa: Myanmar, New Burma Press, 1981), p. 284

⁶⁹ Dhs.A. p. 1.

⁷⁰ AsMṬ. P. 12.

“*tattha*” in *Aṭṭhasālinī* and “*tattha*” in *AbhidhammatthaSaṅgaha* are homogeneous. The demonstration “*Abhidhammakathaṃ ti etasmiṃ vacane*” of *Mūlaṭīkā* and the demonstration “*tattha tasmīṃ Abhidhammatthasaṅgahanti pade*” are homogeneous. The exposition “*yo abhidhammo vutto, so*” of *Mūlaṭīkā* is the demonstration of the partial word “*Abhidhamma*” of “*Abhidhammakathaṃ*” and insertion the word “*vutto*” is also a kind of exposition. These expositions are similar to that in the word “*AbhidhammatthaSaṅgahaṃ*”, having removed the word “*Saṅgaha*”, insertion the word “*vuttā*”, it explores that “*vuttā bhidhammatthā*”.

Sayadaw Sāsana said in Decree *ṭīkā*⁷¹ that all expositions, of *Vibhāvinī*, old sub-commentary, *Dīpanī* and *Aṅkuraṭīkā*, are not wrong in term of meaning. But in term of grammar, Anuruddha Mahāthera said only with “*attha*” as “*Abhidhammatthā*”, not “*pada*” as “*Abhidhammapada*”. Because the word “*tattah*” is said in first place that “*tattha vuttā bhidhammatthā*”, if the word “*ta*” demonstrates that “*tattha tasmīṃ abhidhamme*”, there would be repetition.⁷²

In this regard, it is true that the word “*ta*” can demonstrate the minor meaning and the subject could be the Buddha in term of a kind of various ways. Therefore, Ledī Saydaw did not say “*sabbaṃ taṃ paṭikkhittaṃ: all that are rejected*”. He says just “*sabbaṃ na sundaraṃ: all is not good*”. It means that those definitions are absolutely not wrong and not correct meaning as well. The correct or closed meaning to the attention of Anuruddha Mahāthera might be “*tattha tasmīṃ Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha pade*” because Anuruddha Mahāthera says “*bhāsissaṃ Abhidhammatthasaṅgahaṃ: I will speak the text of Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha*” in the first verse. Next, he says “*tattha vuttā: therein what I have said*”. As nature of debate, the contributors were making an attempt to escape from accusation. The meaning is not as complexity as they had been thought.

Regarding to the formal definition of “*Nibbāna*”, Ledī Saydaw exclaims that the instrumental has a feature of cooperating condition (*sahakārīpaccya*) with agent. Sayadaw Sāgarābhīdhaja says that the

⁷¹ Sayadaw Sāsana, **Decree ṭīkā**, (Mandalay: Ratanasiddhi Press, 1934), p. 8.

⁷² Sayadaw U Sāsana, **Decree ṭīkā**, (Yangon: Ratanasiddhi Press, 1934), p. 8

cooperating condition cannot always be found in all instances. The example sentences that he provides are enough to support his idea. In the case of *Nibbāna* definition, the instrumental has no feature of cooperating condition, but it supports to the agent in accomplishing the action of extinguishment. This idea seems to identical to Talainkone Sayadaw's view that "*etena*" is not the instrumental, but it is a causative which support to an agent. Talainkone Sayadaw says that "*etena*" refers to the unconditioned dhamma which is a causative (*hetu*), which is not an instrumental. The same idea but different explanation is made by Minkhin Sayadaw that unconditioned *Nibbāna* is able to extinguish all action of extinguishment of suffering in round birth by the power of supporting action. The usage "*taṃ āgamma: on account of that*" is also important to solve the problem. Ñānindāsabha Sayadaw says that the usage signifies the instrumental sense.

According to the observation of those explanation, the exposition "*nibbāti etena rāgaggiādikoti Nibbānaṃ*" seem to be no fault if we regard "*etena*" as causative rather than instrumental because *Nibbāna* is unconditioned element which cause the defilements to be extinguished indirectly.

In conclusion, the formal definition is a kind of exposition by commentators and sub-commentators. There is no fixed rule or regulation for making formal definition. It is hard to say the real intended meaning of a commentator in some exposition. In the case of *Nibbāna* definition in *Vibhāvinī*, we could not know whether Sumaṅgala Mahāthera intended instrumental or causative. Ledī Sayadaw says it is not good. It doesn't mean wrong. Therefore, the formal definition of *Nibbāna* by Sumaṅgala Mahāthera is acceptable in some ways that had been discussed in this chapter.

The key points of argument for the formal definition of “*Nibbāna*”.

Vibhāvīnī	<p><i>Nibbāti vā etena rāgaggiādikoti nibbānaṃ:</i></p> <p>On the other hand, it is called “<i>nibbāna</i>” because it causes greed etc., to be extinguished.</p>
Dīpanī	<p><i>Nibbāyanti vā ariyajanā etasminti nibbānaṃ:</i></p> <p>Alternatively, it is called “<i>nibbana</i>” because noble persons become extinguished in that state.</p> <p>The formal definition of “<i>Nibbāna</i>” should not be made by means of instrumental sense (<i>karaṇasādhana</i>) because <i>Nibbāna</i> is not a condition which is cooperating with agent (<i>kattu</i>). In the definition, <i>Nibbāna</i> (<i>etena</i>) is an instrumental (<i>karaṇa</i>), greed-fire etc. (<i>rāgaggiādiko</i>) is agent (<i>kattu</i>), and to extinguish (<i>nibbāti</i>) is action or verb (<i>kiriya</i>). the nature of instrumental cooperates with agent in accomplishing action (verb). Herein, <i>Nibbāna</i> does not cooperate with greed-fire etc., in accomplishing the action of extinguishment</p>
<i>Abhidhammattha Anuvibhāvīnī</i>	<p>When agent (<i>kattu</i>) and instrumental (<i>karaṇa</i>) accomplish an action together, then the cause of action is said as “a cooperating condition (<i>sahakāriṇaccaya</i>)”. The cooperating condition cannot always be found in all instances. It is founded in some instances and is not in others.</p>
Talainkone Sayadaw	<p>It is not an instrumental (<i>karaṇa</i>) but causative (<i>hetu</i>) and he explains that in the definition “<i>nibbanti rāgaggiādayo etenāti Nibbānaṃ</i>”, <i>etena</i> refers to the unconditioned dhamma which is a causative (<i>hetu</i>), which is not an instrumental (<i>kāraṇa</i>). <i>Nibbāna</i> is not a condition which is cooperating with agent [i.e. <i>rāga</i>, <i>dosa</i> etc.] in accomplish of action of extinguishment. Therefore, <i>Nibbāna</i> has no nature of instrumental (<i>karaṇabhāva</i>).</p>
Minkhin Sayadaw	<p><i>Nibbāna</i> is actually not a cooperating condition in accomplishing the action of extinguishing the defilements but it has an ability to support, especially for accomplishing the action of the extinguishment of the defilements. It should not be noted that it is called the instrumental only when it becomes</p>

	a cooperating condition with the agent because there are fivefold instrumental.
U Natthar	The fire of aggregates is extinguished by <i>Nibbāna</i> and the fire of aggregates is extinguished because of <i>Nibbāna</i> . These two sentences are the same. The meaning should be regard that the fire of defilements is extinguished by the <i>Nibbāna</i> . The fire of aggregates is extinguished because the fire of defilement is extinguished
Researcher	<p>The exposition “<i>nibbāti etena rāgaggiādikoti Nibbānaṃ</i>” seem to be no fault if we regard “<i>etena</i>” as causative rather than instrumental because <i>Nibbāna</i> is unconditioned element which cause the defilements to be extinguished indirectly.</p> <p>Moreover, according Abhidhamma point of views, <i>Nibbāna</i> conditiones the extinguishment of the defilements by way of “<i>Upanissayapaccaya</i>”. Therefore, the formal definition by Vibhāvinī seems to be reasonable.</p> <p><i>Purimā purimā abyākatā dhammā pacchimānaṃ pacchimānaṃ abyākatānaṃ dhammānaṃ upanissayapaccayena paccayo.</i></p>

Chapter V

Conclusion and Suggestion for further research

5.1 A Summary and Conclusion

This dissertation entitled “*Abhidhamma* debate: A comparative study of selected points of controversy between the *Abhidhammatthavibhāvinīṭikā* and *Paramatthadīpanīṭikā*” has accomplished its four objectives.

As for the first objective, chapter one has covered the significant background of the *Abhidhamma* debate and development of *Abhidhamma* literature in Myanmar. In the summary of chapter one, it is noted that *Abhidhamma* literature develops extensively in *Theravāda* countries, especially in Sri Lanka and Myanmar. The *Saṅgaha* plays a key role in developing *Abhidhamma* literature. Several *Abhidhamma* sub-commentaries, focused upon the *Saṅgaha*, appeared from time to time. Among the *Abhidhamma* sub-commentaries, the *Vibhāvinī* and the *Dīpanī* have discordant views on certain points of the *Saṅgaha*. The *Dīpanī* criticizes 245 points from the *Vibhāvinī*. In response, those who were disagree with the *Dīpanī* supported the *Vibhāvinī* by authoring further scholarly works. Those works had been recorded in the first chapter.

As for second objective, the second chapter has studied the exposition on the second verse of the *Saṅgaha* by two dissenting *Abhidhamma* sub-commentaries, the *Vibhāvinī* and the *Dīpanī*, along with their key *Ṭikas*, the *Maṇisāramaṅjūsāṭikā* and the *Anudīpanīṭikā*. On studying these five texts, it is noted that Sumaṅgala Mahāthera explains the second verse in brief, but in its key commentary “*Maṇisāramaṅjūsā*”, Ariyavaṃsa Mahāthera explains the *Vibhāvinī*'s expositions in detail. Ledī Sayadaw explains the second verse in some detail but in its key commentary, the *Anudīpanī*, he explains only some points in brief. The

interesting points is that before the *Dīpanī's* explanation, *Maṇisāramañjūsā* had recognized some points that are criticized by the *Dīpanī* and approached these points with positive views but *Dīpanī* did with negative views. This second chapter has accomplished its objective, to study comparatively the exposition of two dissenting *Abhidhamma* sub-commentaries, sufficiently.

As for the third objective, chapter three has explored 70 points of controversy contained in the *cittasaṅgaha* of the *Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha*. There are six sub-division of *cittasaṅgaha*, *akusalacitta*, *ahetukacitta*, *kāmāvacarasobhanacitta*, *rūpāvacaracitta*, *arūpāvacaracitta* and *lokuttaracitta*. As seen above, the theme of the controversy points varies based on the sub-division. Some points concern the indicated meaning of certain words, some concern grammatical perspective, some concern contactual meanings of the two words, some concern an *abhidhamma* perspective. We can conclude that, for controversy point, although naming *Abhidhamma* debate, the controversy points made by *Dīpanī* are not only *Abhidhamma* perspectives but also include other *Pāli* commentarial perspectives. To understand these controversy points, one must have profound knowledges about not only the *Pāli* commentarial tradition but also *Abhidhidhamma* perspective. Without such knowledges one cannot tackle these controversy points. The third chapter has accomplished the objective, to study the perspective of controversy points between two *Abhidhamma* sub-commentaries, the *Vibhāvinī* and the *Dīpanī* thoroughly.

As for fourth objective, chapter four has studied two points of controversy; 1) the demonstrative meaning of *tattha* and 2) the formal definition of *Nibbāna*. To make judgement on the demonstrative meaning of *tattha*, the subject of *vutta* and the status of meaning, minor meaning (*apadhānattha*) or major meaning (*padhānattha*), are widely considered by most scholars. Moreover, three kinds of *ta* are also considered for the argument. On attempting to make judgement, as a Researcher, the definition of *Vibhāvinī*: “*tattha tasmim abhidhamme*” is not totally wrong but it seems to be far away from the intended meaning of Anuruddhathera. The Definition of *Dīpanī*: “*tattha tasmim abhidhammatthasaṅgahe*” would be closer to the intended meaning of Anuruddhathera. To make a

judgement on the formal definition of *Nibbāna*, the cooperation condition (*sahakārīpaccaya*), instrumental and causative case (*karaṇasādhana* and *hetvattha*), and two kinds of *Nibbāna* are considered widely. On attempting to make judgement, as a Researcher, the definition of *Vibhāvinī*: “*nibbāti vā etena rāgaggiādikoti Nibbānaṃ*” is also not wrong and acceptable in some way. The argument by Ledī Sayadaw seems to approach by way of negative view. The fourth chapter has accomplished the fourth objective, to study comparatively selected points of controversy and different views of different scholars on the points.

As a conclusion, an important question that readers want to know, is to which sub-commentary the researcher of this dissertation supports, the *Vibhāvinī* or the *Dīpanī*. The best answer for the question would be that it will depend on a sort of controversy points accordingly. As seen in chapter four, the researcher supports the *Vibhāvinī* in case of formal definition of *Nibbāna* and the *Dīpanī* in case of demonstrative meaning of *tattha*. In this way, this dissertation has accomplished its objectives sufficiently and successfully.

5.2 Suggestion for further research

The researcher of this dissertation believes that this dissertation has provided some valuable information which enables scholars and researchers to do further researches in Buddhist Studies. The texts that contributed to the debate are still in Myanmar script and most of texts are not transliterated into Roman script yet. The majority of texts are yet to be translated into English and even into Myanmar translation. These valuable literatures have been waiting for scholars and researchers since they came to exits. Moreover, the controversial points are manifold and most of them have not reached a final or satisfactory conclusion yet. Scholars can do further research in Buddhist studies field, such as;

5.2.1 A critical edition of certain *Abhidhamma* Pāli texts such as *Maṇisāramañjūsāṭīkā*, *Paramatthadīpanī*, *Aṅkuraṭīkā*, *Atulaṭīkā*, *Abhidhammatthavibhāvinīyojanā* and so on.

5.2.2 An Annotated Translation of certain *Abhidhamma* Pāli texts such as *Maṅṣārāmañjūsāṭīkā*, *Paramatthadīpanī*, *Aṅkuraṭṭīkā*, *Atulaṭṭīkā*, *Abhidhammatthavibhāvinīyojanā* and so on.

Regarding controversy points, most of the points concern commentarial technique and very few points concern doctrinal perspective. The following points would be very interesting;

5.2.3 A comparative study of controversy about prompted or unprompted (*sasaṅkhārika* or *asaṅkhārika*) of delusion consciousness.

5.2.4 A comparative study of controversy about drinking alcohol (*surāpāna*) whether being *kammaṭṭha* or not.

5.2.5 A comparative study of controversy about life-span of consciousness (*cittakkhaṇa*)

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Appendix I

Table of controversy points in *cittasaṅgaha*

Point	Vibhāvinī	Dīpanī	Argument
1	The Theme of the text (<i>abhidheyyattha</i>)” is indicated by the word “ <i>Abhidhammattha-saṅghaṃ</i> ”.	The Theme of the text” is indicated by the word “ <i>abhidhammattha</i> ”, a part of combination word of “ <i>abhidhammattha-saṅgahaṃ</i> ”	Summary is not the theme of the text.
2	The writing style of the text (<i>ganthappakāra</i>) is indicated by the word “ <i>abhidhammattha-saṅgaha</i> ”.	The writing style of the text is indicated by the word “ <i>saṅgaha</i> ”.	The word “ <i>abhidhammattha</i> ” does not indicate the writing style of the texts.
3	The Advantage of the Text (<i>ganthappayojana</i>) is indicated by the word “ <i>saṅgaha</i> ”.	The advantage of the text is indicated by the word “ <i>abhidhammattha-saṅgaha</i> ”.	The word “ <i>saṅgaha</i> ” without “ <i>abhidhammattha</i> ” can convey other meaning such as the summarizing of untrue dhamma.
4	The paying respect to the Triple Gem is, as to core meaning, the wholesome volition (<i>kasalacetanā</i>) which functions as immediately effective <i>kamma</i> (<i>diṭṭhadhamma-vedanīyakamma</i>).	The paying respect to the Triple Gem is, as to core meaning, a process of great merit (<i>puññā-bhisanda</i>), a stream of great merit (<i>puñña-pavāha</i>), which function as reproductive <i>kamma</i> (<i>janakakamma</i>).	The immediately effective <i>kamma</i> (<i>diṭṭhadhammavedanī yakamma</i>) is the first impulsion-moment (<i>pathama-javana</i>). it needs here only the function of supporting <i>kamma</i> (<i>upatthambanakamma</i>) and it is also found in all of seven impulsion-moments of wholesome <i>kamma</i>
5	The word “ <i>sammā-sambuddhaṃ</i> ” expresses only	The word “ <i>atulaṃ</i> ” is said to makes the veneration more	The word “ <i>sammā-sambuddhaṃ</i> ”

	an appellation of the Buddha. It needs to be qualified by the virtues of the Buddha. Therefore, the word “ <i>atulaṃ</i> ” is said to qualify the word “ <i>sammāsambuddhaṃ</i> .”	powerful. The veneration by uttering several words of the virtues of the Buddha is more powerful.	is great word among the words of virtue of the Buddha like the moon among the stars. Therefore, the word should not be just appellation for those who know pāli language.
6	The word “ <i>tula</i> ” is secondary derivative form (<i>taddhita</i>). the combination of “ <i>tula</i> ” stem and “ <i>ya</i> ” suffix becomes <i>tulya</i> . (<i>tula+ya= tulya</i>). In this step, the “ <i>y</i> ” is elided, then becomes “ <i>tula</i> ”.	The word “ <i>tula</i> ” is primary derivative form (<i>kita</i>). a combination of “ <i>tula</i> ” root and “ <i>a</i> ” suffix. The “ <i>a</i> ” suffix is used in the sense of accusative (<i>Kammasādhana</i>). It simply becomes “ <i>tula</i> ” ($\sqrt{tul+a} = tula$)	the word “ <i>tula</i> ” is possible to be formed by means of root and in the sense of accusative (<i>Kammasādhana</i>). It is useless to think of using ‘ <i>yya</i> ’ or ‘ <i>a</i> ’ in the sense of measured (<i>sammitattha</i>).
7	The order of <i>sampadā</i> is <i>ñāṇasampadā</i> , <i>pahānasampadā</i> , <i>ānubhāvasampadā</i> , <i>rūpakāyasampadā</i> .	The order of <i>sampadā</i> is <i>pahānasampadā</i> , <i>ñāṇasampadā</i> , <i>ānubhāvasampadā</i> , <i>rūpakāyasampadā</i> .	<i>Ñāṇasampadā</i> can arise only after <i>pahānasampadā</i> . Therefore, the order should be <i>pahānasampadā</i> , <i>ñāṇasampadā</i> etc.
8	<i>Arahattamaggañāṇa</i> is <i>ñāṇasampadā</i> .	<i>Arahattamaggañāṇa</i> is <i>pahānasampadā</i> .	There is no other thing apart from <i>arahattamaggañāṇa</i> to be called (<i>pahānasampadā</i>)
9	<i>Ñāṇasampadā</i> is <i>maggañāṇa</i> , <i>dasabalañāṇa</i> etc.	<i>Ñāṇasampadā</i> is <i>sabbaññutañāṇa</i> , <i>dasabalañāṇa</i> etc.	<i>Sabbaññutañāṇa</i> should be mentioned first in explanation on <i>ñāṇasampadā</i> .
10	<i>Dhammasaṅghānaṃ abhivādetabbabhāvo sahayogena viññāyati</i> .	<i>Etena dhammasaṅghānaṃpi vandanā kata hoti</i> .	The suffix “ <i>tabba</i> ” conveys the meaning of “deserving”. It is not desirable here.

11	<i>Gaṇānaṃ gaṇesu vā devamanussādisamūhesu uttamo yathāvuttanuṇavasenāti gaṇuttamo.</i>	<i>Uttamo ca so gaṇocāti atthena uttamagaṇo nāma. So yeva idha gaṇuttamoti vuccati.</i>	In the definition, “ <i>gaṇānaṃ or gaṇesu uttamo gaṇuttamo</i> ” the word “ <i>uttama</i> ” would convey a major meaning (<i>padhānabhūta</i>). The word “ <i>uttama</i> ” conveys only the sense of adjective or minor meaning (<i>guṇibhūta</i>). Therefore, it cannot convey the meaning of the <i>Ariyaśaṅgha</i> .
12	The word “ <i>ta</i> ” of <i>tattha</i> demonstrates the meaning of the word “ <i>abhidhammattha</i> ”, a partial word of <i>abhidhammatthasaṅgahaṃ</i> that had been said in previous verse.	The word “ <i>ta</i> ” of <i>tattha</i> demonstrates the meaning of the word “ <i>abhidhammatthasaṅgahaṃ</i> ” which had been said in previous verse.	There is no such word “ <i>ta</i> ” that demonstrates a minor meaning at the beginning in the commentaries.
13	The word “ <i>sabbathā</i> ” contacts to the word “ <i>vuttā</i> ” in the verse, i.e. spoken of in full or spoken of in all.	The word “ <i>sabbathā</i> ” contacts to the word “ <i>catudhā</i> ”, i.e. fourfold in all aspects.	The interpretation “spoken of in full” does not accord with these up-coming word “ <i>sabbathā dvādasa, sabbathāpi aṭṭhārasa</i> etc.”.
14	<i>Paramassa vā uttamassa ñāṇassa attho gocaroti paramattho.</i>	<i>Avisaṃvādakaṭṭhena paramo uttamo atthoti paramattho.</i>	The word “ <i>parama</i> ” does not convey the meaning of knowledge and the word “ <i>attha</i> ” does not convey the meaning of object.
15	Among the three definitions, the way of agent and way of instrumental are alternative definitions (<i>pariyāyanibbacana</i>) and	Only the way of nature (<i>bhāvasādhana</i>) is definitive way. It refers to the state of action of all <i>paramattha dhamma</i> . All dhamma have	The way of agent and instrumental should be understood as example: “ <i>sila-puttakassa sarīraṃ:</i>

	<p>only the way of nature is definitive definition (<i>nippariyāyanibbacana</i>)The definition by way of agent is to be said in term of putting themselves foremost in demonstrating own function. The definition by way of instrumental is to be said in term of putting themselves as agent among the associated dhammas.</p>	<p>just action of their function. The other two ways are to be known as alternative ways [<i>pariyāya</i>]. The definition by way of agent and instrumental seems to indicate that there is some substance or self or doer etc., apart from consciousness which conscious or knows. It said indivisible as dividing in alternative way [<i>pariyāyakathā</i>] to know special meanings.</p>	<p>the body of small stone. The stone and body of stone are indivisible, but it is said as dividing.</p> <p>Vibhāvinī’s explanation seems to say “thinking of unreality as reality (<i>abhūta bhūta-kappanā</i>)” as in the example “the horn of hare (<i>sasa-visāṇa</i>).</p>
16	<p>It is called “<i>cetasika</i>: mentality” because it exists in the mind. It occurs in dependence upon mind or other word, its occurrence is related to mind. The mentality “<i>cetasika</i>” cannot arise or cannot take an object without consciousness, but consciousness can occur or can take an object without some kinds of mentalities.</p>	<p>Mentality “<i>cetasika</i>” has characteristics such as arising together, ceasing together and so on. When consciousness arises, mentalities arise. When consciousness decays, mentalities decay. When consciousness ceases, Mentalities cease. The object of consciousness is the object of mentalities. The seat of consciousness is the seat of mentalities.</p>	<p>The characteristics of <i>cetasika</i> should be explained here because it is the place where the exact meaning of the word “<i>cetasika</i>” is to be defined.</p>
17	<p>It is called “<i>rūpa</i>: materiality” because it changes due to opposite conditions such as cold, heat etc. The Buddha said “<i>sītenapi ruppati</i>: change due to cool, <i>uṇhenapi ruppati</i>: change due to heat” etc. The words “<i>sītenapi uṇhenapi</i>” are said to prevent an argument that immaterial dhamma (<i>arūpa-dhamma</i>)</p>	<p>It is called “<i>rūpa</i>: materiality” because it changes due to harmful conditions such as cold, heat, hungry etc. or it is changed by harmful conditions such as cold, heat, hungry etc. The term “<i>rūpa</i>” is used only for the dhammas which have substance and their chaining is common to the people. On the contrary, mentalities (<i>arūpadhamma</i>) have no substance and their</p>	<p>The changing of mentality which is not well known to the world, is here, not to be taken. The terms are used with consensus of the world. The consensus of the world is widely known. The term “<i>arūpa</i>” is itself well known. Therefore, without the terms “<i>sīta, uṇha</i> etc.”,</p>

	too can be called “ <i>rūpa: materiality</i> ”.	changing is not common to the people.	the supposition can be removed by consensus of the world.
18	Materiality in Brahma world has no oppressive condition, such as cold, heat etc., so it could not be called “ <i>rūpa: materiality</i> ” in Brahma world. There is no oppressive condition but supporting condition such as cold. Therefore, it can be called.	In Brahma world, the Brahams have physical changing, verbal changing, and various forms created by psychic power. They are also called “changing” in on aspect. Therefore, it is to be noted that the matter in Brahma world has a state of being matter.	The doctrine “ <i>sītenapi, unḥenapi</i> etc.”, are just for examples and to indicate respective points. Without giving up these words <i>sīta</i> etc., it is useless to explain that the matter in Brahma can be called <i>rūpa</i> .
19	<i>Nibbāti vā etena rāgaggiādikoti nibbānaṃ:</i> On the other hand, it is called “ <i>nibbāna</i> ” because it causes greed etc., to be extinguished.	<i>Nibbāyanti vā ariyajanā etasminti nibbānaṃ:</i> Alternatively, it is called “ <i>nibbana</i> ” because noble persons become extinguished in that state.	The instrumental sense is not seen in <i>nibbana</i> like the path (<i>magga</i>). Moreover, <i>nibbāna</i> cannot be the cooperating cause (<i>sahakārīpaccaya</i>) of craving which words as a subject to do that act of extinguishing.
20	The consciousness is called sensuous sphere (<i>kāmāvacara</i>) because it occurs mostly (<i>yebhu-yyena</i>) in elevenfold sense-sphere (<i>kāma-bhava</i>).	The sensuous-sphere (<i>kāmāvacara</i>) is so called because it occurs or includes in eleven-fold <i>kāma</i> planes (<i>kāma-bhava</i>).	The meaning of <i>uppajjati</i> for <i>avacarati</i> is not accord with Pāli cannon. It should be <i>pariyāpanna-bhāvena pavattati</i> .
21	Anuruddha Mahāthera arranges unwholesome consciousness (<i>akusala-citta</i>) and the consciousness without roots (<i>ahetukacitta</i>) first for the convenience of naming beautiful consciousness (<i>sobhaṇa-citta</i>).	Among the sensuous-sphere consciousnesses, non-beautiful consciousness (<i>asobhaṇacitta</i>) is lower. And among those, unwholesome consciousness (<i>akusalacitta</i>) is lowest. The order of <i>akusla</i> , <i>ahetuka</i> and <i>sahetuka</i> is	The explanation of Vibhāvinī is not good because the meaning is very clear that it is arranged according to level of lower and higher

		arranged according to lower and higher level	
22	Among twelve types of unwholesome consciousnesses, the consciousness rooted in greed (<i>lobhamūlacitta</i>) is said first because it arises from the start in the consciousness processes of one who has taken rebirth in the state of existence (<i>bhava</i>)	The consciousness rooted in greed (<i>lobhamūlacitta</i>) is more in number. It is distinct because of association with two roots of birth-and-death circle (<i>vaṭṭamūla</i>). Therefore, it is stated first	The explanation of Vibhāvinī is also not reasonable because only <i>Manodvāravajjanacitta</i> arise at very first, in <i>vīthiccittas</i> (thought-process)
23	<i>Saṅkhāra</i> is the distinction state of consciousness that is a state of sharpness supported by the earlier exertion. The consciousness which has no <i>saṅkhāra</i> is called <i>asaṅkhāra</i> . <i>Asaṅkhāra</i> itself is called <i>asaṅkhārika</i> . The consciousness which is with <i>saṅkhāra</i> is called <i>saṅkhārika</i> .	<i>Saṅkhāra</i> is earlier preparation (<i>pubbābhi-saṅkhāra</i>). The group of condition (<i>paccayagaṇa</i>) which has no <i>saṅkhāra</i> is called <i>asaṅkhāra</i> . The group of condition has <i>saṅkhāra</i> is called <i>saṅkhārika</i> . The consciousness which arises due to the group of condition without <i>saṅkhāra</i> is called <i>asaṅkhārika</i> . The consciousness which arises due to the group of conditions with <i>saṅkhāra</i> is called <i>saṅkhārika</i> .	The suffix “ <i>ika</i> ” of <i>asaṅkhārika</i> and <i>saṅkhārika</i> is used in the sense of arising. This is the true meaning of <i>asaṅkhārika</i> and <i>saṅkhārika</i> .
24	It is <i>saṅkhāra</i> by which a consciousness is supplied or equipped by means of making sharpness.	It is <i>saṅkhāra</i> which organizes and encourage the inactive mind without letting it not to do in this and that deed.	According to explanation of Vibhāvinī, the consciousness with <i>saṅkhāra</i> would be the consciousness of sharpness.

25	<i>Saṅkhāra</i> is the distinction state of consciousness that is a state of sharpness supported by the earlier exertion.	<i>Saṅkhāra</i> is earlier preparation (<i>pubbābhi-saṅkhāra</i>). It has two kinds: action (<i>payoga</i>) and instruction (<i>upāya</i>).	<i>Saṅkhāra</i> is not a consciousness.
26	The distinction state that arise in next consciousness because of preceding exertion is called <i>saṅkhāra</i> . Because of this <i>saṅkhāra</i> , there is a state of <i>asaṅkhārika</i> etc.		Basically, the definition of <i>saṅkhāra</i> by Vibhāvinī, is wrong. So, this verse is also wrong.
27	The word “ <i>saha</i> ” conveys the meaning of existence or presence (<i>vijjamāna</i>) <i>asaṅkhārika</i> is called <i>asaṅkhārika</i> because it does not have <i>saṅkhāra</i> .		It is said depending on his own idea without referring to the direct and apparent meaning that is given in <i>Pāli</i> and Commentaries
28	The terms “ <i>somanassa</i> , <i>diṭṭhi</i> , <i>saṅkhārika</i> and <i>lobha</i> ” are used to distinguish because they are not related to all types of consciousness.	<i>Lobha</i> distinguishes this <i>lobhamūlacitta</i> from other consciousness. <i>Vedanā</i> , <i>diṭṭhi</i> and <i>saṅkhāra</i> distinguish within the <i>lobhamūla-citta</i> . Therefore, the terms “ <i>lobha</i> ; <i>vedanā</i> (<i>somanassa</i> , <i>upekkhā</i>); <i>diṭṭhi</i> and <i>saṅkhāra</i> are used	The terms <i>somanassa</i> , <i>upekkhā</i> and <i>saṅkhāra</i> are used in other consciousnesses, then these terms are not able to distinguish between the consciousnesses rooted in greed and another consciousness. if so, these terms would not be used.
29	The term “ <i>domanassa</i> ” is used to characterize the <i>dosamūlacitta</i> by means of that unhappiness is not common to all types of consciousness.	The term, <i>domanassa</i> , is used to avoid the supposition (<i>paśaṅga</i>) which this <i>citta</i> may sometimes associate with other feeling.	The usage “unhappiness is not common to all types of consciousness” is not proper because the meaning would be that the <i>domanassacitta</i> associates with <i>somanassa</i> and <i>upekkhā</i> too, but these

			feelings are not used to characterized.
30	The term “ <i>paṭigha</i> ” is used to show that both (<i>domanassa</i> and <i>paṭigha</i>) always exist together	The term “ <i>paṭigha</i> ” is used to avoid the supposition that perhaps the other dhammas associate with this consciousness.	A significant meaning by Vibhāvini can be known only through the minor conclusion.
31	The <i>momūha-citta</i> has no other root, and being associated with doubt and restlessness, their nature is instability by being scattered and diffuse because of delusion; they always occur free from attachment and hostility. Therefore, they are accompanied by just equanimity.	The <i>momūhacitta</i> associates with <i>moha</i> which has a chance being free from other roots and is very powerful and <i>vicikicchā</i> and <i>uddhacca</i> which are in a state of wavering and derangement. So, the feeling in this mind cannot enjoy fully an object and only <i>upekkhā</i> associates with this <i>citta</i> .	The reason that is saying that they are always free from attachment, they are accompanied by <i>upekkhā</i> , is not good because there are some <i>lobhamūlacitta</i> which are accompanied by <i>upekkhā</i> , even though they are not free from attachment.
32	The <i>momūhacittas</i> has no division of <i>saṅkhāra</i> . Because they are absent from the natural activity and the encouragement.	The <i>momūhacittā</i> is in the nature of sentient beings; they cannot be generated by means, effort, or way and they arise without drawing back, sinking, difficulty and trouble like <i>bhavaṅga-citta</i> . Therefore, they are definitely <i>asaṅkhāra</i> .	This notion (no division of <i>saṅkhāra</i>) does not correspond even with Commentary. It is said “ <i>avijjā</i> (ignorance) is to be of twofold only by the division of <i>saṅkhāra</i> in the <i>paṭiccasamuppāda</i> Commentary.
33	The <i>momūhacitta</i> is free from the state of sharpness of mind. (<i>sabhāvatikka</i>).	The state of sharpness of mind (<i>tikkhabhāva</i>) is here said that this <i>citta</i> can arise through the mere group of usual conditions, without a prior action. This <i>momūhacitta</i> appears in such a way.	It cannot say that this <i>momūhacitta</i> has no the state of sharpness of mind. (<i>sabhāvatikka</i>).

34	The meaning of <i>sabbathā</i> is that by all these modes of association, the twelve unwholesome consciousness are complete.	<i>Sabbathāpi</i> means that it is only twelve through the division which is mentioned in Dhamma-saṅganī, it is only twelve through the division which is classified in Vibhaṅga, etc.	Vibhāvini explains only the mode of association, etc., that is said before. That is clear only by the word “ <i>iccevaṃ</i> ”.
35	<i>Akusalavipākacitta</i> is explained first among three types of <i>ahetukacitta</i> because it is result of akusalacitta and it should be explained just after explanation of akusalacitta.	<i>Akusalavipākacitta</i> is explained first among three types of <i>ahetukacitta</i> because it is lowest of all resultant <i>cittas</i> .	According to Vibhāvini’s explanation, the results of <i>kusala</i> ’ also should be said just after only the <i>kusala</i> .
36	If <i>kusalavipākāhetuka-cittas</i> are named according to producing cause (<i>nibbattakahetu</i>), they would get the name of <i>sahetukakusala-vipākacitta</i> . If so, there would be confusion with the name of great resultant <i>cittas</i> (<i>mahāvipākacitta</i>).	The supposition that this <i>citta</i> can be named as <i>sahetuka</i> due to being produced by producing cause (<i>nibbattakahetu</i>) which is borne together with previous <i>kamma</i> . It is not good.	There is no such a place in <i>Abhidhamma</i> where <i>Vipāka</i> is denoted to have the possibility of <i>sahetuka</i> or <i>ahetuka</i> through the producing cause which is borne together with previous <i>kamma</i> .
37	<i>manodvāra</i> (mind-door) is life-continuum consciousness (<i>bhavaṅgacitta</i>) which is contiguity condition (<i>anantarapaccaya</i>) for <i>āvajjana</i> (adverting) because it is the entrance for the occurrence of the process consciousness (<i>vīthiccita</i>). It is called <i>manodvārāvajjana</i> (mind-door-adverting) because it adverts (<i>āvajjati</i>) an object which is presenting by means of seeing, hearing,	<i>Manodvārāvajjana</i> is an <i>āvajjana</i> which arises in mind-door, that is <i>bhavaṅga</i> . It arises, indeed, being aware of an object, which manifests in that mind-door. Herein, <i>manodvāra</i> is to be known as the entire <i>bhavaṅga citta</i> .	If it is the meaning ‘only this <i>bhavaṅga</i> just after which <i>vīthiccita</i> arise is to be actually called <i>manodvāra</i> . The entry of <i>vīthiccita</i> , not the other <i>bhavaṅga citta</i> s which preceded’- such unnecessary meaning arises; “only these bases, eyes, etc., upon which the objects, visible object, etc., impinge and the

	sensing etc., at the mind-door (<i>tasmī manodvāre</i>) or it diverts the flow of consciousness by meaning of what has been said		<i>vīthicitta āvajjana</i> , etc., arise, are to be called <i>dvāra</i> (door), the entry of those <i>vīthicitta</i> , not the others'. However, there are not such eyes, etc., which are not to be door. And all of these will be clear in <i>dvārasaṅgaha</i> later.
38	The pair of receiving consciousness (<i>sampaticchanayugala</i>) is always accompanied by equanimity only because it doesn't get contiguity condition (<i>aladdhānantarapaccaya</i>) from the same bases (<i>samānanissaya</i>) because it arises immediately next to eye-consciousness etc., which have not the same bases with it, that is why it is not so strong and not able to enjoy the tastes of the objects in every way like a man who doesn't get a support from another on the same base.	<i>Sampaticchana</i> arises just after five - <i>viññāṇas</i> which are the weakest and it is always weak; hence it associates only with different feeling toward every object.	
39	The first (<i>pañcadvāra-vajjana</i>) arises only once with an object what have not previously been taken by any consciousness, and the next (<i>manodvāra-vajjana</i>) anticipates the difference in task by diverting the flow of	The two <i>āvajjanas</i> have a little more strength than <i>santīraṇa</i> . they have no own powerful effort to produce <i>vipāka</i> . Those which arise depending on powerful <i>kamma</i> conditions etc., have the great power, and those	The statement “the next anticipates the difference” is not proper because the discrimination of <i>cittas</i> , powerful or not powerful, cannot be said through the <i>citta</i>

	consciousness to a different kind. So it is unable to enjoy the taste of the object in every way and are therefore it associates with only neutral feeling.	which arise depending on powerless <i>kamma</i> condition etc., have less power. Although there is such a condition, the <i>āvajjanas</i> are both actually less power being absent from <i>kammic</i> power and receiving a condition from the process of <i>vipāka</i> . Therefore, it always associates with only indifferent feeling.	just after arisen. But it can be said by means of own condition alone. Otherwise, <i>santīraṇa</i> also may has another function to perform. Indeed, this <i>citta</i> too alters thought-processes.
40	<i>Sabbathā</i> means by division according to unwholesome resultant, wholesome resultant, and <i>kiriya</i> .	The meaning of <i>sabbatha</i> should be understood in the way said before.	This division has been taken by only the word, “ <i>iccevaṃ</i> ”.
41	The total number of <i>Mahākusalacitta</i> is 15120, without taking pure types of <i>cittas (suddhika)</i> .	The total number of <i>Mahākusalacitta</i> is 19440, together with the 4,320 pure types of <i>cittas(suddhika)</i> .	<i>Mahākusalacittas</i> are to be called <i>ninyatādhipatika</i> (<i>cittas</i> being with permanent dominating factor). But, those do not have the permanent dominating factors like the higher moral <i>cittas</i> and Supramundane <i>cittas</i> .
42	<i>Mahāvipākacitta</i> cannot be multiplied by the door of <i>kamma (kammadvāra)</i> because they do not cause the arising of two communication (<i>viññatti</i>). They cannot be multiplied by	<i>mahāvipākacitta</i> cannot be multiplied by means of the conditions of meritorious deeds (<i>puññakiriyavatthu</i>), <i>kamma</i> and dominating factors (<i>adhipati</i>), because they never perform the function of giving (<i>dāna</i>), etc., the function of bodily	Vibhāvīnī’s explanation should be examined because it was said before that <i>kusala</i> is multiplied only through the triad of <i>kamma</i> , but not through the <i>kammadvāra</i>

	<i>kamma</i> because they do not produce the results.	action (<i>kāyakamma</i>), etc., and they do not depend on <i>chanda</i> , etc.	separately. The triad of <i>kamma</i> (<i>kammatika</i>) exist only through the threefold <i>kamma</i> door.
43	In <i>mahākiriya</i> citta, the accompaniment of happiness etc., for the great functional consciousness should be understood by the way in the wholesome consciousness.	In <i>mahākiriya</i> citta, the division of feeling (<i>vedanābheda</i>) will be said by himself later only through object like in the <i>mahāvīpāka</i> . However, the division concerning with the association with knowledge, the dissociation from knowledge, the absence of <i>saṅkhāra</i> and being with <i>saṅkhāra</i> , should be known as said in <i>kusala</i> .	Without examining such meaning, Vibhāvinī states that the accompaniment of happiness etc., for the great functional consciousness should be understood by the way in the wholesome consciousness. It is not reasonable
44	The word “ <i>sahetuka</i> ” of “ <i>sahetukakāmāvacara-kusalaivīpākakiriya</i> cittāni”, modifies the words <i>vīpāka</i> and <i>kiriya</i> because <i>kusala</i> is indeed itself <i>sahetuka</i> . it is to be regarded in accordance with possibility (<i>yathālābha</i>) as in example “stones and pebbles and shoals of fish wandering and standing” since moving about of stones and pebbles make no sense, the activity of wandering is to be regarded with shoals of fish.	The word <i>sahetuka</i> of <i>sahetukakāmāvacara-kusalavīpākakiriya</i> cittāni, if it relates with the word “ <i>kusala</i> ”, is a qualifier of <i>bhūtakathana</i> (revealing as it is). For that reason, it has not been mentioned in minor conclusion of <i>kusala</i> . If it realates with the words “ <i>vīpāka</i> and <i>kiriya</i> ” it is to be regarded as a qualifier of <i>byavacchedaka</i> (excluding).	There is no resemblance between them. There it is suitable for that stone and pebbles are not wandering” but it is not suitable for that <i>kusala</i> is not <i>sahetuka</i> .
45	The division of feeling is appropriated because feelings are different by nature. The knowledge and prompting are not different by nature. Then,	<i>Vedanābheda</i> means that through the division of citta which is clear by the division of feeling. <i>Ñāṇābhedenā</i> means through the division of	It is the quality of the compound words (<i>samāsa</i>) that they can describe the various meanings known

	how is their division? The answer is that the division depends on the presence or absence of knowledge and prompting. It should be understood as in example that plenty and famine depends on rain. Therefore, the division of knowledge and prompting is reasonable and no inconsistency.	citta which is clear by association with and dissociation from knowledge. <i>Saṅkhārabhedena</i> means that through the division of citta which is clear by the unity of condition without or with <i>saṅkhāra</i> .	easily through a few words. There is needless to have supposition in Vibhāvinī.
46	<i>Sabbathā</i> : all together, by internal division of wholesome, unwhole-some, resultants and functional, there are just fifty-four consciousness, although they are innumerable by division of time, place and individual consciousness continuity; this is the meaning.	In the word <i>sabbathā</i> , the word “ <i>pi</i> ” is omitted the meaning of it was mentioned before. They are only fifty-four in all aspects as said in Dhammasaṅgaṇī; they are only fifty-four in all aspects as classified in Vibhaṅga and so on.	
47	<i>Kāme</i> means <i>bhave</i> .	<i>Kāme</i> means <i>kāma-bhūmiyaṃ</i> .	The word ‘ <i>bhava</i> ’ in <i>Abhidhamma</i> and <i>suttanta</i> is different. It should be defined specifically.
48	All <i>jhānas</i> are not to be said <i>asaṅkhārikas</i> because they do not arise by a right (<i>adhikāra</i>) alone without preparation (<i>parikamma</i>).	If all <i>jhānas</i> , mundane or supramundane, have easy ways (<i>sukhapaṭipadā</i>) it has already said to be <i>asaṅkhārika</i> .	The preparation (<i>parikamma</i>) is not to be regarded as <i>saṅkhāra</i> in division of <i>saṅkhāra</i> and the preparation is an original condition which brings about <i>jhānas</i> .

49	All <i>jhānasa</i> are not to be said as <i>sasaṅkhārika</i> because they do not arise by the preparatory practice (<i>abhisāṅkhāra</i>) alone without a right (<i>adhikāra</i>).	If they have difficult ways (<i>dukkhapaṭipadā</i>), it has already been said to be <i>sasaṅkhārika</i> .	It cannot be said that the mundane <i>jhāna</i> does not arise without <i>adhikāra</i> .
50	On the other hand, <i>jhāna</i> is not said as <i>asaṅkhārika</i> because the state of <i>asaṅkhārika</i> is never found nor <i>sasaṅkhārika</i> because it is surely being <i>sasaṅkhārika</i>	If all <i>jhānas</i> , mundane or supramundane, have easy ways (<i>sukhapaṭipadā</i>) it has already said to be <i>asaṅkhārika</i> . If they have difficult ways (<i>dukkhapaṭipadā</i>), it has already been said to be <i>sasaṅkhārika</i> .	It is reasonable to examine such a division only through the nearby conditions in the <i>jhāna kusala</i> and <i>kiriya</i> .
52	<i>Jhānabeda</i> means by division according to the combinations of five, four, three, two, and again two <i>jhāna</i> - factor.	<i>Jhānabedena</i> means through the division of association with five <i>jhānas</i> beginning with the first <i>jhāna</i> .	The division of <i>jhāna</i> is one thing. The division of <i>jhāna</i> factor is another. Only division of <i>jhāna</i> is necessary here, not the division of <i>jhāna</i> factor
53	<i>Pañcadhā</i> means that it is uniformly five kinds, having five factors, four factors, three factors, two factors, and again two factors.	<i>Pañcadhā</i> means five-fold through the division of <i>jhānascitta</i> that associated with the first <i>jhāna</i> , associated with second <i>jhāna</i> , associated with the third <i>jhāna</i> , associated with fourth <i>jhāna</i> and associated with the fifth <i>jhāna</i> ; thus, it is five-fold	Only <i>jhāna</i> which has five factors, etc., not <i>citta</i> .
54	<i>viññāṇaṅca</i> is what one should incline towards or arrive at by the second formless consciousness. The <i>viññāṇaṅca</i> is <i>viññāṇaṅcāyatana</i> because it	The word <i>viññāṇaṅcāyatana</i> , <i>viññāṇa</i> is only <i>ākāsāṇaṅcāyatana</i> . The <i>viññāṇa</i> is called <i>ananta</i> ‘infinite’ because it is being on infinite space although it	Vibhāvīnī’s explanation does not accord with the following Pāli. It is said that “ <i>anantaṃ viññāṇaṃ</i> means to

	is being the support of the <i>second</i> formless consciousness.	has limit beginning with arising. <i>Viññāṇānanta</i> is used as <i>viññāṇaṅca</i> according to the grammatical method. <i>Viññāṇaṅcāyatana</i> is a <i>jhānā</i> that has an infinite mind as its ground	only that <i>viññāṇa</i> a yogi pays attention discerning by knowledge and wide it with the intention of infinity. For this reason, it is called <i>anantaṃviññāṇaṃ</i> ”
55, 56	[55] The one who reaches the stream of being noble persons at first earlier than <i>sakadāgāmi</i> etc., is called <i>sotāpatti</i> . It is a person. [56] The path of the person is called <i>sotāpattimagga</i> .	A person attains that <i>sota</i> through the practice at the very beginning, so it is called <i>sotāpatti</i> . It is either <i>sotāpatti</i> or <i>magga</i> , so it is called <i>sotāpattimagga</i> .	[55] The word, <i>sotāpatti</i> , which describes a person cannot be found anywhere. [56] in this meaning, the statement “The path of the person is called <i>sotāpattimagga</i> ” is also rejected.
57	The path-consciousness obtained by entering the stream is <i>sotāpattimaggacitta</i> .	<i>Sotāpattimaggacitta</i> is a <i>citta</i> which associates with the <i>sotāpattimagga</i> .	The word ‘ <i>sotāpatti</i> ’ that connects with the word ‘ <i>citta</i> ’ is not found in any Pāli text.
58	The once-returner is one who returns to the world of humans by way of rebirth only one more time.	<i>Sakadāgāmī</i> is one who is in the habit of coming once to this world as being born.	The meaning of the word “to this world [<i>imaṃ lokam</i>]” is given in two ways in commentaries: to this human world or to this <i>kāma</i> world.
59	A person of the path of once-returner (<i>sakadāgāmimagga</i>) is not possible to return once to this human world, so only a person of the fruit of once-returner (<i>sakad-</i>	<i>Sakadāgāmimagga</i> is a path which belongs to the person of once-returner. That path, being itself a “producing” (<i>janaka</i>), brings about the “produced” (<i>janetabba</i>) that	Vibhāvinī has the idea that to be “qualifier and qualified” is not reasonable. It is not good.

	<i>āgāmiphala</i>) is called “ <i>sakadāgāmi</i> ”. although being so, in order to exclude the other paths, by meaning of the fruit of it (<i>magga</i>), the path is called <i>sakad-āgāmimagga</i> .	belongs to the person of “once-returner”. So, to be “qualifier and qualified” is reasonable here by relating as “produced” and “producing” like these terms <i>tissa mātā</i> , <i>phussassa mātā</i> etc	
60	The meaning of “ <i>pi</i> ” is explained at the end of <i>kusalacitta</i> .	The meaning of “ <i>pi</i> ” is explained at the end of <i>vipākacitta</i> .	The meaning of “ <i>pi</i> ” is described in Commentary to be explained only in the place of <i>vipāka</i> .
61	The division of the <i>maggacittas</i> is explained without referring to the <i>paṭipadā</i> at beginning.	The division of the <i>maggacittas</i> is explained with referring to the <i>paṭipadā</i> at beginning.	In Pāli text, the division of <i>paṭipadā</i> is mentioned only at the beginning.
62	The division of the <i>maggacittas</i> is first simply divided into two as <i>suññata</i> and <i>appaṇihita</i> ; by applying in addition the four kinds of practice, each one is divided into four, giving a total division of ten according to <i>jhāna</i>	Regarding the division of the <i>maggacittas</i> , there are nine <i>cittas</i> in the first section of <i>suddhika-paṭipadā</i> out of the five sections of <i>jhāna</i> in the two ways – four sets and five sets (<i>catukka</i> and <i>pañcaka</i>)	The <i>suññata</i> etc., are not a way here. Indeed, only these two ways, tetrad and pentad (<i>catukka</i> and <i>pañcaka</i>) - are to be a way here in each of them.
63	The nine <i>lokuttara-dhamma</i> that are not included (<i>apariyāpanna</i>) anywhere, are stated as the consciousness in unsurpassed (<i>anuttare citta</i>) like the branch of tree.	<i>Anuttara</i> is the stage of supramundane. And it is two-fold; the stage of conditioned things (<i>saṅkhatabhūmi</i>) and the stage of unconditioned things (<i>asaṅkhata-bhūmi</i>).	<i>Bhūmi</i> is twofold: the moment (<i>avatthā</i>) and the locality (<i>okāsa</i>). Of them, only the moment is regarded as real <i>bhūmi</i> , not other.
65	Either <i>pathamajjhāna</i> or <i>sotāpattimagga</i> is called <i>pamajjhāna-sotāpattimagga</i>	<i>Sotāpattimagga</i> which associates with first <i>jhāna</i> endowed with five factors is called	<i>Jhāna</i> is not a <i>citta</i> and <i>citta</i> is no <i>jhāna</i> as well. <i>Jhāna</i> is one thing and <i>citta</i> is one thing.

		<i>pathamajjhānasotāpattimagga</i> .	
66	It is [<i>lokuttara</i>] first <i>jhāna</i> because it is similar to the [<i>lokiya</i>] first <i>jhāna</i> by means of <i>jhāna</i> factors.	The supramundane <i>jhāna</i> directly obtains the name of first <i>jhāna</i> by itself as it has five factors of <i>jhāna</i> .	it is impossible to say that the supramundane <i>jhāna</i> with five factors is to be called the first <i>jhāna</i> due to being similar to the first <i>jhāna</i> .
67	The four <i>maggas</i> get the name of <i>pathamajjhā</i> etc., with the appearance of the factors of <i>vitakka</i> ect.		The <i>magga</i> are not to be called <i>pathamajjhāna</i> etc. <i>Magga</i> is one thing and <i>jhāna</i> is one thing
68	If there is no particular <i>jhāna</i> which is foundation of <i>vipassana</i> , one produces the <i>magga</i> just by observing one of the five <i>jhānas</i> . The <i>magga</i> is similar to the observed <i>jhāna</i> . This is <i>sammasitajhāna</i> .	If one of the <i>jhāna</i> , <i>pādakajjhāna</i> , or the others, is contemplated. If it is the first <i>jhāna</i> , the <i>vipassana</i> is only usual. If it is the second, the <i>vipassana</i> has an ability to remove <i>vitakka</i> . It can define the <i>jhāna</i> to be absent from <i>vitakka</i> . The same way in the rest contemplated <i>jhānas</i> as well. This is <i>sammasitajhānavāda</i> .	The statement “there is no particular <i>jhāna</i> which is foundation of <i>vipassana</i> ” is not fit to commentary.
69	Having emerged from some lower <i>pādakaj-jhāna</i> , one has observed the <i>dhammas</i> of some higher <i>jhāna</i> , the <i>magga</i> he attains is similar to the observed <i>jhāna</i> , paying no attention to the <i>pādakajjhāna</i> ”.	The <i>pādakajjhāna</i> alone can make thought-process to be distinct	The observed <i>jhāna</i> , which is just object, although it is higher, should not be more stronger than the <i>pādakajjhāna</i> .
70	Having emerged from some higher <i>pādakaj-jhāna</i> and having observed the		It is also rejected because the <i>pādakajjhāna</i> is more

	<p><i>dhammas</i> of some lower <i>jhāna</i>, the <i>magga</i> one attained is similar to the <i>pādakajjhāna</i>, paying no attention to observed <i>jhāna</i> because the higher <i>jhānas</i> are stronger than lower <i>jhānas</i></p>		<p>powerful not because of being higher stage, but because of being the foundation.</p>
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Appendix II

Note: brief biography of the author of these texts is mentioned in chapter one, 1. 6.

1. *Abhidhammatthavibhāvinī* (P. 75)

Bhavābhavaṃ vinanato saṃsibbanato vānasaṅkhātāya taṇhāya nikkhantaṃ, nibbāti vā etena rāgaggiādikoti nibbānaṃ.

“nibbāna” is that which is liberated from craving named as “vāna” as it stitches and fasten existence and great-existence, or “nibbāna” is that by which greed-fire etc., are extinguished.

2. *Maṇisāramañjūsāṭṭikā* (P. 137)

Bhavābhavanti duggatisugativasena hīnapaṇītavasena ca khuddakaṃ, mahantañca bhavanti attho. Vuddhyatthopi hi akāro dissati “asekkhā dhammā” ti ādīsu viya. Tasmā abhāvoti mahābhavo vuccati. Vinanatoti etena bhavābhavaṃ vinati heṭṭhupariyavasena saṃsibbatīti vānanti atthaṃ dasseti. Nikkhantanti visayātikkanavasena atītaṃ. “vānanī” ti vattabbe “tadanuparodhenā”ti paribhāsato vaṇṇāgamo vaṇṇavipariyayoti vuttaniruttinayena pubbāparānaṃ vipariyayavasena “nibbāna”nti vuttaṃ.

Nibbātīti vūpasamati accantanirodhena nirujjhati. Etenāti padena. Ādisaddena dosamohajātījarāmarañaggiādayo dasaggayo saṅgaṇhāti. Ettha ca paṭhamavikappe “vī saṃsibbane”ti dhātu. Vānasaddo kattusādhano. Nibbānasaddo ca pa ñcamītappurisasamāso. Dutiyavikappe “vā gatigandhanesūti vuttepi “ane katthā hi dhātavo”ti vuttattā “nipubbo vā vūpasame”ti dhātu. Nibbānasaddo ca

karaṇasādhanoti viseso veditabbo. (Maṇisāramañjūsāṭṭhikā, P 137).
(Nissaya P, 255)

Existence and great-existence (Bhavābhava) mean the existence of either small or great on account of bad or good destination and inferior or superior as well. Indeed, the letter “a” appears in the sense of great too as in example such as “the phenomena of no-more-training” [i.e those of Arahanta] etc. Therefore, the great-existence is said as “*Abhava*”. By the word “vinanato”, he [i.e. the author] shows the meaning of “vāna” as that which stitches the existence and great-existence, it sews [them] on account of being in state of low and high. Transcendent (*nikkhanta*) means gone by on account of being beyond the objects. Though it should be said as “vānani”, it is said as “nibbāna” due to transposition of former and latter speech-sounds on account of the philological rule, namely “Insertion and metathesis”, on the basis of the meta-rule “tadanuparodhena” (Kacc 56. See Kacc-v ad Kacc 56 yathā yathā tesam jīnavacanānaṃ anuparodho¹⁵, tathā tathā idha līngaṇca nippajjate. Here, the base should be formed in such a way that it does not contradict the Word of the Conqueror.)

Vanishes (*nibbāti*) means extinguished, is destroyed through complete destruction. By that (*etena*) means by [that] word [i.e. *nibbāna*]. By the word “and so on” (*ādisaddena*) he includes the ten kinds of fire, namely greed, ignorance, birth, decay, dead-fire etc. Furthermore, here, in the first definition, the meaning of root “vī” is to stitch. The word “vāna” is in the sense of agent and the word “nibbāna” is Pañcamītappurisa-compound [i.e. a compound expressing a relation of ablative]. In the second definition, even though the meaning of the root “vā” should be “to go” and “to show”, the meaning of the root “vā”, with “ni” prefix, is “to extinguish”, because of the saying “the roots have several meanings”. The

word nibbāna should be understood in the specific sense of the “means expressed by an instrument” (karaṇasādhana).

3. *Paramatthadīpanī* (P. 31)

Nibbānanti ettha nibbāyanti sabbe vaṭṭadukkhasantāpā etasminti nibbānaṃ. Nibbāyantīti ye kilesā vā khandhā vā abhāvitamaggassa āyatim uppajjanāhārapakkhe ṭhitā honti. Teyeva bhāvitamaggassa anuppajjanārahapakkhaṃ pāpuṇantīti attho. Na hi khaṇattayaṃ patvā niruddhā atītadhammā nibbāyanti nāma. Paccuppannesu āyatim avassaṃ uppajjamānesu ca dhammesu vattabbam eva natthīti.

Vaṭṭadukkhasantāpāti kilesavaṭṭa kammavaṭṭa vipākavaṭṭa dukkhasantāpā. Na hi tividhavaṭṭadukkhasantāparahitānaṃ rukkhādīnaṃ anuppādanirodho nibbānaṃ nāma hotīti. Etasmin ti visaye bhumbaṃ. Yathā ākāse sakuṇā pakkhantīti. Ye hi te nibbāyanti. Tesaṃ tabbinimuttaṃ aññaṃ nibbutiṭṭhānaṃ nāma kiñci natthīti. Nibbāyanti vā ariyajanā etasminti nibbānaṃ. “nibbanti dhīrā yathayaṃ padīpo”ti hi vuttaṃ. Nibbāyantīti taṃ taṃ kilesānaṃ vā khandhānaṃ vā puna appaṭisandhikabhāvaṃ pāpuṇantīti attho.

Etasminti visaye eva bhumbaṃ. Etasmiṃ adhigatetiyo yojenti. ṭikāsu pana “bhavābhavaṃ vinanato saṃsibbanato vānaṃ vuccati taṇhā. Tato nikkhanti nibbānanti vuttaṃ. vibhāvanīyaṃ pana “nibbāti vā etena rāgaggiādikoti nibbāna”ntipi vuttaṃ. Taṃ na sundaraṃ. Na hi magge viya nibbāne katthaci karaṇasādhanaṃ diṭṭhaṃ. Na ca nibbānaṃ nibbūtikriyāsādhane rāgādikassa kattuno sahakāripaccayo hotīti. (Dīpanī, P 31)

(P. 51) In the definition of “*nibbāna*”, Nibbāna means that in which all grief and sufferings of cyclic existence are extinguished. They are extinguished, i.e. those defilements and aggregates that are there in the side of those phenomena that have not arisen but have the possibility to arise, later on, in a person who is not developed in the path. Those defilements and aggregates reach the side of impossibility to arise in a person who is developed in the path. This is the meaning. (Because extinguishment does not mean the disappearance of past-phenomenon having reached three moments.) because the past-phenomena which cease having reached three moments, do not mean extinguishment. For (ti) that is needless to say about the present-phenomena and future-phenomena which certainly will arise in the future.

The griefs and sufferings of cycle of existence are, namely, sufferings and griefs pertaining to cycle of defilement [i.e. passion], the cycle of action and the cycle of effect. Because we cannot call *nibbāna* the extinction of those things, like trees, etc. that are unable to reappear in the future and are free from the griefs and sufferings of the threefold cycle of existence.

In that [i.e. Nibbāna] *etasmim* is locative in the sense of sphere, as in the sentence “the birds fly in the sky”. For, with regard to those which are [already] extinguished, there is no other sphere for extinction apart from that in which they have already been extinguished. Alternatively, *nibbāna* is that in which noble people are extinguished. For it has been stated: “the wise men extinguish as the light ceases”. The extinguish means that those defilements and those aggregates reach the state of absence of further-rebirth. This is the meaning. In that (*nibbāna*) is locative in sense of sphere only. They are also connected as in that obtained.

However, there had been said in the Sub-commentaries thus “craving (taṇhā) is called the sewing (vāna) as it stitches and fasten to existence and great-existence. Nibbāna is that which has liberated from that of sewing (vāna).

However, it also had been said in the vibhāvini thus “or “nibbāna” is that by which greed-fire etc., are extinguished”. It is not good. Because instrumental sense cannot be seen in “nibbāna” somewhere else unlike in the path (magga) and “nibbāna” is not a state of condition which co-operates with the agent of greed etc., for the action of extinguishment.

4. *Anudīpanī* (P. 41)

16. *Nibbānapade. ‘Khandhāvā’*ti bhavantare apāyādīsu bhavissamānā khandhāvā. Na hi atīta dhammā, nibbāyanti nāma, satte pīletvā niruddhattāti adhippāyo. Paccuppannā ca dhammā etarahi pīlenti, avassaṃ uppajjamānā anāgatadhammā ca anāgate pīlessanti, kathaṃ te nibbāyanti nāmāti āha ‘paccuppannesu...pe... vattabbameva natthī’

‘*Visaye bhumma’*nti visayādhāre bhummaṃ. Visayādhāro nāma manussā bhūmiyaṃ gacchantīti ādīsu viya mukhyādhāro na hoti. Tena pana vinā aññattha taṃ kiriyam kātuṃ na sakkoti. Tasmā ādhārabhāvena parikappito ādhāroti dassetuṃ ‘yathā ākāse’

*tiādivuttaṃ. Yathā sakuṇānaṃ pakkhanakiriyānāma ākāsenā vinā aññattha nasijjhati. Tathā vaṭṭadukkhadhammānaṃ nibbutikiriyāpi nibbānena vinā aññattha nasijjhatīti dassetuṃ ‘ye hi te’*tiādimāha. Tattha ‘ye’*ti ye tividhavaṭṭadukkhasantāpadhammā. Hisaddonipāto. Te saddo vacanālaṅkāro.*

“Tabbinimutta”nti nibbānavinimuttaṃ nibbutiṭhānaṃ nāma natthi. Tasmā nibbānaṃ tesam nibbuti kiriyāya visayā dhārohotīti adhippāyo. Yathā ayam padīpo nibbāyati. Tathā dhīrā nibbantīti yojanā. “Taṃ taṃ kilesānaṃ vā”ti tesam tesam kilesānaṃ vā. “Khandhānaṃ vā”ti anāgatabhavesu khandhānaṃ vā. “Puna appaṭisandhikabhāva”nti santānassa puna paṭisandhānābhāvaṃ pāpuṇanti ariyā janā. Yathā magge karaṇavacanaṃ dissati addhā imāyapaṭipattiyā jarāmarāṇamhā parimuccissāmītiādīsu. Na tathā nibbāneti āha “maggeviyā”tiādīṃ.

Nibbāne pana bhummavacanameva dissati yattha nāmañca rūpañca asesam uparujjhatītiādīsu. Tasmā nibbāne karaṇa vacanaṃ na dissati, karaṇa lakkhaṇasseva abhāvatoti dassetuṃ “na ca nibbāna”ntiādī vuttaṃ. Karaṇalakkhaṇaṃ nāma kattuno sahakārī paccayabhāvo. Nanu anupādisesāya nibbānadhātuyā nibbāyantīti dissatīti. Saccam, tattha pana visesane karaṇa vacanaṃ. Na karaṇakārake. Tañhi saupādisesanibbānadhātuyā nivattanatthaṃ vuttanti. (Anudīpanī, P 41)

In the regard to the word “nibbāna”, aggregates too (khandhā vā) mean the aggregates too which would be in woeful state etc., in next existences. Because the past-phenomena do not mean extinguishment as they ceased having tortured living beings. This is implied meaning. The present-phenomena too torture now and the future-phenomena too which would be, will certainly torture in the future. How do they mean extinguishment? For such question, it is said that “paccuppannesu...pe...vattabbameva nttīti”. For (ti) that is needless to say about the present-phenomena and future-phenomena which certainly will arise in the future.

“Locative in the sense of sphere” means locative in sense of sphere which is support. The sphere which is support doesn’t mean the main

supporter like in example such as “human beings go on the ground” etc. however, it is unable to do an action in somewhere else without supporter. Therefore, it had said as “like in the sky” etc., in order to show that the supporter is presumption on account of being supporter”.

It is said “ye hi te” etc., in order to show that as the action of wind by the birds could not be accomplished in somewhere else without sky, in the same way, the extinguishment of phenomena and sufferings in cycle too could not be accomplished in somewhere else without “nibbāna”. In the sentence, “ye” refers to the griefs and sufferings of phenomena in threefold cycle. The word “hi” is indeclinable particle. The word “te” is adorn the speech.

“Apart from that” means that there is no sphere for extinction apart from “nibbāna”. Therefore “nibbāna” is the sphere which is support for the action of extinguishing of those. [i.e those griefs and sufferings of phenomena in threefold cycle]. This is implied meaning. As the flame of the lamp extinguishes, so do the wise men.

This is connected meaning. “taṃ taṃ kilesānaṃ vā” means “tesaṃ tesaṃ kilesānaṃ vā”. “of aggregates too” means “of the aggregates too in future-existences”. “the state of absence of further-rebirth” means that the noble people attain the absence of state of further-rebirth in the continuity. As there is seen instrumental sense in the path like in the example such as “may I free from aging and death by the power of this noble practice” etc., there is not like in the nibbāna. Therefore, it is said “like in path” etc.

However, there is seen only locative case in the nibbāna as in the example such as “where mind and matter completely ceases” etc.

Therefore, it had said “nibbāna is not” etc, in order to show that the instrumental case is not seen in the nibbāna because of absence of the feature of instrumental. The feature of instrumental is condition-state which cooperate with the agent. It is not true or do you not see that (they) extinguish by the element of nibbāna without remaining any substratum” etc. it is true, however in that, the instrumental case is in the specific sense, not in the instrumental factor. Because it had said in order to excluded the element of nibbāna with remaining substratum.

5. *Aṅkuraṭṭikā* (P. 19)

(25) nibbanti ariyapuggalā etthāti nibbānaṃ. Yathāha nibbanti dhīrā yathayaṃ padīpoti. Nibbantīti puna appaṭisandhikabhāvaṃ pāpuṇanti. Athavā bhavābhavaṃ vinati saṃsibbatīti vānaṃ. Taṇhā. Vānato nikkhantaṃ nibbānaṃ. Natthi vānaṃ etthāti vā nibbānaṃ. Nibbanti rāgaggiādayo etenāti vā nibbānaṃ. Etenāti asaṅkhatadhammajātena hetubhūtena. Na karaṇabhūtena. Na hi nibbānaṃ nibbutikriyāsādhane rāgādikattuno sahakārīpaccayo hoti. Evaṅca sati karaṇabhāvopi natthi.

Tena vuttaṃ saḷāyatanaṣaṃyuttaṭṭhakathāyaṃ... taṇhakkhayapaccayattā taṇhakkhayoti. Ettāvatā sīhaḷaṭṭikāyaṃ nibbāti vā etena rāgaggiādikoti nibbānanti yaṃ vuttaṃ. Tattha etenāti asaṅkhatadhammajātena karaṇabhūtenāti atthaṃ kappetvā rāgādikattuno asahakārīpaccayattāti karaṇāsambhavahetuṃ dassetvā kesaṅci paṭikkhepo. Tattha aññaṃ kāraṇaṃ natthi ṭhapetvā takkāraṣa ābhogamaṃpāpetvā vitakkaṇaṃ aṭṭhakathāpāṭhāpassanaṅcāti dassito hoti.
(26) nibbānasacchikiriyaṃ nāma idha arahattaphalaṃ adhippetanti vuttepi tassa citte pariyāpannattā taṃ idha nādhippetam.

Maggaphalānamārammaṇabhūto asaṅkhatadhammova adhippeto.
(*Aṅkuraṭṭkā Pāḷi, P 19*)

Nibbāna is that in which noble people extinguish. The example has been said thus “the wise men extinguish as the light ceases”. “they extinguish” means they attain the state of absence of further-rebirth. Alternatively, that which stitches i.e. sews the existence and great-existence, is “vānā”, i.e. craving. “nibbāna” is that which is liberated from craving, or “nibbāna” is that in which there is no craving, or “nibbāna” is that by which greed-fire etc., are extinguished. “by which” is by that which is unconditioned that is a cause, not the instrumental. Because “nibbāna” is not a condition which cooperate with agent of greed-fire etc., in accomplish of action of extinguishment. And that being so, there is no nature of instrumental. Therefore, it has been stated in the commentary of Saḷāyatanaṣaṃyutta thus “the extinction of craving is because of conditionality in extinction of craving”.

To that extent, it has been stated in the Sīhala Sub-commentary thus “or “nibbāna” is that by which greed-fire etc., are extinguished”. In this regard, some scholars consider the meaning of “by which” as “by the nature of instrumental which is unconditioned” and they have shown the cause of not being instrumental because of conditionality which is not cooperating with agent of greed-fire etc... they have rejected.

In this regard, it should be commended thus there is no other reason apart from consideration after not reaching the opinion of the author and unawareness of commentary text. Though it has been stated that the experiencing nibbāna is herein, implied the fruit of Arahanship, it is not implied that [i.e. the fruit of Arahanship] because it includes in the list of

consciousness. It should imply only the element of unconditioned which is the object of paths and fruits.

6. *Decree Tīkā (P. 11)*

(26) chabbīsātime dutiye nibbānapadavaṇṇanāyaṃ nibbāti etena rāgaggi ādikoti nibbānanti yaṃ vuttaṃ tathā pañcame. Taṃ catutthe etenāti padassakaraṇattham gahetvā taṃ na sundaranti vuttaṃ. Pañcame pana hetvatthe gayhamāme hetusādhanam nāma dassetabbaṃ. Na ca atthi. Yasmā ca hetubhūtena nibbānena rāgaggiādiko nibbātīti atthe sati nibbānassa sabbadāpi atthitāya rāgaggiādipi sabbadāeva nibbāyeyya. Sūriyālokena andhatamo viya. Na ca nibbāti. Sutte ca avijjā ca taṇhā ca taṃ āgamma tamhi khīṇam tamhi baggaṃ na kiñci na ca kadāciti hi vuttaṃ. Tasmā catutthavacanameva sundaranti.

Chattīṃsatime momūhacittavaṇṇanāyaṃ. Imāni pana dve cittāni mūlantaravirahato atisammulhatāya saṃsappanavikkhīpan vasena pavatta vicikicchauddhacca samāyogena cañcalatāya ca sabbatthāpi rajjana dussanarahitāni upekkhāsahagatāneva pavattantīti yaṃ dutiye vuttaṃ. Taṃ catutthe taṃ na sundaranti vuttaṃ. Taṃ tatheva hoti pañcame pana yenapi taṃ vipphaṇṇārahitānīti ādinā karaṇam vuttaṃ. Tampi na sundaram. Kadāci vipphaṇṇārahitānampi dosamūlacittānam domanasseneva sahatattā. Yadā hi rājādayo hasamāmo va cora vadaṃpesenti. Attano verīnam maraṇe tuṭṭhiṃ pavedenti. Migapakkhino mārenti tadāpi tāni domanasseneva sahatānīti. Yañca tathha upatthambhana vacanam vuttaṃ. Tampi na sundaram. Tathha hi rajjanam nāma ragassa sabhāvo rāgopi vā. Dussanañca nāma dosassa sabhāvo dosopi vā. Tāni pana somanassadomanassehi sahatatthā. Na somanassadomanassānam kāraṇāti honti.

In the regarding to twenty-sixth, in the definition of nibbāna, that which has been stated in the second commentary [i.e. Abhidhammatthavibhāviniṭṭikā], namely “nibbāna is that by which greed-fire etc., are extinguished”, similarly it has stated in the fifth commentary [i.e. Aṅkuraṭṭikā]. Therefore, it has said thus “it is not good”, having taken instrumental sense of the word “by that” in the fourth commentary [i.e. Paramatthadīpanī]. However, it is shown in fifth commentary, which is expressing a relation of the cause (hetusādhana) sine it has taken in the sense of cause. Actually, there is no. [i.e. no hetusādhana].

Since there is the meaning of that “greed-fire etc., extinguish because of nibbāna which functions of the cause”, the greed-fire etc., too would extinguish forever because nibbāna exists forever in the example that the darkness disappears due to the sun-light. Actually, it doesn't extinguish. Indeed, it has been said in the Sutta too thus “on reaching that [i.e. nibbāna], ignorance and desire exhausted on account of that [i.e. nibbāna], are destroyed on account of that [nibbāna], there is no tiny thing [of them, i.e. ignorance and desire] at any time.” Therefore, only the speech of the forth is good.

7. *Vibhāvinīyojanā* (P. 60)

Bhavābhavaṃ vāyati saṃsibbatīti vānaṃ tāhnā. Tato nikkhantaṃ nibbānati dassento āha “bhavābhava”ntyādi. Bhavo cettha khuddakabhavo. Abhavo mahanta bhavo. Vuddhi attho hi a-kāro “asekkhā dhammā, tyādīsu viya. Ve tantasantāne, tañca saṃsibbananti” dassento “saṃsibbanato”ti āha. Vānamīti saṅkhātā vānasaṅkhātā. Nikkhamatīti nikkhantaṃ nibbānaṃ. Tañhi visayā tikkamavasena taṇhāya nikkhamati.

Etena asaṅkhatena rāgaggiādiko nibbāti vūpasamatīti nibbānaṃ. Nibbāṇanti panettha yuttataraṃ. Ni pubbo vā dhātu, karaṇasādhanam kiñcāpi nibbānaṃ nibbutikriyasādhane ragaggiādikassa kattuno sahakārippaccayo na hoti. Pariyāyato panetaṃpi sahakārippaccayabhūtaṃ maggassa ārammaṇattā “maggoviya, sahakārippaccayo hotīti veditabbaṃ. Ta mevattamaṃ sandhāya sakkapañhasuttaṭṭhakathāyaṃ vuttaṃ “nibbānaṃ yasmā ta māgama taṇhā saṅkhayati vinassati, tasmā taṇhāsaṅkhayo”ti. (vibhāvinī yojanā, P 60)

The author, showing that of “that which stitches i.e. sews the existence and great-existence is “vānā”, i.e. craving and “nibbāna” is that which is liberated from craving”, says “bhavābhavaṃ” etc., herein, “bhava” is small existence. “abhava” is great-existence. Because “a” letter has the sense of great as in example such as “the phenomena of no-more-training” [i.e. those of Arahanta] etc. The author who shows that of “ve√ to string and continuity. It is to stitches” says that “as it stitches etc.” That which is named as “vāna” is called “vāna”. (“vānasāṅkhā” means that which is called “vāna”, desire) That which is liberated is liberation, i.e. “nibbāna”. Because the liberation [i.e. nibbāna] liberated from craving on account of being beyond the object.

Nibbāna is that by which i.e. unconditioned greed-fire etc., are extinguish, i.e. cease. The [spelling] “nibbāṇa” is here more proper. It is “vā” root with “ni” prefix, expressing relation of instrumental. Even though “nibbāna” is not a condition which cooperates with agent of greed-fire etc., in accomplishing action of extinguishment, however it should also be understood, figuratively, that it is the condition which cooperates with [the action], like the path, because of being object of the path which cooperates

with [action]. With the regard to only the meaning, it has been said in the commentary on sakkapañhasutta thus for craving is destruction, i.e. perished owing reaching to nibbāna, therefore nibbāna is “destruction of craving”.

8. *Mahāatulaṭīkāpāṭha* (P. 27)

Nibbānanti ettha bhavābhavaṃ vinati saṃsibbatīti vānaṃ. Taṇhā. Vānasāṅkhātāya taṇhāya nikkhantanti nibbānaṃ. Vānaṃ vuccati taṇhā. Sā tattha natthīti nibbānanti aṭṭhakathāsu vuttattā natthi vānaṃ etthāti nibbānaṃ. ṭīkāsu pana bhavābhavaṃ vinanato saṃsibbanato vānaṃ vuccati taṇhā. Tato nikkhantanti nibbānanti vuttaṃ. Vibhāvaniyaṃ pana nibbāti vā etena rāgaggiādikoti nibbānantipi vuttaṃ. Ayamassādhippāyo. Bhavābhavanti ādinā vī saṃsibbaneti dhātvatthāñca kattusādhanatthañca pañcamitappurisasamāsattāñca dassetvā idāni vā gatiganthanesūti vuttepi anekatthāhidhātavoti vuttatthā nipubbo vā vūpasmeti dhātvatthāñca karaṇasādhanāñca dassento āha nibbāti vā etenāti ādi. (18)

Dīpaniyaṃ pana na hi magge viya nibbāne katthci karaṇasādhanam diṭṭhanti vuttaṃ. Evampi diṭṭhatam gacchatiyeva. Yasmā pana nibbānam pañcasu tadaṅga-vikkhanbbana-samuccheda-paṭippassaddhi-nissaraṇappahānesu nissaraṇapahānaṃ hoti. Tasmā pahānikassa dhammassa karaṇasādhanabhāvo nanu sakkā bhavituṃ. Teneva hi kathāvatthumūlaṭīkāyaṃ yāya vā adhigatāya pacchimacittam appaṭisandhikam jātam. Sā tassa appaṭisandhikavūpasamassa karaṇabhāvena vuttāti vuttaṃ. Tathā hi kathāvutthuanuṭīkāyaṃ sā ti asaṅkhata dhātu karaṇabhāvena vuttā yathā vuttassa upasamassa sādhatamabhāvaṃ sandhāyāti vuttaṃ.

*Sakkapañhasuttavaṇṇanāyañca nibbānaṃ yasmā taṃ āgamma taṇhā sañkhīyati vinassati. Tasmā taṇhāsañkhayoti vuttaṃ. Tattha taṃ āgammāti etena karaṇasādhanampi dassetiyeva. Evaṃ sati nibbānēpi kātabbamevāti daṭṭhabbaṃ. *15 yañca tattha naca nibbānaṃ nibbutikriyāsādhane rāgādikassa kattuno sahakāripaccayo hotīti vuttaṃ. Evampi sūriyo tamaṃ hantvāti ādīsu viya taṃ paccayabhāvaṃ gacchatiyevāti daṭṭhabbaṃ. Mañisāramañjusāyaṃ pana nibbānasaddoca karaṇasādhanoti visesoti vuttaṃ. Taṃ aṭṭhakathāpāṭhāpassanañcāti dassito hoti. Keci pana nibbanti rāgaggiādayo etenāti vā nibbānaṃ. Etenāti asaṅkhataadhammajātena hetubhūtena. Na karaṇabhūtena. Na hi nibbānaṃ nibbuti kriyāsādhane rāgādikattuno sahakāripaccayo hoti. Evañca sati karaṇabhāvopi natthīti vadanti. Taṃ sabbaṃ na yujjatiyeva.*

Visuddhimaggatṭhakathāyaṃ pana attho pana sabbāneva etāni nibbānassa vevacanāni. Paramatthato hi dukkhanirodhaṃ ariyasaccanti nibbānaṃ vuccati. Yasmā pana taṃ āgamma taṇhā virajjati ceva nirujjhati ca. tasmā virāgoti ca nirodhotica vuccatīti vuttaṃ. Tattha taṃ āgammāti etena karaṇasādhanampi dasseti yevāti. Pāḷi-aṭṭhakathā-ṭīkāsu pana bahum taṃ āgammāti padaṃ dissanatoti alamtippapañcenāti. Nibbanti vā ariyapuggalā etthāti nibbānaṃ. Nibbanti dhīrāyathayaṃ padīpoti hi vuttaṃ. Nibbantīti punaappaṭisandhikabhāvaṃ pāpuṇanti. Nibbānasacchikriyānāma idha arahattaphalaṃ adhippetanti vuttepi tassa cite pariyāpannattā taṃ idnādhippetā. Maggaphānamālambaṇabhūto asaṅkhata dhammova adhippeto. (Mahāatulaṭṭhāpāṭha, 28)

In the regard to nibbāna, for it has been said in the commentaries that which sews i.e. stitches the existences and great-existence is called sewing (vāna) i.e. craving (taṇhā). Nibbāna is that which is liberated from craving, known as sewing. Sewing is said craving. The craving is not there.

Therefore, it is nibbāna., nibbāna is that in which there is no sewing(vāna). However, it has said in the sub-commentaries thus sewing is said craving because it sews i.e. stitches the existence and great-existence. Therefore, it has said thus nibbāna is that which is liberated form that [i.e. craving]. However, it has been said in the Vibhāvaniya thus nibbāna is that by which greed-fire etc., are extinguished. The following is the meaning. By “existence and great-existence” etc,

The author shows the meaning of root that vī is to stitch, the meaning of expressing a relation of agent, the meaning of Pañcamītappurisa-compound [i.e. a compound expressing a relation of ablative]. Though here it should be said the meaning of the root “vā” is to go and to show, the author who want to show the meaning of root that “vā”, with “ni” prefix, is “to extinguish”, because of the saying “the roots have several meaning”, the sense of instrumental, say “or by which extinguish” etc.

However, it has said in the Dīpanī that “because instrumental sense cannot be seen in “*nibbāna*” somewhere else unlike in the path (*magga*)”. Though being so, it certainly reaches the state of visibility. For that nibbāna is the overcoming by escape (*nissaraṇa-pahāna*) among five namely: overcoming by temporary, opposite, destruction, tranquillization and escape. Therefore, why should the state of instrumental sense not be possible for the nature of overcoming? For this reason, it has been said in the *Mulaṭīkā* of *Kathāvatthu* that the attainment by which the last consciousness becomes non-rebirth, is said as being instrumental for the extinguishment of non-rebirth consciousness. Indeed, it has said similarly in the *Anutīkā* that “*sā*” [that] implies the element of unconditioned [i.e. nibbana]. “speech of being instrumental” has been said to imply being a state of main supporter of the appeasement which has been said previously.

It has been said in the commentary on *Sakkapañhasutta* too that because *nibbāna* is that on account of which craving vanishes i.e. perishes, therefore, it is [called] “destruction of craving”. In the texts, instrumental sense too has been certainly shown by the clause “that on account of which”. That being so, it is understood that it is to be done in [the analysis of] “*nibbāna*” too. It is said in the *dīpanī* that “*nibbāna*” does not have the state of condition which co-operates with the agent of the action of extinguishing the fire of greed etc.

Though being so, it should be understood that it [i.e. *nibbāna*] certainly reaches the state of cause as in examples such as “the sun, having removed the darkness...” etc. however, it has said in the *Mañisāramañjūsā* that the word “*nibbāna*” is also in the specific sense of “the means expressed by an instrument”. It [i.e. this interpretation] is shown without any awareness of commentary text. However, some scholars say that “or “*nibbāna*” is that by which greed-fire etc., are extinguished. “by which” is by that which is unconditioned that is a cause, not the instrumental. Because “*nibbāna*” is not a condition which cooperate with agent of greed-fire etc., in accomplish of action of extinguishment. And that being so, there is no nature of instrumental. That all are not reasonable.

It has been said in the *Visuddhimagga* too that “those all are the synonyms of *nibbāna* according to the meaning. Nibbāna is said the noble truth of destruction of sufferings according to ultimate sense. For that on account of which desire loses and ceases, therefore it is said the absence of desire and cessation.” In the texts, *karaṇasādhana* is also certainly shown by the clause “that on account of which”. However, there is enough for much delay because the word “that on account of which” can be seen in cannon, commentary and sub-commentary. (*Paramatthavisodhanīṭikā*)

However, it is enough for much delaying because the word “that on account of which” can be seen in the Cannon, Commentary and Sub-commentary in plenty times. Alternatively, “*nbbāna*” is that in which noble people extinguish because it is said “the wise extinguish like the lamp ceases”. To extinguish [*nibbanti*] means to reach a state of no-more rebirth. Herein, though it is said that the experiencing *nibbāna* is intended as the fruit of arahant, it is not intended here because it belongs to the consciousness. Only unconditioned phenomenon which is the object of the paths and the fruits is intended.

9. *Paramatthavisodhanītikā* (P. 17)

Bhavābhavanti ādinā vi saṃsibbaneti dhātvatthañca kattusādhanatthañca pañcamītappurisa samāsatthañca dassetvā idāni vā gatigandhanesūti vuttepi anekatthā hi dhātavoti vuttattā nipubbo vā vūpasamehi dhātvatthañca karaṇasādhanañca dassento āha nibbāti vā etenāti ādi. Paramatthadīpaniyaṃ panaa na hi magge viya nabbāne katthaci karaṇasādhanaṃ diṭṭhanti vuttaṃ.

Evampi diṭṭhataṃ gacchatiyeva. Yasmā pana nibbānaṃ pañcasu tadanā vikkhambhana samuccheda paṭipassaddhi nissaraṇappahānesu nissaraṇappahānaṃ hoti. Tasmā pahānikassa dhammassa karaṇasādhanabhāvo na na sakkā bhavituṃ. Sakkapañhasuttavaṇṇanāyañca nibbānaṃ yasmā taṃ āgamma taṃhā saṅkhiyati vinassati. Tasmā taṃhāsaṅkhayo ti vuttaṃ. Tattha taṃ āgammāti etena karaṇasādhanampi dasseti yeva. Evaṃ sati nibbāne pi kātabbamevāti daṭṭhabbaṃ. Yañca tattha na ca nibbānaṃ nubbuti kriyā sādhanā rāgādikassa kattuno saḥkāri paccayo hotīti vuttaṃ. Evampi sūriyo tamaṃ hantvāti ādīsu viya taṃ paccayabhāvaṃ gacchatiyevāti.

Ettāvatā ca taṃ nasundaranti vacanaṃ visodhitaṃ hotīti. (10)
(Paramatthavisodhanīṭikā, 17).

Having shown the meaning of root that is vī to stitch, the sense of agent and pañcamī-tappurisa compounds by the word “bhavābhavaṃ”, the author showing the meaning of root that is vā with “ni” prefix to extinguish because of saying that “the roots have several meaning” even though it says that vā to show and to go, and the sense of instrumental says “or extinguish by which etc.”.

However, it has said in the Paramatthadīpanī that the instrumental sense is not seen in any sense in nibbāna unlike in the path. For nibbāna is the overcoming by escape among five namely overcoming by temporary, opposite, destruction, tranquilization and escape, therefore the nature of overcoming is certainly possible to be a state of instrumental. It has said in the commentary on Sakkapañhasutta that for nibbāna is that on account of which desire vanishes i.e. perishes, therefore it is destruction of desire.

In the text, “karaṇasādhana” is certainly shown by the clause “that on account of which”. That being so, it is understood that it is to be done in [the analysis of] “nibbāna” too. It is said that “nibbāna” does not have the state of condition which co-operates with the agent of the action of extinguishing the fire of greed etc. Though being so, it should be understood that it [i.e. nibbāna] certainly reaches the state of cause as in examples such as “the sun, having removed the darkness...” etc. in those ways, the speech of that it is not good, is clean up.

10. *Abhidhammattha Anuvibhāvinī, (P. 84)*

Nibbāyanti vā ariyajānā etasminti nibbānaṃ. Nibbanti dhīrā yathayaṃ padīpoti hi vuttaṃ. Nibbāyantīti taṃ taṃ kilesānaṃ vā khandhānaṃ vā puna appaṭisandhikabhāvaṃ pāpuṇantīti attho. Etasminti visaye eva bhumbaṃ. Etasmiṃ adhigateti yojenti. ṭīkāsu pana bhavābhavaṃ vinanato saṃsibbanato vānaṃ vuccati taṇhā. Tato nikkhantanti nibbānanti vuttaṃ. Vibhāvaniyaṃ pana nibbāti vā etena rāgaggiādikoti nibbānantipi vuttaṃ. Taṃ na sundaraṃ. (18).

Na hi maggeviya nibbāne katthacikaraṇasādhanaṃ diṭṭhaṃ. Na ca nibbānaṃ nibbūti kriyāsādhane rāgādikassa kattuno sahakārīpaccayo hotīti. Nibbānaṃ. Nibbāntīti vūpasameti. Saṅkhatadhammānameva nirujjhanaṃ hotīti attho. Asaṅkhatadhammo pana na nirujjhanti. Vijjatiyevāti adhippāyo. Etenāti nibbānena. Rāgaggiādikoti ettha ādisaddena dosamohajātijarāmarāṇaggiādayo tebhūmakapavatte saṅkhatadhamme saṅgaṇhāti.

Mañjusāṭīkāyaṃ pana ādi saddena dosa moha jāti jarā marāṇaggi ādayo saṅgaṇhātīti vuttaṃ. Etena hi karaṇasādhanam dasseti. Abhidhammatthasaṅgahadīpaniyaṃpi evmeva vuttaṃ. Paramatthadīpaniyaṃ pana vibhāvaniyaṃ pana nibbāti etena rāgaggiādikoti nibbānanti vuttaṃ. Taṃ na sundaraṃ. Na hi magge viya katthaci karaṇasādhanam diṭṭhanti.

Na taṃ paccetabbaṃ. Abhidhammatthasaṅgahadīpaniyaṃ karaṇasādhanassa diṭṭhattā. Niratthakabhāvato ca. tato paraṃ yaṃpi na ca nibbūtikriyāsādhane rāgādikassa kattuno sahakārīpaccayo hotīti vuttaṃ. Ettha ca sahakārīpaccayonāma karaṇakārakakattukārakena saha uppajjitvā kriyāsādhane tassa kriyāyakāraṇam vuccati. Iminā lakkhaṇena

sampanno kārako karaṇakāraṅkonāmāti vuttaṃ hoti. Taṃ sabbampi na gahetabbaṃ. Karaṇakāraṅkalakkhaṇassa abhāvato. Sahakārīpaccayo hi sabbudāharaṇesu sabbadā na labbhati. Ekaccesu labbhaati. Na ekaccesu.

Taṃ yathā dattena vihiṃ lunāti. Attho me āvuso cīvarenatyādi. Tesu dattena. ..pa... lunātīti etaṃ sahakārīpaccayaabhāvudāharaṇaṃ.

Tattha dattenāti karaṇakāraṅko purisoti kattukāraṅkarassa shakārīpaccayo hoti. Dattadabbassa kattudabbesu vijjamānattā. Attho ...pa.. cīvarenāti etaṃ sahakārīpaccayaabhāv udāharaṇaṃ. tattha hi atthoti atthiko labhitaṃ icchāmīti attho. Ayañhi kattuvācakakitakriyāsaddo. So asadhātu thapaccayavasena veditabbo. Meti katvatthe vā sampadānatthe vā tatīyācatutthīvacaṇaṃ.

Tesu yadā katvatthe pavattati. Tadā tatīyāvibhattijotakabhāvena. Na vācakabhāvena. Etassa hi vācako yebhuyyavasena pavattati. Tadā catutthīvibhattivācakabhāvena. Evaṃ meti saddassa katvatthasampadānatthavasena duvidhattho veditabbo. Sattasu hi vibhattīsu pathamāvibhattito aññesaṃ vācako yebhuyyavasena pavattati. Jotako appakavasena. Pathamāvibhattiyā pa jotako yebhuyyavasena pavattati. Vācako appakavasena. Evaṃ ekesaṃ vācakajotakabhāvopi veditabbo.

Āvuso ti ālapanatthe nipāto. Cīvarenāti karaṇatthe karaṇavacaṇaṃ. etena karaṇakāraṅkaṃ dasseti. Ettha ca cīvarenāti karaṇakāraṅko. Meti kattukāraṅkassa sahakārīpaccayo na hoti. (cīvarassa meti kattudabbe asaṃvijjamānabhāvato. Cīvarenāti hi vuttepi labhamānavatthiṃ sandhāya vuttaṃ. Na kattudabbe saṃvijjamānavatthiṃ. Cīvaraṃ hi labhamānattā anāgatoyeva. Na paccuppanno. Kattudabbassa hatthena

saṃvijjatīti vuttaṃ hoti. Evaṃ pi cīvarenāti karaṇakārahābhāvena bhagavatā vuttoti daṭṭhabbo.

Tena sahaṅkārahābhāyā karaṇakārahābhāyā na hoti. Karaṇaṃ nāma kriyāhābhāyā kattukārahābhāyā atisāyena bahuhābhāyā karoti. Atha vā kattuhābhāyā bahuhābhāyā mahābhāyā atisāyena labbhati. Kattukārahābhāyā aññesaṃ catunnaṃ kammaṅkārahābhāyā adhihābhāyā vijjati. Taṃ kārahābhāyā karaṇaṃ iti kathitaṃ. Tena vuttaṃ saddatthābhāyā.

Yaṃ kriyāhābhāyā kattu hābhāyā tisāyena taṃ

Kārahābhāyā kattuaññesaṃ adhihābhāyā mudāritanti.

Evaṃ vuttatā sahaṅkārahābhāyā sati vā mā vā paṃānaṃ na hoti. Yathāvuttalābhāyā kriyāhābhāyā karaṇanti daṭṭhabbaṃ. Evaṃ karaṇakārahābhāyā kattuno sahaṅkārahābhāyā appaṃānaṃ karaṇanti taṃ sabbānaṃ paṇṇatābhāyā. Sahaṅkārahābhāyā hi na kārahābhāyā lakkaṇaṃ hoti. Ekantaṃ ekantaṃ kriyāyā karaṇaṃ hoti. Kriyāhābhāyā ca vijjati. Etaṃ kārahābhāyā nāmaṃ vuccati. Vuttaṃ hetāṃ saddatthābhāyā kriyāhābhāyā. Kriyāhābhāyā kārahābhāyā. Evaṃ kriyāyā paṇṇatā bhāyā. Yaṃ hi karaṇakārahābhāyā kattuno kārahābhāyā akārahābhāyā. Evāpi idha paṇṇatā nibbānaṃ rāgāhābhāyā kattuno sakkā paṇṇatā bhāyā.

Vuttaṃ hetāṃ saṃyuttapāhāyā jambukhābhāyā nibbānaṃ nibbānanti āvuso Sāriputta vuccati katamaṃ nu kho nibbānanti. Yo kho āvuso rāgāhābhāyā dosāhābhāyā mohāhābhāyā. Idaṃ vuccati nibbānanti. Tattha rāgāhābhāyā ādayo rāgāhābhāyā khayaṅkārahābhāyā attho. Nibbānanti vuttaṃ hoti. Evaṃ āyasmā sāriputtathero attano bhāyāyā

jambukhādakaparibbājakena puṭṭho rāgādīnaṃ khayakāraṇa-sabhāvadhammaṃ nibbānanti vuccaṭīti visajjitathā nibbānaṃ rāgādikattukārakassa kāraṇanti vattum yujjati.

Saḷāyātanasaṃyuttaatṭhakathāyaṃpi taṇhakkhayapaccayattā taṇhakkhyoti vuttaṃ. Evañca katvā nibbānakriyaṃ abhinipphādetum samatthā rāgādīnaṃ kriyābhinipphādanasattiyeva kattukāraṇaṃ hoti. Nibbānaṃ pana tassa sattiyā bahupakāraṃ katattā baladāyakattāca karaṇanti vuccati. Immatthaṃ sandhāya vuttaṃ ṭīkācariyena nibbāti etena rāgaggiādikoti nibbānanti. Evaṃ yathāvuttavacanena tasmim paramatthadīpaniyaṃ vuttavinicchayo paṭikkhipitabbo. Ayamettha etassa mahākkhalitavādaṃ vā vibhāvaniyā atisundabhāvaṃ vā uddharitvā paṇḍitānaṃ nidassanaṃ. (26)(Abhidhammattha Anuvibhāvinī, P 84)

Alternatively nibbāna is that in which noble people extinguish because it is said the wise extinguish similarly to the example such as the lamp cease. To extinguish is that those defilements and those aggregates reach the state of absence of further-rebirth. This is the meaning. “that in which” is locative in the sense of sphere only. They are connected as in that obtained. However, there had been said in the Sub-commentaries thus “craving (taṇhā) is called the sewing (vāna) as it stitches and fasten to existence and great-existence.

Nibbāna is that which has liberated from that of sewing (vāna). However, it also had been said in the vibhāvinī thus “or “nibbāna” is that by which greed-fire etc., are extinguished”. It is not good. Because instrumental sense cannot be seen in “nibbāna” somewhere else unlike in the path (magga) and “nibbāna” is not a state of condition which co-operates with the agent of greed etc., for the action of extinguishment.

“Nibbāti” is to extinguish. it is cessation of conditioned phenomena. It is meaning. However unconditioned phenomena do not extinguish. It means that they are certainly existing. By that means by nibbāna. Herein, by the word “ādi, etc.,” it collects hatred, ignorance, birth, age, death-fire etc., which are conditioned phenomena in three rounds of existences.

However, it has said in the Mañjūsāṭīkā that it collects hatred, delusion, birth, death-fire etc., by the word “etc.,”. Furthermore, karaṇasādhana is shown by that. It is also said the same way in the Abhidhammatthasaṅgahadīpanī too. It has said in the Paramatthadīpanī that “or “nibbāna” is that by which greed-fire etc., are extinguished”. It is not good because instrumental sense cannot be seen in “nibbāna” somewhere else unlike in the path (magga).

It is not trust-worthy because karaṇasādhana is seen in Abhidhammatthasaṅgahadīpanī and it is a state of useless. Afterward, it has said that it [nibbāna] is not a state of condition which co-operates with the agent of greed etc, for the action of extinguishment. To that regard, “the co-operating condition” is said the cause of the action for the accomplishing the action which arise together with relation of instrumental and agent. It is that the relation [i.e.kāraṇa] which has the features is said karaṇakāraṇa. All that shouldn't be accepted because there is no feature of instrumental. Indeed, the cooperating condition cannot always be founded in all instances. It is founded in some instances and is not in others.

For instance, [a man] cut off paddy by sword. Friend; I am in need of a robe, etc., [lit. there is need for me, friend, by a robe] and so on. In these instances, the instrumental factor expressed by dattena “by sword” is the cooperating condition of the agent factor expressed by “the man”,

because the substance of sword exists in the substances of agent. That “I am in need of a robe” is the example without cooperating condition. Indeed, in the sentence, the word *attho* “[I am] in need” means that being needy, I wish to acquire. Because this [i.e. *attho*] is an action word which is a derivative word which is expressing agent. It is understood on account of “as” root and “tha” suffix. “me: I am in” is third and fourth case ending in sense of agent and dative respectively.

In those cases, when it [that is, the word *me*] functions in the sense of agent, [it does so] by the existence of the third case indicator (*jotaka*), not by the existence of direct expression (*vācaka*).⁴⁰⁷ Because the direct expression of the word “me” generally functions by existence of fourth case direct expression. In this way, twofold meaning of the word “me” is understood as the sense of agent and the sense of dative. Because among seven case, direct expression of all other cases expect first case generally functions. Indicator [of other cases] rarely [functions]. However, the indicator of first case generally functions and the direct expression [of the first case] rarely [functions]. In this way, a state of direct expression and indicator of some case, is also understood.

“*Āvuso*” friend is indeclinable particle in vocative sense. “of a robe or by a robe” is third case in the sense of instrumental. The instrumental relation is shown by that word. In the sentence, by a robe is instrumental relation. The word “me” is not cooperating condition of the relation of agent. Because the robe doesn’t exist in the substance of agent expressed by “me”. Indeed, though it is said “of a robe or by a robe”, it is said with references to intended requisite and not requisite which exist in substance

⁴⁰⁷ For the difference between the technical grammatical terms *jotaka* and *vācaka*, see DSG s.v. *dyotaka*.

of agent. Indeed, the robe is the future because of intended. It is not the present. It is said that the substance of agent exists by the hand. In this way, it is understood that it is said by the Buddha as being instrumental relation expressed by the robe, *cīvarena*.

Therefore, the cooperating condition is not the feature of instrumental relation. Instrumental supports the relation of agent in accomplishing action exceedingly. In other word, it is not found the strong supporting of agent exceedingly. The superiority of other four relations namely relation of object etc., expect the relation of agent exists. The relation is said instrumental. Therefore it is said in *Saddatthabhedacintā* thus. The relation which supports the relation of agent in accomplishing action exceedingly, is said the superiority among the others expect agent.

Because of saying so, it is not measure whether cooperating condition exist or not. It is understood that *Karaṇa*, instrumental is due to a state of power which supports to accomplishing action by the feature that has been said previously. In this way, all that is not accepted because cooperating condition for the agent is not measure of instrumental. Indeed, cooperating condition is not feature of relation. It is surely the cause of action. There is purpose of action. It is said the feature of action. certainly, it is said in the *Saddatthabhedacintā*(63 p 82) that relation “*karaka*” is said that which is the cause of action and surely result in action. In this way, it is the cause of action. Because this instrumental relation is either the cause or not the cause of agent. However, here in this way, this *nibbāna* is also able to be condition or the cause of agent that is greed-fire etc.

Because it is said in the *Jambukhādakasutta* in *Samyuttanikāya* that “Friend *Sāriputta*, it is said, ‘*Nibbāna, Nibbāna.*’ What now is *Nibbāna*?”

“The destruction of lust, the destruction of hatred, the destruction of delusion: this, friend, is called Nibbāna? (connected discourses of the Buddha, bhikkhu bodhi, p. 251) in the Sutta, the destruction of lust etc., means the cause of destruction of lust etc., it is said Nibbāna. In this way, because venerable Sāriputta answers the question asked by his nephew Jambukhādakaparibbājaka that Nibbāna is said the nature of the cause of destruction of lust etc, it should be said that Nibbāna is the instrumental or the cause of the relation of agent that is greed etc.

The commentary on the Saḷāyatanasaṃyutta too, the destruction of craving is said due to the condition to the destruction of craving. By doing so, only the ability to accomplish action, of greed etc., that is able to accomplish extinguishing action, is the relation of agent. However, Nibbāna is said instrumental because it supports and gives strength to the ability. By referring to this meaning, Sub-commentator has said Nibbāna is that by which greed-fire etc., are extinguished. In this way, according to the speech that has said previously, the judgment in the paramatthadīpanī is rejected. This is here the show to the wise having pick up the big fault opinion of the Paramatthadīpanī and the excellent opinion of Vibhāvinī.

11. Ming Khing Tikākyaw Ganthithit (P. 30)

နိဗ္ဗာတိ ဝါ ဧတေန ရာဂိအာဒိကောတိ နိဗ္ဗာနံ ဟူ၍ ဝစနတ္ထပြုရာ၌ ဝါ တနည်းကား ဧတေန ထိုအသင်္ခတဓမ္မဖြင့်၊ ရာဂိအာဒိကော၊ ရာဂအစရှိသော မီးသည်၊ နိဗ္ဗာတိ၊ ငြိမ်းတတ်၏။ ဣတိတသ္မာ၊ ထို့ကြောင့်၊ သော ထိုအသင်္ခတဓမ္မသည်၊ နိဗ္ဗာနံ၊ နိဗ္ဗာန်မည်၏။ ဧတေန ဟူသော ကရိုဏ်းဖြင့် အသင်္ခတနိဗ္ဗာန်သည် ရာဂအစရှိကုန်သောမီးတို့၏ ငြိမ်းခြင်းဟူသော ကြိယာကို ပြီးစေရာ၌ ရာဂ စသော ကိလေသာတို့နှင့် သဟကာရီ ကာရက မဖြစ်သော်လည်း အသင်္ခတနိဗ္ဗာန်၏ ထိုရာဂ

အစရှိကုန်သော ကိလေသာတို့၏ ငြိမ်းခြင်းကြိယာကို အထူးအားဖြင့် ပြီးစီးစေနိုင်သော ကြိယာ သာဓကတမ သတ္တိရှိသည်၏ အဖြစ်ကိုပြသည်။ ကတ္တားနှင့် သဟကာရီ ကာရက ဖြစ်မှသာလျှင် ကရိုဏ်းဖြစ်သည်ဟု မုချမမှတ်အပ်။ ထိုစကားသည်မှန်၏။ ကရိုဏ်းဟူသည် အဘာဝပညတ္တိ ကရိုဏ်း၊ အဘိန္ဒကရိုဏ်း၊ သဟကာရီကာရက ကရိုဏ်း၊ သာဓကတမကရိုဏ်း၊ ပရိပုဏ္ဏကရိုဏ်း ဟူ၍ ငါးပါးအပြားရှိ၏။ ထိုငါးပါးတို့တွင် ကတ္တားနှင့် သဟကာရီ ကာရကလည်းမဖြစ်၊ ကြိယာကိုလည်း မပြီးစေတတ်၊ အဘာဝအတ္တ ပညတ်မှုသာဖြစ်သော ကရိုဏ်းသည် အဘာဝပညတ္တိကရိုဏ်းမည်၏။

ကြိယာနှင့်အရမပြားသောကရိုဏ်းသည် အဘိန္ဒကရိုဏ်းမည်၏။ ကတ္တားနှင့် သဟကာရီ ကာရကသာဖြစ်၍ ကြိယာကို မပြီးစေနိုင်သော ကရိုဏ်းသည် သဟကာရီ ကာရက ကရိုဏ်းမည်၏။

ကတ္တားနှင့် သဟကာရီကာရကမဖြစ်မူ၍ ကြိယာကိုသာလျှင် အထူးအားဖြင့် ပြီးစေနိုင်သော ကရိုဏ်းသည် သာဓကတမကရိုဏ်းမည်၏။

ကတ္တားနှင့် သဟကာရီကာရကလည်းဖြစ်၍ ကြိယာကိုလည်း အထူး အားဖြင့် ပြီးစေနိုင်သော ကရိုဏ်းသည် ပရိပုဏ္ဏကရိုဏ်းမည်၏။

ဘဂဝါ သုဇာတာယ ဒိန္နံ ပိဏ္ဏပါတံ ပရိဘုဒ္ဓိတွာ သဥပါဒိသေသာယ နိဗ္ဗာနဓာတုယာ ပရိနိဗ္ဗုတော။ ဥဒါန်းပါဠိတော်။ ကိလေသပရိနိဗ္ဗာနေန ပရိနိဗ္ဗုတော။ (ဣတိပုတ် အဋ္ဌကထာ)

သ ဥပါဒိသေသနိဗ္ဗာနပတ္တိယာ ကိလေသဒုက္ခေန နိဒုက္ခတာ။ (မဇ္ဈိမပဏ္ဏာသဋီကာ) ဤပါဠိတော် အဋ္ဌကထာဋီကာတို့၌ ကရိုဏ်းတို့သည် အရဟတ္တမဂ်ခဏ၌ ကိလေသာတို့၏ ချုပ်ငြိမ်းပြတ်ကင်းမရှိခြင်း အဘာဝ အတ္တပညတ်မှုသာ ဖြစ်၍ အဘာဝ ပညတ္တိကရိုဏ်းတို့တည်း။ ကြိယာတို့ ၏ အရလည်း ထိုကိလေသာတို့၏ ချုပ်ငြိမ်းပြတ်ကင်းမရှိခြင်း အဘာဝ ပညတ်ပင် ဖြစ်သောကြောင့် ကရိုဏ်းတို့၏အရသည် အထူးအပြား မရှိရကား အဘိန္ဒကရိုဏ်းဟူ၍လည်းဆိုအပ်၏။

သင်္ခါရဒုက္ခတာယ ပန လောကော အနုပါဒိသေသာယ နိဗ္ဗာနဓာတုယာ မုစ္စတိ။ နေတ္တိပါဠိတော်။ ခန္ဓပရိနိဗ္ဗာနေနစ ပရိနိဗ္ဗုတော။ ဣတိပုတ် အဋ္ဌကထာ။ အနုပါဒိသေသနိဗ္ဗာနပတ္တိယာ ဝိပါကဒုက္ခေန နိဒုက္ခတာ။ မဇ္ဈိမပဏ္ဏာသဋီကာ။

ဤလည်း ကရိုက်တို့သည် ဘုရား ရဟန္တာတို့၏ စုတိနောက်နှိုက် ခန္ဓာတို့၏ ချုပ်ငြိမ်းပြတ်ကင်းမဖြစ်မပေါ်ခြင်း အဘာဝအတ္တပညတ်မျှသာဖြစ်၍ အဘာဝပညတ္တိ ကရိုက်တို့ပင်တည်း။ ကြိယာသည်လည်း ကရိုက်၏အရပင် ဖြစ်သောကြောင့် အဘိန္ဒကရိုက်ဟူ၍လည်း ဆိုအပ်၏။

ထိုအဘာဝပညတ္တိကရိုက်တို့သည် ကြိယာကိုမပြီးစေနိုင်သောကြောင့် ကရိုက်စစ် မဟုတ်ကုန်ရကား ဣတ္ထံ ဘူတလက္ခဏတ္ထံ တတိယာဂိဘတ်ကို စီရင်အပ်၏။

တာယ အနုပါဒိသေသာယ နိဗ္ဗာနဓာတုယာ ဣတ္ထံ ဘူတလက္ခဏေ စာယံ ကရဏနိဒ္ဒေသော။ နိဗ္ဗာနဓာတူတိစ နိဗ္ဗာယနမတ္ထံ။ နေတ္ထိ အဋ္ဌကထာ။

နိဗ္ဗာနဓာတူတိစ နိဗ္ဗာယနမတ္ထံ၊ န အသင်္ခတဓာတု။ နေတ္ထိဂိဘာဂိနိတို့ကို ထောက်။

စုန္ဒေန ဒိန္နံ ပရိဘုဉ္ဇိတွာ အနုပါဒိသေသာယ နိဗ္ဗာနဓာတုယာ ပရိနိဗ္ဗူတော။ ဥဒါန်းပါဠိတော်။

သဗ္ဗေဟိ သညိနော သတ္တာ ဘဂံစိတ္တေ ဌိတော ဘဂံပရိယောသာနေန စုတိစိတ္တေန ကာလံ ကရောန္တိ။ (ကထာဝတ္ထု အဋ္ဌကထာ။)

ဤပါဠိတော် အဋ္ဌကထာတို့၌ ကရိုက်တို့၏အရသည် စုတိစိတ်၊ ကြိယာတို့၏အရလည်း စုတိစိတ်ပင်ဖြစ်သောကြောင့် ကရိုက် ကြိယာ တို့သည် အရမပြားကြရကား ထိုကရိုက်တို့သည် အဘိန္ဒ ကရိုက်တို့တည်း။

ထိုအဘိန္ဒကရိုက်တို့သည် ကြိယာကိုမပြီးစေနိုင်သောကြောင့် ကရိုက်အစစ် မဟုတ်ပြန်ရကား ဝိသေသနတ္ထံ တတိယာဂိဘတ်ကို စီရင်အပ်၏။

အနုပါဒိသေသာယ နိဗ္ဗာနဓာတုယာ ပရိနိဗ္ဗာယီတိ ပရိနိဗ္ဗာနမေဝ ပရိနိဗ္ဗာနဿ ပရိနိဗ္ဗာနန္တရတော ဝိသေသနတ္ထံ ကရဏဘာဝေန ပုတ္တံ။ ကထာဝတ္ထု မူလဋီကာ။

ပရိနိဗ္ဗာနမေဝ (လ) ပုတ္တံ အဘိန္ဒဘာဝံပိ အတ္ထံ တဒညဓမ္မတော ဝိသေသောဝ ဗောနေတ္ထံ အညံဝိယ ကတွာ ဝေါဟရန္တိ။ ယထာ အတ္တနော သဘာဝံ ဓာရေန္တိတိ ဓမ္မာတိ။ ။ အနဋီကာ။

အနုပါဒိသေသာယ နိဗ္ဗာနဓာတုယာ ပရိနိဗ္ဗာယီတိ ဟူသည်ကား။ ပရိနိဗ္ဗာနမေဝ စုတိ ပရိနိဗ္ဗာန်ကိုပင်လျှင်။ ပရိနိဗ္ဗာနဿ။ စုတိပရိနိဗ္ဗာန်၏။ ပရိဗ္ဗာန နှစ်ရတော၊

တပါးသောကိလေသပရိနိဗ္ဗာန်မှ။ ဂိသေသနတ္ထံ၊ အထူးပြုခြင်းအကျိုးငှာ။ ကရုဏာဘာဝေန၊
ကရိုဏ်း၏အဖြစ်ဖြင့်။ ပုတ္တံ၊ အဋ္ဌကထာဆရာတို့ဆိုအပ်၏။ (မူလဋီကာအနက်)

ပရိနိဗ္ဗာနမေဝ။လ။ ပုတ္တံ။ ပရိနိဗ္ဗာနမေဝ။လ။ပုတ္တံ။ ဟူသောစကားကို။
အဘိန္ဒဘာဝံပိ၊ ကြိယာနှင့်မပြားသည်လည်းဖြစ်သော။ ဝါ၊ ကြိယာနှင့်
အရတူသည်လည်းဖြစ်သော။ တံအတ္ထံ၊ ထိုကရိုဏ်းအနက်ကို။ အညဗေတော၊
တပါးသော ကိလေသပရိနိဗ္ဗာနဓမ္မမှ။ ဂိသေသော၊ ဇောနေတ္ထံ၊
အထူးကိုသိစေခြင်းအကျိုးငှာ။ အညံဝိယ၊ ကြိယာမှ တပါးတခြားကိုကဲ့သို့။
ကတွာ၊ ပြု၍။ ဝေါဟရန္တိ၊ ခေါ်ဆိုကုန်၏။ အတ္တနော သဘာဝံ ဓာရေန္တိတိ ဓမ္မာ ယထာ၊
အတ္တနော သဘာဝံ ဓာရေန္တိတိ ဓမ္မာ ဟူသကဲ့သို့တည်း။ (အနုဋီကာအနက်)

ဤမူလဋီကာ၊ အနုဋီကာတို့ကိုထောက်၍ အဘိန္ဒကရိုဏ်း၌ တတိယာ ဝိဘတ်ကို
ဂိသေသနတ္ထံ၌ စီရင်အပ်၏။

ဦးန ပဉ္စ ဗန္ဓနေန ပတ္တေန အညံ နဝံ ပတ္တံ စေတာပေယျ။ ဟူရာနိက် ပတ္တေန ဟူသော
ကရိုဏ်းသည်။ ဘိက္ခုဟူသော ကတ္တားနှင့် သဟကာရီ ကာရုဏာသာဖြစ်၍ စေတာပန
ကြိယာကို စင်စစ်မပြီးစေနိုင်သောကြောင့်။ သဟကာရီ ကာရုဏ ကရိုဏ်းတည်း။
ထိုသဟကာရီ ကာရုဏ ကရိုဏ်း၌ တတိယာဝိဘတ်ကို ဣတ္ထံ ဘူတလက္ခဏတ္ထံ၌
စီရင်အပ်၏။

ကုသလံ ပရိယောသာနေစ အမတာယ ဓာတုယာ ပရိနိဗ္ဗာန ပစ္စယောတိ။
(မူလပဏ္ဏာသ အဋ္ဌကထာ)

အနုပါဒိသေသာယ နိဗ္ဗာနဓာတုယာ ပရိနိဗ္ဗာယီတိ။ (ကထာဝတ္ထု အဋ္ဌကထာ)

ယာယ ဝါ အဓိကတာယ ပစ္စိမံစိတ္တံ အပဋိသန္ဓိကံဇာတံ။ သာ တဿ
အပဋိသန္ဓိကပူပသမဿ ကရုဏာဘာဝေန ပုတ္တာ။ (ကထာဝတ္ထုမူလဋီကာ)

သာတိ အသံတဓာတု ကရုဏာဘာဝေန ပုတ္တာ ယထာပုတ္တဿ ဥပသမဿ
သာကေတမဘာဝံ သန္ဓာယ။ (အနုဋီကာ)

ကုသလံ၊ ဉာဏသမ္ပယုတ်ကုသိုလ်သည်။ ပရိယောသာနေစ၊ အဆုံး၌လည်း။ အပတာယဓာတုယာ၊ အသင်္ခတအမြိုက်နိဗ္ဗာန်ဖြင့်။ ပရိနိဗ္ဗာနပစ္စယော၊ စုတိ ပရိနိဗ္ဗာန်၏အကြောင်းသည်။ ဟောတိ၊၏။ (မူလပဏ္ဏာသ အဋ္ဌကထာအနက်)

အနုပါဒိသေသာယ နိဗ္ဗာနဓာတုယာ၊ အနုပါဒိသေသမည်သော အသင်္ခတနိဗ္ဗာန ဓာတ်ဖြင့်။ ပရိနိဗ္ဗာယံ၊ စုတိ ပရိနိဗ္ဗာန်ပြု၏။ (ကထာဝတ္ထု-အဋ္ဌကထာအနက်)

ဝါ၊ တနည်းကား။ ယာယ၊ အကြင်အသင်္ခတဓာတ်ကို။ အဓိဂတာယ၊ မဂ်ဉာဏ် ဖိုလ်ဉာဏ်တို့ဖြင့် သိအပ် ရအပ်သည်ရှိသော်။ ပစ္စိမစိတ္တံ၊ စုတိစိတ်သည်။ အပဋိသန္ဓိကံ၊ ဘဝတပါးနှင့် စပ်ခြင်းမရှိသည်။ ဇာတံ၊ ဖြစ်၏။ သာ အသင်္ခတဓာတု၊ ထို အသင်္ခတဓာတ်ကို။ တဿ အပဋိသန္ဓိက ပူပသမဿ၊ ထိုစုတိစိတ်၏ဘဝတစ်ပါးဖြင့် မစပ်မှု၍ ချုပ်ငြိမ်းခြင်း၏။ ကရဏဘာဝေန၊ ကရိုက်၏အဖြစ်ဖြင့်။ ပုတ္တာ၊ အဋ္ဌကထာဆိုအပ်၏။ (မူလဋီကာအနက်)

သာတိ၊ ဟူသည်ကား။ အသင်္ခတဓာတု၊ အသင်္ခတဓာတ်ကို။ ယထာပုတ္တဿ၊ အကြင်ဆိုအပ်သော နောက်ဆုံးဖြစ်သောစုတိစိတ်၏။ ဥပသမဿ၊ ဘဝတပါးနှင့် မစပ်မှု၍ ချုပ်ငြိမ်းခြင်းကို။ သာဓကတမဘာဝံ၊ အထူးအားဖြင့် ပြီးစေနိုင်သည်၏အဖြစ်ကို။ သန္ဓာယ၊ ရည်၍။ ကရဏဘာဝေန၊ ကရိုက်၏အဖြစ်ဖြင့်။ ပုတ္တာ၊ မူလဋီကာဆရာဆိုအပ်၏။ (အနုဋီကာအနက်)

ဤအဋ္ဌကထာဋီကာတို့နိုက် အသင်္ခတဓာတ်ဟူသောကရိုက်သည် စုတိ စိတ်ဟူသော ကတ္တာနှင့် သဟကာရီကာရမဖြစ်သော်လည်း။ အပဋိသန္ဓိက ပူပသမ ကြိယာကို သာဓကတမသတ္တိဖြင့်။ အထူးပြီး စေတတ်သောကြောင့် သာဓကတမကရိုက်တည်း။

ထိုသာဓကတမကရိုက်၌ တတိယာဂိဘတ်ကို ကရဏတ္ထ၌ သာလျှင် စီရင်အပ်၏။

စက္ခုနာ ရူပံ ပဿတိ။ အစရှိသည်၌ ကရိုက်သည် ကတ္တာနှင့်သဟကာရီကာရဏလည်းဖြစ်။ ကြိယာကိုလည်း အထူးအားဖြင့် ပြီးစေ တတ်သော အင်္ဂါနှစ်ပါးပြည့်စုံရကား ပရိပုဏ္ဏကရိုက်တည်း။ ထိုပရိပုဏ္ဏ ကရိုက်၌တတိယာဂိဘတ်ကိုလည်း ကရဏတ္ထ၌သာလျှင်စီရင်အပ်၏။

ဤပါဠိ အဋ္ဌကထာ ဋီကာတို့ကို ထောံသဖြင့် ကတ္တာနှင့် သဟကာရီကာရဏဖြစ်မှသာလျှင် ကရိုက်ဖြစ်နိုင်သည်ဟု ဧကန်မှချ မယူအပ်။

greed-fire etc.; one should not consider that the state of instrumental takes place only when it becomes a cooperating condition with the agent.

It is true. Instrumental is fivefold namely: *abhāvapaññattikaraṇa*: instrumental of concept of absence, *abhinnakaraṇa*: integral instrumental, *sahakārikāraṇakaraṇa*: instrumental of cooperating condition, *sādhakatamakaraṇa*: most efficient instrumental, *paripuṇṇakaraṇā*: complete instrumental.

Among those five, the instrumental that is neither cooperating condition with agent nor with accomplishing action, is called *abhāvapaññattikaraṇa* which is simply instrumental of concept of absence.

That instrumental which is not different from the action is called integral instrumental. That instrumental which is only a cooperating condition with the agent but is unable to accomplish the action is called instrumental of cooperating condition.

That instrumental which is not a cooperating condition with the agent but is most able to accomplish the action is called most efficient instrumental.

That instrumental which is a cooperating condition with the agent and also most able to accomplish action is called complete instrumental.

Bhagavā sujātāya dinnam piṇḍapātaṃ paribhuñjitvā saupādisesāya nibbānadhātuyā parinibbuto. (udānapāḷi)

The Bhagavan, after eating the alms food given by Sujātā, was fully extinguished through the nibbāna element with remainder.

Kilesaparinibbānena parinibbūto. (itivuttaka aṭṭhakathā)

Fully extinguished through the extinction of the defilements.

Saupādisesanibbānapattiyā kilesadukkhena nidukkhatā. (majjhima-panṇāsaṭṭikā)

The absence of suffering caused by the defilements through reaching extinction with remainder.

In these texts of the canon, the commentary and the sub-commentary, these are instrumentals of concept of absence, because they simply express a concept of absence, that is to say cessation, dissolution, disappearance of defilements at the moment of [entering the] path of the Arahāt.

It is also said integral instrumental, because the action of the instrumental is not different from the action of the verb, which expresses the concept of absence, that is to say cessation, dissolution, disappearance of the defilements.

Saṅkhāradukkhātāya pana loko anupādisesāya nibbānadhātuyā muccati. (nettipāḷi)

The world, however, is liberated from the suffering of formations through the nibbāna element without reminder.

Khandhaparinibbānena ca parinibbuto. (itivuttaka aṭṭhakathā)

Fully extinguished through the full extinction of the aggregates.

Anupādisesanibbānapattiyā vipākadukkhena nidukkhatā. (majjhima-panṇāsaṭṭikā)

The absence of suffering caused by resulting suffering through reaching the extinction without reminder.

In these texts too, the instrumentals are of concept of absence due to merely being concept of absence that is cessation, extinction, no-more arising of aggregates of the Buddha and Arahants once passing away.

It is also called integral instrumental because the action is also not different from the instrumental. (*The action is nothing but the instrumental*

That instrumental which is not different from the action is called integral instrumental.)

Third case is used in sense of an indication of [someone or something being in]

¹ this or that state or condition because these instrumentals of concept of absence are not real instrumentals i.e. they are unable to accomplish action.

(Tathā vipariṇāmadukkhātāya. Taṃ kissa hetu? Honti loke appābādhāpi dīghāyukāpi. Saṅkhāradukkhātāya pana loko anupādisesāya nibbānadhātuyā muccati, tasmā saṅkhāradukkhātā dukkhaṃ lokassāti katvā dukkhamassa mahabbhayanti. Tena ca catutthassa padassa visajjanā yuttā. Tenāha bhagavā “avijjāya nivuto loko”ti. Netti pali P 65)

Tāya anupādisesāya nibbānadhātuyā, itthaṃbhūtalakkhaṇe cāyaṃ karaṇaniddeso. Nibbānadhātūti ca nibbāyanamattaṃ. (Netti aṭṭhakathā)

By that Nibbāna element without remainder: it is showing instrumental in the sense of an indication of [someone or something being

¹ Studies in Pāli grammarians II.1 Pāli text society Vol XIV. P. 180.

in] this or that state or condition. Nibbāna element also means merely extinguishment.

Nibbānadhātūti ca nibbāyanamattaṃ. Na asaṅkhatadhātu.
(*Nettivibhāvinī*)

The nibbāna element also means merely extinguishment, not the element of unconditioned.

Cundena dinnam paribhuñjitvā anupādisesāya nibbānadhātuyā parinibbūto. (*Udānapāḷi*)

(the Buddha), after eating the alms food given by Cunda, was fully extinguished through the nibbāna element without remainder.

Sabbe hi saññino sattā bhavaṅgacitte ÷hitvā bhavaṅgapariyosānena cuticittena kālam karonti. (*Kathāvatthu aṭṭhakathā, MyP 279*).

All beings of concepts, existing on life-continuum consciousness, pass away by dead consciousness which is the end of life-continuum consciousness.

In these texts of the canon, the commentary, the instrumentals are integral instrumentals because the core of instrumental and the core of the verb are not different i.e. the core of instrumental is dead consciousness and the core of the verb is also dead consciousness.

The third case is used in sense of adjective because it is not real instrumental that is to say; the integral instrumentals are unable to accomplish the action.

Anupādisesāya nibbānadhātuyā parinibbāyīti parinibbānameva parinibbānassa parinibbānantarato visesanatthaṃ karaṇabhāvena vuttaṃ. (Kathāvatthumūlaṭṭikā)

Anupādisesāya nibbānadhātuyā parinibbāyīti [means] *Anupādisesāya nibbānadhātuyā parinibbāyīti* is, *parinibbānameva* [means] only to the cuti-parinibbāna, *parinibbānassa* [means] of the cuti-parinibbāna, *parinibbānantarato* [means] from other kilesa-parinibbāna, *visesanatthaṃ* [means] in order to distinguish, *karaṇabhāvena* [means] on account of instrumental, *vuttaṃ* [means] is said by the Commentators. (Mūlaṭṭikā, word by word translation).

Parinibbānameva ...la.... Vuttaṃ abhinnabhāvampi atthaṃ tadaññadhammato visesova bodhanatthaṃ aññaṃviya katvā voharanti. Yathā attano sabhāvaṃ dhārentīti dhammāti. (anuṭṭikā)

Parinibbānameva ...la... vuttaṃ [means] the word “*parinibbānameva...la... vuttaṃ*, *abhinnabhāvampi* [means] the state which is not different from the verb, on other word , the state which has the same core with the verb, *taṃ atthaṃ* [means] to the sense of instrumental, *aññadhammato* [means] from the other kilesa-parinibbānadhamma, *visesova bodhanatthaṃ* [means] in order to know the distinguish, *aññaṃviya* [means] as that what is likely something else apart from the verb, *katvā* [means] having done, *voharanti* [means] say, *attano sabhāvaṃ dhārentīti dhammā yathā* [means] it is similar to example such as *attano sabhāvaṃ dhārentīti dhammā*. (Anuṭṭikā, word by word translation.)

According to these Mūlaṭṭikā and Anuṭṭikā, third case is used in the sense of adjective that is to say in the integral instrumental.

In the text “Īnapañcabhandhanena pattena aññaṃ navañ pattam cetāpeyya ([a monk] should ask another new bowl by a bowl which has less than five bondages)”, the instrumental expressed by “pattena” is “sahakārīkāraṇa karaṇa” because it is only cooperating condition with agent expressed by “bhikkhu” and it doesn’t accomplish the action of asking.

The third case is used in sense of in the sense of an indication of [someone or something being in] this or that state or condition that is to say in the integral instrumental.

Kusalaṃ pariyosāne ca amatāya dhātuyā parinibbānapaccayoti. (Mūlapañṇāsaattḥakathā).

Kasalaṃ [means] wholesome accompanied by knowledge, pariyosāne ca [means] in the end too, amatāya dhātuyā: by the element of immortal, unconditioned, parinibbānapaccayo: the condition to Cutiparinibbāna, hoti: it is. (Mūlapañṇāsa ṭ,)

Anupādisesāya nibbānadhātuyā parinibbāyīti. (Kathāvatthu attḥakathā) Anupādisesāya nibbānadhātuya: by the element of nibbāna, unconditioned without reminder, parinibbāyi: fully extinguished that is to say cuti-parinibbāna. (Kathāvatthu, ṭ)

Yāya vā adhikatāya pacchimaṃ cittaṃ apaṭisandhikaṃ jātaṃ. Sā tassa apaṭisandhikavūpasamassa karaṇabhāvena vuttā. (Kathāvatthumūlaṭṭik)

Vā [means] alternatively, yāya [means] to that element of unconditioned, adhigatāya [means] in case of obtaining by the wisdom of path and fruit, pacchimacittaṃ [means] the dead consciousness,

apaṭisandhikaṃ [means] not linking with another life, jātaṃ [means] it is, sā asaṅkhatadhātu [means] to the element of unconditioned, tassa apaṭisandhika-vūpasamassa [means] for the extinguishment of the dead consciousness on account of unlinking with another life, karaṇabhāvena [means] on account of instrumental, vuttā: it is said by the commentators. (mūlaṭīkā trl)

Sāti asaṅkhatadhātu karaṇabhāvena vuttā yathāvuttassa upasamassa sādhakatamabhāvaṃ sandhāya. (Anuṭīkā)

Sāti [means] sā is, asaṅkhatadhātu [means] to the element of unconditioned, yathāvuttassa [means] of the dead consciousness which is the last and has been said already, upasamassa [means] to the extinguishment by means of unlinking with another life, sādhakatamabhāvaṃ [means] to the state of supporting exceedingly, sandhāya [means] having referred, karaṇabhāvena [means] by way of instrumental, vuttā: it is said by Mūlaṭīkā commentator. (Anuṭīkā)

In these commentaries and Sub-commentaries, the instrumental of unconditioned element is “sādakatama” most efficient instrumental because, although not being cooperating condition with agent of dead consciousness, it is supporting exceedingly the action of extinguishment that is no more-rebirth by most efficient power.

The third case is used in sense of instrumental that is to say in the most efficient instrumental.

In the example such as “cakkhunā rūpaṃ passati” [a man] see a tangible object by the eyes” etc., the instrumental is “paripuṇṇakaraṇa”

complete instrumental because it is complete with two factors, namely cooperating with agent and being able to accomplish action.

The third case is used in the sense of instrumental that is to say in the complete instrumental.

According to these Commentary and Sub-commentary, it could not be noted certainly that instrumental is to be so only in case of cooperating with agent.

It should not be understood that unconditioned nibbāna is able to extinguish only the suffering result, aggregate, dead consciousness of Arahant, but not other suffering by the power of supporting action. It should be understood that it is able to extinguish all action of extinguishment of suffering in round birth by the power of supporting action.

Therefore, it should be surly understood that the second definition as “etena vā” in the Vibhāvinī is said with reference to having power of accomplishing extinguishment action of unconditioned nibbāna as in the commentary of Mūlapaṇṇāsa, Kathāvatthu and their Sub-commentaries.

Therefore, new sub-commentary which rejects saying “vibhāvanīyaṃ pana...pa... hotīti is simply unawareness of the different type of instrumental and the statements of commentaries and sub-commentaries.

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